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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

MACJOO

15 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE ELLSWORTH BUNKER  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR  
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
SAIGON, VIETNAM

SUBJECT: Past Experience in Negotiating with the Communists

The inclosed observations on past experiences are forwarded for  
your information.

W. C. WESTMORELAND  
General, United States Army  
Commanding

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PAST EXPERIENCE IN  
NEGOTIATING WITH COMMUNISTS

Lessons Learned in Korean Negotiations  
(CINCPAC Msg 042030Z Jun 67)

Negotiating with the Communists, by H. C. Lodge.  
(from JCS Memo, subject: Planning for Vietnam,  
dated 21 July 1966)

Chronology of Korean War and Negotiations  
(transcribed from miscellaneous notes)

Chronology of Indochina War and Negotiations  
(transcribed from miscellaneous notes)

Original to

Amh. Bunker

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(Security classifications per original documents)

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CHRONOLOGY OF  
KOREAN WAR AND NEGOTIATIONS

25 Jun 50: North Korea invades.

27 Jun 50: UN Security Council calls for:

- a. End of aggression.
- b. Members to aid ROK.

30 Jun 50: President Truman orders U.S. forces into Korea to accomplish by military action two political objectives:

- a. Prevent impending collapse of ROK Government.
- b. Repel aggression.

7 Jul 50: UN Command created with U.S. Commander.

Oct 50: UN forces fight back to 38th parallel.

(U.S. policy objective changes: unify Korea)

Nov 50: CHICOMs drive UN forces back from Yalu.

(U.S. policy objective changes: avoid all-out war with China)

May 51: Fighting stabilizes along 38th parallel.

(U.S. policy objective changes: obtain a cease fire)

Jun 51: UN President Pearson: "UN would accept end of aggression."  
UN Secretary General Lie: "Time to stop bloodshed..."  
Aggressors now back to starting point."  
U.S. Secretary of State Acheson: "U.S. will accept any  
reliable armistice, based on 38th parallel."

23 Jun 51: UN Soviet delegate Malik: "Conflict could be settled."

First steps:

- a. Cease-fire discussions.
- b. Mutual withdrawal from 38th parallel.

30 Jun 51: JCS directs UN Commander and CINCFE Ridgeway to broadcast message concerning armistice. President Rhee states ROK conditions for peace.

1 Jul 51: Reds reply to Ridgeway: "Come to Kaesong." Rhee's conditions ignored.

Reds allowed to transfer war from battlefield, where losing, to conference table, where might win and gain badly needed respite.

30 Jul 51: Fighting resumed and continues through 159 plenary sessions. Two years more of negotiations.

4 Jun 53: Reds agree to U.S. counter-proposals.

27 Jul 53: Rhee finally agrees. "CEASE-FIRE" signed. The terms were virtually those of 1951.

#### LESSONS LEARNED BY REDS:

- a. No more overt aggression because of resultant Western reaction.
- b. In the future, aggression by:
  - (1) Infiltration.
  - (2) Insurgency.
  - (3) Subversion.

#### LESSONS LEARNED BY U.S.:

- a. Reds do not rush to confer; they set the stage.
- b. Never weaken pressure when enemy talks armistice. Increase it!
- c. Site should be outside conflict area and not chosen unilaterally by Reds.
- d. Reaction to Red proposal to confer should be unhurried.
- e. U.S. military command should not be rushed into discussions when it has the upper hand as in 1951.
- f. U.S. negotiating team must be top-notch. Reds always put in their first team.

- g. Never concede anything for nothing just to make progress.
- h. Avoid hurry-up attitude.
- i. Consider agenda carefully. Supervision of armistice should be number one item.
- j. It is reckless to assume Red good faith.
- k. Crystallization of political objectives must precede talks.
- l. Truce frees Red materiel and advisors for other theaters.

CHRONOLOGY OF  
INDOCHINA WAR AND NEGOTIATIONS

1945: Viet Minh expand into the power vacuum after Japanese surrender.

Feb 46: French Expeditionary Force lands.

Dec 46: Fighting between French Expeditionary Force and Viet Minh erupts in North Vietnam. General Leclerc uses Marshal Lyautey's Moroccan campaign "oil slick" technique of 1920's.

1949: CHICOMs reach China-Indochina border providing Viet Minh with sanctuary and base.

1950: Marshal de Lattre relieves Leclerc. Some military successes. Vinh-Yen: 6,000 Viet Minh KIA.

1952: Salan relieves de Lattre.

1953: Navarre relieves Salan. Prime Minister Laniel asks Navarre for one thing: "An honorable way out of the mess." "Negotiations will be undertaken by France as soon as Korean truce is signed." (Laniel, May 1953).

THE NAVARRE PLAN:

PHASE I - Rebuild and reconstruct the Expeditionary Corps:

- a. Avoid Viet main body.
- b. Continue pacification.
- c. Build Vietnamese Army.
- d. Conduct limited operations.

PHASE II - Look for a fight.

- a. Attack the rice granaries.
- b. Attack Viet reserves.
- c. Attack the main body in order to destroy the Viet Minh.

OPERATION CASTOR: Establish air/land base at Dien Bien Phu.

20 Nov 53: Giap concentrates main body of Viets around Dien Bien Phu.

Dec 53: Bermuda Conference. More U.S. aid for Indochina.

Feb 54: Berlin Conference. Announced that Indochina question to be an issue at Geneva Conference to convene April 1954; gives Viets a target date to destroy Dien Bien Phu. Red aid increased dramatically.

Apr 54: French Foreign Minister sends list of questions to Navarre to prepare position at Geneva:

Question # 1: In case Viets are allotted a zone, what are the acceptable limits?

Answers:

- a. No compromise on Laos.
- b. Vietnam - 18th parallel with Hue and Tourane.
- c. Occupy Hanoi, Haiphong, and LOC.

Question # 2: If the zone is established, what must be done to implement it: For French? For Viet Minh?

Answers:

- a. Evacuate regular troops from each other's zones.
- b. Disarm or evacuate regional troops.
- c. Evacuate French and Vietnamese civilians from Viet zone or guarantee property and person of those staying.

26 Apr 54: Geneva conference opens. Final assault on Dien Bien Phu begins.

7 May 54: Dien Bien Phu falls.

8 May 54: Indochina phase of Geneva conference commences. Participants: UK, USSR, PRC, GVN, Cambodia, Laos, DRV, France, and, reluctantly, the US.

4 Jun 54: France and GVN sign independence.

16 Jun 54: Bao Dai calls on Diem to form government.

7 Jul 54: Diem becomes Premier.

21 Jul 54: Geneva accords signed by all except U.S. and GVN.

Terms of Geneva Accord (24 Jul 54):

- a. Partition of Vietnam at 17th parallel. North, including Hanoi-Haiphong, to DRV. South to GVN.
- b. Staged withdrawal of troops to own zones within 300 days.
- c. Military personnel and equipment - replacement only. No new personnel or equipment to be introduced.
- d. Free movement of civilians to zones of choice during 300 day period.
- e. ICC established with India (Chairman), Poland, and Canada.
- f. Laos-Pathet Lao withdraw to Phong Saly, Sam Neua. Viet Minh go home.

Separate U.S. Declaration:

- a. No use of U.S. force to disturb zones.
- b. U.S. will view renewed aggression as grave threat to peace.
- c. U.S. pledged to seek free UN supervised elections.

Note: GVN refused to agree, even verbally. "Reserved the right to safeguard the national interests of the people of Vietnam!"

Results of U.S. -GVN Refusal to Sign Geneva Accord:

- a. U.S. aid continues as Viet aggression continues.
- b. No elections in GVN in 1956 to avoid Viet takeover from within.

"The cease fire negotiated at Geneva on 20 July 1954, all pious cries of sell-out notwithstanding, was, like Panmunjom one year earlier, the best obtainable under the circumstances." Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy.

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APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222  
Office of Special Services COMUSMACV

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20 September, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV  
SUBJECT: Dien Bien Phu

1. Apropos of your discussion with General Vanuxem last night on Dien Bien Phu, I had extracted the following points for information while reading Bernard Fall's "Hell in a Very Small Place". You may find them of interest.

a. French intelligence was quite good, having deduced enemy strength to within 10 per cent. Artillery estimates, however, were off; the garrison found itself badly out-gunned by 144 field artillery pieces, 30 75 millimeter recoilless rifles, 36 AAA guns, and 12-16 Soviet Katushka rocket launchers.

b. Logistical support makes an interesting comparison. Throughout the siege, the Viet Minh were supplied with 8,000 tons by bicycle, porters, etc. The French delivered but 6,400-6,900 tons, not all of which reached the garrison as many drops were made outside of the fortress itself and could not be recovered.

c. The U.S. has been criticized because of failure to provide sufficient air to prevent Viet Minh resupply and reinforcements. Fall believes this invalid, citing the failure of U.S. air to stop North Korean resupply (Operation "Strangle").

d. The French aviation structure was partly to blame. Based on NATO commitments and policies, where bombardment aircraft were provided by other NATO members, France did not have enough to support Indochina.

e. The strength build-up at Dien Bien Phu was as follows:

6 Dec 53-- 4,907

13 Mar 54-- 10,814

13 Mar-6 May 54-- 4,291 (parachuted in and consisting of 1,398 French, 962 Legionnaires, 30 North Africans, 1,901 Vietnamese. Six hundred and eighty "legs" made their first jump into Dien Bien Phu without prior training and with jump injuries approximating those of trained troops

f. Curiously, throughout the siege the garrison had a substantial non-combatant complement consisting of between 2,400 and 3,000 "internal deserters" (actual deserters or units and individuals performing so disgrace-

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SUBJECT: Dien Bien Phu

20 September, 1967

fully that they were taken out of action(, families of local tribesman who had been serving in intelligence activities, and two groups of Vietnamese and Algerian prostitutes.

g. Contrary to a popular belief that Dien Bien Phu was a Legion fight, the following is an ethnic breakout of participants:

French:	1,412
Legionnaires:	2,909
North Africans:	26
Africans:	247
Vietnamese Regulars:	2,151*
Vietnamese Auxiliary:	1,428*


\* Includes 2,500 Tai Tribesman.

h. Total friendly losses at Dien Bien Phu breakout as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>Total</u>
Nov 53-12 Mar 54	151	88	798	1,039
13 Mar-8 May 54	1,142	1,606	4,436	7,184
				8,213

In addition, there were 1,916 losses from the preparatory operation POLLUX (the attempted evacuation of the forces at Lai Chau to Dien Bien Phu).

i. On the Viet Minh side, estimated casualties are: KIA 7,900; WIA 15,000; Total 22,900. Of these and friendly losses, 8,000 PAVN and 2,000 French Union were buried at Dien Bien Phu.



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