

June 26, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NEJ 72-89
 By 18, NARA, Date 3-23-93

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 WASHINGTON

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Romanian Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, June 26, 4:30 p.m.

You have agreed to receive Romanian Premier Maurer (Mow-rer), who is in the United States as head of the Romanian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. He will be accompanied on the Romanian side by Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu (Mu-h-NES-coo) and an interpreter.

Premier Maurer is able and has traveled widely. At Secretary Rusk's dinner on June 23, he showed himself articulate, forceful and quick of apprehension. Foreign Minister Manescu will in all likelihood be elected President of the 22nd United Nations General Assembly this fall, the first Communist to hold that position.

The Romanians are in a unique position because they have been able to stay on good terms with both parties in several current disputes: The USSR and Communist China, East and West Germany, Arabs and Israelis, the United States and North Viet-Nam. Despite their precarious position on the Soviets' doorstep, the Romanians have managed to follow independent policies largely because they take pains to show that they are not anti-Soviet but seek only to advance Romanian interests.

Your talks might touch on the following points, details of which are spelled out in the enclosed Talking Paper:

1. Maurer's Trip to Peking. We believe that a major point in your conversation with Maurer should be our views toward Communist China. Maurer is going to Peking in early July. He will be the first top leader of any nation, particularly the first Communist leader, to go straight from Washington to Peking with a direct impression of your views on China. We therefore believe that you should make a particular point during the conversation of raising China and getting across our central views -- essentially that we are firmly resolved to defend Viet-Nam, but at the same time do not threaten China and hope for an ultimate peace of reconciliation with her.

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GROUP 1

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 and declassification

We urge that you not get into any discussion on the internal situation in Communist China, or Hong Kong. Any remarks on these topics might be misinterpreted by Maurer or the people with whom he talks in Peking.

2. On Viet-Nam, Romania has specifically avoided a mediating role. Maurer has had some talks with North Vietnamese, and you may wish to ask him whether he has any current impressions of their position. However, we do not suggest that he be given anything more than a standard statement of our basic positions -- our desire for a peaceful solution, our willingness to talk, but our insistence that there be some reciprocal military action if we are to stop bombing.

3. Kosygin Talks. You may wish to discuss with Maurer your talks with Kosygin.

4. Near East Crisis. You may wish to welcome the moderate Romanian viewpoint as expressed by Maurer in his General Assembly speech and to set forth U.S. views on the solution of the crisis.

5. U.S.-Romanian Relations. The Romanians have emphasized the importance of active trade with all countries as a key factor in their independence. You may wish to express appreciation of Romania's independent policies and to say that you hope that Congress will take the necessary actions (renewal of the Ex-Im Bank charter, passage of an East-West Trade Bill) to make possible a further increase in our trade.

6. Manescu's Candidacy for the United Nations General Assembly Presidency. If the Romanians raise the question of the possibility of our supporting Manescu for the presidency of the 22nd General Assembly, you may wish to reiterate our high regard for Mr. Manescu but to say that ~~it is still too early for us to make a commitment~~ and say that ~~barring unforeseen developments, we plan to support his candidacy~~.*

In addition to the Talking Paper, I am enclosing Background Papers on China, Viet-Nam negotiation efforts, and U.S.-Romanian economic relations, as well as biographic sketches on the Premier and the Foreign Minister.

Nathaniel K. Nichols
Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Talking Paper.

* Page will follow -

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* The State Dept. phoned
over this suggested change.
It will certainly please
the Romanians.

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PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH ROMANIAN PREMIER
June 1967

Talking Paper

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-89

By 100, NARA, Date 3-23-93

1. Your Talks with Kosygin

Premier Maurer will be interested in your conversations with Kosygin not only as they related to the Near East and Viet-Nam but also as they touched on the Nonproliferation Treaty, a subject in which the Romanians have shown considerable interest.

Recommended US Position

You may wish to tell Maurer as much as the nature of your talks with Kosygin will permit.

2. Romanian Attitudes on Near East Crisis

Romania has steered a middle course which differs sharply from the anti-Israeli positions of the other Communist countries. Bucharest has not accused Israel of aggression nor broken relations with Israel. It has urged that Israeli forces withdraw from Arab territory and that the parties to the dispute negotiate their differences on the basis of the interests of the peoples involved. Romania has also urged "peaceful coexistence" in the area and a solution of the problem of the Arab refugees.

Premier Maurer, at the General Assembly on June 23, stated Romania's position on the Near East situation in reasoned and moderate terms. He called for the creation of a climate conducive to a real settlement by the countries of the region themselves and guaranteeing to them the right to independence and to security, enabling them to devote their efforts to economic and social progress. He defined the essential conditions for this climate as scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and Israel's withdrawal from and renunciation of all territory gained by military actions; the elimination of all foreign influence in the affairs of the countries of the area; and respect for the basic interests of each state with due regard for its independence and sovereign existence. Notably, he did not call for a condemnation of Israel.

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Recommended US Position

We are gratified that the Romanian Government has called upon the parties involved to resolve their differences on the basis of their respective interests. We reject Arab charges of military involvement in the Near East conflict and consider that the first and greatest requirement is that each Near East nation accept the right of its neighbors to stable and secure existence. The US is prepared to cooperate with all nations on the basis of this fundamental principle and to share anew in alleviating the suffering of the peoples of the Near East. It is our earnest hope that the Romanian Government will join in common efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the crisis and permanent stability in the area.

3. Maurer's Trip to Peking

Maurer plans to be in Peking on July 3. Romania has played a relatively independent role in the Sino-Soviet dispute. While not supporting the Communist Chinese position, Romania because of its emphasis on the right of every Communist Party and State independently to determine its own policies has opposed international meetings which would result in condemnation or criticism of another Communist State and Party. At Secretary Rusk's dinner on June 23, Maurer confessed lack of detailed information on China and was not sure his visit of a few days could produce much clarification. He thought, however, the period of struggle in Red China was drawing to a close and that there will soon be a period of "considerable consolidation". He was not concerned that the Communist Chinese would probably resent a visit to you on the eve of his journey and said he would welcome Peking knowing that "it's views on a certain matter or a certain country" are not Romania's views.

Recommended US Position

a. The US wants peace with the Chinese Communists but is determined to resist and oppose present Chinese Communist efforts to encourage and promote violence and conflict in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

b. The US has watched with puzzlement the development of the internal situation within Communist China over the past year but believes this is solely a matter for resolution by the Chinese

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themselves. Our interest in internal developments is the hope that ultimately Chinese Communist leaders will be prepared to sit down with the US and other countries in the area to discuss reasonably ways and means of achieving and ensuring peace.

c. The US is prepared to cooperate with the Chinese Communists and with their neighbors, whenever they are ready, in promoting peace, stability, and independent and free development of the countries of Asia.

d. The US is prepared to discuss with the Chinese Communists, as with other states, our common interest in avoiding the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles. We hope the Chinese will at some point agree to enter into disarmament agreements. In the meantime the US must obviously, along with other interested countries, consider the potential threat to its security which the Chinese weapons program represents.

e. The US dialogue with Communist China continues in Warsaw. Although little progress has been made toward opening up channels of communication and contact or even toward resolving minor issues between the US and the Chinese Communists, the US desires to continue and develop bilateral contacts with Communist China.

f. Differing US-Chinese Communist views on the Taiwan question unquestionably represent major problems, particularly from the Chinese Communist standpoint. We have repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to get the Chinese Communists to agree to an understanding against the use of force to resolve this question. Communist China must recognize that we will not abandon our commitment to defend Taiwan from armed attack.

g. We have tried to make clear to the Chinese that the US does not have hostile intentions toward it, does not intend to attack it. We do not know whether the Chinese really understand this since they repeatedly allege the contrary. We have told the Chinese Communists of our hope that the Vietnam conflict will not be expanded into a larger war by the injection of new outside elements.

h. We are convinced that a peaceful resolution of the Vietnam conflict can be achieved despite the current Chinese opposition to negotiations.

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i. The US recognizes a legitimate Chinese interest in their own security. At the same time, the Chinese Communists must recognize the legitimate security interests of their neighbors.

j. The essence of our view on Chinese representation in the UN is that the Republic of China's place in the UN must be preserved and that there is neither justice nor logic in proposals calling for the expulsion of the Republic of China and seating the Chinese Communists in their place.

k. (Should Maurer attribute to the US any remarks regarding the situation in Hong Kong this could prejudice the Hong Kong problem. Consequently, discussion of Hong Kong should probably be avoided.)

4. Viet-Nam

Although more restrained than some of the other Communist countries in condemnation of US policy in Viet-Nam, the Romanians follow the general Communist position.

Recommended US Position

In view of Maurer's projected visit to Communist China, you may wish to use this opportunity to give him a clear statement of the US position.

5. US-Romanian Relations

A significant factor in the development of US-Romanian relations during the past four or five years has been Romania's determination to strengthen its independence and to pursue policies, both internally and abroad, which serve Romanian national interests. Its firm purpose in this regard has been manifested earlier by its uncommitted position in the Sino-Soviet dispute; its successful efforts to eliminate once-pervasive Soviet cultural, economic and political influences within Romania; and its resistance to Soviet attempts to transform the CEMA organization into a supra-national economic planning body and to bring about closer political and military integration within the Warsaw Pact. More recent evidences of Romanian independence have been its establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and the moderate position which it has taken in the Middle East crisis.

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For the past six or eight months, the Romanians have made clear that they seek closer relations, particularly from the economic point of view, despite Viet-Nam. Manescu said at Secretary Rusk's dinner on June 23 that the Romanians want trade not aid and emphasized their economic development is a force which enables them to be master in their own house. He expressed disappointment at the practical difficulties they have encountered in expanding their trade, particularly the lack of most favored nation tariff treatment. The Romanians understand that Congressional action which would make possible a lifting of discriminatory tariffs is not likely in the immediate future. They are actively negotiating in the US for several large industrial installations, including a glass plant, a pork-packing plant, an artificial fibers plant, and some smaller installations. EXIM Bank has told them it will consider guaranteeing credit for the glass plant, but wishes to wait until Congress has extended EXIM's charter.

Recommended US Position

We understand clearly Romania's determination, while preserving its friendly ties with the Soviet Union, to maintain fully its independence and sovereignty and to act pursuant to its own national interests.

We will continue to do everything we can, within the limits imposed by Congressional attitudes on East-West trade, to encourage increased trade with Romania. The difficulties in getting Congressional approval arise out of a broader context involving Viet-Nam and problems with other Communist countries and not out of any ill will for Romania. We will of course continue to support legislation on East-West trade as well as the extension of the EXIM Bank's authority to guarantee credits, including such authority with respect to the Communist countries.

6. Manescu's Candidacy for the 22nd GA Presidency

The Romanians in November 1966 asked our support for the candidacy of Foreign Minister Manescu for the presidency of the 22nd General Assembly. We told them that we could not commit ourselves so early but commented favorably on Manescu's personal qualifications.

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Recommended US Position

If the subject is raised by the Romanians, you may wish to reiterate our high regard for Mr. Manescu ~~but to say that it is still too early for us to make a commitment~~ and to say that, barring unforeseen developments, we plan to support his candidacy.

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