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
Tuesday, August 1, 1967  
3:30 p. m.

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

Herewith two typical reports on  
the drab, difficult, deteriorated but  
not catastrophic state of Hanoi as of  
this summer.

W. W. Rostow



Aug 1, 1967  
Aug 1, 1967

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SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-188

By 48, NARA, Date 6-13-95

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DIST 1 AUGUST 1967

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COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI OCTOBER 1966 - JUNE 1967

SUBJ

1. SOME EVIDENCE OF WAR WEARINESS IN NORTH VIETNAM
2. REPORTED GOOD HEALTH OF HO CHI MINH IN JUNE 1967
3. GENERALLY QUIET CULTURAL REVOLUTION ACTIVITIES AMONG LOCAL CHINESE

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

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(1. SUMMARY: ANTI-WAR FEELINGS, ALTHOUGH LOCALIZED.  
HAVE BECOME A PROBLEM FOR THE NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) GOVERNMENT.

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THE TRADITIONAL CITY DWELLERS' ANTI PATHY TOWARD RUAL LIFE HAS ALSO BECOME A PROBLEM IN THE EVACUATION OF HANOI. HO CHI MINH REPORTEDLY WAS SEEN BY JAPANESE CAMERAMAN TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AS OF JUNE 1967. THE LOCAL CHINESE COMMUNIST IN HANOI CARRIES OUT "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" ACTIVITIES ON A RELATIVELY QUIET BASIS.)

2. ON 25 JULY 1967, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STATED THAT NOT ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT CARRYING OUT THE PRESENT WAR UNTIL THE BITTER END. HE STATED THAT EVEN AMONG THE HIGH OFFICIALS IN THE GOVERNMENT, "A CERTAIN GROUP OF STAFF OFFICIALS" HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES WHETHER "NORTH VIETNAM CAN WIN THE WAR AGAINST THE U.S." [REDACTED] COMMENT. THE OFFICIALS WERE NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED.) AS A FURTHER EXAMPLE, HE SAID THAT IN AN UNIDENTIFIED VILLAGE NEAR THE COAST WHICH HAD UNDERGONE LAND REFORM, HE HAD ENCOUNTERED A CATHOLIC PRIEST WHO STATED FLATLY THAT HE WAS AGAINST THE WAR. ALTHOUGH THE PRIEST'S STATEMENT CAME AS AN OBVIOUS SURPRISE TO [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

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HIS OFFICIAL NVN INTERPRETER, THE PRIEST WENT ON TO SAY THAT FURTHER FIGHTING WOULD BRING NOTHING BUT MISERY AND DEATH TO THE PEOPLE. HE ADDED THAT HE DID NOT WANT THE VILLAGE TO BECOME A BLODDY GROUND IN THE EVENT A LANDING IS MADE BY THE U.S. TROOPS. [REDACTED] EXPLAINED THAT THE LAND REFORM ALLOCATIONS HAD TRIGGERED A RUMOR AMONG THE VILLAGERS THAT THEIR AREA WAS REGARDED BY THE GOVERNMENT AS A POSSIBLE ENEMY INVASION POINT. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED], THE ANTI-WAR FEELINGS OF THE PRIEST AND THE WAR WEARINESS OUTLOOK HELD BY OTHERS HAD BECOME A PROBLEM THAT THE NVN GOVERNMENT MUST RESOLVE.

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3. [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH EVACUATIONS FROM HANOI WERE PROGRESSING RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY, THE NVN GOVERNMENT WAS CONFRONTED WITH THE PROBLEM OF CONVINCING RESIDENTS TO LEAVE HANOI FOR THE SAKE OF THEIR OWN SAFETY. SUCH RESIDENTS CHOSE TO IGNORE THE EVACUATION ORDERS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT THEY, AS CITY DWELLERS, WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SUBSIST IN THE PROVINCES. HE SAID THAT THE NVN GOVERNMENT HAD MADE PATRIOTIC APPEALS TO HANOI RESIDENTS IN AN EFFORT TO PERSUADE [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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THEM TO FOLLOW EVACUATION ORDERS. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST RELUCTANT EVACUEES. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT THE NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE DEATHES RESULTING FROM U.S. BOMBINGS TOTALLED LESS THAN 10,000 DURING THE PAST ONE YEAR AND A HALF. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THERE IS NOW WAY OF DETERMINING SUBJECT'S BASIS FOR THIS STATEMENT.)

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4. [REDACTED] SAID THAT DURING THE LATTER PART OF JUNE 1967, [REDACTED] SAW PRESIDENT HO CHI MIN "SOMEWHERE IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF HANOI..." [REDACTED] HAD STATED THAT PRESIDENT HO APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AND THAT HO'S COMPLEXION WAS GOOD.

5. [REDACTED] STATED THAT LOCAL CHINESE IN HANOI DID WEAR MAO BADGES AND CONDUCTED CLASSES ON THE TEACHINGS OF MAO. HOWEVER, LOCAL CHINESE WERE QUIET AND ORDERLY IN CARRYING OUT THEIR MAOIST ACTIVITIES. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE FRONT ENTRANCE TO THE COMMUNIST CHINESE EMBASSY WAS ADORNED WITH A LARGE PICTURE OF MAO TSE-TUNG. IN THE RURAL AREAS, HE NOTED MANY NORTH VIETNAMESE FARMERS WEARING RED MAO BADGES BUT ADDED [REDACTED]

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THAT THE FARMERS WERE IGNORANT OF THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BADGES AND WERE MERELY WEARING THEM BECAUSE "THEY WERE BRILLIANTLY COLORED."

6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE ARMATT NAVATT AIRATT USFJ NSAPAC/J COMNAVJ NISOJ 5AF 6499SG 500MIG USARJ DET4/FTD (ALSO SENT SAIGON). GP-1

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