

~~SECRET~~

to stamp
Tuesday, August 22, 1967
3:30 p.m. *1*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the first of a new series: a monthly report from CINCPAC on the bombing effort in North Viet Nam.

We have had prepared a one-page summary, which is the covering memo.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9-3-91

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, August 22, 1967

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

2012026 Dec 3.4

NY 94-298

By Lip, Date 10-26-95

SUBJECT: Bombing Effort in North Vietnam -- July

Admiral Sharp has pointed out the following:

11,000 sorties flown in July -- same as previous months.

Main effort against transportation systems -- 33% of attack effort against Northeast region compared with 3% in February -- with following effects:

- a. management and logistic problems
- b. reduced flow of imports into country
- c. degraded capability for sustained large-scale operations in South Vietnam.

Measurable results:

- a. 8 hours to travel 60 miles from Hanoi to Haiphong
- b. imports in Haiphong piled high, stockpiles growing -- difficulty distributing
- c. ship off-loading increased from 10 days in January to 30 days in July.

Overall bombing effort contributed to destruction of useful capacity or capability as follows:

Fixed electric power	85%
Transportation (including ports)	39%
Air defense (excluding anti-aircraft and SAMS)	46%
Industry	20%
Military support	75%
POL (including known dispersed)	65%

Restrikes against electrical power system -- resulted in serious curtailment of chemical, fertilizer, paper, and textile plant operations.

Future intentions:

- a. maintain emphasis on isolation of Hanoi and Haiphong
- b. maximize efforts in Northeast to interdict support from Chicoms and material leaving ports
- c. increase pressure through use of increased authority for restricted areas of Hanoi, Haiphong and Chicom buffer zone.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET/LIMDIS~~

10
Monday, August 21, 1967

CINCPAC MONTHLY ROLLING THUNDER SUMMARY, JULY, 1967

This report is the first in a series intended to provide an evaluation of ROLLING THUNDER Operations. Future reports will be submitted on a monthly basis in order to provide a continuing evaluation of CINCPAC's objectives, accomplishments and future intentions concerning ROLLING THUNDER Operations.

ROLLING THUNDER Operations conducted during the month of July, 1967, were in direct support of our primary objective, i.e., applying steadily increasing pressure against North Vietnam in order to cause Hanoi to cease its aggression in South Vietnam, while making continued support of the Viet Cong insurgency as difficult and costly as possible. In pursuing this objective, emphasis was placed on the isolation of Hanoi and Haiphong with particular application of effort in the northeast sector. A balance of effort was maintained throughout North Vietnam in order to continue interdiction of lines of communication in depth.

During July, over 11,000 sorties were flown. This is about the same level of effort as May and June. Of significance, however, was the improved sortie distribution among the various Route Packages made possible by the continued favorable weather during July.

Route Package 6-A received 14 percent and 6-B received 19 percent of the total attack sortie effort. In comparison, during February, at the height of the northeast monsoon, only three percent of the total effort was expended in Route Package 6-A and three percent in 6-B. At the same time, 64 percent was flown in Route Package 1 during February versus 37 percent in July.

The approximate percentage of effort expended in each Route Package during July was 38 percent for Route Package 1; eight percent for Route Package 2; seven percent for Route Package 3; nine percent for Route Package 4; five percent for Route Package 5; fifteen percent for Route Package 6-A; and eighteen percent for Route Package 6-B.

~~TOP SECRET/LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-300

By , NARA, Date 7-14-94

The preponderance of the strikes during July were against the transportation systems with emphasis on the lines of communication in the northern regions of North Vietnam. These attacks caused multiple management and logistic problems, reduced the flow of imports into the country, and degraded North Vietnam's capability for sustained large-scale military operations in South Vietnam.

There is evidence of increased truck traffic from Haiphong along Route 5 and from the Chicom border along Route 1A. Much night-time activity has been reported. Visitors to Hanoi report seeing large numbers of oil trucks and cargo trucks loaded with POL drums. Truck traffic and convoys have been observed on Hanoi streets during the day with many trucks undergoing repairs under trees along the streets. As of mid-July it was reported that the auto trip over the 60-mile distance from Hanoi to Haiphong took eight hours because of detours due to damage from bombs and priorities to military traffic.

At the same time, the strikes on Railroad Number 3 (Hanoi-Haiphong) have contributed measurably to the shipping and port congestion at Haiphong. Imports were piled high throughout Haiphong and stockpiles are growing at interdicted points. This has resulted in an increase in ship off-loading time with the number of days in port increasing from a low of 10 days at the beginning of the year to approximately 30 days by the end of July.

As stated, the main effort has been directed at the vital railroad network radiating from Hanoi to the northwest (Railroad Number 1) and northeast (Railroad Number 2) to the Chicom border, north to Thai Nguyen (Railroad Number 5), Thai Nguyen to Kep (Railroad Number 9), south to Vinh (Railroad Number 4), and east to Haiphong (Railroad Number 3). During July, Railroad Number 3 was unserviceable through the 17th. This contributed to the dock congestion.

In addition, the increased tempo in armed reconnaissance along the other lines of communication further compounded distribution problems. To review the other railroad lines: Railroad Number 1 was unserviceable to through traffic five days and probably

unserviceable an additional 24 days; Railroad Number 2 was unserviceable to through traffic seven days, probably another ten days; Railroad Number 4, Hanoi to Vinh, was unserviceable the entire 31 days; Railroad Number 5 was closed three days, probably another 16 days; Railroad Number 9 was unserviceable July 1 - 17 inclusive, probably another three days.

In summary, the six lines were either unserviceable or probably unserviceable for 71 percent of the time.

In terms of vehicles destroyed and damaged in July, armed reconnaissance operations added significantly to the toll taken of North Vietnam's logistic capability. During July, 858 motor vehicles, 411 pieces of railroad rolling stock, and 671 water craft were damaged or destroyed, for a total of 1940 logistic capable targets.

Re-strikes against the North Vietnamese electrical power system during July have produced tangible, measurable results. It is estimated that the operation of North Vietnam's chemical, fertilizer, paper, and textile plants have been seriously curtailed by the power outage. However, reports have indicated that repairs to the main Thermal Power Plant in Hanoi are nearly completed. An increasing number of portable generators are being utilized throughout the city to furnish emergency power. The off-loading of ships in Haiphong port areas continues utilizing both ship and dockside generating equipment.

There were no ROLLING THUNDER 56 Alpha targets struck through July 21 since they had all been previously struck. Eight of the nine ROLLING THUNDER 57 Alpha targets were struck between July 22 - 31. In addition to the Alpha strikes in latter July, approximately 2500 armed reconnaissance sorties attacked other fixed targets in the POL, power, and military support systems, and thus contributed to the destruction of cumulative levels of useful capacity or capability for major target system as follows:

A. Fixed electric power	85%
B. Transportation (Including ports)	39%
C. Air defense (Excluding anti-aircraft and SAMs)	46%

D. Industry	20%
E. Military support	75%
F. POL (Including known dispersed)	65%

The line of communication segment extensions within the Hanoi 10 - 30 nautical mile circle, authorized in ROLLING THUNDER 57, exposed and made vulnerable approximately 100 "new" lines of communication-associated target elements. These targets are suitable for armed reconnaissance. This new authority partially eliminates the sanctuary status of lines of communication vehicles moving through this vital logistic system into the hub of Hanoi. Overall, the strike authority authorized by ROLLING THUNDER 57 enable an accelerated tempo of operations in the vital northeast quadrant of North Vietnam.

With the continued good weather, it was expected that the defensive reactions would increase in proportion to intensity of the attacks. This has not been the case. The peak defensive reactions experienced in the latter part of April and early May, particularly in MIG attacks and SAMs launched, did not recur during July. However, ground fire (anti-aircraft artillery) reactions have remained at approximately the same level as previously. Conversely, indications are that SAM and some anti-aircraft artillery forces may be in the process of relocation to provide more concentrated defenses around the "hard" targets.

In July, 37 aircraft (18 U.S. Air Force, 18 U.S. Navy, and 1 U.S. Marine Corps) were lost in North Vietnam, six to SAMs (5 Navy and 1 Marine Corps) but none were lost to MIGs. Three MIG-17's were destroyed in the air, with one additional MIG-17 and one MIG-21 possibly destroyed. The defensive environment in North Vietnam can be expected to adjust continually to meet varying attack patterns. Reactions may well be intensified against forces penetrating closer to the center of the Hanoi and Haiphong complexes. The diversification of the North Vietnamese radar networks, supported by movement, site hardening, and dispersal will continue to provide adequate warning to North Vietnam of our penetrating forces.

Photo reconnaissance (BLUE TREE) provided current photography on 98 percent of all CINCPAC ROLLING THUNDER Target List targets during the month of July. Near continuous surveillance of lines of communication in Route Package 1 was maintained during the period.

SEA DRAGON forces (shipping interdiction) maintained round-the-clock pressure against water-borne logistic traffic and coastal targets from the Demilitarized Zone to 20 degrees north latitude. Many of these targets were struck at night, thus maximizing the interdiction of lines of communication traffic leading south. The numbers of water-borne logistic craft detected during July were somewhat less than the previous month indicating a probable reduction in the availability of water-borne logistic craft and a reluctance by the enemy to expose his remaining assets to attack. In addition to the water-borne logistic craft interdiction efforts noted above, many coastal targets consisting of POL complexes, storage and transshipment points, truck parks, bridges, railroad facilities, and radar sites were damaged or destroyed.

Eight Walleye weapons were expended against railroad/highway bridges or bypasses during the month of July. Six of these were direct hits, resulting in moderate to severe damage to the four bridges struck. Due to the limited production availability of these weapons, expenditures have been somewhat curtailed.

As Destructor MK-36 weapons became available, they were employed along the major lines of communication between Hanoi and Haiphong, in the vicinity of Vinh, and in the Quang Khe and Dong Hoi areas. Efforts are being made to evaluate the effectiveness of Destructor MK-36's; however, it is anticipated that sufficient data on which to base an effectiveness evaluation may not be available until early October.

Future intentions for ROLLING THUNDER Operations are to:

- A. Maintain emphasis on the isolation of Hanoi and Haiphong;
- B. Continue major strike efforts against targets

assigned in ROLLING THUNDER 57 and the ROLLING THUNDER 57 addenda and other ROLLING THUNDER Target List targets;

C. Maximize the efforts in the northeast sector to interdict overland external support from the Chicoms and materiel leaving the ports;

D. Increase the pressure on North Vietnam through the use of the extended armed reconnaissance authorities in the restricted areas of Hanoi, Haiphong, and the Chicom buffer zone;

E. Maintain a balance of effort in all other Route Package areas.


~~TOP SECRET/LIMDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

ROLLING THUNDER DIGEST

EDITION

333



~~SECRET~~