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SOLDIER'S GUIDE TO

INDONESIA

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FOREWORD

Duty in any foreign country almost immediately raises no end of questions. Actually where is the country situated? What types of people live there? What are their particular likes and dislikes, if any. What are the cultural and scenic attractions and opportunities for troop recreation? These are but a few.

This booklet outlines basic facts concerning Indonesia. It should be helpful to you 'in getting off on the right foot' with the people of Indonesia. Reading it will give you a better understanding of this very interesting country and its inhabitants.

Keep constantly in your mind the thought that you are a representative of Uncle Sam abroad. As such, what you say and how you act has a very great influence on what the Indonesian thinks about the United States. In many instances, contact with U.S. personnel is the only evidence people of a foreign nation have when they form an opinion of what the U.S. is like and, in particular, what our attitude is toward their country.

The material here may prove beneficial in increasing your appreciation of the Indonesian way of life and of further cementing the ties which bind our two nations in trust and friendship.

LOCATION OF INDONESIA

TOPOGRAPHICAL FEATURES

Location and Area

The Republic of Indonesia consists of a group of several hundred islands situated between continental Southeast Asia and Australia. This island chain which extends 3,000 miles from east to west and over 1,000 miles from north to south touches the Asian mainland at Malaya on the east and the Philippines on the north. The total land area is 735,000 square miles, almost one-third the size of the United States.

The main islands include Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and Celebes.

Djakarta, the political and commercial center of Indonesia is located on Java as is Surabaja, one of the finer naval anchorages in the Far East.

Terrain

A chain of mountains stretches from northern Sumatra to the easternmost islands of Indonesia. From Sumatra eastward they decrease in height. Another range of mountains which sweeps down from the north through the Philippines into eastern Indonesia, crosses the first chain. Sumatra and Java have mountain belts which run in an east-west direction.

Borneo has no well-drained lowlands and the Celebes has no deltas formed by rivers. Otherwise, all the islands have equatorial lowlands, criss-crossed by rivers, forming deltas, marshy coastal plains, and alluvial plains. Usually the plains are separated from the mountains by rugged hilly country. Borneo, the largest of the islands, has by far the largest lowland plain, although more than one-half of Sumatra is covered by lowlands.

Climate

The climate is characterized by constant high temperature, heavy rainfall and high relative humidity.

The average temperature in the islands of Indonesia is approximately 80° F. High humidity, usually 85 to 90 per cent, makes the heat extremely uncomfortable. Temperatures vary with the elevation of the land.

Annual weather changes are slight, and the seasons vary mainly in the amount of rainfall. The wettest months, during the northwest monsoon period, are December to February, with an average of one rainy day every three days. The driest months are during the southeast monsoon period, which lasts from July to October, with about one rainy day in six. May and October are the warmest months while January and February are the coolest.

With no definite seasons, the northwest and southeast monsoons determine the changes in weather. During the northwest monsoon, weather often changes to storms without warning. These periods of storm may persist from eight to 14 days.

Strong winds are rare, but thunderstorms are frequent during the northwest monsoon. Strong squalls in July and August known as 'Sumatras' occur in the Strait of Malacca. The extremely violent winds known as typhoons do not occur south of 10° latitude; therefore none strike Indonesia.

Vegetation

Indonesia's equatorial climate is favorable to dense forests. Natural vegetation, however, has been strongly affected by the activities of

Indonesians. As the population grows more dense, vegetation is thinned out. Forests still cover about 70 per cent of the surface of northern and northeastern Sumatra, southern Borneo, central Celebes and the Molluccas.

Coastal forests of mangrove, mipa palms and sago palms are common to the shores of all islands. Equatorial rain forests, modified by the activities of the people, cover most of the lowlands. Brushy grasslands cover areas in central Sumatra and especially southwestern Celebes. Above the elevation of 2,000 feet, the forests of Indonesia become sub-tropical in appearance, with oaks, pines, fern and the like. Extensive teak forests cover the northern hills of Central and East Java. Coconut trees are a familiar sight in most of Indonesia below 2,300 feet, but their greatest concentration is in the northeastern islands, especially Celebes.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

History

Numerous and diverse peoples have flowed into the archipelago of Indonesia from mainland Asia. The last great migration of Asian peoples into Indonesia was that of the Malays, who today constitute the dominant populations of Sumatra, Java, Madura, Bali and coastal Borneo. The Malays were a fishing, sailing, rice-producing people, who differed mainly from the people who came before them in their ability to grow rice on flooded fields.

European adventurers and merchants became interested in Indonesia chiefly because of the rich supply of spices found mainly in Java and Sumatra. The Dutch were finally able to monopolize this highly profitable trade and established a commercial empire which flourished until modern times. The greed of the Dutch, however, proved their undoing and planted the seeds for an Indonesian desire for independence which was finally obtained in August 1950. Sukarno, a nationalist leader and present President, emerged as head of the newly established Republic.

Government

The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia begins by defining Indonesia as a constitutional democracy. It provides for a form of government, headed by a president, and based on the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

The powers of the president, as outlined by the Constitution, are very similar to those of a typical Western European president. His powers are limited to such matters as forming ministries, forwarding draft legislation to the House

of Representatives, issuing decrees and pardons, appointing ambassadors, and serving as the Supreme Commander of the Indonesia Armed Forces. He has a council of ministers who inform him on all matters of importance.

The powers of the Indonesian House of Representatives are those common to any legislative branch. While both the House and the cabinet may initiate legislation, with the House alone lies the power of final action. Most important of all the controls possessed by the House over the executive branch is its power to pass a vote of no-confidence in the government, and thus force its resignation.

The Supreme Court of the Republic exercises supersession over the lower courts and, in certain instances, serves as a court of appeal.

Population

Indonesia's present population of about 85 million equals the combined total of the rest of Southeast Asia. The small island of Java accounts for more than two-thirds of the total population. Java's average of almost 1,100 persons per square mile is one of the highest in the world.

The peoples of Indonesia are basically of Malay stock, strongly influenced by Mongoloid and/or Indian characteristics. There are an estimated 190 separate and distinct tribes, each with its own customs, beliefs and traditions. Some 75 Indonesian languages and numerous dialects are spoken. The official Indonesian language has been created by adding numerous words of Javanese, French, Dutch and English to the basic Malay. The second official language is English, although most of the better educated

Indonesians feel more at ease speaking Dutch.

Indonesians are generally calm, dignified, sensitive and polite. Although cooperative, they do things at a slower pace than we Occidentals.

The Chinese, the principal minority group, comprise about 3% of the population.

Within the routine of daily affairs--in the rice fields, the village market, in city and town--, the people primarily identify themselves as ethnic groups: 'I am a Javanese' or 'I am a Sundanese'. There are ten groups, such as Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, and others, who share a common identity and cultural tradition in addition to a common language. It is fairly certain that the 'average' educated Indonesian living in Djakarta, the capital of Indonesia, would know these groups. For the foreigner, however, making distinctions between groups is very difficult.

There are some readily observable characteristics for identifying some of the groups mentioned above. In their native dress, the Javanese prefer darker colors such as brown, black and dark green, while the Sudanese prefer brighter colors. The Madurese and people from eastern Indonesia have a darker skin than the average Indonesian; the Sundanese have a stockier build and a lighter complexion than the Javanese. Each group has its own foods, musical styles and forms of artistic expression.

Despite intensive educational efforts on the part of the government, a great many Indonesians are still illiterate. Rural natives receive news and rumors by word-of-mouth. The village chiefs are the chief source of such information.

The health status of the Indonesian people is generally unsatisfactory. Sanitation is primitive, with the vast majority of natives going to the river, stream, drainage ditch, or irrigation canal to bathe, obtain water for cooking, launder or dispose of human waste. Medical facilities are grossly inadequate with the life expectancy considered to be about 32 years.

Of the many diseases encountered, the following are the most important: malaria, dysentery, typhoid fever, venereal disease, typhus, dengue fever, fungus infections of the skin, pneumonia, influenza, tuberculosis, rabies, leprosy, smallpox, tetanus and intestinal parasites.

The People and Their Customs

There is no such person as 'the Indonesian.' The vast differences in ethnic background, way of life, and geographical location make it impossible to sketch a 'typical' Indonesian. Rather, the people described below will, in large measure, be the Javanese, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia.

In general, the Indonesians try to take things as they come. The most that he hopes for is that life will be calm, harmonious, and fulfilling. He believes that his fate lies in the hands of spirits or in the hands of God. Everything he does is done in the 'name of God' (bi'smi'llah). With Muslims and Christians, God is an individual deity.

This view of life is less evident today among Indonesians in cities than it is in rural villages. In cities, life is much as Westerners know it and expect it: the desire for individual

improvement and advancement, and social progress. Yet an undercurrent of the older attitude still remains.

For example, to the Westerner, time is a swiftly flowing stream. In Indonesia, the traditional attitude towards time is that time is like a bottomless pool. Thus there is a lack of forward planning in rural areas. The cities have been much influenced by the Western sense of time. Nevertheless, there is not the same urgency and impatience as in the West, except perhaps at high government levels.

Work is a part of life; it is done without complaint. It is not particularly good for the soul or bad for the body. Leisure should occupy as much time as can be afforded. At the same time, Indonesian leaders realize that only hard work will produce more for Indonesia's welfare. Even leisure is becoming organized as movies, sports, and educational activities.

Recreational, organized, competitive, spectator sports are very little known. Bull and cock fights, and boat races are local exceptions. The most common leisure time activity is conversation. The most popular form of spectator recreation for most rural Indonesians in Java and Bali is the wajang play, usually performed with puppets and often in shadow form. They also enjoy music and dance performances. In cities, radio and motion pictures have tremendous appeal. Every large city has a soccer stadium. Soccer is also popular in rural areas.

Family ties are very strong in traditional Indonesian life. Although weakening slightly in cities, they are still a powerful force there. Indonesians also place a high value on friend-

ship. Although it may be easy to become acquainted with Indonesians, they do not, however, make friends readily. Perhaps this is because a friend once made is expected to be a permanent and intimate companion. Friendships between adolescent boys and girls, so common in the United States, are limited in modern as well as traditional Indonesian environments.

Mutual cooperation and aid is a major ideal in Indonesia. It is the cement that held together the traditional village, and it has been incorporated into the Indonesian Constitution as a principle of national development.

Tolerance and good manners are highly regarded; dignity and self-respect, restraint in talking and in displaying emotions, are traditional ideals of behavior. It is in these terms that a person is regarded as either alus (smooth and correct) or kasar (rude and impolite). Good manners also call for the avoidance of open disagreements which are likely to become unpleasant.

It might be assumed that because Indonesia is a Muslim land, women have a low status. Actually, however, women enjoy fairly high status. They wear no veil or face-covering, and for the most part mix rather freely in male society. Women have even taken a position next to their menfolk in work, education, public service and other areas of life.

Patriotism is a powerful force in Indonesia today. Love of country has been strengthened by the struggle for independence in which most Indonesians either directly or indirectly participated.

Islam has become a factor of increasing importance in the life of people at all levels of

Indonesian society. It is estimated that about 90 per cent of the population are Muslims. Religion is an integral part of daily life, even in political life, as attested by the fact that Islamic parties won approximately half the popular vote in 1955.

Language

The official language of Indonesia is "Bahasa Indonesia" (Language of Indonesia). Technically speaking, it is a dialect of Malay. But to stress that the language is a national possession, the Indonesians distinguish carefully between it and Malay. It is very difficult to estimate the number of speakers of Indonesian, but it is growing daily. It is a part of the government program for unifying the country and increasing literacy Therefore it is taught to adults as well as to school children.

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Industrial Potential

Indonesia has great quantities of natural resources; the exact potential however, is unknown. She is believed, nevertheless, to be the third richest nation in the world in unexploited natural resources, preceded only by the U S and the Soviet Union. The country hasn't even begun to exploit her natural resources to the extent possible and is completely dependent upon other nations for consumer goods. Fabulously rich in natural resources, but with an unstable economy, the country represents a decidedly lucrative target for Communist interest and penetration.

Food and Commercial Crops

Rice is the main food in the Indonesian diet but the country does not produce enough for its own needs and must import chiefly from Burma and Thailand. In addition, corn, tapioca, sweet potatoes, soybeans and peanuts are raised.

Indonesia is the world's leading producer of rubber. Other commercial crops include sugar, coconuts, oil palms, tobacco, tea and coffee.

Transportation

The foot-pedalled tricycle-taxis, called betjak, are one of the sights of Djakarta and other large cities. They cost approximately one rupiah (approximately nine cents U.S.) per mile. Taxis are somewhat scarce and expensive. They have no special markings, being designated only by a blue or yellow shield-shaped supplementary license on the license plate. The drivers usually will not understand English. Bargaining is the rule and a firm price should be agreed upon prior to the trip. Municipal bus lines operate all over town (Djakarta).

Railroads and roads connect the major cities of Java. The Garuda Indonesian Airways (GIA) offers very good interisland service. Its airplanes connect 32 major and large cities, as well as handling flights to Singapore, Bangkok, and Manila.

Currency

The official Indonesian currency is the rupiah. The current rate of exchange is 11.4 rupiah per dollar.

Hotels and Restaurants

The hotels in Djakarta have a reputation for being difficult to get in, and in no case would a private room be available. In the best hotel in Djakarta, the Hotel des Indes, an individual should be prepared to be put in a room with from one to three other persons. The average price, including service and government tax, is about 48 rupiahs. The Dharma Nirmala and the Robertson Hotel are other possibilities. The average price for both hotels is about 30 rupiahs.

Scenic Attractions

Djakarta

Mixed ancestry and mixed cultures and the influence of modern western civilization are reflected in the city of Djakarta, the capital of all Indonesia's islands. Cramped native quarters with their mat-walled houses eventually lead into wide boulevards with impressive modern public buildings. Horse-drawn carts and foot-pedalled tricycle taxis move alongside of trams, motor taxis and buses. The Chinese quarter in the thickly packed Glodok area has quaintly-built houses crowded together over sometimes surprisingly broad streets and old canals.

In older sections of the town, diamond-paned windows with swinging shutters on old whitewashed and gabled houses look out over the canals, as though they were in the Netherlands of 300 years ago The old business center, Kali Besar, with its mid-18th century buildings, is not far from the old harbor, with its picturesque 17th century fortress.

Bandung

The Bandung area is a recognized holiday resort on account of its scenery and cool climate. It is noted for its clean, tree-lined streets, its parks and gardens, and for other qualities which have given it the title of "the Paris of Java " A few miles out of town are the resorts of Pengalengan and Lembang, both at about 4,600 feet.

Bogor

Directly south of Djakarta, lying at the foot of the island's backbone of mountains, stands the ancient city of Bogor. Bogor has a cool climate, escaping the steamy humidity of the coast. But there is a fly in the ointment of its climatic attractions -- the average annual rainfall is very high, so that there is rain every day.

Bogor is the site of the very famous Botanical Gardens, representing one of the most successful attempts to gather in natural surroundings complete species of tropical growths. The gardens have 10,000 species of trees, and the herbarium has 500,000 species of plants.

Borobudur Temple

Located in central Java, about an hour's drive from Djakarta, is the Borobudur Temple, considered one of the wonders of the world. Three and one-half miles of intricate stone

carvings, facing four tiers of galleries, depict the life of the great Indian leader, Gautama Buddha. The Temple displays the artistry and culture of the old Hindu-Javanese civilization, which flourished over a thousand years ago.

Palembang

Palembang lies in the southeast corner of the wedge-shaped island of Sumatra. In spite of being 50 miles inland, Palembang is only seven feet above sea level, on the banks of a mighty river. Its lack of height, heavy rainfall and the flooding of the river accounts for the floods which periodically flow over the lower parts of the city. The people live in houses built on piles, and live and shop and go visiting in boats along the river. To really see Palembang is to get into a boat and go along the river, up and down the creeks and canals, in and out the house-boats, and from one house-boat to another.

The Kodipolo restaurant is noted for its excellent Indonesian food. For a small, intimate atmosphere, and good European and Italian dishes, the Chez Mario is one of the nicest places in town. Toko Oen has both European and Chinese food. In Djakarta's Chinatown, Kam Leng, Yit Lok Yoen and Merk Tay Lo Thien are among the best for Chinese food.

Recreational Facilities

As a recreational area, Djakarta leaves a great deal to be desired. Most facilities are under the control of private clubs, and not open to the public. There is a public Palm Beach at Tandjong Priok, but the harbor area is polluted and unsafe for swimming. There are no public dances, and night clubs by western standards are

almost non-existent There are a number of motion picture theaters in town, showing American pictures, usually quite old. One of the most interesting events are the Sunday musical concerts at the Museum.

DO'S AND DON'TS

1. At Work:

a. Maintain a friendly and correct attitude.
b. Develop a sense of patience.
c. Avoid unnecessary bluntness; leave room for negotiation.
d. Abruptness is rude; be prepared to discuss.
e. Loud talk is considered unmannerly; use a moderate tone of voice.

2. Daily Contacts:

a. Abusive language is considered coarse and indicates a lack of vocabulary.
b. To avoid insulting local persons, think before talking.
c. Steer away from topics of controversy.
d. Be prepared to meet local people halfway; cooperation works both ways.
e. Show genuine interest to assist and help local people; deeds are better than words.
f. Respect older people as you would in your own country If you respect them, they in turn will respect you.

3. Common Courtesies and Respect:

a. Friendly greetings will pave the way to friendlier relations.
b. Learn local customs and habits and respect them as you would your own.
c. Offer others your cigarettes, tea, coffee, etc. It may not be accepted but you have made your point.
d. When being addressed show recognition by rising.
e. Learn to recognize insignia of rank.

4. Social Contacts:

a. Be prepared to meet people -- friends are very useful.

b. Practice the golden rule: When invited out return the obligation.

c. Be free with your genuine praises; comment favorably on food etc.

5. Shopping:

a. Bartering is considered desirable. If done properly you can save.

b. Be pleasant in your dealings. You will receive better service.

c. Local areas have local methods for conducting business. Sound them out to avoid embarrassment.

d. Approach a business transaction with an open mind. Maintain your sense of humor but be dignified.

e. The prices may be jacked-up for you Learn local trends to aid you in bargaining

f. Drinking is permissible, but as elsewhere drunkeness is frowned upon.

g. Be properly attired. Don't go out in public if you are not dressed in a manner acceptable to a military post

h. Refrain from undue familiarity.

INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES
UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA

OFFICER UNIFORMS

OFFICERS

SERVICE FIELD DRESS

ENLISTED MEN'S UNIFORMS

ENLISTED MEN

SERVICE FIELD DRESS


RANK INSIGNIA ON SHOULDERBOARD FOR DRESS UNIFORM (OFFICERS AND ENLISTED)
BRANCH OF SERVICE INSIGNIA
RANK INSIGNIA ON SHOULDERLOOP PATCH FOR SERVICE UNIFORM (OFFICERS)
ARC DENOTING BRANCH OF SERVICE ASSIGNMENT
HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY POLICE OR TERRITORIAL BADGE
INSIGNIA OF POSITION (OFFICERS)
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INSIGNIA


SERVICE
FIELD
SUPREME COMMANDER
HIGH GENERAL
GENERAL
LIEUTENANT GENERAL
MAJOR GENERAL
MAJOR GENERAL
MAJOR GENERAL
COLONEL
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
MAJOR
MAJOR
MAJOR
CAPTAIN
FIRST LIEUTENANT
SECOND LIEUTENANT
SUB-LIEUTENANT
CAPTAIN
CAPTAIN
SERGEANT MAJOR
SERGEANT
CORPORAL
SOLDIER FIRST CLASS
SOLDIER SECOND CLASS
SERGEANT
SOLDIER SECOND CLASS

FINAL COMMENT

This is but a brief glimpse of Indonesia. You will become more fully acquainted with the area as time goes on. The more you learn about this interesting section of the world, the more profitable your stay will become and the happier you will be in your job.

You as an individual are but one of the many who are privileged to serve as an "ambassador of good will" to our friends the Indonesians. As such, you may play a very active part in making Free World objectives and principles better understood by the inhabitants of this vital area. This effort represents a most significant phase in the overall struggle against the opposing way of life represented by the Communist menace. May your stay be as pleasant and as profitable as conditions permit.

PREPARED BY

OAC of S, G 2,

USARHAW / 25th INF DIV

SOLDIER'S GUIDE TO

LAOS

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TOPOGRAPHICAL FEATURES

LOCATION AND AREA

Laos, covering approximately 90,000 square miles, is slightly larger than the State of Utah, and almost identical in area to the main Japanese island of Honshu. It is the largest of the four states which made up Indochina and is located in the center of the eastern part of the peninsular of Southeast Asia. Laos is bounded by mountain frontiers on the north, east and south. Its only lowland boundary is the western, formed by the Mekong River. It is bordered on the west by Thailand, for a short distance on the northwest by Burma, on the north by China, on the east by North Vietnam, and on the south by Cambodia. Thus Laos lies astride a strategic land, sea and air crossroads in one of the richest areas of the Far East in agricultural production and natural resources. Also, it provides a jump-off to other critical areas of Southeast Asia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Control of Laos, coupled with control of North Vietnam, could mean domination of most of the principal land routes from China to most of Southeast Asia. Vientiane, the capital of Laos, is less than 1,000 nautical miles from Manila, Singapore, Bangkok and Rangon.

TERRAIN

Over two-thirds of Laos is comprised of mountains interspersed with undulating to hilly surfaces identified by the French as "plateaus".

Extensions of the mountains of Burma and China occupy most of Laos, and extend southward for 900 miles. Although the mountains are not high (generally 2,000 to 7,000 feet) they are commonly very rugged or broken, with many small basins and narrow valleys. Dense forest covered steep slopes and escarpments, sharp ridges and numerous swift, rocky streams in deep gorges with many falls and rapids, would be barriers to movement and unfavorable to large-scale mechanized military operations. These rugged steep-sloped mountains with relatively small lowland areas comprise the eastern provinces. Seasonally flooded, low-lying alluvial plains occupy somewhat less than half of the other third of the area. The remainder is composed of relatively well-drained, level to hilly interior plains which extend from Cambodia along the upper reaches of the Mekong River to Vientiane. Dense tropical evergreen forest, the least penetrable type of vegetation in the world, covers over 60 percent of Laos. This forest is characterized by closely spaced trees with dense undergrowth and tangling vines. Mixed forests occupy large areas on the mountains, interior plains, and hills, ranging from scattered trees and shrubs in grassland areas to moderately dense forests of tall trees. These mixed forests are without foliage from December to late March or April. The widely separated areas which form the rest of the uncultivated terrain are mostly composed of coarse, tall grass, short grass, scrub, bamboo, and above 3,000 feet in elevation, open pine woods.

Cultivated land occupies most of the

unforested plains. Intensive wet rice cultivation is concentrated in the seasonally flooded areas of the southwest. Large expanses of tall and short savanna grasses are found along the Mekong River.

CLIMATE

The climate of Laos is marked by two distinct seasons: the summer wet and winter dry.

The summer wet season extends from May through October. Rainfall is heavy and frequent; cloudiness and low visibility are at a maximum. Just prior to the rains, the temperature reaches its maximum for the year, usually in the 90's or high 80's. Torrential rains cause streams to overflow, roads to become inundated, and rice fields to flood.

The winter dry season throughout most of the area is from early November through April. The air is generally clear and dry; rainfall light and infrequent; cloudiness and low visibility are at a minimum. Conditions are best during this period for all types of air and ground operations.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

HISTORY

Laotians originally were part of a Thai kingdom in southwestern China. An invasion of the Mongols in the middle of the 13th Century drove the Thais southward into Burma, Laos, Siam and Vietnam.

Beginning with the middle of the 16th Century, there was continual friction with Burma, resulting in several Burmese invasions. In the 18th Century the kingdom was divided into Luang Prabang (upper Laos) and Vientiane (middle and lower Laos).

During the whole of the 18th Century,, Vientiane and Luang Prabang were beset by internal and, mostly external, warfare. Until the formation of the present state of Laos in 1893, both provinces remained vassals of Siam. The French intervened in Laos in 1883. Vientiane became the administrative capital, while Luang Prabang remained the royal capital.

Before World War II, northern Laos was known as the Kingdom of Luang Prabang, while the seven southern provinces were administered by the French from Vientiane, an important commercial city on the west-central border.

During a war which was later waged between France and Northern Vietnam (Viet Minh) Laos was threatened with invasion. The situation took a turn for the worse due to the fact that leader of the "Laotian Liberation Army", which had originated as a resistance movement during the Japanese occupation and continued to oppose the

French reoccupation of Laos, allied with the Viet Minh. In March of 1951 a new organization--the Pathet Lao--emerged.

Laotian opposition to the Pathet Lao, mainly the Communist Viet Minh, forces, was ineffective. By the first half of 1954, probably one-third of Laos could be counted in the Viet Minh camp. The cease fire in the Indochinese War came into effect in Laos in August 1954. Negotiations between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Government of Laos continued until 19 November 1957, when the Pathet Lao was officially given a share in the cabinet and National Assembly.

GOVERNMENT

The Laotian constitution declares Laos to be a kingdom whose authority comes from the Laotian people with the King as the supreme chief-of-state. The King is sacred. He designates his successor to the throne, issues the laws approved by the National Assembly, and acts as head of the Army and state religion. The King and the National Assembly depend heavily upon a council of ministers in charge of such departments as National Defense, Finance, Education, and others.

POPULATION

The total population of Laos is about one and one-half million. Approximately 95% of the population is rural, about half of whom grow rice along the Mekong. The rest of the population is made of mountain tribes collectively called Kha.

THE PEOPLE AND THEIR CUSTOMS

The Lao people are Buddhist in culture and Buddhism is the state religion. The three principal ethnic minorities in the country are the Tahi (Neua, Dam Hus), the Indonesian (called Khas) and the Chinese (Hos, Yao, Meos). The Lao royal family and princes of royal blood share political prominence with a relatively small group of Lao French-educated commoners. Buddhist monks are often the principal social and intellectual leaders of the outlying areas and occasionally act as propaganda outlets for the government. However, the influence of Buddhism and of Buddhist schools in the towns is beginning to be replaced by that of public educational facilities.

Most of the intelligent and educated Lao people who live in the cities are usually friendly to American visitors and will afford them hospitable treatment. The people as a whole are rather shy and retiring.

LANGUAGE

Since the formation of the national state, Laotian Thai has been designated as the official language of Laos. Differences in dialect between speakers of the Thai language in Northern Vietnam, Burma, Thailand and Laos do not prevent mutual understanding. French remains an important second language which is still taught in the elementary schools.

ATTITUDES AND SENSITIVITIES

The Laotians do not expect an outsider to

know all the aspects of their Code of Behavior, but it is appreciated if an individual knows something of proper behavior.

The Laotians have been characterized as an easy-going, hospitable, non-competitive people, valuing a good sense of humor. It is considered a grave offense to strike someone on the head, and a long bitterness can result from this insult, which is a sacred part of the body.

When a stranger approaches a village, he is greeted by the pho ban (village "father" or headman) and a group of young girls, who present the stranger with flowers. He is expected to sleep at the house of the pho ban. The only time Laotian hospitality ceases to operate is when, there is a state of "kham" or taboo. This taboo can be applied to an individual, group, house, or village. The reasons are varied from area to area. If the men are out hunting, the village is kham to strangers, a house is kham when there is a birth, death or sickness.

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

CURRENCY

The "Kip" is the monetary unit of Laos. The official rate of exchange is 80 Kip to the US dollar. Local bank rates 79.83 Kip to the US dollar after the charge for exchange handling is deducted. The open market in Bangkok ranges from 90 to 100 Kip to the US dollar.

TRANSPORTATION

All travel to, from, and within Laos (city to city) is by air. During the rainy season, roads outside the cities are impassable and even during the dry season, they are not conducive to extensive travel. Mass local transportation consists of pedicabs (a bicycle-drawn carriage). Prices for this service should be arrived at in advance. Laos has no railroads.

PLACES OF INTEREST

There are very few "items" of interest in Laos. The cities have their many Buddhist temples and pagodas. The countrysides are mostly flat and uninteresting consisting largely of rice paddies which are covered with water during the wet season.

RECREATIONAL FACILITIES

Religious festivals are of particular interest. A religious festival called a "boun",

includes dancing to native music, plays, and fortune telling by monks.

In Vientiane, the "Club Hawaii" provides Western-type night club entertainment.

Vientiane and Luang Prabang have at least one movie theater and one hotel. The hotels are filled with long-term residents making accommodations almost impossible to obtain. The quality of films along with uncomfortable conditions will probably discourage most theater patrons.

In addition to the restaurant in hotels, the cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang have two or three restaurants that cater to foreigners. Dining in any restaurant is risky with dysentary a very likely result.

DO'S AND DONT'S

1. DO:

a. Maintain a friendly attitude.
b. Develop a sense of patience.
c. Avoid unnecessary bluntness.
d. Avoid insulting local persons.
e. Steer away from topics of controversy.
f. Avoid abruptness.
g. Be prepared to meet local people halfway.
h. Show genuine interest to assist and help local people.
i. Respect older people as you would in your own country.
j. Learn local customs and habits and respect them.
k. Learn to recognize local insignia of rank.
l. Offer local people your cigarettes, tea, coffee, etc.
m. Return the invitation when invited out.
n. Be free with your genuine praises on food, drink, etc.
o. Accept gifts, especially food and drink, if offered.
p. Maintain your sense of humor in a dignified manner.
q. Dress properly.
r. Refrain from undue familiarity.

2. DON'T:

a. Talk loud.
b. Use abusive language.

c. Point to or touch a Laotian's head.
d. Get drunk.
e. Be afraid to meet the local people.

ARMY INSIGNIA

Recently the Laotian Army changed their insignia from the French style to the one shown on the following pages. The new insignia generally follows the British system except for the design of the insignia itself.

For normal everyday wear the stars and wreathed stars are worn on the epaulets of the khaki shirt. For dress occasions shoulder boards are worn. For all branches of service, the dress shoulder boards have a red background with the insignia in gold. Two examples of dress shoulder boards are shown.

For Major General, Lieutenant General, and General, one, two, and three stars are added to the Brigadier General insignia shown.

Insignia of branch are of gold colored metal and are worn on the collar. The cap crest is also made of gold metal. The Parachutist's badge is of silver with the oak leaves below the wings in gold. The pilot's wings are of silver with the trident and rosette in gold.

Brigadier General (Green)

Infantry

Air Force

Gal Great



Military Police



Signal Corps

Cyber Squadron



Armor

Artillery

Transportation

Engineers

JAG

Ordnance

Medical Corps

Intelligence Staff

Pilot's Wings



Captain (Dress)



Major



Lieutenant Colonel



Colonel, Dress



Caporal



Aspirant



Sous-Lieutenant



Lieutenant

YOU CAN LEARN TO SPEAK LAO

Lao is spoken as a native language by about half the population. Local dialect differences exist but are slight. The language is closely related--in fact, almost identical in its literary form--to Siamese Thai.

Thai is a monosyllable language. Pronounce the following Thai phrases and words as you would English. This will not make you an expert nor a scholar, but it will help you get around and perhaps make a few friends.

Greeting	On meeting anyone any time of the day, say 'sa-wad-dee'
Where is	Point to Thai-language name or address on a map and say 'ti-nai'.
Go to	Point to Thai-language name or address and say 'pai'.
water	nam
chicken	gai
eggs	kai
coffee	gah fair
telephone	torasub
rickshaw	sam-lor

- no	cha - mai, plao
- Mrs - Miss	Nai - Nang - Nangsao
ry good	To indicate approval or appreciation say 'dea marle'.
od bye	You can say 'ta-gon' but 'sawad-dee' can also be used.

MBERS

e	-	nung	seven	-	jut
o	-	song	eight	-	pard
ree	-	sarm	nine	-	kow
ur	-	see	ten	-	sib
ve	-	hah	hundrrd	-	roy
x	-	hok	thousand	-	pan

an you speak English?	Tarn pood Angkrit dai mai?
cannot speak Thai	Chun pood Thai mai dai
ow do you do?	Sabai de rue
ite well thank you	Sabai dee kob koon

Excuse me	Kho tose
I beg your pardon	Kho apai
Please - thank you	Proad - kob koon
How much?	Tao rai
Which is the best hotel?	Hotel nai dee tee soot?
I am in a hurry	Chun reep ron
I don't feel well	Chun roo suk mai sabai
I am tired	Chun nuai
I will come back later	Chun cha kub ma eek

PREPARED BY

OAC of S, G2,

USARHAW / 25th INF DIV

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Contents

SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Southeast Asia is important because of its geographical location astride international communications routes and its enormous wealth in natural resources. Its manpower is capable of contributing significantly to world peace and prosperity. Today, all shipping between Europe and the Orient via the Indian Ocean must pass through either the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Sunda. The former is between the Malay Peninsula and the Island of Sumatra, and the latter between Sumatra and Java. Control of these two Southeast straits gives dominance over a sea route that is comparable in importance to the Panama Canal route. Furthermore all intercontinental airways in the Far East traverse the Southeast Asian area. Bangkok in Thailand and Rangoon in Burma are major air transport centers, only a few flying hours from Saigon, Hong Kong, Darwin and Calcutta.

Southeast Asia lies across the tropic zone between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Its peninsula and island chains form a vast broken horseshoe of land rimming the South China Sea. Burma, Laos, and Vietnam, northernmost of the peninsular states, border on Communist China and, together with Thailand, Cambodia and Malaya, compose the western side of the horseshoe. The islands of Indonesia descend in a series of stepping stones toward Australia and then veer north toward the Philippines, which forms the eastern side of the horseshoe and extends to within approximately 300 miles of Formosa.

2. COLONIALISM

From the beginning of history, oriental routes of migration, conquest, and trade have converged on Southeast Asia. Once European navigators had circled the globe, the area was destined to become the commercial and strategic gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and also between Asia and Australia. Inevitably it became a goal in the European race for colonies, with Portugal, Spain, Holland, England and France competing for prizes in the course of the centuries. Of the seven nations that comprise the region, only the Kingdom of Thailand managed to retain its independence throughout the age of European colonial expansion. Under colonialism, Southeast Asia, long the rice bowl of the Orient, gradually became also the Western World's major supplier of certain critical raw material and other very desirable commodities. World War II underscored the importance of Southeast Asia as a gateway and as a source of strategic raw materials and agricultural products. Lying in the path of Japanese expansion, Indochina passed from French to Japanese control shortly after the fall of France. By the spring of 1942, the remaining countries of the area were under Japanese occupation. Until the liberation of enemy-occupied area in 1945, the gateway was a barrier and the source inaccessible to all nations except Japan. In the course of the liberation all countries of the area became battle grounds.

3. COMMUNISM

Not long after the withdrawal of the Japanese from the area it became apparent that Southeast Asia lay in the path of yet another type of expansion, that of World Communism. Ever since World War II the Communist strategy of infiltration to exploit existing nationalist revolutionary movements or to foment them where they do not exist has complicated--and in some instances retarded--the transition of Southeast Asian countries from Colonial status to independence. The successful advance of Communism through China and into what is now North Vietnam threatens the remaining Southeast Asian countries with a more deadly form of Colonialism than the world has ever known. Extension of Communist control over the remainder of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma which together form Asia's rice bowl, would place most of the independent Asian nations in mortal danger. India, Ceylon, Japan, Indonesia and Malaya, which are dependent upon that rice bowl for life itself, would have access to it only on Communist terms.

4. MILITARY ASPECTS

No Southeast Asian country is militarily strong enough to withstand armed aggression without help. None of the new and inexperienced governments have been able to raise the standard of living high enough to insulate its people against Communist subversion. If these governments are to prove to their peoples that free institutions can give more solid satisfactions than communism's promised pie in the sky, they must have economic and technical assistance from other non-communist countries.

5. LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

Although it sprawls across a vast area more than 3,000 miles from east to west and more than 2,000 from north to south, Southeast Asia has less than half the actual land mass of the United States. Its population is about 10 million greater. The land form is varied, the population more so; and the configuration of the land has created barriers not only between countries but also between communities.

The area abounds in rugged, trackless mountains rich in virgin forests and scarcely tapped minerals, dense jungles, fever-infested swamps, fertile inland plateaus, turbulent rivers, and fertile river deltas and coastal plains. In the monsoon belt wet and dry seasons alternate with regularity; outside it the lowlands are hot and humid the year around. Temperature variations increase with altitude--and altitude ranges from sea level to heights of more than 18,000 feet--in the north, where the Burma-China border becomes indistinct in the Himalayas.

The region's lush fertility makes land clearance a never-ending labor. The work of years was obliterated by World War II. Bridges, railways, roads, and inland waterways fuffered wholesale destruction, and once-cultivated fields reverted to jungle. Economic disruption was serious throughout the entire area.

The peoples are disparate in racial background, religion, language, and customs. Among them is about every known form of government, which may be exercised by a tribal chieftain, a rajah, a sultan, a king, a dictator, or a democratically elected parliament.

Some 3,000 years ago the area began to receive waves of immigrants who were to effect great changes in the life and thinking of whatever land they reached. The Chinese were first, coming usually in the spirit of conquest. A later wave rolled in from India, and the Hindu immigrants brought with them higher forms of religion, philosophy, and art and an advanced social organization. Much later, traders from the Arabian Sea arrived at Indonesian ports with Mohammedanism as well as commercial cargo to offer.

In the 16th century the Europeans began to reach the area--Portuguese, Spanish, British, Dutch, and French--in that order. Their merchant companies busied themselves with developing natural resources for the good of the mother country. Their missionaries bestowed varieties of Christian faith among the receptive elements of the population. And in due time European racial strains were added to the existing complex.

European colonialism and the impetus it gave to commerce drew more Chinese and Indians to the area. Both groups--the Chinese in particular--became small businessmen, middlemen, and moneylenders. As they prospered, many became landlords, bankers, and plantation operators. Today more than 10 million Chinese live in the area, and the vast majority of them regard themselves as Chinese nationals regardless of their place of birth. The sharp business practices of many of these "overseas" Chinese have made them a powerful and bitterly resented element in most Southeast Asian communities.

In all the countries the populations are concentrated in the lower reaches of large river valleys and coastal plains. In the sparsely settled inland frontier regions, steep mountains and turbulent rivers separate hill peoples from one another as well as from their countrymen in the densely populated lowlands. This separation of communities has preserved intact hundreds of dialects and has increased the difficulty of achieving cooperation among the peoples.

Despite diversity of origins, languages, and religions, the peoples have had certain experiences in common. Throughout the area the standard of living is measured within a rice economy. Village socieites have persisted for centuries. Average life expectancy is low and infant mortality high, with malaria, dysentery, and tuberculosis taking a high toll of life.

Barring some exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods from the West, the populations have been largely self-sufficient, with little need of trade or other dealings with one another. Every country within the area has a past history of tribal or interracial warfare and periodic invasions, principally from the north--from China. None is unaware that pressure for southward expansion continues in the giant country to the north.

With the exception of Thailand, all Southeast Asian countries have been developed by foreigners and in the colonial pattern. They are convinced that they were denied a fair share of the gains for colonial enterprise. Until World War II Southeast Asian trade was overwhelmingly with the nations of Western Europe and the United States. Under the system of exchanging raw materials for processed goods and manufactured products, Southeast Asia remained industrially backward and undeveloped. Japanese occupation reoriented the economy of each of these countries toward Japan, and liberation activities disrupted the economy altogether.

Except in Thailand where independence goes back some 3,000 years, the nationalism that has inspired the influential classes of Southeast Asia for more than half a century is deeply rooted in anti-colonialism and has needed little stimulation to put forth anti-Western attitudes. After World War I nationalistic fervor increased in intensity; during and after World War II it reached revolutionary proportions.

6. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

Southeast Asia's production of critical raw materials and agricultural products appears impressive when expressed in percentages of the world's output. Measured against its own potential, Southeast Asian production is seen in better perspective. Primitive mining and farming methods sharply limit production in most of the countries of the area. Currently the yield of agriculture--which accounts for more than 70 percent of the total production of the area--is only a fractional part of what it might be. As yet Southeast Asia has scarcely tapped its vast natural resources.

Southeast Asia supplies about 10 percent of all U. S. imports and buys approximately 5 percent of all U. S. exports. Stated another way, about 30 percent of the area's exports go to the United States, from which it receives 20 percent of all its imports. The remainder of non-Communist Asia accounts for a quarter of Southeast Asia's total trade, and one-third of that quarter is with Japan. The area's heaviest trade, about 45 percent of the total volume, is with Western Europe. Thus far trade with Communist countries has been slight--but not from lack of effort on the part of Communist China to attract it.

Throughout the area per capita income continues lower than it was before World War II. This situation slows political and economic progress at the same time that it makes economic development the principal objective of every government's program. A complex of circumstances has contributed to the slow rate of increase in per capita income. Outstanding among them are destruction wrought by World War II and subsequent guerrilla fighting, reluctance of the West to reinvest capital, lack of savings for domestic investment, unfavorable exchange rates, scarcity of management skills, and preponderance of unskilled labor.

Because of this situation, the newly independent governments face difficulties that would challenge the abilities of the most stable, experienced, and mature governments. The peoples, with their long tradition of resisting governmental authority, are unlikely to continue long in

support of the new governments unless those governments can demonstrate their ability to improve living conditions for the average man and his family. A very little improvement goes a long way toward breeding hope and faith; a very little slip backward breeds disillusionment with the present government and renders the people more susceptible to the promises of the Communists in their midst.

Willingness of individual nations, including the United States, to provide technical and direct economic assistance is not the answer in all parts of the area. Despite their needs and desire for such assistance, some of the Southeast Asian governments do not ask it of any individual country. Those governments do seek help through the United Nations. Though some of the countries have been denied membership by Soviet veto in the Security Council, every one of them trusts and supports the United Nations. Some of the recently independent countries know that the United States is their friend and has no imperialistic designs on them or on any other countries in the world.

BURMA

A. GEOGRAPHY

Burma is located on the western flank of the southeast Asian peninsula astride one of the most feasible but difficult land routes between India and China. Slightly smaller than the State of Texas, it is partly protected by natural barriers on all land borders and is in some measure a buffer between India and China.

B. TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

Burma is characterized by high, rugged mountains on the west, north, and east. To the west is the narrow relatively isolated Arakan coastal plain backed by the Arakan Yomas (mountains). These western ranges extend northward to merge with the Himalayas. They are sparsely settled and since most of the ranges have a general north-south alignment in echelon, east-west movement through the few high passes is difficult. Northern Burma consists of hills and high, rugged mountains which include the headwaters of the Irrawaddy and its principal tributary, the Chindwin. The valley plains of the Irrawaddy and the lower Sittang and their extensive delta lowlands are areas of dense population and intensive rice cultivation. The dissected plains of central Burma, in the vicinity of Shwebo and Mandalay are connected with the lowlands to the south by the Irrawaddy and Sittang valleys. The ranges of the Pegu Yomas occupy most of the interstream area between the Irrawaddy and the Sittang, and channelize north-south movement to the river valleys. Eastward is the high Shan plateau, 3,000 to 4,000 feet in elevation with a steep western escarpment facing the plains and hills of central Burma. The plateau extends southward into the Tenassarim mountains bordering Thailand. Movement in the delta lowlands and coastal plains would be hindered by swamps, large areas of rice fields, and the permanent drainage features. The rice fields are flooded from May to October and operations involving mechanized equipment would be difficult except along developed routes, and in places along the tops of levees. By December the rice is harvested and the ground is again dried hard and remains continually dry until about April. More than half of Burma is heavily forested. Cultivation is concentrated in the deltas and valleys of the Irrawaddy, Chindwin, lower Salween and Sittang rivers.

The principal strategic area of Burma is the Irrawaddy-Sittang delta. On it are located Rangoon, the capital and chief seaport; Bassein, another important seaport and gateway into the country; the extensive rice-producing areas; and the densest population. Rangoon is the terminus for all the principal roads and railways, although the roads are generally poor and unable to sustain large-scale military traffic. A less important strategic area is Mandalay, which is a key transportation center controlling the highway, railway and river traffic to upper Burma.

Burma has a tropical monsoon climate divided typically into four seasons: the southwest monsoon (June-September), characterized by heavy

rains flooded streams and persistent cloudiness; the northeast monsoon (December-February), with scant rainfall, minimum cloudiness and cooler temperatures; and two intermonsoonal transitional periods (April-May and October-November). Annual rainful ranges from 200 inches in coastal areas to only 30 inches in Central Burma's "dry zone". Rangoon has an annual total of 103 inches; Lashio 62 inches; Myitkyina 84 inches. Except in the highlands, temperatures are high throughout the year. Mean annual temperatures range from near 80 degrees Fahrenheit in southern central Burma to the middle 70's in northern lowland areas. The hot season (March-May), with temperatures often exceeding 100 degrees Fahrenheit in central Burma precedes the onset of the southwestern monsoon.

C. HISTORIC BACKGROUND

A long succession of tribal migrants from Central Asia drifted across the high hills and mountains along the Tibetan-Chinese border of what today is called Burma. Among the innumerable tribal peoples, the Burmese (or Burmans) have long been the most prominent, and it is from them that Burma takes its name. The arrival of Indian traders, during the early centuries of the Christian era, indirectly helped to link these tribes together in a common loyalty. The Indians, on their way to China and the Spice Islands, brought with them various forms of Buddhism and Hinduism that the local peoples could adopt without regard to race or tribe. They also brought with them an almost equally important institution, that of divine kingship.

It is curious and important that even though there were Chinese settlements as well as Indian settlements, the Chinese failed to impress their civilization on the local peoples. Possibly the reason for this situation is that a man could become a Buddhist or a Hindu without being an Indian, but only a person who had accepted the Chinese culture could be Confucian. Thus, even to the present day, in spite of the closeness of China, Chinese culture prevails only among those who call themselves Chinese.

In the 14th and 15th centuries, the Thai tribes, driven down from southern China by the Mongols, pushed their way into central Burma. These Thai, known as Shans, were not driven back into the eastern hills until the second half of the 16th century. The activities of the Burmese against the Thais involved them in warfare with the Thais in Siam. Since this time, war between Burma and Siam was recurrent in the history of both countries.

Although numerous Portuguese arrived in Southeast Asia in the early part of the 16th century, a century later, Dutch strength in Indonesia, and the English in India, gave them command of the eastern area. While these two European countries were building up their power, the Burmese had retreated inland, remote from contact with the outside world. Unfortunately for the Burmese, their kingdom along the Irrawaddy was seen by the Western powers as the key to trade in the interior of China. Conflict was inevitable while Burma refused to trade with the West. In

1824-1826 and 1852, the British waged two successful campaigns against the Burmese, gaining control of lower Burma. Late in 1885, Britain took advantage of Burma's new ruler, an incompetent youth, to pursue an almost bloodless campaign. On 1 January 1886, Burma ceased to be an independent kingdom, and became merely a province of the Indian Empire. The British government threw Burma open to world trade. Burma was flooded with immigrants, especially from India and China.

In 1935 the British Parliament approved the separation of Burma from India, effective in 1937. But separation from India and a new constitution still did not meet the nationalistic demands of Burmese leaders. The problem was temporarily settled when the Japanese landed in southern Burma on 9 December 1941 and by May 1942 were in complete control. Subsequent to the termination of the Japanese Occupation of Burma, its leaders organized the Anti-fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPFL) and attempted to obtain recognition as an independent government from Britain. Finally in 1947, the British agreed to permit Burma to exercise a free choice whether to remain within or leave the British Commonwealth. The ensuing general election gave an overwhelming majority to the AFPFL and a constitution creating a Federal Union of Burma was approved, giving the Union of Burma an independent status on 4 January 1948.

D. POLITICAL

1. General. Burma severed all ties with Great Britain and became an independent sovereign republic on 4 January 1948. Its constitution provides for a centralized federal structure composed of Burma proper, the four constituent states of Kachin, Shan, Kayah, and Karen, and one special division (Chin) of minority ethnic groups.

2. Government

a. General. Burma has a parliamentary form of government, with a Prime Minister who is responsible to the Parliament. The latter is composed of two houses, the Chamber of Nationalities and the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber of Nationalities, which has very little power, has 125 members. The Chamber of Deputies, roughly comparable to the British House of Commons, is supposed to be twice the size of the Chamber of Nationalities. Representatives for both chambers of Parliament are elected from single member districts. Members of both Houses, elected at the same time, hold office for a term of four years, unless Parliament is dissolved or unless the President declares a state of grave emergency; in which case, by a two-thirds vote of Parliament in joint session, the term of Parliament members may be extended beyond four years. Suffrage is universal for those over eighteen years of age.

(1) The President, who is elected by Parliament, possesses little political power and functions chiefly as a ceremonial head of state. Real power is wielded by the Cabinet officers through the Prime Minister. Cabinet members must be members of the Chamber of Deputies, and are appointed by the President on the nomination of the Prime Minister.

(2) In terms of actual political dynamics, Burma is governed by an oligarchy composed of an extremely small number of politically significant figures, among whom rivalries and friction have been suppressed as a result of the exigencies of the anti-dissident struggle.

b. Stability. The stability of the government has measurably improved during the past three years. Despite the predominance of military activity in Burma, the government's military leaders, while possibly harboring long-range political ambitions, have apparently subordinated their role to civilian authority. Although the government's parliamentary majority of socialists and independents was reduced in the elections of April 1956, it still retains a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Elections for the upper house, the Chamber of Nationalities, are also to give the government a firm margin of control.

c. Foreign Policy. The government's foreign policies are to maintain the neutrality of Burma, cooperating with India and other Colombo powers; to support the UN, relying on it for assistance in the event of external aggression; to reduce dependence on the United Kingdom; to maintain friendly relations with Communist China, in view of the vulnerability of Burma's northern border; and to maintain cordial relations with kindred, small, socialist states.

d. Domestic Policy. The government's domestic policies are to restore internal order and security by quelling insurrections and eliminating Chinese Nationalist guerrilla elements; to create a national loyalty by the Burmanization of ethnic minority groups; and to create a socialist welfare state by a long-range program of internal developments that will gradually eliminate foreign investment and socialize major industries. For the short term, the government is seeking to attract foreign capital for the development of its basic resources.

3. Political Parties

a. Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL). The loose coalition of political groups which achieved Burma's independence--the AFPFL--has been the governing political group in Burma. It is what remains of the popular front established in 1944 to spearhead the independence movement. With the subsequent defection of the Communist faction in 1947, and the withdrawal of the left-wing socialists in 1950, the organization moved away from its original extreme leftist position. While many AFPFL leaders were once avowed Marxists, most of these leaders assumed a more conservative character which might be described as moderate socialist in political color, and their nationalism far outweighs their sympathy for any international movement. Recently, as a climax to growing intra party factional strife within the AFPFL, the party split--with the U NU faction (led by Prime Minister U NU) retaining the AFPFL title; and the U BA SWE (Defense Minister) faction forming a National Socialist Party in opposition to the AFPFL. The U NU faction, with the support of the Communist dominated National Unity Front, emerged victorious in the June 1958 elections and retained the reins of the government.

b. Burma Workers and Peasant Party (BWPP). Prior to the split of the AFPFL and the organization of the National Socialist Party, the BWPP was the only significant legal political opposition. The BWPP has been and is the major overt pro-Communist party in Burma. It functions largely as the legal front for the underground Communist Party, which was declared illegal in the fall of 1953. It faithfully follows the Communist Party line and controls a number of front organizations.

E. ECONOMIC

1. Agriculture

Burma, a food surplus country, has a predominantly agricultural economy. Rice is by far the most important crop, accounting for two-thirds of the crop area and eighty (80) percent of the total value of exports. Other crops such as peanuts, cotton and sugar cane are also grown, but agricultural production falls far short of its high potential because of lack of development. Forest products, especially teak wood, are also important as export products.

2. Minerals

Burma ranks among the more richly endowed small nations of the world in mineral resources. Two if its mines, the Bawdwin lead mine and the Mawchi tungsten and tin mine, are among the world's most important mines. However, current production is insignificant because of damage caused by postwar strife. Burma's 1956 calendar year crude petroleum production was 60,401,128 gallons. Plant expansion and reconstruction is being undertaken to provide a surplus for export. Coal of a very low grade is widespread and exploitation is being increased to reduce dependence on imports. Burma has a total installed electric power capacity of approximately 90,744 KW which is about equal to their prewar capacity.

3. Manufacturing

Manufacturing and construction consist primarily of the preparation of domestic raw materials for export and the products of handicraft workers in cottage-type facilities. One small arsenal, in Rangoon produces some Sten-type submachine guns and a small quantity of small-arms ammunition.

4. External Trade

Burma is one of the world's largest exporters of rice. Rice accounts for nearly eighty percent of Burmese export earnings. Currently about one-half of Burma's rice exports go to the Soviet Bloc countries. In exchange for rice, it obtains all types of consumer, industrial, and military goods. Burma is underpopulated in relation to other Asian countries and is potentially one of the most prosperous countries in the area. Introduction of extensive welfare-state legislation has led to deficit spending since 1952, but no serious inflationary effects have been apparent. Burma has adopted a plan, scheduled for completion by

C D E F G H I J K

1960, for reconstruction and development designed to improve agricultural production, increase mining activities, improve village living conditions, improve transportation, and introduce new industries to strengthen the economy.

5. Summary

The strengths of the Burmese economy are the products of its agriculture, which produces an exportable surplus of rice, and the absence of population pressures, which permits an increase in population. Its weaknesses are dependence on rice as the one major crop, a small industrial base, a low level of education and technical competence, hazardous health conditions, and primitive medical conditions.

F. SOCIOLOGICAL

1. Population. The population of Burma was estimated at roughly 20,356,000 as of 1 January 1959. Approximately 60% are Burmans, 12% Karens, 7% Shans, 6% Indians, and 2% Chins. No other group represents over 1%.

2. The People and their Customs

The Burmans are intensely proud of their country's national tradition and detest subjection to foreigners, whether European or Asian. Burmans dislike urban dwelling and have not migrated to cities in large numbers; the village and its rice fields still comprise the typical socio-economic unit. Elements of democratic community life have always existed at the basic village level, and election of local officials has been traditional.

Although Burmans have a tradition of warfare and are proud of their military traditions, they are individualists impatient of restraint, and military discipline does not come naturally to them. The average Burman, however, is brave and fearless when his antipathies against outsiders are aroused, or when his country is invaded.

Racial antagonism, fear and distrust between the dominant Burmans and the ethnic minorities of Karens, Kachins, Mons, Shans and Chins, who together comprise one-third of Burma's population, is still high. However, recent efforts by the Burmese government to assuage the traditional hostility of these minority groups toward the Burmans through the grant of semiautonomous status and by generous treatment of captured ethnic dissidents may eventually create a greater measure of harmony in relationships between these minorities and the Burmans.

Eighty-four percent of the inhabitants of Burma, and ninety-five percent of the Burmans, are Buddhists. The next largest group, principally the ethnic minorities, are animists, and there is a strong current of animism in the Buddhism of Burma. A significant proportion, perhaps one-third, of the 2,500,000 Karens is Christian, principally Baptist.

Buddhism is the greatest unifying force in Burma. The Burmese Government, while maintaining separation of church and state and religious freedom for all, has attempted to strengthen Buddhist monastic and other institutions. It is possible, however, that the new proselytizing tendencies within Buddhism may eventually result in friction with non-Buddhist, mainly Moslem and Christian minorities.

No one can understand Burma today without having at least an elementary awareness of the role of Buddhism in Burmese life. Buddhism influences Burmese reactions to any given situation, and to a great extent determines typical Burmese interpretations of events. Buddhism is more than a religion; it is a way of life. It provides a moral code, goals in social and economic life, and even enters into nationalistic sentiments, as the kernel of distinctive Burmese culture. The individual Burmese attempts to follow the five basic precepts which underlie Buddhist morality: (1) to abstain from taking life; (2) from stealing; (3) from committing adultery; (4) from lying; and (5) from partaking of intoxicants. By village standards for example, a man may be an upright citizen in every respect, but because he supplemented his income by shooting birds, he is held in low esteem by his community. He has violated the first precept of the Buddhist code of moral conduct and therefore has earned social disfavor.

3. Holidays and Celebrations

a. All of Burma's great religious holidays are related to seasonal changes, a common occurrence among peoples whose lives are dependent upon agriculture. Burma's most important holiday by far is the Thingyan (Water Festival). It occurs in April (undatable by Western calendar standards since the Burmese use an irregular lunar calendar). It coincides with the coming of the "New Year," and anticipates the end of the hot season and the arrival of the life-giving monsoonal rains, which will make the new planting season possible a month later. In the villages, Thingyan is really the only holiday which is observed wholeheartedly by everyone. All work comes to a halt for at least a three-day period. In Rangoon, Thingyan has acquired an even more festive character than in the villages. Gayly decorated floats, similar to those in a Mardi Gras parade, compete for prizes.

b. A genuinely Buddhist celebration, Buddha Day (Full Moon of Kason) occurs in May and commemorates three holy events, the Buddha's birth, his achievement of Buddhahood, and his death and concomitant achievement of nirvana. In the villages, actual observation of this holiday ranks it fourth in importance. The Chief activity connected with the event is the watering of the roots of all sacred Bo trees, the type of tree under which the Buddha sought and found enlightenment.

c. The third-ranking holiday and one of great Buddhist significance is Dhammasetkya (Full Moon of Waso). Supposedly commemorating the date of the Buddha's first sermon, as well as his passing into "homelessness," it also marks the beginning of the Buddhist "Lent." This "Lenten" season, which lasts more than three months, is noted for the restrictions it imposes upon monkhood and laity alike. No one willingly

undertakes any activity of importance during this lengthy period. Marriages are banned, no houses are built and monks supposedly confine themselves more closely to their monasteries for purposes of meditation. The day itself is marked by the gathering of Waso flowers and their presentation at monasteries or other holy places.

d. The end of the Lent arrives in mid-October with a spectacular holiday, Thadingyut (Festival of Lights). Its arrival coincides with the rainy season. It marks the end of the heaviest work in the rice paddies, and thus is an occasion of great joy. At night, thousands of small lamps and candles are placed on trees, posts, houses, monasteries, pagoda platforms, and other appropriate places. These and other major holidays are supplemented by a host of local celebrations which have more of an atmosphere of a carnival than a religious occasion.

e. Tazaungdaing (Full Moon of Tazaungmone) follows Thadingyut by one month and is something of an encore to the earlier event. It is a spectacular festival of lights, more fully observed in lower Burma where monsoon rains last longer. In upper Burma villages the non-Buddhist character of this celebration is emphasized by traditional stealing of less valuable foodstuffs, although recompense is eventually made for the theft. This holiday is also utilized as an important occasion for Kahtein ceremonies, in which new robes are given to the Buddhist monks.

f. The last of the holidays which have nationwide significance, Tabaung (Full Moon of Tabaung), is a harvest festival and is basically non-Buddhist in origin although it too is observed through Buddhist forms since it falls on a "duty" day of "sabbath" (Full Moon Day). Tabaung marks the climax of the series of festivals which began in mid-October and now, in February, gradually come to an end. In upper Burma villages Tabaung is celebrated by the making of offerings to the nats (spirits) through the offices of special functionaries.

g. Supplementing the major nationwide holidays are a variety of local events, some of which attract considerable attention on the national level, but most of which are actually celebrated in some particular locale. Most typical of these events are the many pagoda festivals. There is little about these festivals that would suggest a religious atmosphere. The nearest approximation in U. S. culture would be the state or county fair.

4. Attitudes and Sensitivities

One of the most refreshing things about the Burmese is his excellent sense of humor. His light-hearted ways have caused him to be branded as charming but idle. Actually, however, he is quite capable of exerting himself, but exertion is tempered by the desire to "grow old gracefully." He would rather spend money for building a new monastery than put his resources into things of this life.

Burmese life presents many contradictions. While pets are comparatively rare, and Buddhism makes killing animals a crime, the condition

they are allowed to live in is unimportant, provided they are kept alive. From Buddhism, the men learn that they are the more important sex, yet the women often manage the household and make the decisions.

The Burmese have a curious disregard for the actions of others. "It is his way," they will say with a laugh when a person does something strange; "what does it matter to us?"

In both public and private affairs, tempers rise quickly but rapidly subside, usually without lasting resentment. The Burmese is seldom lukewarm; he is either passive or very aggressive, particularly in the cities. On the other hand, life is generally serene and calm in a Burmese village. There is no one more delightful than the quiet, friendly self-respecting villager of Upper Burma.

G. U. S. OFFICIALS

1. Ambassador ..... William P. Snow
2. Counsellor ..... Peyton Kerr
3. Army Attache ..... Colonel Marvin A. Kreidberg
4. Naval Attache ..... Colonel Franklin B. Nihart (USMC)
5. Air Attache ..... Lt Col Roy M. Ahalt, Jr
6. Foreign Agriculture Service ... Carl O. Winbert
7. International Cooperation Administration ..... Richard S. McCaffery
8. Public Affairs Officer ..... Arthur W. Hummel
9. Embassy Political Officer ..... William C. Hamilton

H. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

1957

1. "Junking" the then current and incomplete Eight-year Plan, marking a drastic shift in national policy, and replacing it with a Four-year Plan. The new plan has as its prime objective the establishment of law and order.

2. Home Guard (Pyusawhti) expanded to free the army for regular duty.

3. Discussions with the Premier of Communist China that brought a closer solution of the border problem in the Shan and Kachin States.

4. Resumption of economic aid, which had been discontinued since 1953, by the United States.

1958

1. Split in Burma's leading political party, AFPFL, caused no-confidence motion against Prime Minister. Motion was defeated but without a substantial majority. The Communist-dominated National Unity (NUF) provided the Premier with over one-third of his total vote and it was speculated promises were made to legalize the Communist Party in return for the NUF votes. The army commander, General Ne Win, warned "the army will take action" if Communists were included in the Government.

2. U. Seinda, leader of the Arkanese guerrillas surrendered with 1,000 men in January. Later in the year, 1,100 more insurgents surrendered.

3. U Nu formed a new cabinet reducing the cabinet membership from 30 to 20. He was expelled from the anti-Fascist People's Freedom League.

4. General Ne Win and the Army took control of Burma. Ne Win, "at the request of U Nu", formed a new government and agreed to hold free elections within six months from September. U Nu "resigned" as Premier and Ne Win succeeded him with a "caretaker" government.

1959

1. The Air Force received six troop-carrying helicopters that will enable them to make a significant contribution in the support of the Army campaign against insurgents.

2. Ne Win resigned as Premier because he could not ready the government for elections within the prescribed 6 months from the date he took office. Opposition from U Nu's political bloc to the extension of the tenure of the Ne Win Government evaporated except from the Communist dominated National Unity Front and a few diehards of U Nu's faction. The amendment was passed and Ne Win was reelected Prime Minister.

3. Upon the recommendation of General Ne Win, Burma's most capable field commander, Brigadier Douglas Blake retired. He commanded Burma's Southern Army Command and relinquished his command in February.

4. Thai-Burmese relations showed a gradual improvement. Field Marshal Sarit, of Thailand, and General Ne Win are personally acquainted and reportedly mutually sympathetic.

5. The government asked for revision of the 1954 treaty with Japan setting up reparations for WWII damages.

6. Soviet Aid for costly projects were cancelled because of the expense to the Burmese government.

7. President Win Maung issued a proclamation dissolving both houses of Parliament with a promise of General elections to be held in February 1960.



HEADQUARTERS
USARMAW/25th Inf Div
OAC of S, G2

ORIENTATION
MAP

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CAMBODIA

A. GEOGRAPHY

Cambodia is located on the southern part of the Southeast Asian peninsula. It is bordered on the north by Thailand and Laos, the east and southeast by South Vietnam, and the west and southwest by Thailand and the Gulf of Siam. Covering approximately 89,000 square miles, it is somewhat larger than the state of North Dakota.

B. TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

1. Terrain

The interior portions of Cambodia are gently rolling to almost level plains containing great forests of varying densities, large areas of short and tall grass, and a mosaic of cultivated fields and scrub. The borders of the country are marked by three extensive uplands, separated from each other by three broad lowland corridors, which afford easy access between Cambodia and Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam.

The Cardamom mountains, located at the southern part of the Cambodia-South Vietnam border, and the Elephant Chain, running along the western coast up to the Cambodia-Thailand border, form a notable barrier between the large interior plains and the Gulf of Siam. In places their steep seaward faces rise 9,000 feet above the narrow coastal plain. To the north, the Dangrek escarpment (a long, steep slope of the Korat plateau of Thailand) is more than 6,000 feet in places.

Nearly the entire area of Cambodia is drained by the Mekong River, one of the world's major rivers. The Tonle Sap, the largest lake in Southeast Asia, serves as a natural reservoir for the flood waters of the Mekong. From February to May the lake is 100 miles long; its greatest width is about 25 miles, and its average depth about six feet. The lake normally empties southeastward into the Mekong via the Tonle Sap River. In June, however, the Tonle Sap reverses its flow and discharges flood waters of the Mekong into the Tonle Sap Lake. When the lake reaches its greatest volume, in October or November, it is approximately three times its low-water area, and its maximum depth has increased to 33 feet.

Forests dominate the Cambodian landscape, a valuable asset in a timber-starved Asia. Dense forests of tropical hardwoods and softwoods cover nearly half the area of the country; open forests (widely spaced trees and scattered bushes, giving a park-like appearance) blanket about one-third of the area. Only about one-fourteenth of Cambodia is under continuous cultivation.

2. Climate

Cambodia has two climates. Along the southwest coast, tropical monsoons bring summer rains; in the interior portions of the country

the climate differs from the monsoon climate of the coast in that the amount of rain is less and temperature ranges are greater. Everywhere January is the coolest month, and April or May the hottest. Daily temperatures are constantly above 64° F. In the tropical monsoon area, May to October are the wettest months. In interior Cambodia, on the other hand, the wet season lasts from March to September. Annual rainfall varies from about 55 inches at Phnom Penh to over 160 inches in the Cardamom Mountains. Between October and February, dry winds sweep the interior of Cambodia.

C. HISTORIC BACKGROUND

The earliest historical records of Cambodia's part of the Indochinese Peninsula is derived mainly from native inscriptions. They tell us that the Khmer, who were to become the dominant people of Cambodia, came down the Mekong valley, between the first and sixth centuries A.D., and defeated the original occupants of the lower Mekong valley and delta. The early kings of the Khmer were converted to the worship of a Hindu god, Siva, by Brahman immigrants from India.

These early dynasties conquered the territory which today is Cambodia and considerable territory which is now part of Thailand. By the end of the eighth century, the powerful Malay kingdom in Sumatra captured the Khmer capital. In the next 200 years, the Khmer empire claimed part of northeast Burma, as well as much of Thailand, Laos, modern Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

For the first time, near the end of the 15th century, direct contact with the West is recorded in reports by missionaries, travelers, and merchants from Portugal and Spain. Cambodia soon became familiar to the western world. The monumental architecture around Angkor particularly attracted the attention of Europeans.

By 1603 Cambodia succumbed to Siam. Siamese rule was insecure, however, and the Annamese (from east-central Indochina) gained control of the Mekong delta in the early years of the 17th century. In the 18th century Siam and Annam struggled for control of Cambodia. The Annamese, unlike the Siamese, were interested in populating Cambodia and imposing their cultural institutions on the Cambodians. Cambodia's desire for independence, combined with a cultural bond with Siam (both shared the teachings of Hinayana Buddhism), led to a request for Siamese aid. Four years of war, consequent to this request, left Cambodia a poverty-stricken country.

Cambodia found herself in support of the French, who were at war with Annam. As the French gained control of important territory in Annam, they replaced Annam as Siam's contender for control of Cambodia. In 1867 Siam was forced to recognize the French Protectorate over Cambodia. Modern Cambodian history begins with the establishment of the French Protectorate.

By the turn of the century, the various parts of the Indochina Peninsula--Laos, Tonkin, Cochin China, Annam, and Cambodia--had been united under the authority of French rule. In Cambodia the French acquired the

right to do business, to conduct foreign affairs, and to administer the country's internal affairs. In increasing numbers, and through myriad administrative agencies, French commercial, industrial, and agricultural interests carried out reforms to develop the country and the region.

World War II tended to create or to accelerate political movements in Cambodia and Indochina in general. On the one hand, French power in this area weakened considerably; on the other hand, Japanese power and prestige increased. Thailand took the opportunity to invade Cambodia after the French defeat by the Germans in 1940. The French were forced to cede portions of Cambodia, as well as Laotian territories, to Thailand in 1941. With the establishment of complete military control by the Japanese over Indochina, the political situation changed radically.

In order to counter the Japanese appeal of a "Greater East Asia," the French put forward the concept of an Indochinese Federation. The development of the different states was to be encouraged within a federal framework directed by the French. After the Japanese surrender, French troops reoccupied the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. The French and the Cambodians began to redefine their future relationship. On 7 January 1946 Cambodia was recognized as an autonomous kingdom within the French Union.

In spite of this change in French-Cambodian relations, pressure began to mount for more real independence. There remained a traditional fear of the Vietnamese as a potential threat to the political independence of Cambodia. Cambodia wanted complete control over their administration, foreign relations, and army. Cambodian representatives in the French Union's Assembly asked for a new treaty, which was formulated in November 1949.

Speaking for Cambodia, King Norodom Sihanouk maintained that the value of the treaty was nullified by: (1) the failure to abolish the system of special courts for Frenchmen; (2) economic and tax restrictions; and (3) the French retention of command over Cambodian military forces. The King's grievances were not overcome. Dramatically, in mid-June 1953, he exiled himself into Thailand. After a short exile he returned to Cambodia to continue his fight for independence. The King finally succeeded in winning virtually all of his demands. The royal government was recognized as the sole and legal government of the country.

D. POLITICAL

1. Government

Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government. The Sangkim Reastr Niym (People's Social Community), a socialist neutralist party, founded and still controlled by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, occupies all seats in the National Assembly. Despite the predominance of the Sangkum party, governmental instability has been high as a result of absolute dependence upon the whim of mercurial Sihanouk. The Cambodian Government is anti-Communist in internal policy but follows a neutral foreign policy.

E. ECONOMIC

The Cambodian economy is underdeveloped and shows no signs of significant growth. However, economic conditions in the past have generally been regarded as satisfactory. The economy is almost entirely based on agriculture, fishing, and livestock raising. Rice, Cambodia's chief asset, is produced on small farms which, because of the primitive methods used, have a low rate of productivity. There is little pressure on land resources, and per capita rice consumption is high compared to other Southeast Asian countries. Other important agricultural commodities are maize, pepper, and palm sugar. Forestry products also play a significant part in the Cambodian economy. Limited surveys show that the country is deficient in mineral resources. Small deposits of coal, iron phosphates and trace minerals exist, but no significant mining has been undertaken. Industry is negligible.

Economic difficulties have been aggravated by unsatisfactory economic relations with neighboring countries. For example, trade among the former Associated States has been subject to tariffs, and trade between Cambodia and Thailand remains limited. Available foreign exchange resources are expected to be sufficient to meet consumer goods import needs. Assuming continued foreign assistance, economic conditions will probably not threaten political stability through 1958, but there is little prospect for a substantial improvement in Cambodia's economic capabilities during this time.

F. SOCIOLOGICAL

1. Population

It is estimated that as of 1 Jan 1959 the population of Cambodia was 4,803,000. Approximately 86% are Cambodians, 6% Chinese, 7% non-Cambodian Indochinese. Other ethnic groups comprise 1%.

2. The People and their Customs

a. The Cambodians, Or Khmers, are probably of Indonesian extraction, with strains of Malay, Indian, and more recently, Chinese. The national language is Khmer, the written language is Indian in origin. The majority are Hinayana Buddhists and Pali is the sacred language. Compared with other native groups of the area, the Khmers are relatively tall in stature, about five feet five inches, of vigorous constitution, and appear rather picturesque in their brightly colored attire. The Cambodian is a peaceful and contented type of individual. His natural tendency is to be friendly and hospitable to all. Overseas Chinese monopolize the commercial enterprises of the country. The Vietnamese, who have emigrated to Cambodia, are generally more industrious than the Cambodians and are employed as fishermen, artisans, and businessmen. The Crown and Buddhist leaders exert considerable influence among the traditionalist-minded and normally docile people.

b. Most Cambodians live in villages. The kind of village will be determined by the characteristics of the land and the resulting kinds of cultivation. The most important factor determining the type of settlements is nearness to the major waterways. Along the rivers, for example, the people live in villages strung out along the levee. Further away from the river, the people live in relatively isolated clusters.

c. The large majority of Khmer villages have their own pagoda which serves as the nucleus of the community. The pagoda is a symbol of village unity, providing a place for regular religious, political and social activities, as well as informal gatherings where village events are discussed. It is a place of worship and instruction, religious and secular. Nearly all the peasant farmer's needs are satisfied within the village. Ordinarily the farmer leaves his village only for a brief period of travel to a town or city.

d. Family bonds are very strong. The father is considered the head of the family but responsibility is commonly shared with his wife. The relationship between parents and children is warm and affectionate. Parents are highly respected. Family life, Cambodian historical experiences, and the Buddhist religion have tended to discourage aggressive traits among the people.

e. Music and singing are the most popular forms of entertainment. There are numerous songs which everyone knows by heart. Labor is often accompanied by singing. Wandering troops of rural musicians are available for celebrations, reaching even quite remote areas. Cambodia long has had a kind of mime-dance theater. Cambodian art has been influenced heavily by Siam. Chinese and French influences are important in the cities, especially Phnom Penh. The admission price to a movie is within the means of almost everyone, and the movie houses are almost always packed. Most movie houses in Cambodia, however, are concentrated in Phnom Penh. Most films imported are American and French.

3. Holidays and Celebrations

a. The Cambodian New Year comes in mid-April, shortly before the hot season and the growing cycle of rice. At the royal palace, elaborate precede and follow the appointed day, which is determined each year by the royal astrologer. Religious celebrations last for 7 days. Commoners celebrate New Year in essentially the same form. Three days prior to the appointed day all quarrels are avoided and/or ended. The people also refrain from killing animals and desist from any business activities.

b. The mid-May "Feast of the Sacred Furrow" comes about a month after the New Year celebration. The "Feast" is celebrated in Phnom Penh in the presence of the King. Traditionally it has to be completed before any farmer could turn his field, but peasantry has long ceased to await this royal signal. Villages from every part of the country send witnesses to Phnom Penh to bring back first hand news of the event for the rituals of the feast are believed to forecast the crop results for the coming season. The climax of the feast is the placing of two oxen before

seven silver bowls containing rice, maize, beans, sesame, grass, alcohol and water. Should they eat each of the first four ingredients, bountiful harvest in these crops may be expected. Should they partake of the other items, dire results are predicted, for grass indicates plagues, water floods, and alcohol, piracy and thievery.

c. The last three months of the rainy season, which extends from May to October, are known as the vassa. This is the three month period of retreat for Brahman priest (baku) at the palace. Bonzes, however, spend only a month (mid-July to mid-August) in seclusion during which all religious activities including weddings, are suspended. At the royal palace, the vassa is signaled by Brahnamic rites not practiced in the rest of the country. Away from the palace, vassa is observed with Buddhist rituals. The inhabitants of a community gather and accompanied by an orchestra, march in a procession to the pagoda. They sing and the ceremony ends with the pagoda chief leading the congregation in prayer. Congregations sometimes make a pilgrimage to a neighboring pagoda as even to Angar Wat (a world famous temple) if the community is located closeby.

d. The Feast of the Ancestor is the occasion for inviting ancestors to feast with the living. A procession carries special festive foods to the local pagoda where villagers, monks and ancestors (invited before hand by a diviner) enjoy the feast. The monks read the life of Buddha to the people. In the evening canoe models are loaded with candles and incense and released on rivers to return the ancestors to their own world.

e. The "Festival of the Waters" is held in Phnom Penh at the junction of the Mekong and Bassac Rivers at the end of the rainy season. The chief attraction are the regattas held on three consecutive days. Tens of thousands of people converge in the city to watch or participate in the events since the pirogues (dugout canoes) represent villages from all over the country. The symbolic climax to the festival comes at the end of the third day when all pirogues are gathered up stream and a line is strung between two barges. After the Brahmanic duties have been invoked, the line is served just as a full moon appears. The pirogues race forward and the King salutes the moon while the conches are sounded. The meaning of the Water Festival is not clearly understood. The Cambodian elite probably feel the aim of the ceremony is to prevent evil spirits from devastating the kingdom, while peasants seem to regard the rituals as expressions of thanksgiving to the goddesses of earth and water for their goodness and of apology for defiling them through use. At the same time the King offers his salute to the moon, Cambodians in all communities do likewise. This appears to be related to hopes for a bountiful harvest in the ensuing weeks.

4. Attitudes and Sensitivities

Cambodians do not expect outsiders to know all the aspects of their code of behavior, but it is appreciated if an individual knows something of proper behavior.

The Cambodians act cautiously, particularly in relation to strangers, because he is afraid of causing embarrassment to himself or others; he does not want to give the impression that he is trying to assert himself. Until he is sure that personalities in social relationships are congenial, he is careful to see that his behavior is particularly restrained. In his daily social life he is particularly careful to show proper respect and courtesy, lest he cause others to be resentful. Perhaps the Cambodian's greatest anxiety is that he will be unable to understand the situation in which he is involved, and therefore will not know how to act or what is expected of others.

The Cambodians stress nonviolence, temperance, diligence and self-discipline, as well as other aspects of the Buddhist code of personal conduct. Children are taught to despise lying. In the past the Cambodians have felt little compulsion to "succeed" in a material sense. However, educated Cambodians, proud of the glorious episodes of their history, are unhappy about the present backward conditions, and believe that material progress is an important means to national survival.

Cambodians respect those nations which have most influenced their culture: India and France. India is revered as the "father" of Cambodian customs, the homeland of Buddhism. Despite Cambodia's nationalist effort against France during their struggle for independence, Cambodians generally do not dislike the French. They value French cultural and modernizing influences.

G. U. S. OFFICIALS

1. Ambassador ..... William C. Trimble
2. Counselor ..... Edmund H. Kellog
3. Army Attache ..... Col L. F. Springer
4. Air Attache ..... Lt Col R. B. Bieck
5. Naval Attache ..... Cdr J. R. Oliver Jr
6. International Cooperation Administration ..... Alvin J. Roseman
7. Public Affairs Officer ..... John M. Anspacher
8. Chief, Military Advisor Assistance Group ..... Brig Gen Charles H. Chase

H. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

1957

1. Continued success of short-lived cabinets which had been a feature of Cambodian politics since 1955.

2. Sihanouk toured Communist and non-Communist countries in Asia which highlighted the country's policy of neutralism in the cold war.

3. Limited scale Communist China aid program.

4. Soviet trade and cultural agreements were concluded while the country continued to receive aid from the United States and France for economic and defense purposes.

5. Bad relations between Cambodia and South Vietnam over border incidents continued.

1958

1. Sihanouk delivered an anti-Communist speech in opposition to his former stand.

2. The press launched an anti-West campaign.

3. Sihanouk's Popular Socialist Party won all 61 seats in Parliament elections.

4. The National Assembly was dissolved by King Sumarit at the request of the government. The new assembly was dominated by the Popular Socialist Party, led by Prince Sihanouk. Sihanouk's party won all 61 seats.

5. The caretaker government of Penn Nouth resigned in April and former Premier Sim Var was named to form a new cabinet.

6. Sim Var resigned in June and in July the National Assembly invested a new cabinet headed by Prince Sihanouk. Shortly after taking office, Sihanouk officially recognized Communist China.

7. Relations between Cambodia and Thailand were strained as the Thais closed their border to Cambodia in November. Cambodia requested a "temporary" suspension of diplomatic relations. In December, Cambodia issued a formal protest to the UN that Thai troops with equipment were massed on their joint borders. This proved to be field exercises by the Thais and nothing more.

1959

1. Coup plots against the government by Brigadier General Dap Chhuon and Sam Sary, veteran politician, were "nipped in the bud". Sam Sary had been a "hunted man" since January and Dap Chhuon was killed by government forces in a surprise raid on his province of Siem Reap on 3 March.

2. Clashes between Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces have occurred and are likely to continue because Cambodia has charged that South Vietnam was aiding Cambodian dissidents.

3. Premier Sihanouk made state visits to Indonesia, South Vietnam, Egypt, and Yugoslovia.

4. The King and Queen narrowly missed assination when a bomb disguised as a gift exploded.


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THAILAND
LAOS
CAMBODIA
SOUTH VIETNAM
GULF OF SIAM
SOUTH CHINA SEA
SARAVANE
MUANG UBON
NAKHON RATCHASIMA
SE KHONG
SAMRONG
SISOPHON
SIEM REAP
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CAMBODIA
ORIENTATION MAP
GLOSSARY
SE, SONG ..... RIVER
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MILES

INDONESIA

A. GEOGRAPHY

The Republic of Indonesia consists of more than 4,000 islands stretching nearly 3,000 miles in east-west direction and over 1,200 miles from North to South. About 2,000 of the islands are inhabited. The four major islands are Java, Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo. Indonesia lies astride the equator between Southeast Asia and Australia and between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Excluding Western New Guinea, which is under dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and British Borneo, the total land area of Indonesia is 583,000 square miles.

B. TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

1. Terrain

A mountainous arc stretches from northern Sumatra to the eastern most islands of Indonesia in the Banda sea. From Sumatra eastward they decrease in height. Another arc of mountains which sweeps down from the north through the Philippines into eastern Indonesia, crosses the first arc. Sumatra and Java have mountain belts which run in an east-west direction. The complexity of the mountain ranges of the Moluccas and Celebes, as compared with mountain formations in the western islands, can be explained by the fact that these two arcs meet and cross each other. The mountains of the Celebes, for example, run east-west and north-south.

Borneo has no well-drained lowlands and the Celebes has no deltas formed by rivers. Otherwise, all the islands have equatorial lowlands, criss-crossed by rivers, forming deltas, marshy coastal plains, and alluvial plains. Usually the plains are separated from the mountains by rugged hilly country. Borneo, the largest of the islands, has by far the largest lowland plain, although more than one-half of Sumatra is covered by lowlands.

Indonesia's equatorial climate is favorable to dense forests. Natural vegetation, however, has been strongly affected by the activities of Indonesians. As the population grows more dense, vegetation is thinned out. Forests still cover about 70 percent of the surface of northern and north-eastern Sumatra, southern Borneo, central Celebes and the Molluccas.

Coastal forests of mangrove, nipa palms and sago palms are common to the shores of all islands. Equatorial rain forests, modified by the activities of the people, cover most of the lowlands. Brushy grasslands cover areas in central Sumatra and especially southwestern Celebes. Above the elevation of 2,000 feet, the forests of Indonesia become subtropical in appearance, with oaks, pines, fern and the like. Extensive teak forests cover the northern hills of Central and East Java. Coconut trees are a familiar sight in most of Indonesia below 2,300 feet, but their greatest concentration is in the northeastern islands, especially Celebes.

2. Climate

The climate of Indonesia is characterized by constant high temperature, heavy rainfall and high relative humidity. Rainfall varies from 60 to more than 150 inches a year. Only the southern fringe of islands from Java to Timor have a marked dry season from June through August.

With no definite seasons, the northwest and southeast monsoons become the only distinguishable periods of weather. Between each monsoon are several weeks of transitional weather. From December through March, northwest monsoon winds blow out of Asia. Since they pass over warm seas before reaching the islands, the air is moist and yields heavy conventional rainfall where it is forced to rise up the mountain slopes. During the northwest monsoon, fine weather often changes to storms, which may persist from eight to fourteen days. From April to November, southeast monsoon winds originating in Australia blow across Indonesia. These winds are dry at their source, but become progressively more moist as they pass over the tropical seas.

Strong winds are rare, but thunderstorms are frequent during the northwest monsoon. Interior Java has a world record of 322 thunderstorm days per year. Strong squalls known as "Sumatras" are found in the Straits of Malacca. These squalls occur in July and August when the Southeasterly monsoon recurs north of the equator and becomes the southwesterly wind. The extremely violent winds associated with typhoons do not occur south of 10° north latitude and there are none of the low pressure cyclonic storms of the middle latitudes.

C. HISTORIC BACKGROUND

Indonesia's recorded history began with scattered Hindu inscriptions in Java and Borneo dating from the 5th century. During the first five centuries of the Christian era, Hindu traders from India (with Brahman and Buddhist priests in their wake) settled in the western islands and established small Hindu states. These states gradually merged into the powerful kingdoms of Srivijaya, based in southern Sumatra and Singhasari, which embraced eastern Java. Srivijaya extended its influence into the Malay Peninsula and even waged wars with states of southern India and Ceylon in the 11th and 13th centuries respectively.

The advent of Islam in the 13th century heralded the eventual doom of the Hindu era. The only Hindu stronghold to survive was in Bali, which remains a cameo of medieval Hindu culture to this day. Islam spread throughout the archipelago and to Malaya, and a series of petty Moslem states were formed in its wake, providing the new pattern of government. Marco Polo and his party, in the late 13th century, were the first Europeans to enter the Indies, but the Portuguese, in the 16th century, led the general European excursion. In the 18th century, planned emigration from China to Southeast Asia really began, and this was stimulated in the 19th and 20th centuries by the rapid economic developments and needs for cheap labor in the European colonial territories.

The British and the Dutch competed for control of the Indies. The Dutch, from their arrival at the end of the 16th century, were more successful in extending their control over the islands, while British interests were mainly restricted to western Indonesia where the British East India Company had commercial interests.

The Dutch East India Company (formed in 1602 and dissolved in 1798) governed the parts of the country brought under its influence. Under charter from the Netherlands Government the company exploited Indonesia's resources for nearly 200 years. Its impress was such that the Netherlands East Indies Government, which administered the country for the succeeding 150 years was known not uncommonly as "The Company". Finally, in the 19th century, the Government of the Netherlands took direct responsibility for the running of the colony.

The Japanese occupation in World War II gave the Indonesian Nationalist movement an opportunity to come to the fore. On their defeat in 1945, the Japanese encouraged Indonesian Nationalist leaders to proclaim their independence from the Dutch. This they did on 17 August 1945. Indonesia rejected a Netherlands proposal to make Indonesia an autonomous partner in a union of states under the Dutch crown. In 1947 all negotiations between the two failed and the Netherlands Government resorted to force to keep Indonesia in the fold. Finally on 27 November 1949, as a result of a round table conference at the Hague, sovereignty over Indonesia, except for New Guinea, which was to remain under Dutch control, was transferred to the new federal state of Indonesia. A constitution was drafted and accepted during this conference.

Initially, it was agreed that the Netherlands and Indonesia would form a union under the nominal guidance of the Netherlands crown. The union and the federal form of government were short lived, however. New disputes broke out about the implementation of The Hague Treaty. The Indonesians complained of the Dutch policy in New Guinea and the Netherlands accused the Indonesians of violating the agreements safeguarding the minorities and the economic clauses of the treaty. In the course of 1950 the representative bodies of several federal states adopted resolutions which resulted in the liquidation of the member states and their incorporation in the federation; and on August 1950, the unitary state, Republic Indonesia, was proclaimed.

D. POLITICAL

1. Government

The Republic of Indonesia is a constitutional democracy, based on the philosophy of "Pantja Sila", or five principles, enunciated by President Sukarno in 1945. These are: Divine Omnipotence, Humanism, Nationalism, Democracy, and Social Justice. The Indonesian Government's structure and functions have not been permanently established as the national constitution has not been completely drafted, although it has been under discussion for nearly nine years.

The present general structure of the Government is as follows. In form, the executive branch is headed by a president and a vice-president, having approximately coequal powers. They were elected for an indefinite term pending ratification of the constitution. The president is Achmed Sukarno. The post of vice-president is vacant, since the former incumbent, Mohammed Hatta, resigned in December 1956. Under the President is a prime minister and a 24-man cabinet, most of whose members also carry portfolios as heads of ministries. There are also the National Defense Council and other ad hoc committees which the President has formed to facilitate operation of the Government.

President Sukarno has invoked his powers under the State of War and Siege (which he proclaimed in March 1957) to create a special 45-man appointive body called the National Advisory Council. Under his chairmanship, this body is to advise the Cabinet, but the advice, particularly in regard to preparing laws and regulations, is binding and not subject to parliamentary review. By this means, President Sukarno has created the machinery for a totalitarian government, but he has not yet used it as such.

There are four major political parties and over 100 other parties of varying lesser influence. The major parties are the Masjumi (Indonesian Moslem League), the PNI (Nationalist Party), the NU (Moslem Scholars), and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). In elections held in Java the summer of 1957, the PKI jumped from fourth place to the position of the most powerful party on that island, but the outlying islands of Indonesia, where elections are yet to be held, are still staunchly anti-Communist, and view the Java political situation with great dissatisfaction.

Regionalism, resulting from geographic, ethnic, and linguistic diversity, and from the outer islanders' fears of political and economic domination by the more numerous Javanese, has always been a strong centrifugal force in the Republic of Indonesia. The people of the outlying islands also feel that they are being exploited for the economic benefit of Java. Provincialism within the Army has been preserved and fostered by the stationing of troops in their areas of origin, principally for reasons of economy and language. Since late 1956, the urge for regional autonomy has found political expression in the autonomous regimes established by the provincial military commanders.

Although these revolts followed a similar pattern, they appeared to be spontaneous reactions to particular grievances against the central government rather than coordinated uprisings. Their principal objectives were to obtain greater autonomy, a greater share of the economic returns from exports originating in the provinces, a greater voice in formulating central government policy, and the elimination of Communist influence from the Government.

The Central Government, utilizing persuasion and some intimidation, attempted to end the bloodless revolts of the outlying regions. The most dramatic government efforts were centered around two national

conferences, attended by widely representative Indonesian delegates, including dissident leaders. None of these efforts achieved any genuine success. In fact, the effect of President Sukarno's total government program since early 1957 has been to enhance the position of the Communists in the Government in the name of "national unity", and thus further to alienate the anti-Communist regional leaders.

During the fall of 1957, in anticipation of UN consideration of an Indonesian resolution calling for renewed Indonesia-Dutch negotiation of the disposition of Dutch-held Western New Guinea (West Irian), Sukarno initiated and promoted a nation-wide anti-Dutch campaign. This campaign temporarily distracted public attention from the demands and activities of the dissident leaders. However, when the Indonesian UN resolution was defeated, the Government sponsored anti-Dutch campaign got out of hand, and the Communists were able to exploit the economic confusion attendant upon the closure of important Dutch-operated enterprises.

In the midst of this, the Central Government dispatched military purchasing teams to Europe to obtain much needed military equipment. In early January 1958 Sukarno departed ostensibly on an extended "rest cure". His obvious purpose was to gain support for Indonesia's actions and to acquire economic and military aid from certain Afro-Asian nations visited. The departure of the president and the military purchasing teams triggered overt action by the dissident elements. The disaffected regional military and political leaders met in Padang, Central Sumatra, to solidify their position, coordinate their efforts, and plan a course to force an anti-Communist national policy on the Central Government before it could strengthen itself through expected Sino-Soviet Bloc aid.

The "National Revolutionary Council" which was formed in Padang, issued an ultimatum on 10 February 1958 calling for the dismissal of the Djuanda cabinet; the return of Sukarno to his elected role as "constitutional" president; the elimination of his leftist "Guided Democracy" concept of government; and the formation of a strong anti-Communist government. These demands were flatly rejected by the Central Government and on the 15th, the Council proclaimed the establishment of the "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia". The revolutionary movement was supported only by Central Sumatra, the North Celebes, and the Tapanuli area of North Sumatra, and the Central Government invoked force to suppress the rebels. On 10 March, the Central Government launched a military campaign to subdue the Sumatran contingent of the rebels. The "civil war" has been notable for its almost complete lack of bloodshed on either side, and the lack of resistance by the rebel troops. With the re-establishment of the Government authority over the populated areas of Sumatra, a campaign is expected to be undertaken against the North Celebes contingent of the revolutionary movement.

E. ECONOMIC

Indonesia has a basically agricultural economy, despite the fact that the archipelago, and particularly Sumatra, contains some of the

world's richest supplies of unexploited strategic minerals and raw materials. About three-fourths of Indonesia's population are farmers, but their per capita income averages only $40 per year, one of the lowest in the world. Rice is Indonesia's staple food and is cultivated by both wet and dry farming methods. Although rice is intensively cultivated, and two crops are harvested per year, poor strains, lack of attention to proper fertilization and inadequate distribution have led to shortages in the heavily populated Java area, forcing the Government to purchase rice, often of inferior quality, from abroad. At the same time the Government also exports good rice from other island areas in order to bolster the nation's low export balance. The chief source of national income is provided from exports of rubber, oil, copra, spices and cinchona (quinine). The nation also has vast supplies of coal, nickel, manganese, aluminum, gold, silver, tin, and other important strategic metals, but since World War II, the Indonesians have not been able to raise and maintain the level of output of any of these materials to that formerly attained under Dutch control and supervision. There are many reasons for this: chiefly the fault lies in the ineffective, new Indonesian management; the lack of qualified technical help; and the red-tape and corruption accompanying governmental attempts to stimulate industry. Manufacturing and construction in Indonesia were severely curtailed during the World War II and have made no significant recovery. There is a continuing dangerous imbalance of imports over exports, and the Indonesian currency, the rupiah, officially pegged at 8.72¢, is woth only 2.5¢. This condition has made it profitable for many exporters to engage in smuggling rather than to put up with the lessened profits, red-tape, delays, and bribery necessitated when dealing through legal governmental export channels.

Aware of Indonesia's problems, the Soviets, Communist-Chinese, East Germans, Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Yugoslavs are providing technical assistance, and economic and military aid, showing particular interest in "aiding" in the recovery of oil, rubber, and coal production. Meanwhile, the nation's gold reserves backing the issue of paper currency have dropped to about 15% of the paper in circulation. This is 5% below the legal minimum, and a downward trend still exists.

Further complicating the economic picture are the serious effects of barter trade now being carried on by several key outlying territories. This has cut off a large portion of the Government's tax revenues, and has contributed greatly to the nation's rapid economic decline. The Government is operating in the red and no relief from deficit spending is envisioned for the near future despite large injection of Soviet Bloc aid.

F. SOCIOLOGICAL

1. Population

Indonesia is the sixth most populous country in the world with an estimated 87,500,000 inhabitants.

Major ethnic groups are: Javanese, 48%; Sudanese, 15%; Malay, 8%; Madures, 8%; Chinese, 3%; and others (including non-Asiatic), 18%.

2. The People and their Customs

There is no such person as "the Indonesian". The vast differences in ethnic background, way of life, and geographical location make it impossible to sketch a "typical" Indonesian. Rather, the people described below will in large measure be the Javanese, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia.

In general, the Indonesians try to take things as they come. The most that he hopes for is that life will be calm, harmonious, and fulfilling. He believes that his fate lies in the hands of spirits or in the hands of God. Everything he does is done in the "name of God" (bi'smi'llah). With Muslims and christians, God is an individual deity.

This view of life is less evident today among Indonesians in cities than it is in rural villages. In cities, life is much as Westerners know it and expect it: the desire for individual improvement and advancement, and social progress. Yet an undercurrent of the older attitude still remains.

For example, to the Westerner, time is a swiftly flowing stream. In Indonesia, the traditional attitude towards time is that time is like a bottomless pool. Thus there is a lack of forward planning in rural areas. The cities have been much influenced by the Western sense of time. Nevertheless, there is not the same urgency and impatience as in the West, except perhaps at high government levels.

Work is a part of life; it is done without complaint. It is not particularly good for the soul or bad for the body. Leisure should occupy as much time as can be afforded. At the same time, Indonesian leaders realize that only hard work will produce more for Indonesia's welfare. Even leisure is becoming organized as movies, sports, and educational activities.

Recreational, organized, competitive, spectator sports are very little known. Bull and cock fights, and boat races are local exceptions. The most common leisure time activitiy is conversation. The most popular form of spectator recreation for most rural Indonesians in Java and Bali is the wajang play, usually performed with puppets and often in shadow form. They also enjoy music and dance performances. In cities, radio and motion pictures have tremendous appeal. Every large city has a soccer stadium. Soccer is also popular in rural areas.

Family ties are very strong in traditional Indonesian life. Although weakening slightly in cities, they are still a powerful force there. Indonesians also place a high value on friendship. Although it may be easy to become acquainted with Indonesians, they do not however make friends readily. Perhaps this is because a friend once made is expected to be a permanent and intimate companion. Friendships between adolescent boys and girls, so common in the United States, are limited in modern as well as traditional Indonesian environments.

Mutual cooperation and aid is a major ideal in Indonesia. It is the cement that held together the traditional village, and it has been incorporated into the Indonesian Constitution as a principle of national development.

It might be assumed that because Indonesia is a Muslim land, women have a low status. Actually, however, women enjoy fairly high status. They wear no veil or face-covering, and for the most part mix rather freely in male society. Women have even taken a position next to their menfolk in work, education, public service and other areas of life.

Patriotism is a powerful force in Indonesia today. Love of country has been strengthened by the struggle for independence in which most Indonesians either directly or indirectly participated.

3. Attitudes and Sensitivities

The Indonesians do not expect outsiders to know all the aspects of their code of behavior, but it is appreciated if an individual knows something of proper behavior.

Generally Indonesians may be called passive in their attitude toward life, and fatalistic toward death. The best way to handle life is to properly adhere to custom: to take things as they come and handle them as they have traditionally been handled. This passivity is reinforced by obedience to authority. In Indonesian life from the individual through the family, village, province and right up to the national government, obedience is expected. Nevertheless, life in Indonesia is enjoyed, and foreign visitors are quickly aware of the happy outlook of most Indonesians they meet.

Satisfactory and enduring social relationships among Indonesians, and between Indonesians and outsiders, are dependent on good manners. Good manners, according to the ideal of a Javanese Gentleman, consist of restraint--not talk too much, not laugh too loud, and not make too many gestures; feelings should not be shown too openly and must always show dignity and self-respect. These traditional ideals have, in cities, been supplemented by Western ideas of proper behavior.

There are numerous small points of behavior which one should keep in mind if he wishes to be regarded as polite and good mannered. Never touch a person's head (except in the case of little children); sit with your feet flat on the ground in the presence of elders; if possible do not walk in front of an older person; do not give or receive an object with the left hand; always thank a person for any courtesy or attention.

G. U. S. OFFICIALS

1. Ambassador ..... Howard P. Jones

2. Counselor ..... John G. Mein

3. Army Attache ..... Lt Col W. R. Cole

4. Air Attache ..... Lt Col John C. Summers

5. Naval Attache ..... Lt Col H. A. McCartney (USMC)

6. Public Affairs Officer ..... Lionel Landry

7. International Cooperation Administration ..... James C. Baird, Jr.

8. Chief MILTAG ..... Col Robert H. Conk

H. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

1957

1. The Central Government issued arrest orders for the former Army Deputy Chief of Staff for an attempted coup d'etat and army commanders openly defied the government in an attempt to get the Cabinet to resign. As a result, Masjumi Party members of Cabinet resigned.

2. In a series of mid-year regional council elections the Communist Party (PKI) improved its total vote.

3. The "Liberation Committee" attempted to renew negotiations on Western New Guinea. The resolution failed and the Central Government launched an anti-Dutch campaign. The campaign got out of hand and the government directed the army to assume responsibility for Dutch property.

4. President Sukarno escaped, uninjured, an assassination attempt.

1958

1. The government refused to accept UN mediation in the dispute with the Netherlands over West New Guinea.

2. The Central Sumatra Revolutionary Council set up a revolutionary Government with a full Cabinet as a result of the Central Government's rejection of its ultimatum to form a new Communist-free Cabinet.

3. "Shooting" started between the Central and Revolutionary Governments.

4. Four Army Colonels, who lead the dissidents in Central Sumatra, were discharged as the revolutionary government was formed by various anti-Communist party leaders. Dr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was named Premier of the "new" government. He and five of his cabinet ministers were accused of treason and their arrrsts were ordered by the Government of Indonesia.

5. A new rebel cabinet, headed by Colonel Joop Warouev, was formed in May.

6. Dutch holdings seized in December 1957 were nationalized by Parliament in September.

7. The "shooting war" between Rebel and Government forces waged throughout 1958. Although government forces inflicted heavy damage to Rebel personnel and equipment, at the end of the year the Rebels were still a very large "throne in the paw" of the Central Government.

1959

1. Naval personnel were sent to Yugoslavia and Poland for training.

2. Lt Gen Nasution was forced to relieve several key military men in order to save his position. They were charged with corruption. One of them, Lt Col Sukendro, was the former Indonesian Army G2.

3. The National Police was reorganized and placed under Army control for the duration of the state of emergency.

4. The Army sent a purchasing mission to Western Europe.

5. There were rumors that Lt Gen Nasution would be appointed Minister of Defense and Brig Gen Gatot Subroto the new Chief of Staff. Nasution became Minister of Defense and retained his position as Chief of Staff.

6. An agreement was signed with Russia whereby the Soviet credit of $100 million granted in 1956 will be used for construction purposes

7. The government accepted $125 million in loans from the USSR. President Sukarno devaluated 1,000 and 500 rupiah bank notes by 90 percent and proclaimed an indefinite extension of a state of war.

8. The U.S. approved a government request for $10 million worth of small arms and other equipment. Also, arrangements were made to buy 50 older planes and 10 turbo-prop jet transports.

9. The U. S. sold $40 million in farm products to Indonesia under its surplus disposal program.

10. Compulsary military service was ordered.

11. Territorial military commanders were given authority to regulate prices of daily necessities in an effort to halt the rising cost of living.

12. All political activity was prohibited by Chief of Staff, General Nasution, as a result of failure to get dictatorial powers for Sukarno from the Constituent Assembly. Sukarno re-established the 1945 constitution and dissolved the assembly. Premier Djuanda's

cabinet resigned and he was named Finance Minister and "First Minister" in the new Cabinet. Sukarno stated he would not exercise dictatorial powers although the 1945 Constitution clearly grants them.

P&C GRAPHIC NR 621 MAY 58

U.S. ARMY MAP SERVICE, FAR EAST - 5/58 - 2C

LAOS

A. GEOGRAPHY

Laos, located in the center of the Eastern part of the Southeast Asian peninsula, is bounded on the North by Communist China, the East by North Vietnam, the South by Cambodia, and the West by Thailand. It measures some 600 miles long from North to South and covers an area of 91,400 square miles (approximately twice the area of Pennsylvania).

B. TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

1. Terrain

Laos is a mountainous country with small plateau sections and hills in the south. A mountain chain with an intricate network of mountain spurs and narrow valleys with summits ranging from between 3,000 to 6,000 feet runs in a general southeasterly direction following the Laos-North Vietnam border. The elevation decreases from northwest to southeast. In the central portion of the northern half of Laos is an area called the Tran Ninh Plateau. This plateau is a high rectangular basin surrounded by mountains and deep canyons. Along the Mekong River, which is the west boundary of Laos, there is a narrow belt that extends from a point west of Vientiane and generally follows the Mekong south and widens considerably as it reaches the vicinity of Savannakhet. This area is comparatively level to gentle rolling hills and mountains in the north and east. To the south of Saravane and east of Pakse is an undulating basalt plateau approximately 3,500 to 4,000 feet above sea level which is bordered on the west, south and east by cliffs ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 feet.

2. Climate

Two main seasons characterize the weather in Laos. Winter, which extends from November through March, is the period of the northeast monsoon. Summer, which extends from June through August, is the period of the southwest monsoon. The months between the two seasons have transitional weather. The arrival of winter monsoons varies from year to year but is usually well established over the whole of Indochina by November and continues through March. This season is the driest period of the year in all sections except the east coast. Prolonged periods of drizzle and light rain occur from late December through March. These spells are accompanied by low stratus clouds and fog. Winds are generally light and from a northeasterly direction. Temperatures remain generally high throughout the year. Freezing temperatures are rare and occur only in the northern highlands. Rainfall is heavy throughout the country, averaging 50 to 80 inches annually in most localities.

Laos has a tropical monsoon climate characterized by a hot rainy summer and a cooler, dry winter. Vientiane has a mean temperature

of 81 degrees Fahrenheit in April and 69 in January. Maximum March-May temperatures are commonly over 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Annual rainfall ranges from 55 inches at Savannakhet to over 160 on the mountain crests. Morning fog is common in the valleys.

C. HISTORIC BACKGROUND

Laotians originally were part of a Thai kingdom in southwestern China. An invasion of the Mongols, in the middle of the 13th century, drove the Thais southward into Burma, Siam, Laos, and Vietnam. Numerous "Hill Thai" migrated to Laos from southern China during and after the 13th century. These "hill" peoples (so-called because they remained scattered throughout the highlands) today constitute an estimated half of the population.

In the early 14th century, one of the leaders of the Laotians, Fa Ngom, fled to the Cambodian (Khmer) court, in the hopes of winning support to gain control of Muong Swa (Laos). The Cambodian King, anxious to make Muong Swa independent of the newly powerful Ayuthia (Thailand), lent Fa Ngom an army. Fa Ngom conquered considerably more territory than present-day Laos, and in 1353, founded the kingdom of Lan Xang.

After more than a century of unity and prosperity, the Annamese (from east-central Indochina) destroyed the city of Luang Prabang, the religious center of Lan Xang. The capital temporarily moved to Vientiane, an important commercial city on the west-central border.

About 200 years later, in 1707, the kingdom of Lan Xang would be divided into two separate kingdoms -- Vientiane and Luang Prabang. Beginning with the middle of the 16th century, there was continual friction with Burma, resulting in several Burmese invasions.

In 1696, an Annamese, Sai Ong Hue, sought aid from the emperor of Annam to gain the throne of Lan Xang, claiming he had a right to it. In return for his aid, which resulted in Hue's gaining the throne, Lan Xang came under Annam's authority. In the early 18th century, with the rule of Sai Ong Hue (1700-1707), the kingdom of the Lan Xang was divided into Luang Prabang (Upper Laos) and Vientiane (Middle and Lower Laos).

During the whole of the 18th century, Vientiane and Luang Prabang were beset by internal and, mostly, external warfare. Luang Prabang warred with Vientiane, in 1771, and was routed by the Burmese, who came to Vientiane's aid. Shortly thereafter, in 1776, the Siamese invaded both Vientiane and Luang Prabang, and both became vassal states of Bangkok. The last ruler of Vientiane, Chao Anou (1805-1828), took advantage of Siamese preoccupation with a British invasion to launch his own invasion of Siam. Chao Anou's forces were badly routed, and he fled for aid to Annam. When he returned to Vientiane with more troops, the city was a smoking ruin, and another Siamese army was there to meet him. He was finally caught, and executed in Bangkok. Until the formation of the present state of Laos in 1893, Vientiane, as well as Luang Prabang, remained a vassal to Siam.

After the final defeat of Vientiane, Siam emerged dominant in the Mekong region of Southeast Asia. The French intervened in Laos in 1883. Vientiane became the administrative capital, while Luang Prabang remained the royal capital. However, French contact with Laos was so irregular and infrequent that when Sisavang Vong ascended the throne of Luang Prabang, in 1905, he knew no French. Sisavang Vong's rule continued until his death in 1959. Laos became, in part, a military territory, with direct French administration of the province, and remained such until the beginning of World War II. Through French schools and a Laotian administration, the French gradually prepared leaders for the responsibilities of power.

Just before the fall of France to the Germans, war developed between France and Thailand. The Siamese demanded parts of Laos and Cambodia, and, in May 1941, the French were forced to cede these territories. Laos continued to be under the administration of the Indochinese Federation (the French system for administering the Indochinese peninsula). When the Japanese overran the Indochinese peninsula, at first they used the French administration to control the area. On 10 March 1945, however, they announced that France's control over Indochina had ended. In April, Sisavang Vong, the King of Luang Prabang, declared his country independent.

After the Japanese surrender, in August 1945, the Allies at the Potsdam Conference decided that the Chinese would occupy Indochina north of the 16th parallel, which included northern and part of southern Laos. The arrival of Chinese troops in Laos gave the royal Laotian government a choice between France or China. By mid-September 1945, King Sisavang Vong decided to continue the French protectorate over Laos.

As soon as the terms of this protectorate were known, a group of Laotian leaders proclaimed the independence of Laos under a government known as the Lao Issarak. At first King Sisavang refused to become the constitutional monarch of a unified Laos, but, in April 1946, he accepted the throne. French troops arrived in the meantime, and defeated the Issarak. France recognized the unification of Laos under the sovereignty of the King of Luang Prabang.

Prince Phetsarath, a brother of King Sisavang and the former Prime Minister of the old Royal Government, and almost 10,000 Laotian leaders of the Lao Issarak, had sought refuge in Siam. Two years after Laos adopted a constitution (April-May 1947), in October 1949, the Lao Issarak dissolved itself, in recognition of a united and free Laos. Prince Phetsarath and Prince Souvanna Vong (a half brother of the Laotian Prime Minister and a distant cousin of the King) notably did not return to Laos with the other leaders.

During the war between France and Northern Vietnam (Viet Minh), Laos was threatened with invasion. The situation deteriorated because Prince Souvanna Vong, leading the "Laotian Liberation Army" (which had originated as a resistance movement during the Japanese occupation and continued to oppose the French reoccupation of Laos), allied with the Viet Minh, in March 1951. A new organization--the Pathet Lao--emerged.

Laotian opposition to the Pathet Lao, mainly the Communist Viet Minh forces, was ineffective. By the first half of 1954, probably one-third of Laos could be counted in the Viet Minh camp. The cease fire in the Indochinese War came into effect in Laos in August 1954. Negotiations between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Government of Laos continued until 19 November 1957, when the Pathet Lao was officially given a share in the Cabinet and National Assembly of Laos.

D. POLITICAL

1. Government

Laos is a constitutional monarchy with a national government structure based on French political institutions; this system is superimposed upon indigenous administrative forms at the local level. According to the constitution (adopted in 1947), and as a matter of practice, governmental power is vested predominantly in the cabinet, which is responsible to the elected lower house of the legislature. The aged and infirm monarch symbolizes national unity and culture, but the Crown Prince, acting in his behalf, plays a central role in important government policies and transmits them downward through the administrative hierarchy of the regional sub-divisions. Self-government exists in limited degree only in the two municipalities of Luang Prabang and Vientiane.

The structure and operations of government have been strongly influenced by close relationship with France and the French Union, but this influence is diminishing. The French-Lao agreement of 19 July 1949 and the implementing conventions of 6 February 1950 gave Laos more autonomy than it had had as a protectorate before World War II, but France retained certain powers in a wide variety of internal matters. The French-Lao treaty of October 1953 vested Laos with full political and judicial powers but with only partial authority to regulate its foreign, military, and fiscal powers. Thus, while Laos, according to the treaty, was a "fully independent and sovereign state" within the French Union, its freedom of action was limited in certain military, diplomatic, economic, and financial matters. Since 1954, this situation has changed progressively until Laos can now be considered completely independent, with its own National Assembly and Cabinet performing the full functions of government.

The major political parties are the Nationalist, Democratic, Independent, Neo Lao Hak Sat (Pathet Lao) and National Union Parties.

E. ECONOMIC

Laos is laboring under severe economic handicaps. Geographically landlocked, its mountainous terrain makes both internal and external transportation costly and difficult. Damages resulting from the 1953-54 Communist invasions have not yet been fully repaired. The uncertain political situation inhibits both foreign and domestic investment. Several problems common to underdeveloped countries, such as lack of capital, a shortage of skilled labor, primitive transportation, and

inadequate communication facilities are particularly severe in Laos. Prospects for achieving economic self sufficiency are remote, despite modest natural resources and ample arable land. Since exports cover less than ten percent of imports, Laos exists as an economic entity only through foreign aid, primarily from the US. This trade imbalance is increased by the necessity of maintaining substantial armed forces. However, even in the basence of a need for these armed forces, it is doubtful that Laos could support itself financially. Foreign aid would certainly be essential at least to provide funds for economic development. The high level of government spending, financed by foreign aid, has extended and intensified the wartime inflationary trend. Even at the lowest subsistence level, Laos probably could not become self sufficient because production of rice, the basic food, is seldom adequate for domestic consumption and exportable goods are not produced in sufficient quantities to cover minimum import needs. Approximately 90% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming. There is no industry, apart from a few saw mills and village crafts. The tax system depends primarily on customs duties on imported goods. In short, the development of a self-supporting economy in Laos is a long-term and perhaps unattainable goal.

F. SOCIOLOGICAL

1. Population

The population of Laos was estimated at 1,690,000 as of 1 January 1959. Major ethnic groups are: Laotian 56%; Meo, 24%; other Thai, 10%; and others, 10%.

2. The People and their Customs

a. Laotians are Buddhist in culture and religion. Buddhism is the state religion. The ethnical minorities are of three races: Thai (Neua, Dam Lus), Indonesian (called Khas, i.e. savages), and Chinese (Hos, Yao, Meos). Because the Lao are carefree by nature and often seem to lack energy and competence as public officials, they have been described by foreigners as politically naive and apathetic. Traditional groupings fall along family, personal and regional lines. The Lao royal family and princes of royal blood share with a relatively small group of Lao commoners (French educated) political prominence. The total number of people actively engaged in politics constitutes a very small proportion of the 1.3 million population. Buddhist monks are often the principal intellectual and social leaders of the outlying rural areas and occasionally they act as propaganda outlets for the government. However, the influence of Buddhists and of Buddhist schools in the towns is beginning to be replaced by increasing public educational facilities and by a new administrative class. The non-Lao, indigenous tribal minorities, such as, the Kha and Meo, Man, Moi, tribal and Laotian Thai's having been neglected by the government, are susceptible to the Communist propaganda to which they have been exposed.

F G H I J K

b. All Buddhist holy days are observed as national holidays.

c. While the illiteracy rate is over 90 percent most of the intelligent and educated Laotians who live in the cities can understand and speak French. They will usually be friendly to the American visitor and will afford him hospitable treatment. The people as a whole are rather shy and retiring. They are not particularly aggressive about anything or toward anyone.

3. Attitudes and Sensitivities

The Laotians do not expect an outsider to know all the aspects of their code of behavior, but it is appreciated if an individual knows something of proper behavior.

The Laotians, like their neighbors the Thai, have been characterized as an easy-going, hospitable, noncompetitive people, valuing a good sense of humor. Their gentleness is intimately associated with the teachings of Buddha, which stress non-violence. It is considered a grave offense to strike someone on the head, and long bitterness can result from this insult to the head, which is a sacred part of the body.

Laotians are traditionally hospitable people. When a stranger approaches a village, he is greeted by the pho ban (village "father" or headman) and a group of young girls, who present the stranger with flowers. When he enters the village, all doors are open to him. He is expected to sleep at the house of the pho ban. The only time when Laotian hospitality ceases to operate is when there is a state of Kham, or taboo. This taboo can be applied to an individual, a group, a house, or a village. The reasons are varied, from area to area. If the men are out hunting, the village is kham, forbidden to strangers. A house is kham when there is birth, death, or sickness.

G. U. S. OFFICIALS

1. Ambassador ..... Horace A. Smith
2. Counselor ..... Leonard L. Bacon
3. Army Attache ..... Lt Col J. M. Hollis
4. Naval Attache ..... Cdr J. A. Oliver Jr
5. Air Attache ..... Lt Col R. B. Bieck
6. Programs Evaluation Office (PEO)..... John B. Heintges
7. Public Affairs Officer ..... Frank Corrigan

H. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

1957

1. An agreement was reached with the Communist-lef Pathet Lao (PL) continuing the following chief provisions:

a. Royal control extended to the former PL provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua.

b. 1500 PL troops to be integrated into the Royal Army and the remaining 5,500 demobilized.

c. The Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS), PL political party was to be given legal status and its followers granted full civil rights.

d. Laos was to remain outside any foreign military alliances and not permit foreign bases on its soil.

e. Foreign aid without political or military commitments would be accepted.

2. Two NLHS members placed on the union cabinet headed by Premier (Prince) Souvanna Phouma.

1958

1. In the May 1958 elections for 21 additional seats in the National Assembly, the Communists won a landslide victory 14 to 7.

2. The Lao Independent and Nationalist parties, both conservative, merged into a political party to be known as "The Rally of the Lao People" in order to gain control of the National Assembly.

3. Border incidents with South Vietnam continued.

4. The Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) extended its influence in the countryside.

5. Prince Souphanavong, leader of the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao made a speech denouncing Communism.

6. Souvanna Phouma resigned as Premier and formed a new government in July excluding members of the Neo Lao Hak Sat. In August, Phoui Sananikone was called upon to select a cabinet and head the government.

7. Monetary reform was agreed upon and the value of the "kip" was changed from 35 to 80 per US dollar.

8. Border disputes with North Vietnam were prevalent.

9. A special Commando or Ranger Type Battalion was formed by the Army.

1. Prime Minister Phoui received a vote of confidence by being granted special powers to reorganize the Cabinet and govern Laos for a year without being subject to National Assembly veto.

2. The government declared it was no longer bound by the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

3. The Ministry of National Defense and Army General Staff was reorganized.

4. The government formally protested to the UN that North Vietnamese troops were 10 miles into Laos.

5. Army officers were given Cabinet posts for the first time.

6. A battalion of 750 PL followers surrendered in May.

7. Emergency measures were adopted as the government reported Communist rebels opened attacks on army posts in northern Laos near the North Vietnam border. The rebels were believed to be a combination of former Pathet Lao "irregulars" and North Vietnamese soldiers totalling 1,000.

8. Premier Phoui called a state of emergency in 5 northeast provinces as charges and countercharges are made concerning North Vietnamese and Communist China support to the rebels.

9. A plan whereby French and US military experts would train Laotian troops was announced. North Vietnam declared foreign troops in Laos would be considered a threat against the government and the country.

10. To support the Laotian government, the US announced it would send money and supplies to Laos.

11. A UN fact-finding sub-committee went to Laos after the government announced that it would seek aid from SEATO if the UN did not come to its aid.

12. A National State of Emergency was declared after rebel forces cut off Sam Neua.

13. King Sisavang Vong died on 29 October and Prince Regent Savang Vathana was named King.

14. The UN fact-finding sub-committee failed to uphold Laotian charges of wholesale aggression by North Vietnamese troops. The report noted that the rebels were receiving North Vietnamese arms and supplies but did not substantiate charges that North Vietnamese troops had crossed the Laotian border.

15. Premier Phoui reshuffled the cabinet eliminating all members of the powerful young reform group.

16. The National Assembly voted to continue until national elections are held; tentatively scheduled for April 1960.

17. King Savang Vathana accepted Premier Phoui's resignation and placed the country under army control. Kou Abhay was named Prime Minister.




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ORIENTATION MAP
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CAMBODIA

MALAYA

A. GEOGRAPHY

Malaya occupies two-thirds of a bulb-shaped peninsula and forms the most southerly position of the Asian continent. It is approximately 460 miles long with a maximum east-west width of 260 miles. Covering 50,680 square miles, Malaya is bounded on the North by Thailand, the East by the South China Sea, the South by Johore Strait and Singapore, and the West by the Strait of Malacca. It is about the size of New York state.

B. TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

1. Terrain

Malaya is dominated by two North-South mountain chains ranging to 7,200 feet separated by a valley corridor and flanked by flat coastal plains. About four-fifths of the area is covered with dense tropical forest. The Western shoreline is fringed almost continuously by belts of mangrove swamps, an almost complete obstacle to movement, while the East coast consists mainly of long stretches of sandy beach.

The mountains divide Malaya so that about two-thirds of the country lies East of the main range and one-third West of it. In the North, the summits limit East-West movement while further South, low passes permit some trans-peninsular travel.

The central mountain range is flanked on both sides by coastal plains up to 25 miles wide. The Western plain contains Malaya's most extensive transportation nets. Rivers, generally flowing North-South in the mountains, change course to East-West, widen and become sluggish as they flow across the coastal plains. Both coastal plains are interrupted by large areas of fresh water swamps.

2. Climate

Malaya has an equatorial climate with no marked dry season except in the extreme North. Rainfall, averaging 100 inches a year, usually falls in brief local torrential showers associated with strong winds. In general, temperatures are uniform and humidity is high all year. Temperatures average 82 degrees in the lowlands and 67 degrees in the mountains.

C. HISTORIC BACKGROUND

For more than one hundred years Malaya was under British colonial domination, and British influence in the area dates back to 1786. In that year Sir Francis Light took possession of the Island of Penang in the name of the East India Company. Control of Malacca and Singapore followed and, in 1824, these areas were combined under a single

administration as the Straits Settlements. In 1874 Britain concluded a treaty with the State of Perak and, three years later, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang had become British protectorates and had accepted British advisers or "residents". In 1896 these states became the Federated Malay States. Authority of the advisers was limited. They had no jurisdiction, for example, over matters of Malay customs and religion, and their "advice" did not constitute orders. In assessing British influence it is significant that it was not until the treaty of 1909 with Siam (now Thailand) that Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Trengganu came under British protection. A British adviser was not accepted in Johore until 1914 nor in Trengganu until 1919. British control, by 1919, extended over the entire Malayan Peninsula. There was no significant change until the Japanese occupied Malaya in 1942.

Following the Japanese surrender, a British Military Administration was established in Malaya in September 1945. In January 1946 Britain proposed a Malayan Union, under a Governor and a strong central government, depriving the Sultans of all but nominal authority. The storm of protest which this scheme aroused led to its abandonment and replacement by the Federation of Malaya Agreement which was signed 21 January 1948. This agreement provided for a High Commissioner (British) and a Legislative Council (Malayan) and restored authority to the sultans. The agreement did not include the Settlements of Penang and Malacca, which remained British territory, or to Singapore which continued as a separate Crown Colony.

In 1948 there was a Communist armed revolt with a target date of 3 August 1948 for taking over the country and forming a Communist Republic. This necessitated the declaration of a state of emergency, in June 1948, which is still in effect although the Communist guerrillas have been decimated and are slowly being eliminated. Efforts to negotiate an end to the internal strife have failed.

In response to postwar nationalist aspirations of the population, the British began to grant progressively increasing independence to Malaya with a view towards the country's eventual independence. Britain stimulated Malayan nationalism as a means of combating armed Communist terrorist activities, in the belief that only a united Malayan people could overcome the Communist threat. Pressed by the nationalism they had fostered, the British relinquished control as soon as the Communist movement declined in strength and activity. On 31 August 1957, Malaya gained independence and became a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

D. POLITICAL

1. Government

An independent nation and member of the British Commonwealth since 31 August 1957, Malaya is a constitutional monarchy, divided into 11 states. These states are headed by Malay Rulers (9 of them are Sultans) whose authority is largely in the field of Muslim customs and religion. Each state has a British advisor appointed by the Malayan government.

The constitution provides for a Paramount Ruler elected by the Sultans for a period of 5 years from among their number. He appoints Cabinet Ministers, on the Prime Minister's recommendation, and subsequently acts in accordance with the Cabinet's advice.

E. ECONOMIC

1. The Malayan economy is based primarily on rubber and tin, and foreign trade. Per capita foreign trade in Malaya amounted to US $205 in 1956, exceeded in the Far East only by Singapore and Hong Kong, and far higher than Japan's US $65 per capita. Rubber accounts for more than one-half of the value of all exports; rubber and tin together comprise two-thirds. The degree of specialization in the Malayan economy on rubber, tin, and trading operations should not, however, obscure the importance of other lines of economic activity which contribute in total far more to the national income than do rubber and tin directly. These other activities include output of a variety of foodstuffs, small manufactures mainly for domestic consumption, and commercial and financial services for the domestic markets and for the large entrepot trade with most of Southeast Asia.

2. Although Malaya is four-fifths jungle, it is still the richest country in Southeast Asia. The country's per capita gross national product of nearly US $300 is the highest of any country in Asia. This figure does not, however, reflect the medium incomes. Income distribution statistics are not available but it is certain that wages do not parallel those in more developed countries.

3. The 10-year-old Communist terrorist campaign has been a continuing drain on the economy and has absorbed revenues sorely needed for development of a more diversified economic base. Diversification is essential to Malaya's economic well-being. The country's dependence on rubber and tin means that the economy is always at the mercy of fluctuating prices for these products in foreign markets, a factor over which Malaya has no control.

F. SOCIOLOGICAL

1. Population

The population of Malaya is estimated at 6,322,000 as of 1 January 1959. Major ethnic groups are: Malays 49%; Chinese 39%; Indians and Pakistanis 11%; and others 1%.

2. The People and their Customs

The Malayans are predominantly Muslims who owe territorial allegiance to the hereditary chiefs of Malay states, the sultans. Culturally their allegiance is to Islam. They are, for the most part, a rural, unobtrusive people of agricultural-fishing economy, village dwellers along the coastal fringes, the estaurine lowlands, and scattered

inland areas. Though many have come to live in the ports and cities where they provide some labor and domestic service, they are generally disinclined to become tin miners, plantation laborers, stevedores, or manual laborers. They are not lazy, indolent drones, as they have been characterized by Europeans. Their traditional pattern of life required a minimum of labor to maintain a subsistence-level existence and they were satisfied to live at that level. The Malays also had a traditional disdain for money and considered themselves superior to the money-hungry Chinese and occidentals. Facing the competition of shrewd Chinese businessmen, the Malays are economically at a distinct disadvantage. This situation has led to ill-feeling and tensions between these two racial groups and has practically halted the assimilation of the Chinese minority into the Malayan social structure.

Among the Indians there have probably never been more than a very tiny fraction who regard Malaya as their country. They form the minority element least susceptible to assimilation, and the smallness of this racial group has militated against complete absorption. The few Indian Muslims who have intermarried with Malays and become Malay-speaking constitute an exception.

Religions in Malaya generally follow the ethnic distribution. The Malays are Muslim, the Indians mainly Hindu, and the Chinese Buddhist, Confucian and Taoist. These three religious groups are hostile towards each other and religious differences tend to hinder integration and assimilation of these groups into a united Malayan society.

Malaya's problems of education are unusually intricate because of the diversity of schools and the large backlog of children, adolescents, and adults without the advantages of even elementary education or literacy. The Federation's schools, classified according to the language and instruction, are Malay, Chinese, and Indian (known as vernacular schools), and English. All types have primary schools, but only the English and Chinese offer secondary courses. They have diverse management and financing--there are schools maintained by government, nonprofit schools to which the government gives financial aid, and private schools wholly dependent on their own resources. English schools are the only ones attended by children of all races.

Malaya's official languages are Malay and English. The new constitution provides for a phasing-out of English over a 10-year period following which only Malay will be used officially. Each ethnic group speaks its own language. Having come from many parts of China, the Chinese speak the different dialects of their places of origin. Many have learned Mandarin as their common language, and it is taught in the Chinese schools. Most non-Malays have learned at least some Malay, and in urban areas many have learned English which serves as the lingua franca for all races.

The Malayan is often referred to as the "Gentleman of the East" because he is very polite, very independent, usually well-dressed, and scarcely does any work.

G. U. S. OFFICIALS

1. Ambassador ..... Homer M. Byington Jr

2. Counselor ..... William B. de Grace

3. Army Attache ..... Lt Col R. W. Allen Jr

4. Naval Attache ..... Cdr Richard N. Billings

5. Air Attache ..... Col Milford F. Itz

6. CO, USA Med Res Unit ..... Lt Col Hinton J. Baker

7. Agriculture Officer ..... Walter K. Davis

8. Public Affairs Officer ..... Heinrich Siemer

H. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

1957

1. Malayan Constitution was ratified on 31 August, granting Malayan Merdeka (Independence).

2. Malayan Communists were offered amnesty.

3. The Government rejected an offer from the Malayan Communist Party to call off the 9-year war in return for legal recognition.

4. Malaya was accepted into the United Nations and became a member of the Colombo Plan.

5. Malaya received first US Ambassador to the Federation.

1958

1. The Government's amnesty offer to the Communists was extended from 31 December 1957 to 30 April 1958.

2. Malaya celebrated its first year as an independent state within the British Commonwealth.

3. The Federal Council approved a bill to forbid the Bank of China from operating in Malaya.

1959

1. Prime Minister Rahman resigned so he could actively campaign throughout the country. For five months Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defense Hussein was Prime Minister until Rahman returned to office.

2. In the first major elections in four years Premier Rahman's Alliance Party was victorious. The Party won 147 of 172 seats in seven state's Legislative Assemblies and 73 of 104 in the National Legislative Assembly.


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SOUTH VIETNAM

A. GEOGRAPHY

Vietnam occupies a long coastal strip on the east coast of Indochina and is bordered on the east by the South China Sea and on the west by Laos and Cambodia. It is nearly 800 miles long. The fertile rice-growing plains of northern Annam are a continuation of southern Tomkin, but the mountains are close to the sea in the central and southern parts of the country. The country is traversed longitudinally by the Annamite cordillera which extends south from the high mass of Laos and bends eastward, just as the cordillera of Burma bends westward, under the influence of the Cambodian block between them. The general slope to the east is far sharper than that to the west, and the rivers are short, with courses broken by many rapids. Apart from the fine Tourane Bay, the coast has little shelter; it is low and flat and alluvial southward to Cape Chu May. South again it is more irregular, and very irregular in the far south, but the bays there are too open to offer good anchorage.

B. TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

1. Terrain

The country includes three major terrain regions; the Mekong Delta region, the coastal plain, and the Chaine Annamitique mountain chain. The Mekong Delta region, the great triangular area extending from Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to the tip of the Ca Mau peninsula and Cap-Saint-Jacques, has a flat, poorly drained surface criss-crossed by numerous tributaries of the Mekong River and a dense network of canals and smaller streams. Extensive marshes cover such areas as the Plaine Des Joncs, and swamps are common along the coast. Rice paddies occupy a large part of the delta, and fields are flooded as much as six months of the year. Settlements and transportation lines are situated on levees throughout the delta and on sand ridges along the coast, since these elevated areas are not usually subject to flooding. Rural population density is about 250 persons per square mile. The Saigon-Cholon complex, with a population of about 1,500,000, is the Chief urban concentration of the country.

Extending northward from Cap-Saint-Jacques is a long stretch of discontinuous coastal plain, generally less than 25 miles wide. Although predominantly level, it becomes rolling toward the mountains that form its inland border. Eastward-extending spurs of these mountains interrupt the coastal plain in many areas. Sand dunes 10 to 60 feet high are common along the coast. Much of the plain is planted in rice and is flooded four to eight months of the year. The plain offers the best north-south natural transportation route; however, flooding streams, which reach their crests in September and October, are definite obstacles to rail and road transportation. Hue is the only coastal city with a population of more than 100,000, but the rural density equals that of the

lowlands of Japan. Inland, and roughly parallel to the coastal plain, is the sparsely settled Chaine Annamitique. The few roads and one railroad (Phan Rang to Dalat) that penetrate this mountain region follow river valleys or mountain passes.

2. Climate

Saigon has a distinctly tropical climate the year round, lying well within the Southeast Asia monsoon region. Nevertheless, there is a fair variation in climatic conditions. From March until June the weather is dry and hot, temperatures going over 100 degrees, and in spite of the lack of rain the humidity is high. From June to November is the rainy season, which brings relief from the heat but the excessive humidity is constantly felt. Only occasionally do the rains last for hours on end; ordinarily there are two or three showers of 30-45 minutes' duration each day. The best season is in December and January, when the days are pleasant and the nights sometimes cool enough to sleep under a sheet or light blanket. Even during this period, however, the temperature never drops enough to permit the wearing of even the lightest woolen clothing.

C. HISTORIC BACKGROUND

Although there is little or no documentation for Vietnamese history prior to the Chinese conquest, scholars believe that originally the "Viets" were a nomadic people who migrated to China from Tibet. These Viets established a number of states south of the Yang-tze River in about 500 B.C. Under pressure from the Chinese and to avoid their rule, the Southern--or Nam--Viets pushed further southward into what is now the Red River delta area of North Vietnam. They possessed their own language, rites, and superstitions. Perhaps most important, they possessed a sense of group identity, so that even though they failed to cooperate among themselves they presented a united front against others. Thus, from earliest times, the Vietnamese absorbed what a foreign culture had to offer without losing its own identity.

In 258 B.C. the Chinese moved down and conquered this kingdom. China's rule initially was not oppressive. Chinese law was superimposed upon Vietnamese custom, and justice was rendered according to the Chinese system and philosophy. For a thousand years the Vietnamese assimilated Chinese religion, ethics, art, literature, political and social structure. As a result, Viet culture was refashioned from primitive tribal forms into a near copy of China's

When the Chinese relaxed their grip on the Viets, the Vietnamese took the opportunity, in 938 A.D., to regain their freedom.

On several occasions the Chinese sought to reconquer the Viets; in the thirteenth century the Viets repelled a series of invasions by Kublai Khan. But a few decades later, the Chinese succeeded in reconquering Tonkin (Northern Vietnam), and occupied it for nearly a quarter

of a century (1407-1428). Le Loi, one of Vietnam's greatest warriors and rulers, finally drove out the invaders and a "golden" age in Vietnamese history began.

The Le dynasty reigned for three and a half centuries. Le Loi adopted an administrative system modeled after the Chinese.

The Le Dynasty gradually decayed and after numerous struggles for power, the country was united in 1802 under one emperor, Gia Long. The Chinese emperor recognized the new nation called Vietnam.

France asserted its rule over Vietnam by degrees. In 1858--under the guise of offering protection to missionaries and Christian converts--the French, assisted by the Spanish, invaded Cochin-China (now South Vietnam). The Spanish forces departed, but the French remained, annexing all of Cochin-China as a French colony. The Vietnamese emperor officially retained control of internal affairs, but actually carried out only religious and ceremonial functions.

The Vietnamese protested almost continuously against the French authority. Between 1884 and 1914, there were numerous unsuccessful revolts led by the Vietnamese royalty.

During World War I France encountered only minor difficulties in the rule of Vietnam and was able to recruit approximately 100,000 people for labor and military service abroad. Vietnamese rulers gradually accepted French domination. Before his death in 1925, Emperor Kai Kinh sent his son, Bao Dai, to Paris to receive a Western education.

Bao Dai, on his return to Vietnam in 1932, made a brief effort to modernize the imperial administration at Hue. When the French refused to assign the administration any power, the young Emperor lost interest in reform.

During the 1920's and 1930's the leadership of the Vietnamese nationalist movement was divided between those who looked toward Moscow and those looking to Kuomintang China. The Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) or Vietnam Nationalist Party, pro-China in outlook, staged an unsuccessful uprising that brought about severe repression of Vietnamese political activity by the French. One important result was that the Communists were driven under-cover, where they remained until 1936.

When the French introduced Western-style schools, the traditional Chinese-style educational system based on Confucian principles was practically destroyed. Teaching little national history, the new schools produced a generation of Vietnamese who knew more about the French Revolution than they did about their national heritage. Only a few private schools kept alive the national tradition.

Many French-educated Vietnamese, disillusioned and embittered by failure to receive suitable employment in the French colonial administration, turned their knowledge of Western democracy against the

French. Particularly after World War II, hatred of French rule was organized in the activities of the Communist led Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

After the fall of France in 1940, the Vichy government was forced to recognize the occupation of French Indochina by the Japanese. Under this arrangement, French officials were allowed to continue governing provided they contributed their share of aid to the Japanese war effort.

During their occupation of Vietnam the Japanese encouraged the development of anti-French and pro-Japanese movements. Vietnamese nationalists, including Communists from both Vietnam and China, formed an anti-Japanese underground. Ho Chi Minh organized the League for Vietnam Independence, better known as the Viet Minh. The Chiang Kai-shek government sponsored a rival organization, the Don Minh Hoi. In the subsequent struggle for leadership within Vietnam, the superior organization of the Communists, who secretly dominated the Viet Minh, ensured Ho Chi Minh of his victory.

When in March of 1945 the Japanese saw that they were losing the war, they suddenly imprisoned all French officials and soldiers and urged native rulers to demand independence. Bao Dai assumed control of the government, but his administration, dominated by the Japanese, accomplished little. At the Potsdam Conference the Allies agreed to a joint occupation of Indochina: By the British south of the 16th parallel, and by the Chinese north of it. Before the Allies arrived, however, control of Vietnam was seized by the Viet Minh, and Boa Dai abdicated in favor of the newly-proclaimed Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

When the British arrived in the South, the Viet Minh was driven underground and control of the urban areas was restored to the French. The Chinese in the North, however, refused to evacuate until France agreed to a number of concessions, formally embodied in a treaty signed in February 1946.

Carefully concealing their Communist leadership, in order to retain Chiang Kai-shek's support, the Viet Minh in the North held elections, drew up a constitution, and formed a national coalition government, headed by Ho Chi Minh. In March 1946, France concluded an agreement with Ho Chi Minh recognizing the DRV as a "Free State" within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union. The new state was to have its own national assembly, manage its own finances, and maintain its own army. The agreement called for a popular vote to be held in Cochin-China that would permit the people of that region to decide whether or not to join the DRV. As a result of this agreement French forces were permitted to land in the North.

Differences immediately developed. Clashes occurred between French and Viet Minh forces. Despite their commitment to a popular

vote, the French established an "Autonomous Republic" of Cochin-China. They also set up a separate administration for Central Vietnam.

Tension steadily mounted as both sides prepared for war. On the night of 19 December the DRV attacked, and was at first defeated by the French, who quickly regained control of the cities and most of the delta regions. Thus began a costly war that ended eight years later with the partitioning of Vietnam and the surrender of its northern half to Communist control.

France then proceeded to complete the transfer of the remnants of its administrative and military control to the State of Vietnam. The government of Ho Chi Minh transferred its capital to Hanoi.

The government of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon--rejected the authority of Boa Dai. In October 1955, Premier Diem held a referendum offering the people of the State of Vietnam a choice between himself as chief of state of a republic, or Boa Dai as chief of state of the old regime. As a result of the vote, a new Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed with Diem, as its president, taking over the powers formerly held by Bao Dai as chief of state.

At Geneva in mid-1954 a settlement was negotiated by France with the DRV and Communist China providing for a military truce and total evacuation of the South by the DRV.

D. POLITICAL

1. Government

The Republic of Vietnam is an independent constitutional republic in which extensive powers are vested in an elected President, with the unicameral National Assembly exercising legislative power. In practice, the present Government, which exerts authority in Vietnam south of the 1954 Geneva armistice line, functions as a ministerial autocracy with real power exercised by the President. Despite inherent weaknesses, the Government has continued to develop strength, although considerable insecurity persists. The outlook for the Republic of Vietnam is for gradual improvement in the internal security situation and in the capabilities of the armed forces. A strongly anti-Communist and pro-United States orientation is expected for the foreseeable future.

As long as President Ngo Dinh Diem remains in power, no substantital alteration of foreign or internal policy is apt to occur. Even should he, through illness or death, lose his dominant position in South Vietnam, his successors, probably Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho or his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, would presumably carry on the same basic policies. A major problem, however, would be that neither of these two men enjoys Ngo Dinh Diem's popularity, and a struggle for power could develop.

The fundamental objectives of the Government are: (1) Internal political, economic, and military stability; (2) security from external threat; and (3) recognition in Asia as the legal government of Vietnam. Domestic and foreign policies of the Government are strongly conditioned by these objectives and the Vietnamese leadership continues to concentrate on matters which it considers to be directly related to these policies.

One of the most serious problems now facing the Government of South Vietnam is that of internal security. Another major domestic problem is the resettlement of refugees from Communist North Vietnam. A third major internal problem exists in the effort to create a viable economy in the country.

E. ECONOMIC

South Vietnam is normally an agricultural surplus area, exporting rice and rubber. About 90 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, chiefly rice production. In recent years, exports have only covered approximately 20 percent of imports. There has also been a rapid increase in consumer and capital goods needed for rehabilitation and development of the armed forces. South Vietnam's economy is still dislocated by the effects of the Indochina War and subsequent unrest. In addition, the country is hampered by a dearth of native capital and technicians. However, major economic programs are being implemented in railroad and highway reconstruction, development of the plateau region, land redistribution, and the settlement of refugees and discharged military personnel in remote areas such as the Ca Mau peninsula and the Plaine des Joncs.

Since 1954 it has been necessary for the Government of South Vietnam to rely heavily upon US counterpart funds for the major portion of its revenue. These counterpart funds provide between 70 and 80 percent of the country's revenue and amount to upwards of $200 million annually in aid. Major improvement in the overall economic structure has been made, particularly during 1957. Liberalization of export permits has given South Vietnam a chance to participate in the international rice market, and an increased effort is going into closing the almost 4 to 1 ratio gap between imports and exports. In 1958, South Vietnam expects to export about 250,000 tons of rice, about twice the amount exported in 1957. The principal economic problem is the lack of diversification of the country's products. A major effort to increase diversification is being made, but as yet the country relies upon only a few products for export. An intensive drive is underway to reduce the amount of imports, particularly those from countries other than the US.

F. SOCIOLOGICAL

1. Population

As of 1 January, the population of South Vietnam was

12,390,000. Major ethnic groups are: Annamites, 78%; Chinese, 8%; Moi, 5%; Cambodians, 4%; and all others, 5%.

South Vietnam is predominantly inhabited by people who are culturally Annamese. The same language and social institutions are common to all of Vietnam. Some differences in dialect, dress, and manners have developed in recent times, due to the southward migrations of various groups and the breakdown of the mandarinate which in pre-French times maintained the uniformity of Annamese culture and Confucian philosophy. The Vietnamese seldom show emotion, but this is a cultural trait and does not necessarily imply that they are unemotional or stolid. The Vietnamese are notoriously reluctant to give information about themselves, and despise anyone who gives orders as if he were asking a favor, as well as anyone who takes on a task which could be given to someone else. They are also adaptable, obedient, skillful, and energetic, but inclined toward gambling and speculation. Within South Vietnam there are a number of different ethnic groups, including: Annamites, Cham, Cambodians, Moi and allied groups, Chinese, a small European colony and some Indians. The higher densities are found in the coastal belt and Mekong Delta area. The Saigon-Cholon area has the highest proportion of urban dwellers as well as the largest European population.

The Chinese have gradually taken over the rice milling and middle-man positions of the South Vietnamese economy. They control to a large extent the collection facilities of the rice crop.

The majority of the Indians in South Vietnam are Moslems or Hindus, who trade in commodities or deal in money. Through high interest rates and questionable operations they keep borrowers permanently in debt.

The Moi are an Indonesian people and the most primitive group in the country. The name, Moi, is an Annamese term for "savages". They live in an upland forest environment and practice some primitive agriculture, raising rice, maize, yams, and sweet potatoes. They have a tribal organization, and most of their agriculture is done on a communal basis.

In southwestern Annam live scattered groups of people known as Chams, who are remnants of an old culture which flourished until the late 15th century. The modern Cham are agriculturalists who live along the rivers and lakes.

There are about 300,000 Cambodians in South Vietnam.

The sects, feudalistic in nature, are an important part of society. Cao Daism, a politico-religious cult, was formally established in 1926 with a hierarchical organization headed by a pope. The Hao Hao is more a union of organized groups for the enhancement of their members' fortunes than a nationalistic religious movement. The Binh Xuyen was an armed gang of opportunists organized for profit

and plunder. Military forces of the sects have been reduced to bandit status. Finally, there are more than 600,000 North Vietnamese refugees who were evacuated to the south during and following the civil war.

2. The People and their Customs

For the educated Vietnamese, speaking to people is surrounded with an elaborate etiquette. Conversation is formal and restrained. Language spoken with well-turned phrases, with grace of expression and in good taste is greatly admired and appreciated. Few Vietnamese can use English really well. However, many are very interested in English and understand it reasonably well.

Social habits of the people of Vietnam are largely derived from Confucianism. This has created a studious, thoughtful and humble people. Feelings are rarely expressed openly, but in an indirect fashion. Thus a simple request may be stated once and restated several times thereafter. The grammatical structure of the language makes it necessary to speak with a certain amount of repetition. This is true of both the written and spoken language.

An example of the social sensitivity of the people is in the use of "thank you". This can be said in three different ways, "Cam on" is "thank you" commonly used. Of the other two "thank you's", one is for special use in formal occasions; the other translated into English sounds something like this: "I ask your permission to thank you respectfully and sincerely."

The order of names in Vietnam is the opposite of English: The family name comes first, followed by the middle and first names. It is customary to address a Vietnamese by his first name. For example, Mr. Le Ba Hung would be addressed as Mr. Hung, even though his last name is Le. The reason for this is that many people have the same family name of approximately one-fifth of the entire population of Vietnam. Other well known family names are Ho, Le, Tran, Dinh and Trinh.

Family ties, relatives and forefathers mean a great deal to the Vietnamese. The senior man in the household is the immediate authority. He regulates and controls his home and is the undisputed head of the family. The Confucian philosophy of life has given Vietnamese homelife an atmosphere of its own. There is an air of soberness, hospitality, a sense of humor and politeness.

The woman's role is to care for her husband, home and children. The families are large and normal daily chores in the home can occupy the housewife as well as several maids. For Vietnamese women "keeping up with the Joneses" is a social requirement. The women of Vietnam are more acutely aware of good dress, use of jewelry and a fitting hair-do for social occasions than their American counter-parts. Lack of the appropriate means, ill health or pregnancy are reasons why a Vietnamese woman may avoid coming to a social gathering.

The children are disciplined and well-mannered. The Vietnamese are kind but strict parents. Their happy-go-lucky and unspoiled children are affectionate and undemanding. Admiration of their children is much appreciated by the parents. Interest in the children is more valued than attention to the grown-ups.

Hand-shaking is widely practiced in Vietnam. A hand-shake may be a formal greeting, but even a passing remark in the street may be accompanied by a hardy hand-shake. It is common for even a total stranger in a theater, for example, to offer a hand-shake to the person seated next to him. Another unusual custom, from the American standpoint, is men holding hands as they walk in the street. This is an old Vietnamese custom, showing friendship and comradeship between men.

On the whole Vietnamese don't like dancing. Among the younger population it is gradually becoming acceptable as a normal recreation. Among the elders, dancing is considered strictly an imported western habit and is thought of as ill-fitting amusement, especially for married people. The taxi-dance places and night-clubs are operated primarily by the French and Chinese.

The Vietnamese like family picnics. Young and old alike enjoy movies, and especially like Western films, comedies, travelogues, documentaries and newsreels. Ladies appreciate musicals and lighter subjects.

3. Vietnamese Attitudes and Sensitivities

The Vietnamese do not expect outsiders to know all the aspects of their code of behavior, but it is appreciated if an individual knows something of proper behavior.

Long subjugation to foreign rule has left the Vietnamese with an intense desire to be understood and appreciated, and to be recognized as a people who possess an important culture and history. They resent any tendency of foreigners to treat them as anything but an independent, distinctive people. Naturally, their response in social relationships with foreigners will be more generous when an effort is made to meet them halfway.

The Vietnamese tend to be distrustful of investigations made by individuals who might tend to manipulate such information against their best interests. The best way to get along with such inquisitive people, therefore, is to tell them what they want to hear. The intent, rather than a malicious one, is merely to spare themselves trouble and embarrassment. No Vietnamese will admit that he is ignorant of a matter about which he is questioned. To admit ignorance, or inability to do a task, would be to "lose face".

The Vietnamese seldom show emotion. They are seemingly unemotional on occasions of joy or grief. They do not laugh when they

are amused. This is a cultural trait and does not mean that in fact the Vietnamese are unemotional. It is part of their reluctance to expose themselves, similar to their hesitation to give information about themselves, which would leave them vulnerable. They admire the tolerance and efficiency of the Chinese, but regard their demeanor of timidity and humility as vices. Similarly, they admire the initiative and "finesse" of the French, but dislike them because of historical circumstances.

G. U. S. OFFICIALS

1. Ambassador ..... Elbridge Durbrow

2. Counselor ..... Howard Elting Jr

3. Attaches:

Army ..... Col Richard H. Comstock

Navy (also Naval Air)..... Cdr J. A. Oliver Jr

Air Force ..... Lt Col R. B. Bieck

4. Chief, MAAG ..... Lt Gen Samuel T. Williams

5. ICA ..... Leland Barrows

6. USIA ..... Chester Opal

7. U. S. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission Chief ..... Col D. E. Breakefield

H. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

1957

1. President Diem in 1957 further consolidated the power of the Saigon Government against the divisive forces in South Vietnam. An elimination campaign was carried on with considerable success against rival military forces, chiefly those of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects. On 22 February Diem escaped injury when an attempt was made to assassinate him at Banmethuot and terrorist bombings in Saigon injured American servicemen and Vietnamese civilians in October. Diem's campaign to assimilate the Chinese minority was further pressed in 1957. The Chinese, who play a leading role in the commercial life of South Vietnam, were barred from many trades and professions under a 1956 decree. Vietnamese-born Chinese must transfer ownership of businesses to Vietnamese. Of the estimated 60,000 native-born Chinese, only about 1200 had complied by August 1957, and many had gone into hiding from the police.

2. In early 1957 the first harvest was reaped by some 43,000 refugees from the north who had tilled a 190,000 acre reclamation project in the southwest. In July work began on a seven-year, $75 million highway project, financed with US aid to link Saigon with cities to the north and east. Apart from US-aided projects in transportation, the economy showed few signs of growth.

3. President Diem toured the U. S. in May and was warmly received as the man chiefly responsible for having saved South Vietnam from falling to the Communists.

1958

1. South Vietnam, nearing its fourth anniversary as an independent state, made remarkable strides since the July 1954 armistice when it was threatened by an early take-over by Hanoi. Surface tranquility, however, belied South Vietnam's continuing struggle for long-range survival and for eventual reunification of Vietnam under non-Communist rule. The acceleration of Communist terrorism in South Vietnam during 1957, together with a more imaginative and aggressive propaganda campaign on the part of Hanoi, attests to the intensity of the struggle.

2. Saigon had achieved a high degree of nationwide stability by early 1957, but the security situation in the rural areas of the delta region and in the western provinces bordering on Cambodia deteriorated. In addition, there was an anti-American terrorist incident in Saigon in October 1957, when Communist bombs wounded 13 American MAAG personnel. Despite tightened security measures, there was a real threat of further violence against Americans in view of the Communist objective impairing American support of the Diem regime.

3. Saigon, concerned over growing Communist influence in Cambodia, vacillated between conciliation and toughness in attempting to influence the Phnom Penh regime. However, South Vietnamese-Cambodian hostility stemmed from traditional animosity between the two races and from the divergent policies of the regimes. Recurrent border incidents and armed clashes between border troops of the two countries served to keep alive an intense feeling of ill-will.

4. South Vietnam's military capability to face the threat of external Communist aggression continued to show steady improvement under MAAG training. The army of some 137,000 men was considered firmly loyal to President Diem and continued to be the government's main pillar of support. Together with less developed air and naval forces, South Vietnam's army was capable of initial limited resistance in the event of overt aggression from North Vietnam. Steps were also taken to streamline and increase the effectiveness of two major paramilitary forces--the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, each with about 50,000 men.

5. In contrast to its military strength, South Vietnam's economy continued to be precarious. American aid accounted for about 85 percent of Vietnam's imports and more than two-thirds of its budgetary revenues. In 1957, however, a sizable budget surplus was realized by stringent budgetary controls and imposition of new taxes.

6. In one sense, the principal factor in South Vietnam's early stability--the strong leadership of President Diem--became somewhat of an unsettling influence. Diem's continued unwillingness to delegate authority and his reluctance to grant greater individual freedoms were hamstringing governmental operations and contributing to popular discontent. Senior Vietnamese officials, including Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, and several cabinet members, expressed serious alarm over the government's apparent loss of popularity. These officials believed that Diem's narrow approach to political affairs was seriously weakening the regime. Diem, although apparently aware of this criticism showed no indication of being dissuaded from the belief that a more liberal government, however desirable, could be afforded then. South Vietnam made considerable progress since 1954 against great odds and was a going concern. There was a good potential for continued build-up toward stability and economic development.

7. The Government was plagued by border disputes with Cambodia and internal security.

1959

1. The Armed Forces was reorganized to include a Field Army Command and the III Provincial Corps. The Commando School was discontinued and replaced by an NCO Academy.

2. Relations with Cambodia took a "turn for the worse" as a result of the Dap Chhuon affair. Cambodia claimed to have irrefutable evidence that South Vietnam had been involved in plots against Premier Sihanouk and the Cambodian Government.

3. An agreement was signed with Japan whereby South Vietnam will receive $39 million in war reparations over a period of five years.

4. Communist terrorists attacked and killed 3 members of the 8-man MAAG at Bien Hoa. Three Vietnamese were also killed.

5. The Army reportedly liquidated terrorist guerrillas on the Ca Mau Peninsula.


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ORIENTATION
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THAILAND

A. GEOGRAPHY

Thailand covers approximately 200,148 square miles, approximately the area of Colorado and Wyoming combined. It is bounded on the west and north of Burma, on the northeast and east by Laos, and on the southeast by Cambodia. The nation's boundaries generally lie along the crests of rugged, heavily forested mountains or follow unbridged, mostly unfordable rivers. The most easily penetrable part of Thailand is a part of the Cambodian-Thailand border which traverses a broad, level plain about 100 miles wide, crossed by roads and a rail line.

B. TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

1. Terrain

Approximately half of the country is hilly or mountainous with the latter predominating in northern or western Thailand. The mountains and hills are generally aligned in parallel, north-south ranges which are generally steep and crossed by few routes suitable for moving heavy military vehicles.

The principal rivers are steep-banked and, in sections of their courses, unfordable throughout the year. Permanent lakes, swamps and marshes, particularly along the coast are also a hindrance to military movement. The main rivers and canals are navigable by sampans and serve as the principal routes of transportation in many parts of Thailand.

About 60 percent of the country consists of woodlands which obstruct air and ground observation. Deciduous forests are predominant on the mountains in the northeast. Scattered small areas in the lowlands are covered with coarse, tall, tropical grass.

The country contains four natural regions: the North, East, Central and Southern.

The East region is about 70,000 square miles in area. It resembles a huge basin lying from 200-300 feet above sea level and is surrounded by hill ranges rising to 1,000 - 2,000 feet.

The Central region is about 50,000 square miles in area. It is the heart of Thailand.

The Southern region of 20,000 square miles comprises that part of the Malaya Peninsula belonging to Thailand. The coast, both east and west, is much indented and studded with islands.

2. Climate

Temperatures remain constantly high throughout the year, being alleviated only for brief intervals when the northeast monsoon

brings cooler winds during December and January. In Bangkok, the mean temperature is 82 degrees; for the greater part of the time, daytime temperatures are in the range from 79 to 85 degrees. The country has two seasons, wet and dry. The rainy season runs from about mid-May to mid-November with the remainder of the year relatively dry. Average annual rainfall at Bangkok is about 50 inches. Heaviest rainfall occurs in the western section of the Southern Region; lightest in the Northeast region.

C. HISTORIC BACKGROUND

The earliest accounts of Thai people locate them in a kingdom in southwest China. Gradually the Thais began drifting southward into the Indochinese peninsula. By the end of the 13th century, they had fanned out into the valleys of the principal river systems -- the Irrawaddy, Salween, Chao Phraya, and Mekong. One branch of the Thai migration, dominating the center of the peninsula, became the kingdom of Sukhothai, the first historical kingdom of the Thai. The empire of Sukhothai was short-lived. The Thai people continued to move south. In 1350 a new Thai state, Ayutthaya, was established in the heart of the Chao Phraya plain.

From the 15th to the 19th centuries, the Thai kingdom was one of the strongest states on the Indochinese peninsula. The strength of the Thai state was threatened periodically by neighboring states. Burma was the most feared and disliked adversary of all. In the last half of the 16th century and, again, in 1767, the Burmese invaded Ayutthaya. The second time the capital was destroyed. A new capital was soon built, across the river from Bangkok; 15 years later, the capital was moved to Bangkok.

Early in the 19th century, Westerners began to arrive in Thailand in numbers. By the middle of the 19th century, instead of trying to block Western influences, Thai leaders took a more practical course. King Mongkut (of "Anna and the King of Siam" fame) had learned much of Western science, ideas and languages. He adopted a policy of accommodating to Western power in business, trade and the development of Thailand's resources.

During the long reign of his son, King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), the country became more and more Westernized. Law, administration, transportation and communications were modernized. Increasing contact with Western ideas gave educated Thai new ideas about political and social progress. The result, in 1932, was a coup d'etat by civilian officials, who established a constitutional regime.

Promotion of nationalism, relatively important even before 1932, became a major theme of the Thai government in the constitutional period. The strongest expressions of Thai nationalism since the War have been actions against the economically powerful Chinese minority; the promotion of national enterprises; the revival of traditional institutions

while, at the same time, adopting Western institutions.

D. POLITICAL

1. Government

Since 1932 the government of Thailand has been a constitutional monarchy based avowedly on democratic principles. Between 1932 and the present, Thailand's government has five times been overthrown by successful coups d'etat. While each coup has resulted in changes in political leadership, the governmental structure has remained intact and the population relatively undisturbed. The ruling faction has been, and continues to be, comprised of a few high ranking military officers. Although the regime rests primarily on armed force rather than the freely expressed will of the people, there are few signs of popular disaffection.

Centuries of national independence and absolute monarchy paved the way for ready acceptance by the Thai of the benevolent military oligarchy established by military coup d'etat of 1947. The coup group, led by Prime Minister Field Marshal Phibun Songgram (who was not a participant in the 1947 coup but was privy to it), remained firmly entrenched in power for ten years, and, until September 1957, exercised autocratic control over the country.

On the night of 16 September 57 Army forces under Marshal Sarit occupied Bangkok and demanded the resignation of the Phibun government. Within hours Phibun and Minister of Interior Phao had fled and Sarit was in complete control.

A new government was elected on 15 December 1957, resulting in Sarit's group actively assuming control of the government. Lt Gen Thanom Kittikachorn, a protege of Sarit and Commander of the First Army, was appointed Prime Minister, and Lt Gen Praphat Charusathein became Minister of Interior. The policies of this government are of little difference than its predecessors.

GROUPS WITHIN GROUPS

Considerable factionalism exists within the government party (National Socialist Party). The situation is complicated by Marshal Sarit's absence in the U. S. for medical treatment. In spite of political factionalism and jockeying for power there are no signs of any imminent crises; although if Sarit should prolong his absence there is a possibility that Thanom will resign and precipitate a crisis.

E. ECONOMIC

Thailand has a basically stable, expanding agricultural economy whose principal asset is its main crop, rice. The population of predominantly small landowners enjoys better living conditions than prevail in most neighboring countries. Thailand's economic situation has improved considerably in the past several years. The economy as a whole

has been undergoing a marked expansion which appears to be great enough, in relation to population growth, to have effected moderate increases in per capita output. Production has been rising as a result of development projects, which have increased productivity, and an improvement in the world market for Thai exports.

Thailand is self sufficient only in food. The country depends upon imports for textiles, kerosene and other vital consumer goods. Because there is no heavy industry, Thailand imports all of its machine tools, automobiles, aircraft and heavy weapons. The railroad system has a low capacity and highways are in poor condition and serve only a part of the country. The supply of electric power does not meet current needs.

The government is presently attempting to diminish the economical advantage the Chinese have gained in the country. Following the same pattern of economic domination that they have employed in other countries of South Asia, the Chinese have settled in the most populated areas and have become the manufacturers and merchants, both large and small.

F. SOCIOLOGICAL

1. Population

Thailand's population numbered 21,673,000 as of 1 January 1959. Major ethnic groups are: Thai (including Thai-born Chinese) 96.7%, China-born 2.8%. All other groups comprise 0.5% of the population. The great majority of the people live in a rural environment, and Bangkok is Thailand's only large urban center. About 88 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture. Density of population varies greatly from one Changwat (province) to another because of difference in topography, especially as they affect the suitability of the land for rice culture. Population density is greatest in the central plain area and along the coastal lowlands. Thailand is not densely settled by Asian or European standards and the agricultural population per unit of cultivated land is smaller than in most other countries of monsoonal Asia.

The population of Thailand has more than doubled in the past forty years. Although only estimated figures are available for the years subsequent to 1947, the growth trend appears to parallel that observed in the Philippines, Malaya, and Singapore.

2. The People and their Customs

The people of Thailand are fundamentally similar in that they have the same language, the same customs and religion, eat similar food, live in houses of the same type, and tend to have similar values.

Most of the rural Thai live in farming villages. These villages are usually built along a river, canal or roadway, with rice fields behind the houses. Each village usually has a temple and a school. In Bangkok, and in the larger towns there are rows of two story

buildings, with small shops and factories downstairs. These buildings are for the most part occupied by Chinese.

In rural areas, the year's work begins with the rains which soften the earth enough for plowing and planting. Transplanting of the rice shoots begins within six weeks of the first planting, and doesn't end for about two months, from the middle of June until September. Since there is little to be done to the rice until December when it has matured, the typical rural Thai is idle during this period. Then the heavy cooperative harvesting begins and lasts until early February. A second period of idleness then follows until the cycle again begins with the first June rains.

City life is much less responsive to the changing seasons. During the hot season, the latter part of March through April and May the office worker, if he can afford it, takes a vacation or a pilgrimage to a holy place. The Thai likes to think of himself as cool and outwardly unemotional in difficult situations. Life is to be enjoyed, beautified, and embellished rather than controlled. Serenity combined with a zest for life appear to be the traits most valued. The Thais have a lively sense of humor and rate highly the ability to have a good time and to be a good sport. They have a live and let-live individualism and concentrate on the present rather than the past or future.

A Thai's primary obligation is to keep relations with others smooth. As long as a person does not embarrass himself or others, a person may do as he pleases. The Thai seeks to remain aloof from involvement with other people and to avoid needless difficulties arising from troublesome human relationships. They wish to be friendly, pleasant, and polite, not too involved, yet not too distant. Mutual respect between individuals is highly regarded.

3. Attitudes and Sensitivities

The Thai has been characterized as an easy-going people, hospitable, noncompetitive, and valuing a good sense of humor. Sanuk, the Thai word for fun frequently appears in their speech. Moderation and peacefulness are among the most important Thai social values. They consider it highly desirable to avoid direct expressions of aggression, anger or hatred. Most statements of praise or admiration for an individual will include references to his peacefulness and non-aggression. An industrious, intelligent, educated person, if he is not peaceful, is not thought to be a good person.

A Thai value which is closely akin to the Chinese concept of "saving face" is that of kreng chai-the desire to be humble, respectful and considerate. None of these traits should be taken to mean that the Thai is not individualistic. The vast majority of Thai are independent, self employed rice farmers who value their independence. This personal independence finds support in Thai Buddhism, which has a basic teaching that each person's moral state is his own responsibility.

The Thai's believe that the human head is a sacred part of the body. So believing, they are very sensitive about the way a person acts towards the head. No one is allowed to even point to it, let alone touch it. Perhaps the gravest insult that a person can direct at the Thai is to point his foot at the Thai's head. The Thais also take modesty very seriously and feel that the body should not be unnecessarily exposed. They also dislike to shake hands because of perspiration from the heat. They prefer to exchange greetings by bowing slightly, with fingertips placed together and raised to the chest. A foreigner, however, need only to make a polite and respectful greeting to be cordially accepted.

Juniors do not stand when talking to seniors who are seated nor do they pass things over their heads. It is also considered discourteous to point with one's finger or to shake it at someone.

Protocol is important in Thailand. One standard practice is men first, and ladies last.

The most honored and respected person in the country is the King. He is the head of the state, the spiritual leader of the people, the defender of the faith, and the symbol of Thailand's culture. His picture and that of the royal family will be found prominently displayed in shops, offices and homes. In Thailand, crimes of disrespect for the King are punishable by law. In this respect, at the end of large public gatherings such as plays, motion pictures and the like, everyone stands at attention during the playing of the King's anthem. In the case of the movies, this is accompanied by the display of his photograph on the screen. The entire audience is expected to rise.

Shoes should be removed before entering a temple. To do otherwise would be like entering a church with one's hat on.

Many religious shrines are open only to Buddhists and photography on sacred premises is generally prohibited.

Many Buddhists wear miniature images of Buddha around their necks. The different sized and shapes determine their function, which may be to protect the wearer in battle, while travelling, or under any number of circumstances. Many have their scalps and other parts of their bodies tattooed for the same purpose. These tattooes are very sacred and the work is performed as a religious service.

When images of Buddha are displayed in the home and elsewhere care is taken to place the shrine high enough so that no human can be at a higher level or work above the image. Women are cautioned against brushing a Buddhist priest. They are not permitted to touch or even gaze at a woman.

Nearly every yard of a Thai home contains a miniature temple on a post. These are the shrines of the guardian spirit of the

homes, called "Phra Phum". The little statues, flowers, food and incense are offerings to the spirit in appreciation for prayers answered.

A visitor invited to stay overnight in a Thai home is expected to pay his respects to the host's Phra Phum before entering the home and again before leaving. Besides the Phra Phum of the house, there are nine other household spirits. Since one is believed to live in the doorway to the home, the threshold should not be stepped upon when entering the front door. Also, since most Thai homes have immaculately clean and polished floors, the shoes are customarily removed before entering.

G. U. S. OFFICIALS

1. Ambassador .... U. Alexis Johnson

2. Counsel ..... George F. Wilson

3. Attaches:

Army ..... Col ~~Aldon M. Hoffman~~ FRED GASTON

Navy ..... Cdr John L. Nuttall

Air Force ..... Col Paul A. Pettigrew

4. Chief, JUSMAG ..... MGen Baird P. Johnson

5. ICA ..... Thomas E. Naughten

6. USIA ..... Richard M. McCarthy

H. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

1957

1. Thailand's ruling triumvirate-Premier Phibun Songgram, Director General of the Police, General Phao Sriyanond, and Army Commander-in-Chief, General Sarit Thanarat-fell apart in 1957 in the face of popular demands for greater democracy and growing protests against corruption in high places. The long-standing rivalry between the police and the army heads ended with the latter's ousting of his two associates.

The first indication of the weakening of the triumvirate was the strong opposition to Premier Phibun manifested in the February elections. There were widespread charges of fraud and in March several thousand students demonstrated against these elections, which were admitted by General Sarit to be dishonest. In Phibun's new cabinet of March 29, the army was given a stronger role, and Sarit took over the post of Defense Minister previously held by Phibun. Opposition to Phibun, however, continued to rise.

General Sarit finally withdrew army support from Phibun and resigned as Minister of Defense. Sarit shortly thereafter decided that the Phibun regime had outlived its usefulness. On 16 September his army units seized control of Bangkok and Phibun and Phao were allowed to flee the country without hindrance. King Phumiphon dissolved the assembly and appointed 123 new members on 18 September. Sarasin, former ambassador to the U. S. and secretary general of SEATO was named premier and it was made clear that the government's pro-Western policy would be unaltered. The army took steps to disband artillery, tank and paratroop units of Phao's so-called "police" and Sarit was proclaimed supreme commander of all the nation's forces.

2. In the 15 December elections a new Nationalist Socialist Party was formed by Sarit. Lt General Thanom Kittikachorn was named premier on 1 Jan 58 heading a pro-Western cabinet of largely military complexion.

3. An event of considerable importance for Thailand's long-run economy took place on 2 September when the Yanhee Electricity Authority (a newly created governmental agency) and the World Bank signed an agreement for $66 million loan for financing the Yanhee electric power, flood control and irrigation project. The project was the largest of its kind ever undertaken in Thailand. The first state-construction of a dam on the Ping River in western Thailand-is to be completed in 1963.

1958

1. The stability of Thailand's government was unsettled due to the fact that the ruling National Socialist Party was riddled by internal dissension and under heavy attack from outside the Party. A number of factors worked against the cohesion needed by the NSP. Not the least of these was the prolonged absence from Thailand of the NSP's leader and dominant figure of the military clique, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Sarit went to the U. S. in mid-January 1958 to undergo treatment for a liver ailment. During his absence he attempted to run the Thai government by remote control through the medium of letters, tape recorded messages and by frequent calls for his associates to confer with him in the U. S. Although Sarit's efforts were reasonably successful, his personal prestige suffered greatly during his absence and he was under heavy press and political attack. Almost every newspaper in Thailand censured his alleged ineptitude in handling negotiations for U. S. economic aid. incompetence

Another factor promoting conflict within the NSP resulted from the three-element composition of the Military Group: (a) senior military officers who occupied key positions in the government; (b) junior officers who occupied lesser positions or none at all; and (c) a group composed of both junior and senior officers who believed that the administration was not being carried out in conformity with the will of the people. There was an increasing number of reports of corruption, fraud and inefficiency in high places and apparently the people came to

realize that the government was as graft-ridden as was the former Phibun regime.

Thailand's political complex has been nearly always confused and the internal situation generally did not indicate any change in the country's foreign policy was to be contemplated. Thailand's anti-Communist position continued as did Thai participation in SEATO. Thailand continued to be largely dependent upon foreign aid and slow, steady improvement in the Thai military capability was realized.

2. Lt General Thanom was named Premier.

3. Field Marshal Sarit, in a quiet coup, established military rule. Political parties were abolished and arrest of persons engaged in Communist activity started. Lt Gen Thanom resigned.

1959

1. Field Marshal Sarit was named Prime Minister of the provisional Government. Members of the military Revolutionary Group received key appointments as was expected.

2. "At the point of death" in January, Sarit recovered following major abdominal surgery by a team of US medical officers.

3. King Phumiphon Adundet proclaimed an interem Constitution. The old Constitution was abandoned when Marshal Sarit came in to power in October 1958.

4. Diplomatic relations were resumed with Cambodia less than two months after the break.

5. Thai Communist leader Supachai Srisati was executed.



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DIEM DEFEATS HIS OWN BEST TROOPS

Stanley Karnow

At three one humid morning last November, three battalions of paratroopers surrounded the handsome Saigon palace of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem. Within thirty-six hours their attempted revolt had been crushed. The rebel chiefs fled to sanctuary in Cambodia, and the rebel troops themselves, forced to surrender, tactfully reaffirmed their allegiance to the regime. Bullet holes in buildings were quickly plastered in. The dead were discreetly buried. President Diem, who has survived several serious scrapes in his six years of power, emerged from the fortified cellar of his palace with another narrow triumph to his credit. "The government continues to serve the nation," he intoned confidently, and his spokesmen dismissed the abortive coup d'etat as merely "an incident."

So it was--just an incident. But it was the most dramatic symptom to date of a deeper disturbance that has plagued Sough Vietnam for a year or more. Beneath the appearance of calm and stability, and despite all the government's assurances of security, President Diem's regime may well be approaching collapse, and with such a collapse, the country could fall to the Communists. "The situation is desperate," an official told me a few weeks ago.

Bands of Communist guerrillas, directed from Hanoi in North Vietnam, roam almost every rural region, blowing up bridges, blocking roads, terrorizing farmers, and attacking army posts. This menace has been compounded by the demoralization of the peasants, the army, and what the French-oriented Vietnamese call "les intellectuels." Most serious of all, perhaps, is President Diem's own attitude. He seems to have survived the revolt with his ego unscathed and his faith in his own infallibility renewed.

Diem is a complex personality. From his mixed Catholic and Confucian background evolved a combination of monk and mandarin, a kind of ascetic authoritarian. He is deceptively dainty-looking man; in fact, he is tough and obstinate. To a significant degree, his stubborn self-righteousness saved a regime that most "experts" considered lost back in 1955, after the Geneva Agreement had divided South Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel. Amply bolstered by American sympathy and material aid--which has totaled more than a billion dollars in the past five years--he successfully fought off the insurgent sects, consolidated a government, welcomed and resettled almost a million refugees from the Communist North. He initiated a land-reform program and embarked upon such ambitious projects as building roads and railways, extending agricultural credit, and establishing light industries.

In all his energetic enterprises, the fixation in Diem's mind has been survival. But in his concentration on survival, Diem seems to have paralyzed rather than inspired those around him. He demands absolute loyalty and has developed an inability or unwillingness to trust others.

Instead, fearful of betrayal, impatient with any initiative by underlings, he has gathered all power to himself, and working as much as fifteen hours a day, he plunges into the most minute details of administration, personally signing passport applications, reserving for himself the right to approve a student's scholarship to the United States. He has even been known to decide on the distance between roadside trees.

This sort of one-man rule is not uncommon in underdeveloped countires that lack trained personnel. But it discourages the development of a responsible civil service, and it can inspire minor officials to all sorts of red tape and pettifoggery. Without any balanced administrative structure, officals turn to the most convenient source of power. Here, Diem's family--he does trust them--display their peculiar talents. They have succeeded in building a partly public, partly clandestine structure inside and outside the government. On this, Diem's power rests.

One of the President's brothers, the mysterious Ngo Dinh Can, lives in Hue, and from there controls central Vietnam. He exercises much of his authority through the National Revolutionary Movement, the progovernment political party. Another brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, whom Diem trusts implicity and relies upon constantly, is probably the most powerful single individual in the country after Diem himself. Educated in Paris and the leading native civil servant under French rule, Nhu is a handsome, articulate, passionate, voluble intellectual. Speaking elegant French in a voice that sometimes whines with emotion, he will declaim at length on one of his favorite subjects, the "problems of the underdeveloped country." This includes an exposition of the theory that "freedom must not prevent the march of progress."

There is considerable validity to Nhu's notion. But his ideas in action are somewhat more questionable. He has certainly helped to curtail freedom, but it is not so sure that he has done much to promote progress. He directs an avowedly clandestine movement called the Can Lao Nhan Vi--the "Revolutionary Labor Party"--which, he concedes frankly, is organized along the lines of a Communist apparantus. Its seventy thousand secret members have been infiltrated into factories, villages, government offices, army units, schools, and newspapers, where they spend part of their time collecting information about their compatroits. Nhu's pretty wife--commonly called Madame Nhu, though the family surname is Ngo--commands the ladies' auxiliary.

Although there is not a single shred of evidence against them, Nhu and his wife are believed to be at the heart of most major corruption in the country. Through his Can Lao, Nhu is said to control the wood and charcoal trade, and their are tales of his investments in Brazil, France, and Switzerland. When the Nhus are confronted with stories of their supposed venality, they simply issue denials. "It's the diplomats," Madame Nhu told me huffily during a recent chat. "They have nothing better to do than gossip. I just ignore them." Her husband tends to protest more vigorously. "Foreign powers are against us," he insists. "Everyone picks on poor little Ngo Dinh Diem and his brothers. Why? Maybe it's because we are Catholic. I don't know. But these rumors of our corruption, our stealing--all lies. Nobody has any proof."

EIGHT HUNDRED MURDERS A MONTH

One way or the other, however, everyone believes that the Nhus are corrupt (everyone, that is, but Diem himself, who will not even listen to charges against his family). The real or imaginary, or total or partial, misconduct of Diem's family is serious because it coincides with a period of tension generated by increased Communist terrorism. And as Communist terrorism became more acute, the growing uneasiness and insecurity sparked more vocal dissatisfaction which, not long ago, began to spread beyond the family to criticism of Diem himself.

The current Communist offensive against South Vietnam began to build up as early as September, 1959. Communist guerrillas opened their operations with teams of fifty or more, soon increasing to company strength of a hundred--their largest groups since they fought the French. They had French, British, and American weapons hidden since wartime days; newer arms--some of Czech or Chinese origin--and fresh recruits were beought in from the north.

The first big push came last January. One night, attacking in company force, the Communists raided a regimental headquarters at Tay Ninh, northwest of Saigon, and killed thirty-four Vietnamese soldiers sleeping off their Chinese-style New Year's celebration. Soon they were fanning out through the southern delta, hitting army posts, ambushing troops, terrorizing local village chiefs. It is no longer safe to travel without escort in many parts of the country, and the important commercial highway between Saigon and Phnompenh is often closed. The Communists are, at present, killing about eight hundred people per month--rural officials, troops, police, and ordinary peasants. In recent weeks they have reportedly destroyed some fifty bridges in the delta area and they have killed an American military adviser--mainly as a demonstration of their strength.

Communists guerrillas are believed to number about six thousand at the moment. Reliable intelligence sources describe them as highly mobile and extremely well acquainted with the local countryside, and there is no place in the southern delta they cannot effectively control. But they apparently do not always consider it advantageous to be aggressive. Well aware of Mao Tse-tung's art of partisan warfare, they seem to recognize that a hostile population would be to their detriment. Thus they scout villages carefully. When they take one, they hold it long enough to deliver political lectures and distribute pamphlets, then leave behind them the threat of execution if they do not get co-operation. By "co-operation" they mean information and food, perhaps recruits, maybe medical care.

The South Vietnam Army of 150,000 men, supported by American aid and trained by American advisers, seemed to lack sufficient instruction for the kind of conflict they had to fight. As in Laos and Thailand, they had been taught conventional, western methods of warfare, and they were outfitted with tanks, armored cars, and artillery.

Not until last spring--after some squabbling among various American services--was an anti-guerrilla school created in South Vietnam. But most of the army has not begun to unlearn its earlier instruction, and in many

areas troops will not move at anything less than battalion or regiment strength, accompanied by elaborate armor. A more hopeful program in South Vietnam was the recent creation of a corps of thirty thousand civil guards, armed with shotguns and radios to get help when Communist partisans are sighted. They have not been operating long enough to have proved their value.

If they are to be successful, however, Diem will have to alter part of his political and administrative structure, which has seriously hindered the fight against the Communist. In each of the thirty-eight provinces, for example, the civil guard is under the orders of a semi-autonomous province chief, who is directly responsible to the president alone but usually clears his moves with brothers Nhu or Can. Often the province chiefs exercise their peculiar right to deny their neighbors "hot pursuit" of guerrillas more than five kilometers into their territory. Similar rules and regulations hamstring the army. Units may only move within their own military districts, and lateral communications between districts are poor or nonexistent.

Still another stumbling block to effective military activity has been Diem's typical propensity to ignore his senior officers. Like a model railroad enthusiast dispatching toy trains hither and you, he occasionally picks up a telephone in his palace and capriciously orders a battalion to pack up and move five hundred miles, without informing anyone else of the directive and leaving all his subordinates wondering which troops are where.

THE RURAL BALANCE SHEET

In any conflict against guerrillas, however, the key to success or failure lies in the rural population, and in many regions of South Vietnam the peasants' attitude to the Diem regime seems to range between plain and "hostile" neutrality.

To some extent the army has been at fault. It has tended--as the French did so often in Indo-China--to evacuate villages at night, thereby leaving peasants to the mercy of terrorists. Like most Oriental armies it has done its share of brutalizing peasants--raping, pillaging, torturing. And often it is caught in clever Communist traps. In the Mekong River delta a couple of month ago, for instance, a Communist band captured a junk-load of rice. They carried it to a nearby settlement and distributed it free to the people, thus winning a vote of gratitude. But to consolidate this tactic, disguised Communist agents went to army officers in the vicinity and told them where the captured cargo could be uncovered. Government troops were promptly dispatched to raid the village and confiscate the stolen rice and the final score in this ruse was one more psychological victory for the Reds, one more psychological loss for the Diem regime.

Aggravating this sort of fumbling, some of Diem's dramatic security decisions have fallen short. Late in 1959, for example, he devised a scheme to pull the peasants together in large agglomerations, officially to be called "prosperity centers" and commonly known as agrovilles. The

laudable aim of these projects was to establish protected villages and, incidentally, to set up marketing cooperatives. Last spring, traveling with military escort, I drove down to an agroville at Vi Thanh, in the heart of the dangerous delta region. At first glance, it seemed magnificent compared to the scrubby farms I had seen along the way. Flanking a canal for about four miles, it had ample bamboo-and-thatch houses, each with a large garden. There were ferries to take farmers to their fields and in the town itself there was a power plant, a school, a dispensary, and a common market; and there were plans to stock the local canals with fish to give peasants another source of income between rice harvests.

But probing a bit more deeply into the story of Vi Thanh, I discovered some fatal flaws that, in practice, had made the entire scheme a detriment to South Vietnam's security--and perhaps explain why the government has abruptly dropped the whole agroville idea.

For one thing, the project ran directly counter to traditional social patterns in the region. Peasants in the delta area, unlike those in the north, have always lived on their land and not in villages. The swift and ruthless manner in which the agrovilles were created not only disrupted ancient customs, it also alienated more peasants than it could ever have protected. The ingenuous provincial official who was responsible for Vi Thanh was delighted to describe what he considered his achievement. In fifty days, beginning in December, 1959, with the help of the army he rounded up twenty thousand peasants--although they were in the midst of their rice harvest--and put them to work immediately. They were paid nothing, and many of them had to walk ten or twelve miles to and from the construction job every day. And when the agroville was finished, there was room in it for only 6,200 people, leaving some fourteen thousand others without their rice crop, without any payment for their work, and without any opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor.

On balance, there is no doubt that Diem has done a great deal for the South Vietnamese peasant. The accomplishments--credit, new seeds, irrigation projects, tax exemptions, land distribution, and the like--cannot be overlooked. But the individualistic, self-conscious farmer, like farmers everywhere in the world, has an inherent inclination to discount his blessings; and in critical times, such as the present, failings tend to gain greater currency than achievements.

In a different but no less serious way, the dissatisfaction of the peasants has been matched by the increasing disenchantment of Saigon's educated elite with Diem and his government.

From various conversations during the past year, I can only venture some opinions of the influences at work among the Saigon "intellectuals." Events in Korea last spring, which culminated in the overthrow of Syngman Rhee, had a profound and pervasive effect throughout Asia. In South Vietnam--as in Formosa--younger people were inspired with the fuzzy idea that they, like the Koreans, might be able to "do something," without ever specifying clearly what they wanted to do. Many, for example, would have liked to "do something" about government bureaucracy, and in many private talks, almost every Vietnamese I saw--including some public officials--

vehemently wanted to "do something" about Diem's family and its influence. Several of these youths, lacking the right political connections for advancement, felt frustrated by the difficulties they encountered in trying to serve their country.

In all the recent Saigon grumbling, however, there has been surprisingly little demand for "democracy." The general displeasure, as I heard it, was with what the wits dubbed "Diemocracy"--the government's make-believe guarantees of civil liberties and fair elections. With much fanfare, extensive plans were worked out for National Assembly elections in August 1959, and opponents of the government's National Revolutionary Movement were invited to run. But hardly had the campaign begun than opposition politicians encountered a variety of obstacles, such as having the wrong stamp or signature on their documents or displaying "illegal" placards. Those who managed to hurdle these barriers found themselves facing another block on election day. Contingents of troops were moved into Saigon, where the opposition was strongest; the troops were all under orders to vote for the goverament candidates.

Even so, a Harvard-educated opponent of the regime, Dr. Phan Quang Dan, somehow succeeded in winning a parliament seat. He was never able to assume it, however. With almost infantile pique, the government arrested him for such infractions as opening his campaign "too early," using "unauthorized posters," and making "false promises"; and despite appeals by three western ambassadors to Diem, Dr. Dan's election was annulled.

Although nobody was prepared to fight strongly for Dr. Dan the government's action against him made Diem appear petty and peevish, and it diminished his prestige considerably. Last April, a group of eighteen former officials--among them several ex-ministers, the president of the Red Cross and, in spite of family ties, Madame Nhu's uncle--sent Diem a petition requesting that he "liberalize his regime, expand democracy, grant minimum civil rights," and reform the administration, the army, and the economy. Neither this modest appeal nor its signers could have been considered a menace to the regime.

Upon receipt of their petition, however, President Diem's first reaction was to have them arrested and sent to "political re-education camps," where an estimated 25,000 citizens are currently being shown the paths of righteousness. After some reflection, Diem decided to ignore them. But, coincidentally, about thirty obscure doctors, students, and journalist were picked up on suspicion of "Communist affiliations." To my knowledge, none of them--nor any other suspects--has ever been brought to trial. Frequent police roundups of this kind serve as a warning.

The rumbling of disgruntlement throughout last spring and summer did not delude Diem and his government, and much of it sounded ominously like another South Korean episode in the making. Diem was extremely sensitive to this possibility, and a good deal of his irritation was directed toward the United States, which had taken a hand in removing Syngman Rhee and was, through its diplomats in Saigon, constantly trying to press upon him the urgent need for reforms.

But heads of state, however much aid they receive, are still aware of their sovereignty; indeed, the more impoverished and indebted they are, the more sensitive and stubborn they may be in resisting the advice or pressure of an American representative. Efforts with Diem elicited only an impatient rejection of "interference" in his domestic affairs. Obliquely, one of Diem's close aids described to me how the United States had "dislocated" South Korean society.

South Vietnam and South Korea are, it seems, parallels that do not meet. Korea had an organized opposition party, a body of fairly sophisticated students, and a group of independent army officers. In Vietnam, there has not been--and may still not be--any visible alternative to Diem except the Communists. As recently as a month or two ago, his most vociferous critics could not conceive of South Vietnam without him. "We cannot abandon him," one of them said, "but he must bring in reforms." There are several reasons to believe that the paratroopers who rebelled last year shared this feeling about Diem. They were frustrated and overworked. They were irritated by political meddling in their operations, and they blamed the government for failing to generate popular support in the countryside. Despite a later government propaganda campaign to vilify them--as "egomaniacs," "Communist and colonial agents," and the like--there is scarcely any doubt that the rebels were sincere.

Over and over again during their rebellion, the paratroop officers repeated the same theme: the regime needs overhauling so its fight against the Communists can be more effective. "If we allowed things to continue," a rebel captain explained, "it's obvious that this country would be Communist in a year."

The insurgent leaders were, first and foremost, soldiers. One of them, Lieutenant Colonel Vuong Van Dong, was a native of the north who had served with the French against Vietminh. His partner in the uprising was Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi, commander of the country's three thousand paratroopers--a veteran who had helped save Diem's life in 1955, when the regime was attacked by the piratical Binh Xuyen and other sects. Since then, Colonel Thi had been so intimate with the Ngo family that Diem often referred to him as "my son." Neither these nor any of the other military men involved appear to have had political ambitions or much political acumen. They failed to follow the most elementary procedures of a coup detat, such as seizing the radio station, blocking the roads into the city, or cutting communications. At the height of the fracas, for example, it was still possible to pick up a telephone and ring the palace switchboard. This evidence points to utter naiveté. It also points to a motive behind the facade of callowness. No experienced military men would have held back their troops for thirty-six hours from attacking the palace of the president they intended to overthrow--unless, of course, they did not intend to overthrow the president.

That, in my opinion, was the reason for their restraint. They were primarily attempting to pressure Diem into reform. In their only effort to see him, they went to the chief of the American military mission, and after outlining their grievances, asked for an escort to the president.

Most Americans in Saigon were sympathetic to the rebels. But neither the general nor Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow could risk involvement in the revolt. They refused to arrange a meeting, and at no time during the episode did Diem and the insurgents confront each other. Although they skirmished with the palace guards, the rebels never made a frontal attack on the palace. Indeed, their conduct throughout--as a paratroop colonel described it at the time--was "gentlemanly."

President Diem on the other hand, was playing to win. At the first rebel outbreak, he and his brother Nhu descended to the palace cellar, which had recently been equipped against the possibility of a siege. There, sitting at a table--now enshrined as "la table de la victoire"--Diem began sending radio messages to army units in the nearby countryside. This very practice of personally moving around troops, which so exasperated professional soldiers, became an essential element in his success. He managed to contact commanders in the south and north, and ordered them into Saigon to rescue him. They were slow in coming. To stall, Diem agreed to a whole list of reforms--civil liberties, free elections, a liberal economic program, a more effective offensive against the Communists, and other changes. He also promised to dismiss the government and form a new coalition cabinet, with himself as president. A tape recording of these decisions had barely been broadcast when his saviors arrived and, after some fierce fighting, sent the rebels scattering.

Without much hesitation, Diem publicly reneged on his promises. They were made, he explained, at a time when the situation seemed lost and it was imperative "to preserve the integrity of our military potentialities." He forgave the rank-and-file paratroopers, claming that they had assembled at his palace under the illusion that they were protecting him. And he reaffirmed that "republican and personalist principles" would continue as the basis of his regime. In short, there would be no change.

Saigon seemed calm and peaceful again. But scores were quietly and severely settled in the days that followed. A kind of committee of public safety, sanctioned by the government, announced "a systematic purge in state and civic organizations until the last suspected element is wiped out." As advertised, it systematically aided the secret police in making arrests, cluttered the city with vengeful posters, and failed only "to stop the indignant masses" from smashing up five newspaper offices that were guilty of printing news of the revolt.

In that sort of atmosphere it is usually difficult to assess public opinion. But in Saigon that week I discovered, on the contrary, a greater willingness in people to talk than I had ever before encountered. They had, it seems on looking back, a desire to unburden themselves engendered by a mixture of confused feelings: desperation at the rebel failure, encouragment from the attempt, and, I found everywhere, the certainty that sooner or later there would be another revolt--a successful one. "The army has lost its virginity," as a knowledgeable Vietnamese put it "Next time it will be easier."

GOOD NEWS FOR THE GUERRILLAS

South Vietnam will be fortunate, however, if the "next time" there is fighting in Saigon, the anti-government forces are not Communists.

For the revolt and its aftermath is bound to prove a boon to the guerrillas. It introduced an element of distrust between Diem and his army that should inevitably make their relations more brittle than ever. Beyond that, the insurrection took a moral and physical toll on the most effective army unit in the country. The paratroopers were the spearhead against the Communist partisans. From their bases around Saigon, they could be mobilized and put into action anywhere within eighteen hours. Although no casualty figures have been released, it is calculated that as many as four hundred of them may have been killed during the revolt. Some of their best officers fled with the rebel colonels; and nobody knows how many individual soldiers, beaten and ashamed, deserted to the jungles. A high-ranking, apolitical military man commented sadly: "The Communists would have given three divisions to wipe out the paratroopers. We have done it for them."

If the insurrection hurt the army, it also shattered Diem's prestige. The aloof mandarin had never been loved, but he had at least enjoyed a healthy measure of respect. Diem lost ground by allowing the situation to degenerate to a point at which revolt was conceivable, especially by troops who had often served as his most trusted bodyguard. Moreover, he lost face badly by disavowing the promises of reform he had broadcast during the uprising. "We didn't want the rebels to harm him," a schoolteacher said bitterly, "but now we're sorry they didn't."

MISPLACING THE BLAME

The ugly mood of the country does not seem to have affected Diem. Just after the revolt, palace officials reported that they had rarely seen him in such good humor, and a western ambassador who paid a courtesy call described him as "bouncy." His self-confidence is paralleled by his brother Nhu's somewhat alarming analysis of the "rebel causes" behind the country's unsettled state. In a long conversation I had with him a few weeks ago, Nhu emphasized that the principal culprits in the revolt were the "western embassies" in Saigon, and individual Americans in particular. They supposedly provoked the paratroopers to rebellion by disseminating rumors of corruption and nepotism. "Not only that," he said, "but American military advisers were helping the paratroopers during the revolt. And they volunteered--they were not invited."

To this suggestion of "colonialist" inspiration--a charge diffused widely by the government press--Nhu added another disturbing notion. He readily admitted that the country's fight against the Communists was not going well. But, he pointed out, the army rather than the government was at fault. "The army is doing its job badly," he said. "They don't know enough about psychological warfare. It's entirely wrong to suppose that the population is displeased with the government. It's the army they dislike." And hinting at possible purges to come, he added: "Every military chief must take stock of his conscience."

Nhu's analysis of events, which naturally absolves Diem of any fault, thus puts the blame squarely on the two main props of the regime--the United States and the South Vietnamese Army. This thesis--to which Diem himself certainly subscribes--is likely to create trouble in the future.

Anxiety and suspicion that the United States is "interfering," as it did in South Korea, is apt to stiffen Diem against further efforts to make him liberalize. A very blunt version of this fear was expressed in a recent Times of Vietnam editorial, which commented: "The threat to our independence does not come from our Communist enemies alone, but also from a number of foreign people who claim to be our firends." At the same time, Nhu's criticism of the army and the possibility of purges--even if party justified--can be hazardous for a country heavily infiltrated by Communist guerrillas. Military morale, as the insurrection testified, has reached a low point. Should Diem inaugurate "loyalty tests" for his troops or punish them for his own failings, he may find nothing between himself and Ho Chi Minh's terrorists.

KEY TO SURVIVAL

Some of the president's aids, conscious of the unstable situation--and also concerned with the regime's reputation abroad--persuaded Diem to let them announce a forthcoming "reshuffle of the cabinet and a general revamping of our entire establishment." This program of "reform," which has yet to be revealed in detail, does not, however, answer the basic question of whether Diem himself can be reformed. In Saigon, as in Djakarta and Rabat and Leopoldville, the establishment is never as important as the man who manages it. Liberal constitutions, parliaments and law courts are a glut in underdeveloped countries where governments resemble nothing so much as the personality of the man at the top.

The characteristics that made Diem a success in 1955 and 1956--obstinacy, single-mindedness, and guile--are his most obvious weaknesses today. If he is unable to change, there is not much hope that he, or perhaps even the country, can last. In recent months, several reputable firms have declined to underwrite any business in South Vietnam. "No premium, no matter how high, is worth the risk," explains one American insurance executive.

The precariousness of the Diem regime, the current fighting in Laos, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk's unpredictable neutralism in Cambodia have combined to bring Indo-China to its dreariest days since Dienbienphu. A durable anti-Communism can, in time, emerge from economic and social development. The problem in a vulnerable country like South Vietnam is to survive and progress simultaneously, as Malaya did throughout the years of its emergency. This is, of course, easier to suggest than to accomplish. But neither survival nor progress is likely to evolve out of puerile slogans, secret police, and massive regiments maneuvering like ancient Asian armies of elephants. Among other things, it requires the rational use of force accompained by long-term economic planning and efforts to arouse popular enthusiasm. It also needs an intangible: style of leadership. If Diem cannot, in some radical switch, provide these elements, he is liable to fall. The Communists are ready to fill the vacuum.

HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
APO 25, San Francisco, California

DFIN

SUBJECT: Uniforms, Ranks and Insignia of Selected Countries

TO:

1. The attached inclosures are forwarded to provide recognition data on uniforms and insignia used by the armed forces of Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand.

2. Additional data on this subject will be forwarded as received by this headquarters.

JAMES M. MCGUIRE
Lt Col GS
AC of S, G2

11 Incl
1. Cambodian Army and Air Force Ranks and Insignia.
2. Continuation of Incl 1.
3. Cambodian Navy Ranks and Insignia.
4. Photo of Cambodian Paratroopers.
5. Lao Army Ranks.
6. Lao Army Insignia.
7. Uniforms, Ranks and Insignia of the Army, Navy and Air Force of South Vietnam.
8. Thailand Army Ranks.
9. Thailand Army Insignia.
10. Thailand Air Force Ranks.
11. Thailand Navy Ranks.

[redacted] --Cambodian Army and Air Force Ranks and Insignia with United States Equivalents

Cambodian Name	Cambodian Insignia	U. S. Equivalent
General		Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General		Major General
Major General		Brigadier General
Colonel		Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel		Lieutenant Colonel
Commandant		Major
Capitaine		Captain
Lieutenant		1st Lieutenant
Sous Lieutenant		2nd Lieutenant
Aspirant		Cadet
Adjudant Chef		Chief Warrant Officer
Adjudant		Warrant Officer

Army Crest  Air Force Crest 

(continued on next page)

[redacted]. (continued)

Cambodian Name	Cambodian Insignia	U. S. Equivalent
Sergent Chef		Master Sergeant
Sergent		Sergeant, 1st Class (Army) Technical Sergeant (Air Force)
Caporal Chef		Sergeant (Army) Staff Sergeant (Air Force)
Caporal		Corporal (Army) Airman, 1st Class (Air Force)
Premiere Classe		Private, 1st Class (Army) Airman , 2d Class (Air Force)

The arms and services of the Cambodian Army are indicated by the color of the background and the color of the stripes, as follows:

Arm or Service	Background	Stripes	Arm or Service	Background	Stripes
Infantry	Blue Black	Gold	Medical	Maroon	Gold
Artillery	Black	Gold	Veterinary	Maroon	Silver
Armor	Gray	Silver	Ordnance	Silver Gray	Silver
Airborne	Green	Silver	Quartermaster	Black	Silver
Signal	Navy Blue	Gold	Engineer	Black	Gold
Transportation	Black	Silver			

[redacted]--Cambodian Navy Ranks and Insignia, and United States Equivalents

Cambodian Name	Translation	Insignia	U. S. Equivalent
		Navy Crest 	
Commissioned Officers			
Capitaine de Vaisseau	Captain		Captain
Capitaine de Frigate	Commander		Commander
Capitaine de Corvette	Lieutenant Commander		Lieutenant Commander
Lieutenant de Vasseau	Lieutenant		Lieutenant
Lieutenant	Lieutenant (jg)		Lieutenant (jg)
Enseigne	Ensign		Ensign
Aspirant	Midshipman		Midshipman

(Note: Presently there are no flag ranks in the Cambodian Navy.)
(Note: Presently enlisted insignia is being designed.)

[redacted]

CAMBODIAN PARATROOPERS

These men are an elite force, being all regular army volunteers. Their uniforms and insignia are all French (note lightweight combat dress and rubber-soled jungle and jump boots), but most of their equipment -- particularly signal equipment, as shown here -- is U.S.-made and given them under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). (Source: United States Information Agency.)

The following are the ranks and insignia of the Royal Kingdom of Laos.

K

L

M

ກອງທັບແຫ່ງຊາດ

FORCES ARMEES

ເຄື່ອງໝາຍຊັ້ນ ປະກອບອິນທະນູ

INSIGNES DE GRADE

Insignia of Rank

ນາຍພົນ ແລະ ຈອມພົນ

OFFICIERS GENERAUX ET MARECHAL General Officers and Marshal

ພົນຈັດຕະວາ GENERAL DE BRIGADE — ພົນຕີ GENERAL DE DIVISION — ພົນໂທ GENERAL DE CORPS D'ARMEE — ພົນເອກ GENERAL D'ARMEE — ຈອມພົນ MARECHAL

Brigadier General — Major General — Lieutenant General — General — Marshal

ນາຍພັນ

OFF-SUPERIEURS Field Grade Officers (Senior Officers)

ພັນຕີ COMMANDANT Major — ພັນໂທ LIEUTENANT COLONEL — ພັນເອກ COLONEL

ນາຍຮ້ອຍ

OFF-SUBALTERNES (Company Grade Officers (Subalterns))

ນັກຮຽນນາຍຮ້ອຍ ELEVES OFFICIERS Student Officers (Officer Candidates) — ວ່າທີ່ຮ້ອຍຕີ ASPIRANT — ຮ້ອຍຕີ SOUS LIEUTENANT Second Lieutenant — ຮ້ອຍໂທ LIEUTENANT First Lieutenant — ຮ້ອຍເອກ CAPITAINE Captain

ພົນທະຫານ, ນາຍສິບ, ນາຍຈ່າ

HOMMES DE TROUPE ET SOUSOFFICERS Enlisted Men and Non Commissioned Officers

ພົນທະຫານຊັ້ນ ໑ 1re CLASSE Private 1st Class — ສິບຕີ CAPORAL Corporal — ສິບໂທ CAPORAL CHEF Senior Corporal — ສິບເອກ SERGENT Sergeant — ຈ່າຕີ SERGENT CHEF Senior Sergeant — ຈ່າໂທ ADJUDANT Approx 1st Sgt — ຈ່າເອກ ADJUDANT CHEF Sgt Major

ກອງທັບແຫ່ງຊາດ

FORCES ARMEES - Armed Forces

ເຄື່ອງໝາຍໝວກ

INSIGNES POUR COIFFURE

Headdress Insignia

ໝວກແກັບ
CASQUETTE
Service Cap

BERET
Beret

ເຄື່ອງໝາຍອິນທະນູບ່າ

INSIGNE POUR PATTES D'EPAULES

ພົນທະຫານ,ນາຍສິບ,ນາຍຈ່າ
SOUS/OFFICIERS ET HOMMES DE TROUPE



Insignia for shoulder Straps
NCO's and Soldiers

ສາຍຜ່ານໜ້າໝວກ

BANDE POUR CASQUETTE

Band for Service Cap

ຈອມພົນ
MARECHAL Marshal

ນາຍພົນ
OFFICIERS GENERAUX General Officers

ELEVES OFFICIERS ET ASPIRANTS - Student Officers & Aspirants

ນາຍພັນ
OFFICIERS SUPERIEURS - Field Grade Officers

ນາຍຮ້ອຍ
OFFICIERS SUBALTERNES
Company Grade Officers

ເຄື່ອງໝາຍກົມແລະກອງ

INSIGNES DES ARMES ET SERVICES (Insignia of the Arms and Services)

INFANTERIE Infantry — ກອງບິນ AVIATION Air Branch — ESCADRILLE ELUVIALE River Squadron — A.B.C. Armored Cavalry — ປືນໃຫຍ່ ARTILLERIE Artillery — TRAIN Transportation — ພົນຮົ່ມ PARACHUTISTE Parachute — GENDARMERIE (Now renamed Military Police) — TRANSMISSIONS Signal Corps — GENIE Engineers



INTENDANCE Quartermaster — JUSTICE MILITAIRE Military Justice — MATERIEL Ordnance — SANTE Medical

ເຄື່ອງໝາຍພິເສດ

INSIGNES PAR TICULIERS

Special Insignia

ຄູພົນຮົ່ມ
MONITEUR PARACHUTISTE
Instructor Parachutist

ພົນຮົ່ມ
PARACHUTISTE
Parachutist

ນັກບິນ
PERSONNEL NAVIGANT

ສາຍແອວ (ທັມະດາ)

CEINTURE ORDINAIRE Ordinary Belt



ສາຍແອວ (ກຽດຕິຍົດ)

CEINTURON DE CEREMONIE Ceremonial Sword Belt

ກະດຸມ

BOUTONS

ແບບໃຫຍ່
GRAND MODELE
Large Model

ແບບກາງ
MOYEN MODELE
Medium Model

ແບບນ້ອຍ
PETIT MODELE
Small Model

The following are the ranks and insignia of the army, navy and air force of the Kingdom of Thailand.

Royal Thai Army Ranks and U. S. Equivalents

Thai Name	Usual Translation	Thai Insignia	U.S. Army Equivalents
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS			
จอมพล	Chom Phon		General of the Army
พลเอก	Phon Ek		General
พล โท	Phon Tho		Lieut. General
พลตรี	Phon Tri		Major General
พลจัตวา	Phon Cha Tawa		Brig. General
พันเอก	Phan Ek		Colonel
พันโท	Phan Tho		Lieut. Colonel
พันตรี	Phan Tri		Major
ร้อยเอก	Roi Ek		Captain
ร้อย โท	Roi Tho		1st Lieutenant
ร้อยตรี	Roi Tri		2nd Lieutenant
NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS			
จ่าสิบเอก	Cha Sip Ek		Master Sergeant
จ่าสิบ โท	Cha Sip Tho		Sergeant 1st Class
จ่าสิบตรี	Cha Sip Tri		Sergeant
สิบเอก	Sip Ek		Corporal
สิบ โท	Sip Tho		Private 1st Class
สิบตรี	Sip Tri		Private



THAI ARMY BRANCH OF SERVICE INSIGNIA

	Nawa Arkas Tho		Lieut. Colonel
นาวาอากาศตรี	Nawa Arkas Tri		Major
เรืออากาศเอก	Rua Arkas Ek		Captain
เรืออากาศโท	Rua Arkas Tho		1st Lieutenant
เรืออากาศตรี	Rua Arkas Tri		2nd Lieutenant
NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS			
พันจ่าอากาศเอก	Phan Cha Arkas Ek		Master Sergeant
พันจ่าอากาศโท	Phan Cha Arkas Tho		Tech. Sergeant
พันจ่าอากาศตรี	Phan Cha Arkas Tri		Staff Sergeant
จ่าอากาศเอก	Cha Arkas Ek		Airman 1st Cl.
จ่าอากาศโท	Cha Arkas Tho		Airman 2nd Cl.
จ่าอากาศตรี	Cha Arkas Tri		Airman 3rd Cl.

[redacted]--Royal Thai Air Force Ranks and U. S. Equivalents

Thai Name	Usual Translation	Thai Insignia	U.S.AF Equivalents
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS			
จอมพลอากาศ	Chom Phon Arkas		General of the Air Force
พลอากาศเอก	Phon Arkas Ek		General
พลอากาศโท	Phon Arkas Tho		Lieut. General
พลอากาศตรี	Phon Arkas Tri		Major General
พลอากาศจัตวา	Phon Arkas Cha Tawa		Brig. General
นาวาอากาศเอก	Nawa Arkas Ek		Colonel
นาวาอากาศโท	Nawa Arkas Tho		Lieut. Colonel
นาวาอากาศตรี	Nawa Arkas Tri		Major
เรืออากาศเอก	Rua Arkas Ek		Captain
เรืออากาศโท	Rua Arkas Tho		1st Lieutenant
เรืออากาศตรี	Rua Arkas Tri		2nd Lieutenant
NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS			
พันจ่าอากาศเอก	Phan Cha Arkas Ek		Master Sergeant
พันจ่าอากาศโท	Phan Cha Arkas Tho		Tech. Sergeant
พันจ่าอากาศตรี	Phan Cha Arkas Tri		Staff Sergeant
จ่าอากาศเอก	Cha Arkas Ek		Airman 1st Cl.
จ่าอากาศโท	Cha Arkas Tho		Airman 2nd Cl.
จ่าอากาศตรี	Cha Arkas Tri		Airman 3rd Cl.

[redacted]--Royal Thai Navy Ranks and U. S. Equivalents

Thai Name	Usual Translation	Thai Insignia	U.S. Navy Equivalents
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS			
จอมพลเรือ	Chom Phon Rua		Fleet Admiral
พลเรือเอก	Phon Rua Ek		Admiral
พลเรือโท	Phon Rua Tho		Vice Admiral
พลเรือตรี	Phon Rua Tri		Rear Admiral
พลเรือจัตวา	Phon Rua Cha Tawa		Commodore
นาวาเอก	Nawa Ek		Captain
นาวาโท	Nawa Tho		Commander
นาวาตรี	Nawa Tri		Lieut. Commander
เรือเอก	Rua Ek		Lieutenant
เรือโท	Rua Tho		Lieutenant, J.G.
เรือตรี	Rua Tri		Ensign
NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS			
พันจ่าเอก	Phan Cha Ek		Chief Petty Officer
พันจ่าโท	Phan Cha Tho		Petty Officer, 1st Class
พันจ่าตรี	Phan Cha Tri		Petty Officer, 2nd Class
จ่าเอก	Cha Ek		Petty Officer, 3rd Class
จ่าโท	Cha Tho		Seaman
จ่าตรี	Cha Tri		Seaman Apprentice

HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
APO 25, San Francisco, California

DFIN 3 APR 1961

SUBJECT: Uniforms, Ranks and Insignia of Selected Countries

TO: S2
1st Battle Group, 35th Inf
APO 25

1. The attached inclosures are forwarded to provide recognition data on uniforms and insignia used by the armed forces of Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand.

2. Additional data on this subject will be forwarded as received by this headquarters.

James M McGuire

JAMES M. MCGUIRE
Lt Col GS
AC of S, G2

11 Incl
1. Cambodian Army and Air Force Ranks and Insignia.
2. Continuation of Incl 1.
3. Cambodian Navy Ranks and Insignia.
4. Photo of Cambodian Paratroopers.
5. Lao Army Ranks.
6. Lao Army Insignia.
7. Uniforms, Ranks and Insignia of the Army, Navy and Air Force of South Vietnam.
8. Thailand Army Ranks.
9. Thailand Army Insignia.
10. Thailand Air Force Ranks.
11. Thailand Navy Ranks.

The following are the ranks and insignia of the army, navy and air force of the Kingdom of Cambodia.

[redacted]. --Cambodian Army and Air Force Ranks and Insignia with United States Equivalents

Cambodian Name	Cambodian Insignia	U. S. Equivalent
General		Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General		Major General
Major General		Brigadier General
Colonel		Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel		Lieutenant Colonel
Commandant		Major
Capitaine		Captain
Lieutenant		1st Lieutenant
Sous Lieutenant		2nd Lieutenant
Aspirant		Cadet
Adjudant Chef		Chief Warrant Officer
Adjudant		Warrant Officer

Army Crest  Air Force Crest 

(continued on next page)

[redacted]. (continued)

Cambodian Name	Cambodian Insignia	U. S. Equivalent
Sergent Chef		Master Sergeant
Sergent		Sergeant, 1st Class (Army) Technical Sergeant (Air Force)
Caporal Chef		Sergeant (Army) Staff Sergeant (Air Force)
Caporal		Corporal (Army) Airman, 1st Class (Air Force)
Premiere Classe		Private, 1st Class (Army) Airman , 2d Class (Air Force)

The arms and services of the Cambodian Army are indicated by the color of the background and the color of the stripes, as follows:

Arm or Service	Background	Stripes	Arm or Service	Background	Stripes
Infantry	Blue Black	Gold	Medical	Maroon	Gold
Artillery	Black	Gold	Veterinary	Maroon	Silver
Armor	Gray	Silver	Ordnance	Silver Gray	Silver
Airborne	Green	Silver	Quartermaster	Black	Silver
Signal	Navy Blue	Gold	Engineer	Black	Gold
Transportation	Black	Silver			

--Cambodian Navy Ranks and Insignia, and United States Equivalents

Cambodian Name	Translation	Insignia	U. S. Equivalent
		Navy Crest	
Commissioned Officers			
Capitaine de Vaisseau	Captain		Captain
Capitaine de Frigate	Commander		Commander
Capitaine de Corvette	Lieutenant Commander		Lieutenant Commander
Lieutenant de Vasseau	Lieutenant		Lieutenant
Lieutenant	Lieutenant (jg)		Lieutenant (jg)
Enseigne	Ensign		Ensign
Aspirant	Midshipman		Midshipman

(Note: Presently there are no flag ranks in the Cambodian Navy.)
(Note: Presently enlisted insignia is being designed.)

The following are the ranks, insignia and uniforms of the army, navy and air force of the Republic of Vietnam.

OFFICERS—ARMY

GENERAL

MAJOR TO COL.

CAP INSIGNIA

GENERAL OF THE ARMY

CAPTAIN

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL

BRIGADIER GENERAL

COLONEL

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

MAJOR

CAPTAIN

LIEUTENANT

SECOND LIEUTENANT

STUDENT OFFICER

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

OTHER ARMY RANKS AND GRADES

CAP INSIGNIA

SERGEANT

MASTER SERGEANT

SERGEANT

CORPORAL FIRST CLASS

CORPORAL

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

OFFICERS—AIR FORCE

CAP INSIGNIA

PILOT'S WINGS

CAPTAIN

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL

BRIGADIER GENERAL

COLONEL

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

MAJOR

CAPTAIN

LIEUTENANT

SECOND LIEUTENANT

STUDENT OFFICER

ASPIRANT

OTHER AIR FORCE RANKS AND GRADES

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

WARRANT OFFICER

SERGEANT

MASTER SERGEANT

SERGEANT

CORPORAL FIRST CLASS

CORPORAL

AIRMAN FIRST CLASS

AIRMAN SECOND CLASS

OFFICERS—NAVY

CAP INSIGNIA

MARINE INFANTRY INSIGNIA

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET

ADMIRAL

VICE ADMIRAL

REAR ADMIRAL

CAPTAIN

COMMANDER

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER

LIEUTENANT

LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE

ENSIGN

MIDSHIPMAN

VIET-NAM

OTHER NAVY RANKS AND GRADES

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

WARRANT OFFICER

PETTY OFFICER FIRST CLASS

PETTY OFFICER FIRST CLASS

PETTY OFFICER SECOND CLASS

LEADING SEAMAN

ABLE SEAMAN

SEAMAN

LEADING SEAMAN

HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
APO 25, San Francisco, California

DFIN 20 February 1962

SUBJECT: Bibliography on Southeast Asia and Guerrilla Warfare

TO: See Distribution

Attached as Inclosure 1 is a recommended list of books and periodicals which relate to Southeast Asia and the general subject of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency operations. All listed books and periodicals are available at the Carter Library, Schofield Barracks.

1 Incl
as

JAMES M. McGUIRE
Lt Col GS
AC of S, G2

DISTRIBUTION:
"E" 1 ea items 3 thru 6 (A)
3 ea item 1 (A)
1 ea items 2-6, 13, 14, 17 and 18 (C)
6 ea items 7 and 20 (D)

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RECOMMENDED READING LISTING ON SOUTHEAST ASIA AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

GENERAL

908 Blacker, I. R. Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas. 1954

940.54 Dixon, C. A. and Heilbrunn O. Communist Guerrilla Warfare. 1954

355.425 Guevara, E. LaGuerra de Las Guerrillas. 1960

355.42 Linebarger, P. M. A. Psychological Warfare. 1954

951.05 Mao Tse-tung. Selected Works (2 volumes available). 1954

355.425 Peterson, H. C. Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. 1961

355.4 Virgil Ney. Notes on Guerrilla War. 1961

PERIODICALS

Bashore, B. T. "A Dual Strategy for Limited War," Military Review. May 1960

Beebe, J. E. Jr. "Beating the Guerrilla," Military Review. December 1955

Galbraith, J. K. "A Positive Approach to Economic Aid," Foreign Affairs. April 1961

Gray, D. W. "When We Fight a Small War," Army. July 1960

Guevara, Che. "LaGuerra de Las Guerrillas," Army. March, April, May 1961

SOUTHEAST ASIA - GENERAL

950 Caldwell, J. C. Far East Travel Guide. 1959

959.6 Coolidge, H. J. Three Kingdoms of Indo-China. 1933

911.3 Deasy, C. F. and other authors. World's Nations; an economic and regional geography.

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951.05 Elegant, R. S. The Dragon's Seed. 1959

959.6 Hammer, E. J. The Struggle for Indo-China. 1954

959 Harrison, B. Southeast Asia. 1954

950 Kahin, G. M. ed. Major Governments of Asia. 1958

950 Kennedy, M. D. A History of Communism in East Asia. 1957

959 King, J. K. Southeast Asia in Perspective. 1957

950 Lasker, B. Peoples of Southeast Asia. 1944

325.2 Lasker, B. Asia on the Move. Population Pressure and Resettlement in Eastern Asia Under Influence of Want and War. 1945

950 Mechael, F. H. Far East in the Modern World. 1956

950 Michener, J. A. Voice of Asia. 1951

959.6 Newman, B. Report on Indo-China. 1954

959 Rau, R. S. View to the Southeast. 1957

290 Ring, G. C. Religions of the Far East. 1950

Tanaham, Dr. George K. Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Viet Minh in Indochina. 1961

CAMBODIA

959.6 Herz, M. F. A short history of Cambodia from the days of Angkor to the present. 1958

LAOS

959.4 Champassak, S. Storm Over Laos. 1961

Dooley, T. A. Edge of Tomorrow. 1958

Dooley, T. A. The Night they Burned the Mountain. 1960

959 Meeker, O. The Little World of Laos. 1959

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PHILIPPINES

940.548 Harkins, P. Blackburn's Headhunters. 1955

940.548 Volkmann, R. E. We Remained. 1954

THAILAND

959.3 Deyoung, J. E. Village Life in Modern Thailand. 1955

959.3 Sarasas, R. My Country, Thailand. 1956

940.5485 Smith, N. Into Siam, Underground Kingdom. 1946

VIETNAM

959.6 Buttinger, J. The Smaller Dragon, a political history of Vietnam. 1958

959 Fall, B. Street Without Joy. 1961

959.6 Grauwin, P. Doctor at Dienbienphu. 1955

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THE GUERRILLA WAR IN MALAYA

By
James E. Dougherty

Mr. Dougherty is a Research Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, and an assistant professor of political science at Saint Joseph's College, Philadelphia. He is a co-author of the book, AMERICAN-ASIAN TENSIONS (Praeger, 1956).

During the years since World War II, guerrilla warfare in many areas of the world has challenged the power of the Western nations. The Malayan "emergency", which began ten years ago last June, provides a valuable case study in this type of conflict. Its primary significance consists in the fact that the British in Malaya finally devised a successful strategy against a formidable Communist guerrilla force. By employing a combination of counter-techniques--political, social, economic, psychological, and military--the British prevented the Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA) from achieving its major objectives. Today, when the NATO powers face the threat of spreading guerrilla wars, a reexamination of the Malayan experience may prove instructive. This is not to imply that the strategy applied by the British in Malaya should or could be applied in other areas, where the political problems and environmental factors involved are dissimilar. But a review of the Malayan war can cast light on the nature of the struggle which arises in the "Grey Areas" when guerrillas, fighting for "national independence", pit themselves against the regular military arm of a Western industrial state.

To understand the Malayan guerrilla war in its full context, one must know something about the background of Communism in that peninsular country and about the country and about the country itself. When Communist organizers from Indonesia, following Lenin's mandate to penetrate the West's colonial territories, moved into British Malaya in the 1920's, they got a cool reception from the Malays. The rural Malayans, most of them devout Moslems, were satisfied with their simple pattern of village life. Those who migrated into the urban areas for an education usually entered the army, the service industries, the police force, or the government and enjoyed friendly relations with the British. The Indian Tamils, who comprised somewhat less than ten percent of the population, were also hard to stir with Marxist doctrine, since they already benefited from welfare programs arranged jointly by the Indian and Malayan governments. But there was one large and influential ethnic minority in Malaya which felt sufficiently "rootless" to be attracted by Communist preachments. This was the "overseas Chinese" community, which constituted two-fifths of the total population in 1931, the year in which the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was founded. Most of these Chinese, although they enjoyed a strong position in the commercial life of Malaya, looked to China as their homeland. Hence it is hardly surprising that Communism, when it finally came to Malaya, was imported not from Russia but from China.

Until 1939, the British Protectorate of Malaya had seemed so securely guarded by the naval bases at Singapore and Hong Kong that no sizeable native army had been trained to defend it. The Japanese seized Singapore and overran Malaya within three months after Pearl Harbor. At that time the MCP seized its golden opportunity to become the chief vehicle of national resistance sentiment. The party withdrew to the jungle and organized a guerrilla opposition. The British, while fighting a delaying action against the invader, felt constrained to adopt in Malaya (as they have so often elsewhere) a wartime policy which contained the needs of serious postwar problems. The British authorities recognized frankly that the Communists were the only ones in the country who could be counted upon to remain enemies of the Japanese. The Communists had no other choice, since the Japanese had put a price on their heads. The British, therefore, hurriedly set up a special training school and taught the Communists guerrilla tactics and sabotage methods.

Beginning with about 200 hand-picked and well disciplined Chinese Communists, the guerrilla force undertook harassing activities behind the Japanese lines. Initially, it armed itself by searching the battlefield for abandoned weapons. By the time Force 136, headed by British officers from the Southeast Asia Command, landed from a submarine in May, 1943, to contact the so-called Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), the latter boasted some 3,000 men. Early in 1945, Lord Mountbatten's Command reached an agreement with the guerrillas under which the British supplied them with food, clothing, and weapons and parachuted training officers into them preparatory to a planned joint invasion against the Japanese. In view of Japan's sudden collapse late that summer, the projected invasion proved unnecessary. That was a turn of good fortune for the British. Their postwar troubles in Malaya would no doubt have been greatly compounded if the Communists had played an actual role in the liberation of the country.

Even as matters stood, the MPAJA emerged from the war with a grossly inflated sense of its own contribution to the defeat of the Japanese. As a matter of fact, the guerrilas had engaged much more in propaganda, training, indoctrination, and moral-building than in fighting the enemy. When the war ended, about 7,000 guerrillas came out from their jungle campsites and took over control of the countryside, establishing their own government in many towns. They were extremely reluctant in September, 1945, to relinquish their power to the incoming British Military Administration. To facilitate the disbanding of the potentially revolutionary MPAJA, the British offered $350 to every man who would turn in his arms. More than 6,000 responded to the offer, but the Communists made certain that several caches of arms and ammuniton, both British and Japanese, remained hidden in the jungle.

After the war, the British were anxious to re-establish their position in Malaya, for that colony was potentially, by virtue of its rubber and tin resources, the biggest earner of American dollars in the sterling area. But all through South and Southeast Asia, the historical tide seemed to be going against the prewar colonial empires as new nationalist forces arose to demand independence. The French were having trouble in Indochina, as were the Dutch

in Indonesia. India and Ceylon were about to achieve status as Commonwealth members, and Burma was ready to separate completely from Great Britain. If Malaya had been ethnically homogeneous, the British would probably have encountered a great deal more difficulty than they did in that area. But the Malays, now outnumbered by the Chinese in the Malayan Federation and Singapore, were for the most part content to see the British come back.

The years 1945-1948 witnessed unsteady attempts by the British to institute some sort of federal self-rule system in the face of considerable dissatisfaction from the Chinese, the Indians, and a small minority of Malays who desired union with Indonesia. The MCP resorted to strikes as a means of prolonging the country's economic disorganization and thereby embarrassing the British, both politically and financially. Besides infiltrating the labor unions, the Communists founded Youth Corps, Women's Associations, and numerous other front organizations and schools. After the announcement of the Marshall Plan, the party newspapers urged sabotage of the national productive effort to hinder the "imperialist" Marshall Plan. Nevertheless, the Malays, the Indians, and even a majority of the Chinese refused to shift their allegiance.

Throughout Europe and Asia, as it became apparent that the Communists were not yet able to ride into power by peaceful political means, the party line hardened. Just as Czechoslovakia was falling victim to a coup in February, 1948, a revised strategy for the Communists in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, was laid down in a series of meetings in Calcutta. These meetings were followed by a noticeable increase in agitational activities in India, Burma, Indonesia, and Malaya. Following a period of labor unrest, demonstrations, and sporadic sabotage, the MCP retreated into the jungles once again and began to engage in full-scale violence. Not all the party members were eager to return to the rigors of guerrilla life, but they were warned that if they stayed behind they would be identified as party members and punished as traitors.

Approximately half of the "old timers" answered the party summons and joined the guerrilla force, which finally became known as the Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA). New recruits, including thugs and criminals, brought the army up to a strength of 5,000 or 6,000. Against them, the British and Malayan authorities were ultimately compelled to mobilize a total of 40,000 regular troops, 60,000 police, and about a quarter of a million home guards.

The Communists embarked upon a variety of offensive activities after June 20, 1948. Armed gangs carried out payroll roberies to obtain operating funds for the movement. Other gangs, to intimidate the population with a show of strength, slashed or burned thousands of rubber trees and bombed installations at the tin mines. Railroad tracks were ripped up and telephone lines cut. Well-to-do Europeans, Chinese, and Malays were kidnaped for ransom or murdered for reasons of sheer terrorism.

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The MRLA, upon taking up its abode in the jungle, reactivated and extended its wartime network of campsites, which were ingeniously camouflaged against air attacks and carefully defended against ground approach. Generally speaking, the military position of the MRLA in the early phases of the conflict was quite good. The wartime weapons caches provided sufficient strength for the initial terroristic operations, and the guerrilla leaders undoubtedly hoped that in due time additional arms could be obtained from external sources. There was some doubt at the time as to whether the MCP was under the immediate direction of Moscow or whether it was taking orders from the Chinese Communists. The British were mainly concerned over the possibility of Chinese Communist attempts to support the MCP. But as the Malayan rebellion broke out, the Chinese Communists, then mounting their final offensive against the Nationalists, were scarcely in a position to divert sizeable quantities of equipment to the MCP--assuming that they could have overcome the formidable transport difficulties of sending aid to the east coast of the peninsula or down through Thailand.

One of the most pressing problems confronting every guerrilla organization is that of maintaining a steady flow of food and other necessary supplies. The Malayan Communists found a solution ready at hand in the presence of some 500,000 Chinese squatters who lived along the edge of the jungle. These people, mostly illiterate, had little political consciousness, and whatever vague convictions they did hold were usually anti-government. Back in the days of the resistance against the Japanese, they had played a major role in provisioning the guerrillas. Now they were hardly surprised to be visited regularly once again and assessed by the Min Yuen, the MRLA's supporting arm. The Min Yuen, numbering perhaps 10,000, served as a link between the guerrilla and the native community. It performed courier, food-gathering, propaganda, intelligence, and recruiting service in the external zone of operations. Most of its members, as might be expected, were Chinese. Not a few of them led a double life, carrying out missions for the guerrillas by night and blending into the civil occupational pattern by day. The operations of this community support organization, half above and half under-ground, often made it difficult for the British to distinguish between friendly and enemy territory.

During the first two years of the war, the British relied almost exclusively on conventional military measures to put down the rebellion. But they gradually realized that the orthodox modes of warfare taught at Sandhurst were not applicable against an elusive jungle foe who was bent on protracting the conflict as long as possible. The British offensive strategy was simply not geared to the Malayan jungle. In Malaya, the jungle covers four-fifths of the country, furnishes a covered approach to worthwhile targets in many areas, and contains so many unfamiliar, mysterious obstacles as to prove virtually impervious to Western combat forces trained for a very different type of ground action.

There was, first of all, the problem of reconnoitering the enemy. Foot reconnaissance was out of the question for regular troops that had been

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trained to distinguish native from guerrilla trails. Jungle aborigines helped the British in some instances, but they had different names for every place plotted on the military maps and this gave rise to considerable confusion. Sometimes the jungle-dwelling aborigines would start out on a guidance mission for government units, only to end by leading the troops on a wild goose chase rather than run the risk of enemy reprisals. The British nexttried reconnaissance by helicopter, but whenever the guerrillas suspected that their camouflage had been penetrated and a revealing photograph produced, they abandoned the campsite for a few weeks. Army groups found that as they moved into the jungle in squad files, the word that they were coming moved faster than they did. If they avoided the main trails, they ran into brush so thick that they could advance no faster than 100 feet per hour. As they approached a guerrilla campsite, a sentry fired a warning shot and a small rear guard held the track for a few minutes while most of the fighters made their getaway to another campsite, perhaps one which they had abandoned weeks or months perviously. The pursuers rarely caught up with the guerrillas before having to return to their base for supplies. Small wonder, under such conditions, that it took some crack British battalions from three to six months of combing operations before they wer able to report any guerrilla casualties or prisoners.

The British became painfully aware that they were unable to turn against the guerrilla his own prime tactic--surprise. Through 1948 and 1949 the MRLA remained the master of surprise, retaining its freedom to strike at any selected point near the jungle which happened to be poorly protected. The British, on the other hand, even when apparently undertaking an offensive penetration into the jungle, invariably labored under a defensive mentality and were seldom able to seize the initiative. They possessed one instrument of surprise--the RAF--but its sudden attacks proved less efficient than those of the guerrillas, who were able to inflict telling damage in almost every mission they undertook.

By early 1950, the British had recognized the fact that they were making little or no headway against the MRLA. They began to devise new approaches, which required a fuller strategic perspective of the situation. In April of that year, General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed Director of Operations for the Emergency. The British were beginning to see that the key to success consisted in isolating the guerrilla force from the civilian community while at the same time developing more adequate techniques to deal with the guerrillas inside the jungle. There was a grave danger that, as time went on, the Chinese component of the Malayan population would become increasingly sympathetic with the political objectives of the Communists, particularly in view of the Communist triumph on the Chinese mainland. The British, consequently, were faced with a subtle dilemma. The fact that the guerrilla army was almost entirely Chinese made it relatively easy to enlist the support of the Malays for counter-operations. But the British were reluctant to emphasize the ethnic character of the conflict, for this might have driven many Chinese from involuntary cooperation with the MRLA. If the British were to minimize the chances of full scale civil war, it was necessary for them to drive a wedge between the Communists and the great majority of the Chinese.

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General Briggs realized that military measures alone were not sufficient to solve the problem. He worked out a plan to sever the logistical link between the terrorists and the Chinese farmers who lived along the edge of the jungle in villages that were highly vulnerable to guerrilla pressure and almost impossible to protect. Between June, 1950, and the end of 1953, more than a half million Chinese were resettled in new villages removed from the jungle and easier to guard. Altogether, more than 600 new communities were constructed at a considerable cost to the government. Those which were located in rural areas closest to the jungle were enclosed by barbed wire and their perimeters were lighted at night. All of them were kept under constant police surveillance. This resettlement program, which moved the poorest tenth of Malaya's population into more viable areas with good roads, sewage, water, and electricity, helped to solve one of the country's most serious social problems. It gave large numbers of Chinese peasants security in land title for the first time and brought them into a friendlier relationship with the government. Politically, the transfer program contributed toward a reorientation of thinking among the people who had hither to comprised the most unstable and least reliable element of the civilian population.

The resettlement program undoubtedly hurt the Communist guerrillas, for it disrupted their chief source of supply and forced them to rely more heavily on the jungle aborigines. The degree of physical, psychological, and political proximity which the guerrillas had enjoyed vis à vis the local Chinese community declined perceptibly. Lines of communication between the guerrillas and the party cells in the villages were strained almost to the breaking point, at least for a time. The extension of their supply lines rendered the members of the MRLA and the Min Yuen more vulnerable than ever to ambush as they moved in and out of the jungle. The number of terrorist attacks fell off by more than half. Meanwhile, Federation authorities were able to mount their own ideological offensive to offset the effect of the "liberation" propaganda which had gone practically undetected for several years.

The hard-core Communists did not allow adversity to dampen their ardor. The guerrillas attempted to maintain flagging morale by boldly risking dangerous expeditions into the new government-built villages. Occasional murders and other acts of terror continued to occur, giving rise among the Chinese to some resentment against the government for its inability to guarantee absolute security. In that type of war, of course, it is practically impossible to secure the native population completely against terroristic attacks, so long as large numbers of guerrillas can live undetected within the civilian community.

Gradually, civilian morale improved. Normal railway and road communications were restored and private property, especially the rubber plantations and the tin mines, became less susceptible to destructive raids. The popularity of the Communists declined steadily as greater blame was laid to the party for prolonging the troublesome situation. Consequently, the MCP felt constrained to switch its strategy. A party directive dated October 1, 1951,

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ordered all members to desist from the following practices: seizing identity and ration cards, burning new villages, attacking post offices, reservoirs, and other public facilities, derailing civilian trains, burning religious buildings and Red Cross vehicles, and committing sabotage against the major industries, thereby causing workers to lose their jobs. Communists were urged to emphasize the indoctrination of the masses, propaganda against conscription, the obstruction of government policies by non-violent means, and penetration of the trade unions. Violence, however, was not ruled out completely. It was still quite proper to kill British and Gurkha troops, senior civil servants and police officers, members of the Kuomintang and the Malayan Chinese Association, "stubborn reactionaries", and British industrial managers, but not British health officers or engineers. Perhaps the party directive was a face-saving device, designed to convey the impression that the change in the Communists' policy was freely chosen rather than forced upon them. The resettlement program had significantly altered the relationship between the guerrillas and the local Chinese community upon which they had depended for support. Such a change invariably compels a guerrilla army to modify its tactics drastically.

Meanwhile, the British stepped up their pressure against the guerrillas in the jungle. To do this, they had to obtain a better grasp of the enemy's modus operandi. Although the British possessed a superior "map knowledge" of the Malayan terrain, they initially lacked an understanding of the manner in which Communist activities were adapted to the language, customs, and thought patterns of the indigenous population. A "ferret force" was formed, comprising hand-picked British, Malayan, Gurkha, and Chinese personnel. This ferret force went to live in the recesses of the jungle for six months, carrying out patrolling activities and observing the Communist organization in action. The personnel of this force were then distributed among other military units to spread the benefits of their experience. Efforts were made to win over the aborigines who furnished the Communist fighters with rice, acted as scouts for them, and warned them to the approach of hostile troops. But this turned out to be an extremely difficult task, since the aborigines had known some of the veteran guerrillas for upwards of a dozen years, whereas they had previously come into only superficial contact with the British and Malayan officials.

After carefully assessing the military problem, the British adopted new methods of carrying the offensive to the guerrillas. Head-on penetration and attack by battalion-sized units based outside the jungle was abandoned. Smaller units, such as squads or platoons, were sent into the jungle under a screen of deception to thwart the Communist scouts. These units lived like guerrillas for a month or more at a time, shifting their location frequently and solving their own supply problems. The Gurkhas showed themselves especially adept in this phase of the campaign. Whereas under the earlier operational plans, marching units became tired out in fruitless tracking only to find themselves in the end an easy target for ambush, the new counter-guerrilla groups developed their own initiative and skill in ambush techniques. Improved ground-air radio communications enabled the RAF to increase the demoralizing effect of its sudden strafing and bombing missions. The guerrillas were further beleaguered when their food plots in jungle clearings were sprayed with poison.

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The more intensive techniques raised the average number of guerrilla fatal casualties from about 600 per year in the 1949-1950 period to more than 1,000 per year from 1951 onward. Despite the fact that new recruits kept the Communist strength from falling much below its normal level of 5,000 to 6,000, British intelligence indicated that enemy morale was crumbling. The Malayan Communist Party had not succeeded in gaining either international political support or external arms aid to sustain its struggle. To exploit the psychological factors implicit in the decline of dynamism within a guerrilla army, the British worked out an ingenious propaganda campaign which relied heavily on the use of "voice aircraft"--helicopters equipped with loudspeakers to broadcast at night over Communist locations. The general theme stressed was that the guerrillas, caught in a hopeless military situation, were free to choose: a rotten jungle existence probably culminating in death, or a rehabilitated life in urban Malaya following their surrender. Messages from MRLA men who gave themselves up one night were tape-recorded for "pinpoint delivery" over the campsites of their erstwhile cohorts the very next night. Thousands of leaflets urging defection were dropped over the jungle each week. Since one of the main hindrances to the would-be deserter was finding his way out of the thick brush at night, the British furnished colored searchlights and soundtrucks as guides to the nearest army or police post. During 1953, more than 350 individual surrenders were reported.

The Communists' military victory in Indochina and their diplomatic successes at Geneva sent the MRLA's stock climbing for a while in 1954. By and large, however, it was obvious that the war was going against the Communists in Malaya. The guerrillas were gradually being forced deeper into the jungle to more decentralized positions, from which their operations became necessarily less efficient. Their increasing isolation from the civilian community. Outside the jungle, the "white areas", where security was sufficiently established to permit the lifting of curfew and other restrictions, were being steadily extended.

The MCP finally convinced the international leadership of the party that, if additional military support was not forthcoming, a shift would have to be made to political maneuvers to reduce the Federation's pressure and to halt the defections. In September, 1954, Communist delegates to the British Trades Unions Congress sounded the call for a cease-fire in Malaya. No doubt they hoped that truce proposals in Malaya would prove just as successful as they had in Korea and Indochina. Native political leaders in Malaya, notably Tengku Abdul Rahman and Sir Cheng-lock Tan, suggested an amnesty and negotiations with the Communists. But British authorities were willing neither to grant a general amnesty nor to discuss negotiations in any form with the terrorists. The British felt, quite rightly, that their existing policy of offering attractive terms to individual defectors was already the most generous one possible.

The Tengku and Sir Cheng-lock Tan, influenced by the wave of Asian neutralist sentiment which reached its peak in 1955, favored granting lawful status to the Malayan Communist Party. They were left unmoved by British arguments that such concessions would not merely guarantee the Communists a foothold in the soon-to-be-established parliamentary regime

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of an independent Federation. The coalition led by the Tengku and Tan won the country's first constitutional elections in the summer of 1955. After that, the British decided not to hold out any longer against negotiations, but they did quash a suggestion to have the insurrection arbitrated by a neutral power and they also managed to talk down the proposal to legalize the MCP. A formal amnesty was finally announced on September 9, 1955. Actually, it did not go much beyond the surrender policy already in effect. The Communists were told bluntly that they would be required to prove their loyalty to Malaya alone, to respect constitutional authority, and to abstain from any political activity prescribed by the government. Irreconcilables were to be deported, just as in the past. There was no chance that the leaders who had for years plotted and supervised the most grotesque acts of terrorism would be classified as mere "political criminals" and pardoned.

The MCP, probably fearing that it had been outmaneuvered on the amnesty issue--for the raising and the dashing of the guerrillas' hopes no doubt had a harmful effect on morale--stepped up its political offensive. The party made a new proposal for an immediate conference with the Tengku and Tan to discuss a total cease-fire, satisfactory solution of the "emergency", and the creation of a peaceful, free Malaya once tensions had been relaxed. The Tengku, by then the Chief Minister of the Federation, agreed to meet Chin Peng, leader of the MCP, at Baling Chin Peng asked for an international commission to implement the peace terms, as well as an alteration of the amnesty provisions. The Chief Minister bluntly refused to internationalize the peace arrangements. He was willing, however, to discuss the amnesty terms.

During the course of the Baling talks, the Communists tried to drive a wedge between the native leaders of the Federation and their British mentors by promising to halt the war just as soon as the native government should obtain complete control over internal security and local armed forces. But this tactic got the Communists nowhere. The Tengku made it perfectly clear that he had no intention whatsoever of sharing power in Malaya with Chin Peng, and after a few days the talks broke down. The Federation leaders, convinced that their amnesty offer had served little useful purpose except perhaps to placate neutralist opinion temporarily, began to speak of intensifying the anti-Communist drive. While the Federation mission was in London early in 1956 smoothing the way for Malaya's full independence within the Commonwealth, bombing attacks on terrorist hideouts were resumed. Once the country's independence seemed assured, national mobilization plans for the quick defeat of the MRLA appeared to disintegrate, and a "tacit truce" came to prevail. The guerrilla leaders, reckoning time to be on their side, settled back and waited for the day when they could return to the Malayan political scene and open the "constitutional phase" of their strategy.

The British moved to prevent a Communist victory by default. Upon becoming an independent Commonwealth dominion on August 31, 1957, Malaya concluded a defense agreement which provided that air, naval, and land

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forces of Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand would remain in the country after it became free. Then the Federation made a final offer of amnesty to the some 2,000 terrorists still holding out in the jungle. Terrorists who surrendered before January 1, 1958, and renounced Communism were to be guaranteed freedom from prosecution for offense committed under Communist orders prior to the date of independence. Those desiring "repatriation" to China--the term "deportation" was avoided--were promised free passage. The fortunes of the MCP guerrillas entered a period of eclipse, at least for the time being, when the new independent Federation of Malaya was recognized by both Moscow and Peking.

Several valuable lessons can be drawn from the British experience in Malaya. The policy adopted in the "emergency" showed what can be accomplished when Western and local native forces are meshed for close cooperation against Communist threats in the "Grey Areas". It also demonstrated the need for well-conceived measures to supplement military operations against guerrillas. Logistic ties between the guerrillas and the local community must be severed, and nowhere has this been achieved in the last decade as effectively and as humanely as in Malaya. Moreover, guerrilla armies in the underdeveloped areas of the world are doomed to ultimate defeat at the hands of techincally superior Western powers unless they can succeed in gaining substantial political or military assistance from abroad. The British, controlling the sea approaches to Malaya, made it impossible for the MRLA to import arms aid. The chance of securing Chinese Communist help through Thailand faded when the latter country joined SEATO. The Communists' efforts to internationalize the guerrilla war were turned back. For the last eight of the ten years since the "emergency" began, the British have successfully thwarted the Communist guerrillas by conceiving the conflict in larger dimensions and by using a wider variety of weapons. The question for the future is: Which side possesses the greater reserves of strategic patience, or the will to wait for victory?

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HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
APO 25, San Francisco, California

DFIN 18 April 1962

SUBJECT: Summary of an Interrogation Report

TO See Distribution

The attached summary of an interrogation report is forwarded for your information and guidance. The report was made by a U.S. Advisor in South Vietnam on the interrogation he conducted on 22 March 1962 of a Self Defense Corps NCO who was captured and later released by the Viet Cong.

1 Incl
as

JAMES M. McGUIRE
Lt Col GS
AC of S, G2

DISTRIBUTION
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SYNOPSIS

This is the report of an incident involving the ambush of a squad of the South Vietnamese Self Defense Corps (SDC) north of Ninh Hoa (CP019908) by the Viet Cong at 0730 hours on 21 March 1962. Ninh Hoa is a major village approximately 38 miles north of Nha Trang, near the main north-south highway and railroad. The squad leader of the ambushed squad was captured by the Viet Cong and released about three hours later. The following summary is from the initial interrogation report and does not represent a thorough interrogation effort.

Summary: The SDC squad was composed of ten men armed with one submachinegun, seven carbines and two shot guns. At the time of the ambush they were patrolling to provide security for men working in the fields. Immediately prior to the ambush, the SDC squad encountered two men, one standing in a stream and one on the side of a road. These two men were dressed in the typical black garb of the area and were not armed. They were located within 150 yards of the ambush position, and they fled when the ambush was sprung.

(This brings up a good point about the use of decoys in the ambush area; after checking personnel or observing them as this squad did, there is a tendency to relax).

The ambush began when two French light machineguns began firing from the left front. The patrol scattered, the machineguns stopped firing, and about 20 Viet Cong assaulted from the right flank. About half of the assaulting Viet Cong were armed. The ambush hit the SDC squad from a distance of about 30 yards. The SDC squad suffered 1 KIA, 2 WIA, and 1 POW (the squad leader). The Viet Cong losses, if any, were not reported. The Viet Cong also captured 1 submachinegun with 200 rounds, 1 carbine with 90 rounds and 2 shot guns with 60 rounds. It was later determined that there were a total of 40 Viet Cong.

The system the Viet Cong used in this ambush has been repeated many times and is apparently a standard tactic. A support team provides covering fire, an assault team provides shock action, and a scrounge team picks up abandoned or captured weapons and equipment. The Viet Cong were wearing faded blue outfits with a type of belt on their waists upon which a water and food container was attached. They carried no bayonets or knives. All the Viet Cong were wearing sandals and five or six of them were wearing fatigues. During the attack the assault team did not wear shirts. Attacking without shirts could mean a simple means for the Viet Cong to identify each other in a fire fight; or if Viet Cong are wounded, they can bandage the wound and slip a clean shirt over it to hide the bandage.

After the attack the Viet Cong took the SDC squad leader up the road at a fast shuffle for approximately 3 miles. They then stopped for approximately 15 minutes and dispatched 2 and 3 man security teams.

The SDC squad leader was interrogated by the Viet Cong as to the name of his platoon leader and assistant platoon leader, the area of responsibility of his platoon, and his length of service in the SDC. He was warned not to support the President of South Vietnam and not to return to the SDC. The squad leader then was ordered to sign a blank piece of paper at the bottom and was later released by the Viet Cong. The squad leader's hands were tied behind his back but he was not otherwise mishandled or beaten.

The reason for the Viet Cong release of this man is not known; the best guess is that they wanted him to relate his experiences.

The fact that the Viet Cong conducted this ambush near a major village and in the daylight is an indication of newer and bolder tactics. It was later determined that this SDC squad patrolled the same route repeatedly and at approximately the same time of day.

HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

30 March 1962

UNCLASSIFIED BRIEFING ON S. E. ASIA

MY DISCUSSION TODAY IS DESIGNED TO PRESENT GENERAL INFORMATION ON SELECTED COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. I SHALL DISCUSS BURMA, LAOS, SOUTH VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND THAILAND. IN ANY DISCUSSION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, PERHAPS FIRST WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND WHY THIS AREA IS IMPORTANT AND WHY IT IS AN AREA OF SO MUCH INTEREST.

FIRST, IT'S GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION GIVES IT A GREAT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. CONTROL OVER THIS AREA OF THE WORLD MEANS CONTROL OVER INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION ROUTES, AND COULD BE COMPARED IN SOME RESPECTS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PANAMA AND SUEZ CANALS.

A SECOND AND VERY IMPORTANT REASON IS THE ENORMOUS WEALTH OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE MAJORITY OF THESE RESOURCES ARE STILL UNTAPPED BUT THEIR POTENTIAL IS TREMENDOUS. SOUTHEAST ASIA HAS LONG BEEN CONSIDERED THE RICE BOWL OF ASIA AND PRODUCES A LARGE YEARLY RICE SURPLUS. THIS ALONE PROVIDES A STRONG TEMPTATION FOR CONQUEST BY SUCH UNDERNOURISHED COUNTRIES AS NORTH VIETNAM AND COMMUNIST CHINA.

ANOTHER REASON, AND THIS IS IMPORTANT, IS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO PROTECT THE FREEDOMS OF THOSE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES THAT WILL HELP PROTECT THEMSELVES, NAMELY SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAILAND. ALSO, THAILAND IS A MEMBER OF SEATO, THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION. SEATO, AS YOU MAY KNOW, IS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE WHOSE MEMBERS ARE PLEDGED TO RESIST AGGRESSION AND TO PROMOTE PROGRESS THROUGH CO-OPERATION WITH ONE ANOTHER. SEATO CAN BE CONSIDERED THE ASIAN COUNTERPART TO NATO. THE MEMBER NATIONS OF SEATO ARE AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, NEW ZEALAND, PAKISTAN, THE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES.

NOW I WILL GO INTO A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF RECENT SIGNIFICENT EVENTS IN SOME OF THESE SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS. I WILL ALSO BRIEFLY DISCUSS THE PEOPLE OF THESE COUNTRIES AND SOME OF THEIR CUSTOMS.

B U R M A

BURMA, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, ATTAINED ITS INDEPENDENCE IN 1948. IT IS A NATION ABOUT THE SIZE OF TEXAS AND HAS A POPULATION OF ABOUT 20 MILLION.

FOR 10 YEARS, UNTIL 1958, BURMA WAS RULED BY A COALITION GOVERNMENT MADE UP OF MANY DIFFERENT POLITICAL GROUPS. AS OFTEN HAPPENS IN A GOVERNMENT MADE UP OF MANY DIFFERENT PARTIES, ARGUING AND BICKERING WAS COMMONPLACE, AND BY THE SUMMER OF 1958, REACHED A SERIOUS LEVEL. WITH THE COUNTRY FACED WITH NATIONAL STRIFE AND A POSSIBLE MOVE BY THE COMMUNISTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS UNREST, THE ARMY LED BY GENERAL NE WIN ASSUMED CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT IN LATE 1958. UNDER THE ARMY'S SUPERVISION AND THE LEADERSHIP OF NE WIN, THE GOVERNMENT BECAME STABLE AND THE ECONOMY BEGAN TO BE REVIVED. BY 1960 THE GOVERNMENT APPEARED CAPABLE AND EFFICIENT AND THE ARMY RELINQUISHED ITS LEADERSHIP TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITY. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, FACTIONALISM AND BICKERING WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT BROKE OUT AND NEW POLITICAL PARTIES WERE FORMED. THERE WAS AGAIN THE FEAR THAT COMMUNISM WOULD INFILTRATE THE GOVERNMENT. THIS FEAR WAS EMPHASIZED BY BURMESE PERMISSION OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO SEND TROOPS INTO THE FAR NORTHERN FRONTIER OF BURMA IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE BANDIT GROUPS OF FORMER CHINESE NATIONALIST TROOPS.

AS MATTERS SEEMED TO GO FROM BAD TO WORSE, THE ARMY ONCE AGAIN STEPPED IN UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF GENERAL NE WIN, AND IN EARLY MARCH OF THIS YEAR TOOK CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE UNITED STATES HAS RECOGNIZED THIS CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT AND ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO JUDGE THE EFFECTS OF THIS CHANGE, ON THE BASIS OF PAST EVENTS IT APPEARS THAT BURMA IS IN CAPABLE HANDS.

BURMA IS LARGELY A LAND OF VILLAGES WITH A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION LIVING IN CITIES. THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE ARE EMPLOYED IN GROWING RICE AND OTHER FOODS. BURMA IS A FOOD SURPLUS COUNTRY AND IS ONE OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST EXPORTERS OF RICE. IT IS ALSO RICHLY ENDOWED IN MINERAL RESOURCES ALTHOUGH AT THE PRESENT THESE RESOURCES HAVE ONLY BEEN PARTIALLY EXPLOITED.

BUDDHISM IS THE RELIGION OF OVER 90 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION AND IS CONSIDERED THE GREATEST UNIFYING FORCE IN BURMA. BUDDHISM IS MORE THAN A RELIGION AS WE UNDERSTAND IT; IT IS A WAY OF LIFE. THE BURMESE ARE A PROUD PEOPLE AND HAVE A DISLIKE FOR FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN THEIR AFFAIRS, WHETHER IT BE WESTERN OR COMMUNIST. THE AVERAGE BURMESE IS INTELLIGENT ALTHOUGH SOCIALLY SHY.

DISEASE PRESENTS A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN BURMA. THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN SEVERAL MEASURES TO COPE WITH THIS PROBLEM BUT THE RESULTS ARE SLOW IN TAKING EFFECT AND BURMA PRESENTLY HAS AN EXTREMELY HIGH DEATH RATE.

L A O S

ON THE EASTERN BORDER OF BURMA IS LAOS, A COUNTRY ABOUT WHICH YOU HAVE PROBABLY HEARD MUCH IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. LAOS IS LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF THE EASTERN PART OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, IS ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND HAS A POPULATION OF ABOUT 2 MILLION. LAOS HAS VIRTUALLY NO INDUSTRY AND THE FOOD PRODUCED IN THE COUNTRY IS BARELY ENOUGH TO FEED THE LAO PEOPLE. ONE FACTOR AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF LAOS IS IT'S LOCATION. LAOS IN COMMUNIST HANDS WOULD PRESENT A GRAVE DANGER TO THAILAND, SOUTH VIETNAM, AND CAMBODIA. LAOS IS MORE IN THE NATURE OF A STEPPING STONE FOR THE COMMUNISTS THAN A GOAL.

LAOS FIRST CAME TO THE NOTICE OF MOST AMERICANS IN AUGUST 1960 WHEN A LITTLE KNOWN ARMY CAPTAIN NAMED KONG LE OVERTHREW THE ANTI-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT AND PROCLAIMED THE GOVERNMENT NEUTRAL. SOON IT BECAME APPARENT THAT KONG LE'S NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT WAS LEANING TOWARD THE COMMUNISTS. THIS WAS BROUGHT OUT VIVIDLY BY THE SOVIET AIRLIFT OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO KONG LE'S HEADQUARTERS IN VIENTIANE, THE CAPITAL OF LAOS.

THIS LEANING TOWARDS THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY PROMPTED GENERAL PHOUMI NOSAVAN, AN ANTI-COMMUNIST GENERAL IN THE ROYAL ARMY, TO ORGANIZE A MILITARY FORCE AND ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW KONG LE AND THE "NEUTRAL" GOVERNMENT. WITH U. S. BACKING, PHOUMI SUCCEEDED IN CAPTURING VIENTIANE IN DECEMBER OF 1960. THE FALL OF VIENTIANE FORCED KONG LE AND HIS SMALL FORCE TO RETREAT TO THE NORTH WHERE HE JOINED WITH THE COMMUNIST LED PATHET LAO GUERRILLA FORCE.

FROM THE CAPTURE OF VIENTIANE IN DECEMBER 1960 UNTIL MAY 1961 FRICTION INCREASED BETWEEN THE ANTI-COMMUNISTS UNDER PHOUMI AND THE COMMUNIST DOMINATED PATHET LAO. WITH THE FIGHTING NEARING CIVIL WAR AND UNDER THE INCREASING PRESSURE OF MANY OTHER NATIONS, A CEASE FIRE WAS SIGNED IN MAY 1961. AT A CONFERENCE IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, SHORTLY THEREAFTER, IT WAS AGREED THAT A COALITION OR COMPROMISE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE SET UP TO INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST, COMMUNIST, AND NEUTRAL PARTIES. SINCE THEN THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL MEETINGS, BOTH IN GENEVA AND IN LAOS OF THE THREE

PARTIES CONCERNED, BUT AS YET NO AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED. THE BIGGEST SINGLE REASON FOR THIS NON-AGREEMENT SEEMS TO BE A DISPUTE ON THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF POSITIONS EACH SIDE WILL GET IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. EACH OF THE THREE PARTIES DESIRES THE MAJORITY OF POSITIONS CONTROLLING THE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE, AND NO ONE SIDE IS WILLING TO COMPROMISE WITH THE OTHER. A RECENT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR WAS CANCELED DUE TO A FLARE UP OF FIGHTING IN NORTHERN LAOS (NAM THA AREA).

A SO-CALLED "NEUTRAL" GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SET UP IN THE PLAINE DES JARRES AREA OF NORTHERN LAOS, THIS GOVERNMENT IS HEADED BY THE SO-CALLED "NEUTRAL" PRINCE, SOUVANNA PHOUMA, WHO ALSO HEADED THE NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT IN VIENTIANE IN 1960. THIS NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT RECEIVES AID AND RECOGNITION FROM THE COMMUNIST BLOC COUNTRIES; A FACT THAT HAS RECENTLY BEEN OPENLY ADMITTED BY SOUVANNA PHOUMA.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF EVENTS IN LAOS, BUT THE U. S. HAS REPEATEDLY STATED ITSELF IN FAVOR OF A TRULY NEUTRAL COALITION GOVERNMENT.

THE LAO, THOUGH SOMEWHAT SHY AND RETIRING, ARE A FRIENDLY, HOSPITABLE PEOPLE. BECAUSE THE LAOTIANS ARE GENERALLY CAREFREE BY NATURE AND OFTEN APPEAR TO LACK ENERGY AND COMPETENCE AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS, THEY HAVE OFTEN BEEN DESCRIBED AS POLITICALLY NAIVE AND APATHETIC.

THE AVERAGE LAO IS TRADITIONALLY LOYAL TO HIS FAMILY, VILLAGE AND REGION RATHER THAN HIS COUNTRY, AND CONSEQUENTLY HAS LITTLE INTEREST IN NATIONAL EVENTS.

LAOTIANS ARE BUDDHIST IN CULTURE AND RELIGION. BUDDHIST MONKS ARE OFTEN THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS OF THE OUTLYING RURAL AREAS. THE BUDDHIST PAGODA IS THE CENTER OF THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES OF LAOTIANS. THE LARGE NUMBER OF CELEBRATIONS IN LAOTIAN VILLAGES AND ALSO A TRADITION FOR HOSPITALITY ACCOUNTS FOR THEIR REPUTATION OF BEING GAY AND CORDIAL. PRACTICALLY ANY SOCIAL EVENT CAN PROVOKE A CELEBRATION IN THE VILLAGES. MOST OF THE FEW LAOTIANS WHO ARE EDUCATED LIVE IN THE LARGE SETTLEMENTS ALONG THE MEKONG RIVER AND ARE FAIRLY PROFICIENT IN THE FRENCH LANGUAGE.

SOUTH VIETNAM

BORDERING ON SOUTHEAST LAOS AND CAMBODIA IS SOUTH VIETNAM, ANOTHER COUNTRY THAT HAS BEEN IN THE NEWS SPOTLIGHT RECENTLY. SOUTH VIETNAM IS APPROXIMATELY THE SIZE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON AND HAS A POPULATION OF ABOUT 14 MILLION. SOUTH VIETNAM NOT ONLY IS IMPORTANT BY VIRTUE OF ITS STRATEGIC POSITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, BUT HAS AN ABUNDANCE OF RAW MATERIALS AND HARVESTS A LARGE RICE CROP THAT IS A VALUABLE SOURCE OF FOOD IN THIS AREA OF THE WORLD. THE U. S. HAS FIRMLY INDICATED THAT IT WILL ASSIST THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS. EVEN THOUGH THIS ASSISTANCE IS AT THE REQUEST OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, OTHER COUNTRIES ARE UNDOUBTELY WATCHING THESE EVENTS AND WILL JUDGE DEMOCRACY ON THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE COMBINED SOUTH VIETNAMESE/UNITED STATES EFFORT TO SUPRESS THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE COUNTRY.

SOUTH VIETNAM'S TROUBLES STEM FROM 1954 WHEN VIETNAM WAS DIVIDED IN HALF AS A RESULT OF THE FRENCH-INDOCHINA WAR (1946-1954). IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DIVISION OF VIETNAM, OVER 800,000 REFUGEES FLED FROM THE NORTH TO SOUTH VIETNAM. A SMALL COMMUNIST RESISTANCE WAS STARTED IN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER THIS DIVISION. IN 1955, FREE ELECTIONS WERE HELD AND NGO DINH DIEM WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT. PRESIDENT DIEM HAS HELD THIS OFFICE SINCE HIS ELECTION IN 1955 AND APPEARS TO BE THE MOST POWERFUL AND INFLUENCIAL MAN IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN SPITE OF VIETNAM'S PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL STRENGTH THERE HAVE BEEN TWO ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW DIEM'S GOVERNMENT IN THE LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE FIRST WAS IN NOVEMBER 1960 WHEN THREE BATTALIONS OF THE ARMY ATTEMPTED TO FORCE REFORMS IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE SECOND WAS IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR WHEN TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE PILOTS BOMBED AND STRAFED THE ROYAL PALACE IN SAIGON. BOTH OF THESE ATTEMPTS WERE REPORTEDLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND APPEARED TO BE AIMED TOWARD MODIFYING DIEM'S GOVERNMENT. THE BIGGEST SINGLE PROBLEM IN SOUTH VIETNAM, HOWEVER, REMAINS THE WAR WITH THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS, COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE VIET CONG. SINCE ITS BIRTH IN 1954 THE VIET CONG GUERRILLA

MOVEMENT HAS GROWN IN SIZE AND VIOLENCE. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY HAS INCREASED IN SIZE AND HAS INTENSIFIED ITS TRAINING TO OVERCOME THIS THREAT, BUT TO DATE HAS ONLY MET WITH LIMITED SUCCESS. THE UNITED STATES IN RECENT MONTHS HAS GREATLY INCREASED ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO SOUTH VIETNAM TO INCLUDE HELICOPTERS, SUPPLIES, AND TRAINING IN ANTI-GUERRILLA WARFARE. THE VIET CONG HAS INCREASED IN SIZE TO A REPORTED 17 TO 20 THOUSAND MAN FORCE AND HAS PROVEN TO BE ABLE AND EFFICIENT. THE VIET CONG ARE NOT ONLY OPERATING ALONG MILITARY LINES BUT ALSO ARE IN THE BUSINESS OF POLITICS. IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, THE VIET CONG ANNOUNCED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW POLITICAL PARTY PROCLAIMING "LIBERATION" FOR THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THE UNITED STATES HAS STRONGLY COMMITTED ITSELF TO ASSISTING SOUTH VIETNAM IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE VIET CONG, AND ALTHOUGH THE GUERRILLAS ARE FAR FROM BEATEN AND REPRESENT A STRONG AND EFFICIENT FORCE, THE FUTURE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM SEEMS BRIGHTER THAN THE PAST.

THE VIETNAMESE CHARACTER IS MARKED BY COURTESY, SELF-CONTROL AND A DEEP RESPECT FOR FAMILY TIES AND ANCESTORS. THE VIETNAMESE IS ESSENTIALLY A FRIENDLY PERSON ALTHOUGH HE APPEARS UNEMOTIONAL.

MOST VIETNAMESE PEOPLE OFFICIALLY REGARD THEMSELVES AS BUDDHIST ALTHOUGH THIS BELIEF IS FREQUENTLY MIXED WITH CONFUCIANISM AND OTHER RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. ROMAN CATHOLICISM HAS OVER A MILLION FOLLOWERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM INCLUDING PRESIDENT DIEM.

C A M B O D I A

TO THE WEST OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS CAMBODIA, A COUNTRY LITTLE HEARD OF AND GENERALLY QUIET. CAMBODIA IS APPROXIMATELY THE SIZE OF NORTH DAKOTA AND HAS A POPULATION OF ABOUT 5 MILLION. SINCE 1955 CAMBODIA HAS BEEN LED BY PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK. SIHANOUK HAS FEW RIVALS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND IS CONSIDERED FAIRLY SECURE IN HIS POSITION. THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT IS MILDLY ANTI-COMMUNIST IN INTERNAL POLICY BUT APPEARS TO FOLLOW A NEUTRAL FOREIGN POLICY. CAMBODIA HAS ACCEPTED AID FROM BOTH THE U. S. AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC. CAMBODIA HAS HAD STRAINED POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH BOTH SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAILAND IN RECENT YEARS. CAMBODIA HAS CHARGED SOUTH VIETNAM WITH AIDING DISSIDENT ELEMENTS WITHIN CAMBODIA AND IN TURN SOUTH VIETNAM HAS ACCUSED CAMBODIA OF HARBOURING VIET CONG GUERRILLAS. THAILAND CONSIDERS CAMBODIA "SOFT" ON COMMUNISM, AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE SEVERED BETWEEN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES IN 1958 AND AGAIN IN OCTOBER 1961.

THE CAMBODIAN IS GENERALLY CHARACTERIZED AS RELATIVELY TALL IN STATURE (5'5" AVERAGE) WITH A VIGOROUS CONSTITUTION AND A PEACEFUL AND CONTENTED ATTITUDE. HIS NATURAL TENDENCY IS TO BE FRIENDLY AND HOSPITABLE TO ALL. MOST CAMBODIANS LIVE IN VILLAGES AND HAVE VERY STRONG FAMILY BONDS. BUDDHISM IS THE PREDOMINANT RELIGION.

CAMBODIA'S ECONOMY IS UNDERDEVELOPED AND SHOWS FEW SIGNS OF LARGE SCALE IMPROVEMENT. THERE IS GENERALLY A SURPLUS OF FOOD, AND RICE AND FISH ARE BOTH EXPORTED. THERE IS LITTLE INDUSTRY IN CAMBODIA ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT MINERALS HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED INCLUDING PHOSPHATE, GOLD AND IRON. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE SUCH, HOWEVER, THAT THE PEOPLE ARE WELL FED AND GENERALLY HAPPY.

T H A I L A N D

THE LAST COUNTRY I WILL DISCUSS WILL BE THAILAND, ONE OF OUR STRONGEST ALLIES, AND, AS WE MENTIONED BEFORE, ONE OF THE THREE ASIAN MEMBERS OF SEATO.

THAILAND IS APPROXIMATELY THE SIZE OF COLORADO AND WYOMING AND HAS A POPULATION OF ABOUT 26 MILLION. THE COUNTRY IS GENERALLY DIVIDED INTO FOUR MAJOR GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS: THE NORTH, THE CENTRAL PLAIN, THE NORTHEAST, AND THE SOUTH.

NORTHERN THAILAND IS A GREAT PRODUCER OF TEAKWOOD AND CONSISTS OF A SERIES OF ROUGHLY PARALLEL MOUNTAIN RANGES RUNNING NORTH AND SOUTH AND SEPARATED BY BROAD OPEN VALLEYS.

CENTRAL THAILAND IS BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PROSPEROUS PART OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS ONE OF THE MOST DEVELOPED RICE-GROWING REGIONS IN THE WORLD AND INCLUDES THE MAJOR COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES IN THAILAND.

NORTHEASTERN THAILAND CONSISTS OF A LARGE PLATEAU BOUNDED ON THE NORTH AND EAST BY THE MEKONG RIVER AND PARTLY ENCLOSED IN A CIRCLE OF MOUNTAINS. THIS SECTION OF THAILAND IS NOT AS ADVANCED OR DEVELOPED AS THE REMAINDER OF THAILAND AND GENERALLY HAS A LOWER STANDARD OF LIVING.

SOUTHERN THAILAND OCCUPIES MORE THAN ONE-HALF OF THE MALAY PENINSULA. THE COAST IS MUCH INDENTED AND STUDDED WITH ISLANDS.

THE PRINCIPAL RIVERS ARE STEEP-BANKED AND SECTIONS OF THE RIVERS ARE OFTEN UNFORDABLE DURING THE RAINY SEASON. THE MAIN RIVERS AND CANALS ARE NAVIGABLE AND SERVE AS THE PRINCIPAL ROUTES OF TRANSPORTATION IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY.

CENTRAL, NORTHERN AND EASTERN THAILAND HAVE THREE DISTINCT SEASONS. THESE ARE (1) THE HOT SEASON, LASTING FROM MARCH THROUGH MAY; (2) THE RAINY SEASON FROM JUNE TO OCTOBER; AND (3) THE DRY SEASON FROM NOVEMBER TO FEBRUARY. THE AVERAGE TEMPERATURE IN THAILAND IS 82 DEGREESF, BUT DURING THE HOT SEASON, FROM MARCH THROUGH MAY, THE TEMPERATURE HOVERS AROUND 90 TO 95 DEGREES, AND THE HUMIDITY MAY BE AS HIGH AS 95 PERCENT. STARTING IN MARCH THE

RAIN BEGINS TO INCREASE AND THE SKIES ARE GENERALLY CLOUDY. VISIBILITY IS LESS THAN THAT DURING THE DRY SEASON BUT IS STILL GENERALLY CONSIDERED GOOD. BY THE END OF MAY THE RAINY SEASON IS IN FULL SWING AND ALTHOUGH THE TEMPERATURES ARE LOWER THAN DURING MARCH AND APRIL THE NUMBER OF RAINY DAYS INCREASES UNTIL THE SEASON REACHES ITS HEIGHT IN SEPTEMBER.

THAILAND'S HISTORY HAS BEEN ONE OF COUPS AND CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT. RECENT EVENTS IN THAILAND STEM FROM A MILITARY GROUP THAT TOOK CONTROL IN 1947. THIS WAS A FAIRLY EASY-GOING GOVERNMENT AND PROVOKED LITTLE DISSATISFACTION. BY 1957, HOWEVER, THERE WERE SEVERAL OTHER GROUPS COMPETING FOR POWER, AND IRREGULARITIES IN THE 1957 ELECTION WERE USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR A SWITCH IN LEADERSHIP. FIELD MARSHAL SARIT THANARAT, THE HEAD OF A MILITARY GROUP, SEIZED CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. A PROMINENT ARMY GENERAL WAS INSTALLED AS PRIME MINISTER BUT MARSAHL SARIT WAS THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE. THE GOVERNMENT UNDER THE NEW PRIME MINISTER WAS SPLIT BY MANY DIFFERENT FACTIONS AND LITTLE WAS ACCOMPLISHED. MARSHAL SARIT WAS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR SURGERY DURING THE FIRST 6 TO 8 MONTHS AFTER THE NEW GOVERNMENT TOOK CONTROL AND UPON RETURNING TO THAILAND HE FOUND THE GOVERNMENT IN SUCH A DISORGANIZED STATE THAT HE PERSONALLY ASSUMED CONTROL. SINCE 1958 MARSHAL SARIT HAS BEEN THE HEAD OF THE THAILAND GOVERNMENT, AND HAS PROVEN TO BE A CAPABLE LEADER. UPON ASSUMING CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT MARSHAL SARIT SUSPENDED THE CONSTITUTION, BANNED POLITICAL PARTIES AND PLACED THE COUNTRY UNDER MARTIAL LAW. SINCE THEN, AN INTERIM CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN DRAFTED GIVING THE GOVERNMENT AN OUTWARD APPEARANCE OF LEGALITY. FREE ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN PROMISED IN THE FUTURE BUT THE EXACT DATE HAS YET TO BE NAMED. MARSHAL SARIT HAS CONTINUED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND HAS PROVEN A STRONG ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES. AS MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY IN MY DISCUSSION OF CAMBODIA, THAILAND HAS HAD POOR RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES WERE SEVERED IN OCTOBER 1961. DIPLOMATICALLY, THAILAND DOES NOT RECOGNIZE EITHER NORTH VIETNAM OR COMMUNIST CHINA. THERE ARE SEVERAL LARGE MINORITY

GROUPS WITHIN THAILAND, NAMELY THE CHINESE AND VIETNAMESE. THESE GROUPS HAVE CAUSED FRICTION IN THE PAST BUT HAVE NOT BEEN A MAJOR PROBLEM.

THAILAND'S ECONOMY IS FAIRLY STABLE AND IS BASED PRIMARILY ON AGRICULTURE. THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCT IS RICE. THE THAI PEOPLE GENERALLY HAVE BETTER LIVING STANDARDS THAN ANY COUNTRY PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED ALTHOUGH THESE STANDARDS ARE STILL BELOW OUR OWN. ROADS AND RAILWAYS IN THAILAND ARE AMONG THE BEST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, BUT ONCE AGAIN ARE BELOW OUR STANDARDS.

THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION IN THAILAND LIVE IN RURAL AREAS. BANGKOK IS THE ONLY LARGE URBAN CENTER. APPROXIMATELY 90 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE ARE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE AND LIVE IN SMALL FARMING VILLAGES. THESE VILLAGES ARE USUALLY BUILT ALONG A RIVER, CANAL OR ROADWAY, WITH RICE FIELDS AROUND THE HOUSES. EACH VILLAGE GENERALLY HAS A TEMPLE AND A SCHOOL. FROM FEBRUARY TO JUNE EACH YEAR MOST THAIS ARE IDLE AND DO LITTLE WORK. THIS IS DUE TO THE "RICE CROP CYCLE". PLANTING TIME EXTENDS FROM JUNE TO SEPTEMBER AND THE RICE IS HARVESTED FROM DECEMBER TO FEBRUARY. THE MONTHS IN BETWEEN SERVE AS A VACATION.

A THAI'S PRIMARY OBLIGATION IS TO KEEP RELATIONS WITH OTHERS SMOOTH. THE THAIS ARE GENERALLY FRIENDLY, PLEASANT AND POLITE. MUTUAL RESPECT BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS IS HIGHLY REGARDED. THE THAI IS A VERY PEACEFUL PERSON BUT PLACES GREAT IMPORTANCE ON "SAVING FACE" (THE AVOIDANCE OF EMBARRASSMENT OR DEGRADATION) AND WILL NOT EMBARRASS HIMSELF OR OTHERS.

THERE ARE MANY CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS IN THAILAND THAT ARE FAIRLY COMMON THROUGHOUT ASIA BUT ARE CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT THAN THOSE THAT YOU ARE USED TO. THE THAI BELIEVE THAT THE HUMAN HEAD IS A SACRED PART OF THE BODY AND NO ONE IS ALLOWED TO POINT TO IT, LET ALONE TOUCH IT. THE FEET ALSO PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN THAI ETIQUETTE. IT IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY RUDE TO SIT WITH THE LEGS OR ANKLES CROSSED SO THAT THE TOE OR SOLE POINTS AT ANOTHER PERSON.

SHOES SHOULD BE REMOVED BEFORE ENTERING A THAI HOME OR TEMPLE.

MANY RELIGIOUS SHRINES ARE OPEN ONLY TO BUDDHISTS AND PHOTOGRAPHY ON SACRED PREMISES IS GENERALLY PROHIBITED. THAI'S DO NOT PRACTICE THE CUSTOM OF SHAKING HANDS UPON MEETING BUT PREFER TO BOW SLIGHTLY. IN THAILAND, MEN PROCEDE FIRST, LADIES LAST.

THE MOST HONORED AND RESPECTED PERSON IN THE COUNTRY IS THE KING. ALTHOUGH THE KING HAS NO REAL POWER, HE IS THE SPIRITUAL LEADER OF THE PEOPLE AND THE SYMBOL OF THAILAND'S CULTURE. UPON HEARING THE KING'S ANTHEM EVERYONE IS EXPECTED TO RISE.

CRITICISM OR BAD LANGUAGE, WHETHER SPOKEN DIRECTLY TO OR WITHIN EARSHOT OF THE THAI, IS CERTAIN TO OFFEND HIM. REMEMBER, EVEN THOUGH YOU DON'T SPEAK THAI, MANY THAI SPEAK AND UNDERSTAND ENGLISH.

THE THAIS ALSO TAKE MODESTY VERY SERIOUSLY AND FEEL THAT THE BODY SHOULD NOT BE UNNECESSARY EXPOSED. THEY GENERALLY DISAPPROVE OF SHORTS OR PEOPLE NOT WEARING SHIRTS.

THAILAND, AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, NEEDS OUR TECHNICAL AND MATERIAL HELP AND GUIDANCE. THIS MUST BE PRESENTED TO THEM IN A CONSIDERATE MANNER IN ORDER THAT THEY MAY EVOLVE AS FREE AND INDEPENDENT NATIONS.

SOUTHEAST ASIA IS AN AREA IN WHICH STRANGE CONTRASTS AND CUSTOMS ARE VISIBLE IN ALL WALKS OF LIFE. I HOPE THAT THIS PRESENTATION WILL HELP YOU TO BE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THESE DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS AND CULTURES IN ORDER THAT YOU MAY MORE EASILY ESTABLISH RAPPORT, MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT WITH THOSE PEOPLE WITH WHOM YOU COME IN CONTACT.