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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222  
Combat Operations Center

MACCOC

3 March 1968

DEC 1 1968

E.O. 11054 100-3

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: COMUSMACV Visit to I CTZ

By DR A Memo, Jan. 6, 1968  
NARA Date 1-26-70

1. On 3 March COMUSMACV visited I CTZ. First stop was at CHU LAI where he was briefed by MGen Koster. Gen Cushman was present.

2. The status of the move of the 2/35 to DUC PHO was discussed. Gen Koster indicated that he needed it in WHEELER/WALLOWA AO for about ten days, then might be able to move it south to DUC PHO, relieving a battalion of the 11th Bde. Gen Koster stated that his first additional battalion would close by 31 March; it is the 5/46 of the 198th Bde. By 17 April the remaining two additional battalions will have closed. He estimated that by 10 April, he could deploy 2/35th to BINH DINH. COMUSMACV stated that he would try to leave it in Americal Division until 10 April, but it might have to deploy sooner, if situation worsened in II CTZ. He further stated that he would leave it up to Gen Koster as to whether he moved 2/35 to DUC PHO, or, made one move directly to BINH DINH.

3. Gen Koster stated that 2d ARVN Division was in good shape and was conducting offensive operations. Most of these were daylight operations, with the units returning around the cities at night.

4. Highway 1 is open throughout zone, although there is an average of one mining incident per day. A convoy of 3d Bde, 82d Abn was moving today from CHU LAI to DANANG.

5. At 1400, COMUSMACV arrived at HUE - PHU BAI for briefing by DEPCOMUSMACV. Present were LT Gens Cushman and Rosson and MGens Van Ryzin, Anderson and Pearson.

6. Gen Abrams gave a rundown on enemy and friendly situation and on the logistical situation. Gen Abrams stated that requirement of 2000 S/T for I CTZ North per day was not being met, but that by 10 March

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with opening of LOTS it was anticipated that 3350 short tons per day could be moved into I CTZ North. The daily requirement on that date would be 2650 short tons (this excludes KHE SANH requirements and POL, both of which are handled separately). Gen Abrams set forth his airlift priorities as follows:

- a. Continue airlift into KHE SANH
- b. Immediate lift of DELTA Force from NHA TRANG
- c. Continue 400 S/T per day to I CTZ North
- d. 38 sorties to lift Hq 101st Abn
- e. Lift remainder of 2d Bde, 1st Cav

7. COMUSMACV discussed current situation and pointed out that we had been buying time (to get our forces positioned and logically organized) by pounding the enemy with heavy air attacks at KHE SANH. He pointed out that with over 2000 secondaries, 200 fires, and two battalion equivalents KBA, the enemy must have been hurt. These were only the visible signs. COMUSMACV further indicated that we must buy additional time to get ARVN back on its feet, especially the 3d Regt. We must be prepared for enemy to attempt to ~~cross~~ BEN HAI with tanks. We have anticipated this by reallocating Anti-Tank weapons and increasing our AT posture. When weather improves, we must expect more observed enemy fire on KHE SANH. This can be met by air attacks.

8. COMUSMACV outlined his plan to shift Arc Light strikes, if weather permits tactical air to support KHE SANH. He indicated that ASHAU, especially, had to be hit hard, as well as route 547.

9. COMUSMACV advised DEPCOMUS that he was planning to send elements of a River Assault Division to I CTZ. He directed BGen Chaisson to inform Adm Veth to discuss with COMUSMACV the question of RAG (VN) capabilities and assets in I CTZ.

(By building road  
from Ashau to  
Hue)

10. The question of helicopter support for the 101st Division was raised by Gen Abrams. COMUSMACV requested Gen Abrams to send him a message addressing the question of bed down and support of additional helicopters, with a recommended time phasing.

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ll. Gen Westmoreland, Gen Abrams, LT Gen Cushman and  
LT Gen Rosson met in executive session after the open meeting.

J. R. CHAISSON



Discussed  
Central management  
of the air

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