

*6/26/67*

1. I had more than eight hours of face-to-face conversation with Chairman Kosygin. Secretary Rusk spent an equivalent amount of time with Foreign Minister Gromyko.
2. Kosygin struck me as an intelligent, experienced, and competent person with a personal capacity for humor and human feeling. On the other hand, it was equally clear that he is an extremely disciplined Communist leader. On the first day the conversation was fairly relaxed, although neither he nor I moved off well known positions. On Sunday I would judge that he was under instructions to present existing Soviet positions hard; come to no agreements; and rejoin his colleagues in Moscow after the trip to Havana to take stock.
3. In a way, the meeting conformed to an observation of Governor Harriman's based on past experience: "With Russians it takes three meetings to make a deal: the first, courteous; the second, rough; the third, the deal is made."
4. If there is a third session - if agreements emerge - they will not come from a single third session. It will consist in what unfolds in the weeks and months ahead on the specific issues and positions I took up with the Chairman. As I said in my toast at lunch on Friday with Chairman Kosygin, history will judge the conference at Hollybush by the results we achieved in the future on behalf of world peace.
5. Here are the major issues I raised with him:

First, the Middle East. My general theme was that the withdrawal of Israeli troops must be accompanied by a withdrawal of the dangers which led to war. I argued (see Tab A) that in terms of the five principles which I presented in my talk of June 19 and urged in the end that we should work together in New York for a resolution

and action in the General Assembly and Security Council that we both could support.

I should report to you that the Chairman appeared to be under instructions not to budge one inch from the position that withdrawal must come first and then they might talk about other aspects of a Middle Eastern settlement.

Second, Vietnam. I underlined our determination to resist aggression in Vietnam, but equally emphasized two points that will be familiar to you:

- We are prepared for mutual de-escalation and peace talks;
- So far as the future of South Vietnam is concerned, we believe it should be settled by the people themselves; on the basis of self determination; we will accept elections inspected by any outside group if they are conducted in an atmosphere of peace; and we will accept the outcome.

Again, his position was rigid and familiar: we should stop the bombing and get out of Vietnam.

Third, Non-Proliferation (See TabB) I urged Chairman Kosygin that we jointly table the non-proliferation treaty either with the safeguards proposal that we have put forward, or with a blank proposal to be filled in after debate and negotiation among all the members of the Geneva Conference. I urged that we get on with this quickly so that all the nations of the world -- and their peoples -- could look at the draft and discuss it and form views on it.

The Soviet response was that they wished us to press our Allies to accept their formulation which would involve immediately the application of the IAEA safeguards to EURATOM. We explained that

we could not force our European friends to do this. Foreign Minister Gromyko indicated to Secretary Rusk that it was not ruled out that they might be prepared to table the draft with a blank Article III sometime in the future. It is clear that they want a non-proliferation treaty if they can get one.

Fourth, Arms Limitations. I asked Kosygin to name a time and place for a meeting between our representatives to limit the deployment of both offensive and defensive missiles. I pointed out that we had waited three months for a reply to our proposal for such meetings. He was not empowered to give me a response.

I told him that we also were prepared to sit down and talk right away about a mutual lowering of military budgets. Again, he was not prepared to give me a responsible reply.

I pressed hard the need for all parties to reduce the flow of arms into the Middle East. As with all other constructive steps in the Middle East he came back to his single theme: first, withdrawal, and then the rest. Don't tie any other issue to withdrawal. He made the same response to our proposal for the registration with the UN of arms shipments to the Middle East.

Finally, I pressed him hard to use Soviet influence in Havana to deflect Castro from his direct and active encouragement of guerrilla operations in Latin America. I told him that we had evidence that the Cubans were operating in seven Latin American countries. I cited in particular the case of Venezuela (Tab C) and told him that it was most dangerous to the peace of the Hemisphere and the world for Castro to conduct this illegal activity.

As I say, on none of these matters was the Soviet Government, for which Chairman Kosygin spoke, prepared to move forward as of Sunday afternoon.

And only time will tell whether our meeting will help produce concrete results.

It was clear to me and clear to all who saw and listened to Chairman Kosygin that he is a leader in a government whose philosophy is Communist and which regards itself as a leader in the Communist world. This should not come as a surprise any more than it is a surprise that I profoundly believe in constitutional democracy and private enterprise and human freedom as we understand them. There are very important differences in ideology and national interest between the Soviet Union and the United States. These cannot be wished away. They cannot be eliminated by miracles. But what we must do is what we are trying to do; that is, to work hard, patiently and soberly to narrow these differences and broaden the foundations for peace in the world.