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FROM WALT ROSTON  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67644

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*Pres file*

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HEREWITH THE VICE PRESIDENT'S WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION  
IN SEOUL WITH THE JAPANESE.

SEOUL 024

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-102

By           , NARA, Date 8-11-93

VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN EISAKU  
SATO, RESIDENCE OF THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO KOREA, 4:00PM,  
JULY 1, 1967

ATTENDING ON THE JAPANESE SIDE WERE:

EISAKU SATO, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN

SHIROSHICHI KIMURA, AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENI-  
POTENTIARY OF JAPAN

MR HARUKU MORI, DEPUTY VICE-MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MR NAOSHI SHIMANOUCHI, RESEARCH SECRETARY OF THE PUBLIC  
INFORMATION BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (INTERPRETER)

MR TOMOYA KAWAMURA, SECOND SECRETARY OF THE EMBASSY OF JAPAN  
(RECORDER)

ON THE AMERICAN SIDE:

THE VICE PRESIDENT

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES GEORGE NEWMAN

TED VAN DYK, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

JOHN RIELLY, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

JAMES J WICKEL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE AMBASSADOR, AMERICAN  
EMBASSY, TOKYO (INTERPRETER)

AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, PRIME MINISTER SATO EXPRESSED  
INTEREST IN HEARING A REPORT FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT ON THE  
GLASSBORO MEETING. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON  
HAD ASKED HIM TO TELL PRIME MINISTER SATO THAT HE WAS LOOKING  
FORWARD TO SEEING HIM IN WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER. THE VICE  
PRESIDENT THEN BRIEFED THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE GLASSBORO  
TALKS, GIVING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING  
FOR CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND COVERING THE SUBJECTS OF THE  
MIDDLE EAST, VIETNAM, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, ARMS LIMITATION  
AND CUBA. PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT KOSYGIN  
WAS NOT ACTIVE WITH FULL AUTHORITY, BUT RATHER WAS SPEAKING  
FOR THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. ON  
THE SUBJECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD OUTLINED  
THE FIVE POINTS STATED IN HIS JUNE 19 SPEECH.

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KOSYGIN WAS STRAIGHTFORWARD AND FRANK, NEVER ANGRY OR EMOTIONAL. THE CONVERSATIONS TOOK PLACE IN FRIENDLY AND CANDID ATMOSPHERE. THE POSITION OF KOSYGIN WAS MORE RIGID AND INFLEXIBLE IN THE SECOND CONVERSATION THAN IN THE FIRST, PERHAPS REFLECTING INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW BETWEEN THE TWO MEETINGS. DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PRECISE AGREEMENTS, THE GLASSBORO CONFERENCE WAS USEFUL IN CLEARING THE AIR AND IN PERMITTING BOTH LEADERS TO KNOW ONE ANOTHER. KOSYGIN SEEMED OVERWHELMED BY THE WARM RESPONSE OF THE AMERICAN CROWD AT GLASSBORO AND HE RESPONDED WITH SOME CORDIAL WORDS OF GREETING. ON BALANCE, THE PRESIDENT FELT THE MEETINGS HAD BEEN HELPFUL.

THE VICE PRESIDENT QUOTED GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S REMARK THAT IN TALKING WITH THE RUSSIANS IT TAKES THREE MEETINGS TO ACHIEVE RESULTS: AT THE FIRST MEETING THE ATMOSPHERE IS WARM AND CORDIAL; THE SECOND MEETING IS ROUGH; AT THE THIRD MEETING THEY MAY BEGIN TO DEAL.

PRIME MINISTER SATO STATED THAT THE MEETINGS WERE OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE, AS THEY SHOWED THAT BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE TO AVOID A WORLD CONFRONTATION OVER THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE, WHICH COULD LEAD TO WAR. HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND KOSYGIN'S TRUE INTENT IN MAKING THE TRIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO THE UNITED STATES. DID HE EXPECT SOMETHING DEFINITE OR WAS HE PERHAPS ILL-PREPARED? IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR TO THE JAPANESE WHAT IT WAS KOSYGIN WANTED.

THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION SUFFERED A SEVERE SHOCK AT THE SUDDENNESS AND FINALITY OF THE ISRAELI VICTORY OVER SYRIA AND THE UAR. BOTH HAD RECEIVED MASSIVE SOVIET AID, TRAINING, AND ARMS. BUT THE ARABS HAVE BECOME DISENCHANTED WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ARE CLAIMING THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE THEIR FRIENDS UNTIL THEY GET INTO TROUBLE. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN CAME TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEFLY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. IN THE UNITED NATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN A TOUGHER LINE THAN HAVE MANY OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES, APPEARING TO BE MORE ARAB THAN THE ARABS. WE THINK KOSYGIN DID NOT PLAN TO SEE PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT GLASSBORO OR ANY OTHER PLACE OUTSIDE OF NEW YORK; BUT HOPED TO GET THE PRESIDENT TO COME TO ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC ARGUMENT OVER THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS. PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAITED HIM OUT AND PERSONALLY DECIDED NOT TO GO TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND BECOME EMBROILED IN A DISCUSSION THERE. KOSYGIN THEREFORE ENDED UP USING THE UNITED NATIONS FORUM TO STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET POSITION WITH THE ARABS AND TO AGGRAVATE THE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARAB WORLD.

PRIME MINISTER SATO AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS OF KOSYGIN'S MOTIVATION. DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS PRINCIPALLY A PROPAGANDA MOVE ON THE SOVIET SIDE, IN THE END A WORLD CRISIS WAS AVOIDED. BUT UNLESS SOMETHING IS DONE ABOUT THE ARMS PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE POSSIBILITY OF A RENEWED CONFLICT WILL REMAIN. THE MATTER OF THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT THEREFORE IS MOST IMPORTANT. PRIME MINISTER SATO WONDERED IF SIMILAR EFFORTS COULD NOT BE MADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO DEAL WITH THE VIETNAM AND CUBA ISSUES. HE

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HOPED THE RUSSIANS DESPITE THEIR CURRENT PREOCCUPATION WITH THE MIDDLE EAST, EVENTUALLY COULD GIVE THE SAME SORT OF ATTENTION TO SUCH PROBLEMS AS VIETNAM AND CUBA. THE PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER MIKI IS GOING TO MOSCOW IN JULY FOR THE REGULAR JAPAN-SOVIET CONSULTATION AND HOPES TO DISCOVER WHETHER THERE HAVE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY. DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW MR. MIKI MIGHT BE HELPFUL ON ANY OF THESE ISSUES? HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HELP IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE.

THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION INTRODUCED BY INDIA AND YUGOSLAVIA CALLING ONLY FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES IS UNSATISFACTORY. IT WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL. THERE IS AN ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTION, HOWEVER, WHICH CALLS NOT ONLY FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES BUT ALSO FOR THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PERMANENT PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA. WE BELIEVE THE RUSSIAN RESOLUTION WILL NOT PASS, BUT IF THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION PASSES THIS WILL ONLY HARDEN THE POSITIONS OF BOTH ISRAEL AND THE ARABS. THE BEST THING TO DO WOULD BE TO SEND THE ISSUE BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO SUPPORT ONE OF THE TWO OR THREE OTHER RESOLUTIONS WHICH PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN DEALING WITH UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SECRETARY RUSK EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT JAPAN WOULD OPPOSE THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION. ABOVE ALL, WE WANT CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPAN ON THIS SUBJECT.

THE U.S. IS NOT ANTI-ARAB BUT YOU CAN'T JUST HAVE A CEASE-FIRE AND MAKE IT STICK. YOU CAN'T JUST TELL THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY MUST GO BACK TO STATUS QUO ANTE AND EXPECT THEM TO ACCEPT THIS. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN REPEATED THE FIVE POINTS POSITION OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THE TALKS AT GLASSBORO THE SOVIET LEADER DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS THESE.

PRIME MINISTER SATO ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S FIVE POINTS INCLUDED THE NON RECOGNITION OF TERRITORIAL GAINS BY THE USE OF FORCE. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT WE HAVE REQUESTED THAT THERE BE WITHDRAWAL, BUT NOT WITHOUT DISCUSSIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT PEACE IN THE AREA. WE HAVE TAKEN EXCEPTION TO THE UNIFICATION OF JERUSALEM. BUT THE QUESTION OF BOUNDARIES MUST BE DISCUSSED BY THE NATIONS OF THE AREA THEMSELVES. WE DO NOT SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPANSION BY AGGRESSION. BUT THE FACT OF THE WAR IS THERE. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT WANT THIS TERRITORY BUT WISH TO USE POSSESSION OF IT TO ACHIEVE CONDITIONS TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA, AND TO ACHIEVE GUARANTEES ON CERTAIN ISSUES VITAL TO ISRAEL SUCH AS FREE PASSAGE OF THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE SUEZ CANAL, AND AN END TO TERRORISM FROM SYRIA AND SINAI.

PRIME MINISTER SATO SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THESE FIVE POINTS, BUT THE PROBLEM IS THAT ISRAEL HAS OCCUPIED TERRITORY WHICH SHE DID NOT OCCUPY BEFORE.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT OUR U.N. RESOLUTION CALLS FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES BUT WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE OVERALL PROBLEMS OF THE AREA - FOR EXAMPLE REFUGEES. WE HAVE SPENT MILLIONS ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEMS FOR YEARS AND NOW BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE NATIONS OF THE AREA TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. A RETURN TO THE CONDITIONS WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM. RESPONSIBLE NATIONS SHOULD THEREFORE TELL THE NATIONS OF THE AREA TO SIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE AND SOLVE THE PROBLEM

PRIME MINISTER SATO AGREED. HE NOTED THE CONTRADICTION OF THE ARAB POSITION WHICH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND INSISTS THAT SHE WITHDRAW FROM HER PRESENT POSITION.

THE VICE PRESIDENT CONCURRED AND POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. THE SOVIET UNION KNOWS ITS RESOLUTION WILL NOT PASS THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY YET SHE INSISTS ON CALLING FOR A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE WHICH WOULD ONLY STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THE HARDLINERS IN ISRAEL.

PRIME MINISTER SATO AGREED THAT THIS WOULD ONLY INSURE A REPETITION OF HISTORY. HE STATED THAT WHILE JAPANESE HAVE EXTENSIVE RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS, JAPANESE POLICY IS ONE OF STRICT NEUTRALITY. YET, BECAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES-JAPANESE SECURITY TREATY HER NEUTRALITY ON THE MIDDLE EAST IS DOUBTED BY SOME STATES. HE STATED THAT FOLLOWING THE VIETNAMESE ELECTION THIS SEPTEMBER, HE IS PLANNING TO VISIT VIETNAM. HE IS NOT SURE THAT ALL THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF VIETNAM WILL BE SOLVED BY THAT TIME. NEVERTHELESS, HE WANTS TO SEE THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM FIRST-HAND AND WHAT HE CAN DO TO AID IN DEVELOPING GOOD RELATIONS. HE ASKED THE VICE

PRESIDENT IF THERE ARE ANY POTENTIAL LEADERS OTHER THAN CAO KY IN VIETNAM., SINCE HE DID NOT SEEM TO SEE ANY OTHERS ON THE SCENE. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN A MEETING THIS MORNING WITH GENERAL CHIEU, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, HE HAD EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES TO HONEST AND FREE ELECTIONS AND TO CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT THAT EMERGES. THE UNITED STATES ATTITUDE WILL DEPEND ON THE KIND OF ELECTION HELD - NOT ON THE CANDIDATE WHO WINS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS IS PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE MILITARY CONFLICT. IT NOW APPEARS THAT KY AND THIEU WILL RUN TOGETHER AND WILL AVOID A SPLIT WITHIN THE MILITARY, A SPLIT WHICH WE WOULD CONSIDER TRAGIC. THERE ARE OTHER CANDIDATES BUT AT THE MOMENT IT APPEARS THAT THIEU AND KY WILL RUN TOGETHER AND IF THEY WIN, WILL WORK OUT SOME DIVISION OF LABOR LATER. PRIME MINISTER SATO STATED THAT IT WILL BE A GOOD THING IF THIS MEANS AN INCREASE IN POLITICAL STABILITY, BUT HE DOUBTED THAT A TRULY HONEST ELECTION COULD TAKE PLACE. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT WE MUST KEEP THE PRESSURE ON TO SEE THAT IT DOES. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD ASKED HIM TO EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR PRIME MINISTER SATO'S INTERVENTION IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF FOOD AID IN THE KENNEDY ROUND. THE UNITED STATES ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF GREAT CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE AT HOME AND BECAUSE OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM OF FEEDING THE INCREASING POPULATION OF THE WORLD. BOTH PROBLEMS ARGUED FOR A MULTI LATERAL APPROACH TO MEETING WORLD FOOD NEEDS.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS GREAT SATISFACTION WITH THE SUCCESS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC MISSION TO THE MIDWEST. HE HAD MET WITH THE MISSION AT HIS HOME IN MINNESOTA AND IS VERY PLEASED WITH HIS TALKS WITH THEM. THE PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDED TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ARE EXCELLENT. HE ALSO NOTED THE ACTIVE ROLE WHICH JAPAN IS PLAYING IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN ASIA AND JAPAN'S PLEDGE OF 60 MILLION TO INDONESIA IN THE MEETINGS WHICH TOOK PLACE RECENTLY AT THE HAGUE. WE ARE HIGHLY PLEASED WITH THE EXPANDING ROLE WHICH JAPAN IS TAKING IN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA.

THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED AMBASSADOR SHIMODA'S COMMENTS ON THE OKINAWA AND BONIN ISLAND QUESTION AND INDICATED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS DURING PRIME MINISTER SATO'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE BELIEVES THE U.S. AND JAPAN COULD MOVE CLOSER TO ANY UNDERSTANDING AS LONG AS BOTH UNDERSTAND THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY IN THE AREA.

PRIME MINISTER SATO STATED THAT IN REGARD TO THE KENNEDY ROUND JAPAN SENT TO GENEVA THE DIRECTOR OF THE ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY MR MIYAZAWA. THEY DISCOVERED THAT AT FIRST THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE IN THE POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS AT GENEVA AND THAT SOME ACCOMMODATION WAS REQUIRED. HE BELIEVES THAT IF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN HAD HAD CLOSER CONSULTATIONS BEFOREHAND, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EASIER TO REACH A DECISION ON FOOD AID AT GENEVA.

HE WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS THANKS TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR RECEIVING THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC MISSION AND HE ASSURED HIM THAT HE WOULD BE TALKING WITH MEMBERS OF THE MISSION ON THEIR RETURN. HE STATED THAT PRIOR TO HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA, IN VIEW OF THE EXPERIENCE WITH THE KENNEDY ROUND, IF THERE WERE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THE ITEMS TO BE DISCUSSED.

THE VICE PRESIDENT READILY CONCURRED AND SUGGESTED THAT THE AGENDA WOULD INCLUDE AMONG OTHER ITEMS THAT OF MUTUAL SECURITY, THE BONIN AND RYUKYUS ISLANDS PROBLEM, REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND TRADE RELATIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE VICE PRESIDENT REPEATED THAT HE HOPED PRIME MINISTER SATO WOULD CONSIDER WHAT JAPAN MIGHT DO ON THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTIONS CURRENTLY BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IN CLOSING, THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED PRIME MINISTER SATO TO EXTEND HIS SPECIAL GREETINGS TO FOREIGN MINISTER MIKI AND PROMISED TO DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON THE QUESTION OF WHAT MIKI MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED THAT HIS GREETINGS BE CONVEYED TO GOVERNOR HARRIMAN WHOM HE KNOWS AND GREATLY RESPECTS.

THE MEETING CLOSED WITH AN AGREEMENT TO TELL THE PRESS CORPS OF THE SUBJECTS WHICH HAD BEEN COVERED IN THE DISCUSSION.  
NEWMAN

DTG 02/1547Z JULY 1967

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