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Per file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, August 29, 1967 -- 11:00 am

Mr. President:

1.3 (u)(4)

This [redacted] report on the Vietnamese situation, as seen from Cambodia, is worth reading.

1. It suggests a decline in NLF morale and supplies.
2. In particular, they are probing for both rice and Cambodian-French arms and ammunition.

W. W. Rostow

[redacted]
August 29, 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-302
By WJ, NARA, Date 9-28-95

WWRostow:rlh

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Tuesday, August 29, 1967

1.3(a)(4)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-297

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [REDACTED]

By [REDACTED], NARA, Date 3-15-95

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

was impressed with the deterioration in National Liberation Front morale and supply situation.

National Liberation Front leaders no longer consider any major military headquarters inside Vietnam south of Saigon safe. South of the Central Vietnam Highlands, large-scale operations are being directed from safe headquarters in Cambodia. Judging by the rapidity with which he was able to arrange meetings with several top National Liberation Front leaders, they appeared to be staying in Phnom Penh itself in July 1967. (CIA Comment: In mid-June 1967 the Cambodian government authorized the opening of a National Liberation Front diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh, in exchange for the Front's recognition of Cambodia's existing borders. Prior to that time, several high-ranking National Liberation Front officials have periodically visited Cambodia.)

The Front leaders themselves admitted that harassment of their supply sources by American troops and the increasing ability of the peasantry to market produce in Saigon and other large centers had made their food and medicines resupply difficult. Military equipment from North Vietnam was slower and more sporadic in reaching their units in the Vietnamese Delta. Captured equipment was now harder to come by, and their ability to purchase arms and rice from the Saigon blackmarket had declined considerably.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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An anti-Communist Cambodian Army officer told [REDACTED] that Cambodia already had more than enough arms and ammunition for its own needs. His implication, [REDACTED] was that the additional equipment might be destined for Viet Cong forces in the Vietnam Delta. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] (CIA Comment: According to other recent reporting, [REDACTED] Cambodia is not receiving Viet Cong-bound shipments of arms and ammunition. There is also no evidence now available to indicate present stocks of arms and ammunition in Cambodia are in excess of legitimate Cambodian military needs.)

[REDACTED] National Liberation Front quest for more ammunition and supplies continues. From [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

these reports, most all of the National Liberation Front leaders are now located in Cambodia.

[REDACTED]

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In discussions [REDACTED] in July and August [REDACTED] North Vietnamese representatives appear to be speaking more and more authoritatively on behalf of the National Liberation Front and not consulting Front officials as to the latter's opinions.

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[REDACTED]

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