

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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By pa, NARA, Date 12-18-92

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VIPTO 3

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT PARK
CHUNG HUI, FRIDAY, JUNE 30, 10:45 AM. (THE BLUE HOUSE)

ATTENDING ON THE KOREAN SIDE WERE:

PRESIDENT PARK

PRIME MINISTER IL KWON CHUN

CHIEF SECRETARY LEE RUI RAK

VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM YOUNG CHOU

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PRESS SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT SHUNN

CHIEF OF PROTOCOL AND INTERPRETER COLONEL CHO SO-HANG

AMERICAN SIDE:

VICE PRESIDENT

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES GEORGE NEWMAN

TED VAN DYK, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

JOHN RIELLY, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

RON MYERS, EMBASSY OFFICER (INTERPRETER)

THE VICE PRESIDENT OPENED THE HOUR AND A QUARTER MEETING BY
EXPRESSING HIS REGRETS THAT MRS. HUMPHREY WAS ILL AND THEREFORE
UNABLE TO ACCOMPANY HIM. SHE HAD SENT A LETTER FOR MRS. PARK.
PRESIDENT PARK EXPRESSED HIS REGRETS ON BEHALF OF MRS. PARK THAT
MRS. HUMPHREY WAS UNABLE TO COME

THE VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT HE WANTED TO GIVE PRESIDENT
PARK A REPORT ON THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT PARK AND

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PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN OUTLINED THE DISCUSSIONS AS DETAILED BY THE PRESIDENT AT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING, COVERING THE SUBJECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, VIETNAM, NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS LIMITATIONS AND CUBA.

THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND SECRETARY RUSK AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT. THIS MORNING'S PAPERS CARRIED A REPORT THAT AN AGREEMENT TO TABLE A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AT GENEVA HAD BEEN REACHED BY THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

ON THE ISSUE OF CUBA THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED REPORTS INDICATING THAT PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN TOLD CASTRO IN HAVANA THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT SUPPORT GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA, WHICH SUGGESTS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT HAD COME EFFECT.

THE OVER-ALL RESULT OF THE JOHNSON-KOSYGIN TALKS WAS NOT A SOLUTION OF PRECISE ISSUES, BUT A "CLEARING OF THE AIR."

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THEIR RESULTS WOULD NOT BE FULLY KNOWN FOR MANY MONTHS. PRESIDENT JOHNSON IMPRESSED KOSYGIN AS A MAN WHO COULD GIVE A CLEAR AND FORCEFUL EXPOSITION OF THE U.S. POSITION ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUES OF THE DAY.

THE VICE PRESIDENT ADDED HE WAS PLEASED TO GIVE PRESIDENT PARK THE FIRST REPORT ON THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE PERSONALLY GIVEN TO A HEAD OF STATE BY A HANKING U.S. OFFICIAL, BECAUSE KOREA IS A CLOSE FRIEND AND LOYAL ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT PARK'S INQUIRY IF KOSYGIN HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO PRESENT THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT WE BELIEVE KOSYGIN WAS INSTRUCTED BY MOSCOW OVER THE WEEKEND OF THE TALKS AND THAT THE SECOND DISCUSSION REFLECTS THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

PRESIDENT PARK ASKED IF IT IS THEREFORE TRUE THAT NO CHANGE IN POLICY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS REVEALED IN THE TALKS. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT THIS IS CORRECT; NO CHANGE IN POLICY EMERGED IN THE CONVERSATIONS.

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ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THEY ALSO INCLUDED THE SUBJECT OF CHINA. KOSYGIN'S REMARKS REFLECTED THE SAME CONCERN ABOUT CHINA THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR IN LONDON IN HIS TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER WILSON. HIS REMARKS REFLECTED THE SAME PREOCCUPATION WITH CHINA THAT WAS EXPRESSED IN HIS EARLIER CONVERSATIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT IN FACT BE BECOMING TOO FRIENDLY WITH RED CHINA.

THE VICE PRESIDENT INQUIRED ABOUT PRESIDENT PARK'S ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION TODAY.

PRESIDENT PARK DID NOT DIRECTLY RESPOND, BUT FIRST INQUIRED HOW THE SOVIET UNION RATES THE PROBLEM OF VIETNAM IN COMPARISON TO THE MIDDLE EAST. WHAT HAS PRIORITY TODAY?

THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT HIS OWN PERSONAL IMPRESSION IS THAT SOVIET LEADERS GIVE FIRST PRIORITY TO THE MIDDLE EAST. TODAY THE SOVIET INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS CENTERED ON SYRIA AND INCREASINGLY ON ALGERIA. THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IS GRADUALLY ASSUMING A STATUS SIMILAR TO CUBA -- IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION IS THE SENIOR PARTNER IN AN UNHAPPY MARRIAGE.

GP-1. NEWMAN
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PRESIDENT PARK STATED THAT IN A DISCUSSION YESTERDAY WITH PROFESSOR ROGER HILSMAN, WHO HAD JUST HAD DISCUSSIONS OF VIETNAM WITH SOVIET LEADERS IN MOSCOW, HILSMAN TOLD HIM THAT SOVIET LEADERS INSISTED THAT IF THE UNITED STATES STOPPED BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD EXERT PRESSURE ON HANOI TO CURTAIL INFILTRATION OF REGULAR NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS. THEY CLAIMED NO CONTROL OVER THE VIET CONG AND LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO END THE WAR BUT TO DEESCALATE IT. IN THEIR ESTIMATE, CHINA IS READY TO INTERVENE TO HELP NORTH VIETNAM IF SHE IS SUFFICIENTLY WEAKENED. IF SUCH A SITUATION SHOULD ARISE, RUSSIA WOULD BE

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COMPELLED TO COME TO THE AID OF NORTH VIETNAM. PRESIDENT PARK ASKED IF THESE QUESTIONS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN.

THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT HE KNEW ROGER HILSMAN WELL AND THAT HILSMAN UNDOUBTEDLY GAVE THE PRESIDENT A SPECIAL VIEW ON THE VIETNAM SITUATION, A VIEW FAVORING STOPPING THE BOMBING, EMPHASIZING CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE DIRECT INTERVENTION BY CHINA IN THE WAR, AND WHAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WOULD BE TO CHINESE INTERVENTION. UNITED STATES OFFICIALS HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS EVERY POSSIBILITY FOR DEESCALATING THE WAR. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN REPEATED THE PRESIDENT'S SUMMARY TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS OF WHAT HE TOLD KOSYGIN ON VIETNAM.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD REPORTED THAT KOSYGIN'S POSITION WAS RIGID AND FAMILIAR: THE UNITED STATES SHOULD STOP THE BOMBING AND GET OUT OF VIETNAM.

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AS TO RUSSIAN INTERVENTION, NO ONE CAN REALLY TELL FOR SURE. BUT RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN WHICH THE ARABS FEEL THE

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SOVIETS LET THEM DOWN, SUGGESTS THAT IN A DIRECT CONFLICT INVOLVING A THREAT TO SOVIET VITAL INTERESTS, THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO BACK DOWN REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE INTERESTS OF AN ALLY SUFFER. HE DOUBTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL BEHAVE DIFFERENTLY IN VIETNAM THAN IT DID IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY WILL TRY TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED

STATES, AND WE HAVE TRIED TO AVOID ANY CONFRONTATION AND HAVE THEREFORE CAREFULLY AVOIDED BOMBING HAIPHONG HARBOR.

IN ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT, WE WILL CONSULT WITH ALL OUR ALLIES AND MOST CLOSELY WITH THOSE MOST DIRECTLY INVOLVED SUCH AS SOUTH VIETNAM AND KOREA.

PRESIDENT PARK STATED THAT HE HAD REFERRED TO HIS DISCUSSION WITH PROFESSOR HILSMAN BECAUSE HE HAD LONG BELIEVED THAT HE HAD A PREJUDICED VIEW OF THE VIETNAM STRUGGLE. HE HAD EXTENDED AN INTERVIEW ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 10 MINUTES TO 40 MINUTES IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN TO HILSMAN AT LENGTH THE RATIONALE BEHIND KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT. PARK TOLD HILSMAN THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WITH WHOM HE SPOKE IN MOSCOW OR HOW IMPORTANT THE OFFICIALS

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WERE. BUT HE FELT THAT, WHEN THE SOVIETS TOLD HILSMAN THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT INTERVENE IF NORTH VIETNAM BECAME WEAK, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE ATTEMPTING TO BLACKMAIL THE UNITED STATES. THEY ASSUMED OF COURSE THAT HILSMAN, AS A FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, WOULD PASS ON THEIR VIEWS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THOSE WHO CALL FOR A STOPPING OF THE BOMBING ARE MISCALCULATING. IF HANOI DID WITHDRAW REGULAR TROOPS AT THE INSTIGATION OF MOSCOW, BOTH WOULD OF COURSE INSIST ON A RECIPROCAL WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES. THEN THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM WOULD EQUIP AND SUPPLY THE VIET CONG IN THE SOUTH AND WE WOULD BE BACK WHERE WE WERE IN THE BEGINNING. THIS IS WHAT CHINA WOULD LIKE. PARK NOTED THAT HILSMAN REPORTED NO SOVIET CLAIM THAT HANOI WOULD STOP SUPPLYING THE VIET CONG. PARK ASKED IF THE VIEWS OF PROFESSOR HILSMAN REPRESENT THE MAIN THRUST OF THE CRITICISM MADE IN THE UNITED STATES OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY

IN VIETNAM.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT PERHAPS PRESIDENT PARK WAS MORE PERSUASIVE IN EXPLAINING AMERICAN POLICY TO CRITICS LIKE HILSMAN THAN MANY AMERICAN SPOKESMEN. PRESIDENT PARK WAS CORRECT IN REGARDING HILSMAN AS A REPRESENTATIVE CRITIC. HILSMAN SUPPORTS CESSATION OF THE

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BOMBING OF THE NORTH, BUT DOES NOT SUPPORT WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. THE QUESTION OF THE BOMBING IS ALWAYS UNDER REVIEW. THE REAL QUESTION IS WHAT EFFECT IT HAS ON LOGISTICS, MORALE, INFILTRATION, AND THE PROGRESS OF THE FIGHTING. SOME CRITICS TRY TO DRAW A SHARP DICHOTOMY BETWEEN BOMBING OR NO BOMBING, AS IF THAT WERE THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE.

PRESIDENT PARK STATED THAT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT FEELS THE SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM CAN BE BASED ON THREE BASIC PREMISES: (1) CONTINUING MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY; (2) CAREFUL SUPPORT OF THE PROCESS OF BUILDING CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM; (3) OPENING OF ALL AVENUES OF DISCUSSION AND DIALOG TOWARD A POSSIBLE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM. IN THEIR VIEW THERE IS NO OTHER POSSIBLE WAY TO SOLVE THE VIETNAM PROBLEM THAN THIS WAY, WHICH IS THE POLICY BEING PURSUED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE KATZENBACH WILL BE GOING TO VIETNAM THIS WEEKEND TO REVIEW THE QUESTIONS OF TROOP LEVELS, THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, THE POLITICAL SITUATION, AND PROGRESS TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL

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GOVERNMENT.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE AGREED WITH PRESIDENT PARK'S ANALYSIS. ONE THING SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND SECRETARY KATZENBACH WOULD BE EXAMINING CLOSELY IS THE MANPOWER NEEDS IN VIETNAM TODAY. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH PRIME MINISTER HOLT OF AUSTRALIA AND IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WE WILL BE CONSULTING WITH OUR OTHER ALLIES INCLUDING KOREA.

WE BELIEVE THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT CAN BE VERY HELPFUL IN EDUCATING THE LEADERSHIP OF SOUTH VIETNAM ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PACIFICATION ARE ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS IN VIETNAM. MILITARY PROGRESS ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. IN THIS DELICATE AND VITAL SUBJECT, BELIEVED TO BE PRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, KOREAN LEADERS CAN PERHAPS HAVE MORE INFLUENCE.

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THAN THE UNITED STATES. PERHAPS THE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER, AND TH
IR
COLLEAGUES WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH THE
VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVE ATTENDING THE INAUGURATION; MR. CHIEU.
ANYTHING THE KOREANS CAN DO TO IMPRESS UPON PRESIDENT THIEU AND

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PRIME MINISTER KY THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL FIELD
WILL BE INVALUABLE.

PRESIDENT PARK RESPONDED HALF HUMOROUSLY THAT SINCE HE IS HAVING
HIS OWN TROUBLES WITH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN KOREA, HE IS NOT
SURE THAT HE CAN ADVISE OTHERS. BUT HE WILL DO WHAT HE CAN WITH THE
VIETNAMESE LEADERS. HE SHARED IN THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND IS GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER OF 1967, ESPECIALLY
ABOUT THE RIVALRY BETWEEN KY AND THIEU. HE ASKED IF WE HAVE ANY
INDICATION THAT EITHER KYOR THIEU MIGHT WITHDRAW.

THE VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT, IF VIETNAM CAN HAVE AN ELECTION
AS GOOD AS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN KOREA - AND IF THE RESULTS
COME OUT AS WELL - WE WILL BE VERY PLEASED INDEED. AT THE MOMENT
WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT EITHER KY OR THIEU WILL WITHDRAW.
WHEN AMBASSADOR PORTER RETURNS TO KOREA, HE WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE PRESI-
DENT PARK A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM.
BECAUSE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S LONG EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM AND HIS LONG
SERVICE IN COUNTRIES WHERE GUERRILLA WARFARE WAS TAKING PLACE,

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HE IS EMINENTLY WELL QUALIFIED TO GIVE AN ANALYSIS OF THE WHOLE
VIETNAM SITUATION. THIS APPOINTMENT WILL BE VERY HELPFUL IN
MAINTAINING CLOSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH
VIETNAM, AND KOREA.

THE VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT HE WANTED TO BRING UP THE SUBJECT
OF KIMCHI WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.
HE DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA LAST WEEK,
AND THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT OUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR
EACH KOREAN SOLDIER SERVING IN VIETNAM ONE FULL MEAL RATION PER DAY.
THIS WILL BE DONE THROUGH A TIED LETTER OF CREDIT. THE EMBASSY
HERE WILL CONSULT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT ON HOW THIS WILL BE
HANDLED. U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE ASKED THAT THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF
THIS DECISION BE HELD UP UNTIL ON OR AFTER JULY 3.

PRESIDENT PARK EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THIS DECISION.

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HE AND MADAME PARK HAD RECEIVED MANY LETTERS FROM KOREAN SOLDIERS ASKING FOR KINCHI. THEREFORE MADAME PARK ESPECIALLY APPRECIATES THIS DECISION. IN A WAY HE AND MADAME PARK FOUND THEMSELVES IN A SITUATION COMPARABLE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND MRS. JOHNSON

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RECEIVING LETTERS FROM AMERICAN GI'S ASKING FOR BUTTER. THE VICE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT WE KNEW OF THESE LETTERS TO PRESIDENT AND MADAME PARK AND WE WERE DELIGHTED TO KNOW THIS WOULD PLEASE MADAME PARK AS WE THOUGHT VERY HIGHLY OF HER.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE WANTED TO ADD THAT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE TROWBRIDGE WOULD BE VISITING KOREA IN OCTOBER, FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WHICH PRIME MINISTER KWON HAD IN WASHINGTON EARLIER THIS YEAR.

PRESIDENT PARK SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING THE VICE PRESIDENT ON SUNDAY AT 10 WHEN THEY WOULD MEET TOGETHER WITH OTHER ASIAN LEADERS ATTENDING THE INAUGURATION. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED AND WOULD ALSO BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT PARK ANY OTHER SUBJECTS OF CONCERN TO HIM - INCLUDING PROCUREMENT IN VIETNAM - BEFORE HE LEFT KOREA NEXT MONDAY.

GP-1. NEWMAN

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