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By cb, NARA, Date 7-13-94

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BANGKOK 1983

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1. THE VISIT OF CLARK CLIFFORD AND MAX TAYLOR BOTH IN TERMS OF ITS SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVE AND IN ITS POTENTIAL LONG-RANGE EFFECT WAS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT LAST OCTOBER, THE MOST SUCCESSFUL VISIT IN MY FOUR YEARS HERE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, I AM CERTAIN THE THAI WILL SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THEIR TROOP CONTRIBUTION TO SOUTH VIETNAM-TO A LEVEL OF TEN THOUSAND AT LEAST.

2. IN THE OPENING SESSION WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, SCHEDULED FOR TWO HOURS BUT WHICH WENT ON FOUR FOUR HOURS, CLIFFORD

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SET THE TONE, CLEARLY DELINEATING HIS ROLE AND THAT OF TAYLOR AS PERSONAL EMISSARIES DIRECTLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONVEY TO THE THAI LEADERS HIS MOST PRIVATE AND PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON HIS APPRAISAL OF WHERE WE ARE NOW, AND THE ALTERNATIVES THAT MIGHT BE OPEN TO US. HE WAS FOLLOWED BY TAYLOR WHO OUTLINED WITH GREAT CLARITY THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN VIETNAM, OUR THOUGHTS ON WHAT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE COURSES OF ACTION AND ON THE AUGMENTATIONS THAT PRUDENCE MIGHT DICTATE THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE TO ENSURE OPTIMUM CHANCE OF HASTENING THE END OF THE WAR.

3. CLIFFORD THEN REEMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WELCOME THE COMPLETELY FRANK AND CANDID VIEWS OF THE THAI LEADERS. ALTHOUGH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS PRINCE WAN AND GENERAL PRAPHAT, PHYA SRIVISAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER TO PRIME MINISTER, AND POTE SARASIN WERE ALSO PRESENT, THE BURDEN OF THE EXPRESSION OF THAI VIEWS WAS CARRIED MAINLY BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND FONMIN THANAT. FAS WILL BE SEEN FROM COMPLETE NOTES WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY, THE THAI ACCEPTED THE INVITATION TO SPEAK WITH CANDOR AND

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FRANKNESS. THEIR MAIN THRUST INVOLVED A SERIES OF SEARCHING QUESTIONS ON THE BASIC DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS WHICH SEEMED TO GOVERN OUR CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

1.3(a)(3)

CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THESE VIEWS BUT AT THE SAME TIME WARNED OF THE OBVIOUS TECHNICAL MILITARY PROBLEMS INVOLVED AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL ASPECTS.

4. THANAT TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR A GREATER PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS THE OTHER ALLIES TO OFFSET THE WIDESPREAD CRITICISM DIRECTED ~~FACTED~~ AT THE WAR IN EUROPE, THE NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AND IN THE UNITED STATES ITSELF.

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5. IN THE COURSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR WERE ABLE TO CARRY OUT WHAT WE BELIEVE WILL BE AN EXCEEDINGLY EFFECTIVE EDUCATIONAL JOB BY DESCRIBING THE VARIOUS MILITARY PROBLEMS ON THE GROUND IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH NECESSITATE INCREASED FORCES, THE EFFECTIVENESS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NORTH, THE PROBLEMS OF RISK OF WIDENING THE WAR AS WELL AS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND BUDGETARY PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED STATES.

6. A LITTLE BEFORE SIX, SINCE WE HAD NOT DIRECTLY BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL THAI TROOP CONTRIBUTION, THANAT DID SO ALLUDING TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM AND THE KING IN WASHINGTON. THE PRIME MINISTER DEALT AT SOME LENGTH ON THE INCREASING REQUIREMENTS OF COMBATTING THE INSURGENCY ~~GENCY~~ IN THE NORTHEAST. CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR RESPONDED BY POINTING OUT THE ADVANTAGES THAT MIGHT ACCRUE FROM A MORE RAPID END TO HOSTILITIES IN VIETNAM. ~~THE~~ HE EMPHASIZED SEVERAL TIMES THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION WHICH THEY ARE MAKING TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM WHICH IS NOT LIMITED

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SOLELY TO THE DETACHMENT BEING TRAINED FOR EARLY DEPLOY-  
MENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM

1. 3(a)(5)

CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT WE RECOGNIZED FULLY THEIR VERY GREAT CONTRIBUTION. THE THAI RESPONDED IN MOST FAVORABLE AND SYMPATHETIC TERMS TO CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR'S EXPOSITION OF THE NEED FOR ALL OF THE ALLIES TO CONSIDER WHAT MORE ~~REPEAT~~ MORE THEY CAN CONTRIBUTE. THE THAI MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT ONLY CONTINUE TO MAKE THE CONTRIBUTION THEY HAVE BEEN MAKING IN THE PAST BUT WOULD ENDEAVOR TO MAKE WHATEVER ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION THEY COULD MAKE IN THE FUTURE.

7. THURSDAY EVENING CLIFFORD AND I CALLED PRIVATELY ON POTE SARASIN AT HIS HOUSE WHERE CLIFFORD SET OUT IN UNMISTAKE-

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ABLE TERMS THE DEPTH OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERN.

8. I BELIEVE THIS MEETING BETWEEN CLIFFORD AND POTE CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THE MUCH MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE DISPLAYED BY THE THAI WHEN WE RECONVENED AT 0900 THIS MORNING. AGAIN THERE WAS A MOST CANDID EXCHANGE WITH CLIFFORD CLEARLY EXPLAINING THE DIFFICULTIES THE PRESIDENT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ENCOUNTER IF HE WAS UNABLE TO INDICATE CLEARLY THAT THE OTHER ALLIES WERE CARRYING SOME PROPORTION OF THE ADDITIONAL TROOP REQUIREMENTS. CLIFFORD WELCOMED THE FRANKNESS AND CANDOR OF THE EXCHANGE, SAID HE AND TAYLOR WOULD REPORT FULLY TO THE PRESIDENT THE SUGGESTIONS OF THE THAI. HE WAS ASKED OVER AND OVER AGAIN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, POTE AND THANAT TO ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT THE "THAI" RESPONSE WOULD NOT BE NEGATIVE.

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9. THE DOUBLE NEGATIVE MAY NOT BE AS ACCEPTABLE AS A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AFFIRMATIVE, BUT THERE IS NO MISTAKING THAI INTENTIONS. CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THEY HAD NOT COME TO NEGOTIATE BUT TO INFORM THE THAI OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERN AND TO CONVEY TO HIM SUCH ADVICE AS THE THAI MIGHT WISH TO GIVE. WE DID NOT THEREFORE LET THE MEETING DEGENERATE INTO A CATALOG OF THAI COMPLAINT ON PAST LACK OF PERFORMANCE. WE ALSO DID NOT ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE COST FIGURES. WE WILL START SUCH EXPLORATION WITH THE THAI AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL AND REPORT SOONEST. I AM PERSONALLY

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CONFIDENT THAT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE UNDER THAT AUTHORIZED FOR THE KOREAN CONTINGENT.

10. THE THAI REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THEIR EXPRESSION OF NECESSARY CONCERN WITH THE COST IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION ON THEIR OWN ALREADY STRAINED BUDGETARY RESOURCES WAS NOT ~~REPEAT~~ NOT TO BE REGARDED AS ANY WAY IMPLYING A REQUEST FOR A "QUID PRO QUO".

11. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY COMMENTED ON THE UNIFORMLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE TO THIS KIND OF INTIMATE HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS. I REPEAT THAT I COULD NOT BE MORE PERSONALLY PLEASED WITH THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF THIS VISIT.

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