

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Saturday, August 12, 1967
7:30 P. M.

Mr. President:

This is General Westmoreland's
detailed Military Assessment for
July in readable form.

Clark Clifford and Gen. Taylor
have copies.

Bromley Smith

Pres file

August 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR CLARK CLIFFORD

The President asked us to send you this afternoon the following documents which are attached:

1. General Westmoreland's military assessment for July.
2. An extract from Ambassador Bunker's fifteenth weekly message dated August 9, 1967.
3. A message sent by the President to Secretary McNamara when he was in Saigon July 9.
4. The text of the Bunker message just received summarizing Saigon's view of the election.

The President suggested that in your television appearance tomorrow you deal firmly with the current charges about the Vietnamese election. He asked that you consider using material from your own report concerning what you told the Vietnamese about the elections.

It is my understanding that Bill Bundy will be briefing you tomorrow, Sunday, but you may wish to read the enclosed material prior to that time.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

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Friday, August 11, 1967

SUBJECT: General Westmoreland's Military Assessment for July

The assessment for the month of July is broken down into the four Corps Tactical Zones from North to South to give what I hope is a better feel for what is happening here.

First Corps

My primary objective in the First Corps during the month of July was to deny entry of North Vietnam Army Units into South Vietnam and to destroy as much of the enemy's force, including artillery, as possible. This was accomplished.

We destroyed enemy forces and logistical installations in base areas 116 and 122 and established a fire support base for the interdiction of the A Shau Valley by 175 mm guns. Efforts to establish and improve the strong point obstacle system along the demilitarized zone were continued while conducting search and destroy operations in and south of the demilitarized zone. To fulfill these objectives, ten major ground operations were conducted, four major operations were continued, and five amphibious operations were conducted. In addition, vital base areas were defended and patrols, numerous ambushes, and small unit actions were carried out.

All objectives were fulfilled except a sweep of base area 114 and prevention of the enemy 122 mm rocket attack on Da Nang Airbase.

Progress in First Corps Tactical Zone is best indicated by the heavy enemy losses: a confirmed 3,877 enemy killed, 2,062 weapons captured. The number of enemy killed by Army of the Republic of Vietnam was the second highest level of the year, 12,906 by body count. In two major contacts during the period, two enemy battalions, the 800th and 808th, were rendered ineffective.

Large caches of enemy supplies were captured as a result of Free World Military Assistance Forces and Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations, including one enemy sea-going trawler containing sufficient weapons and munitions to support three Viet Cong battalions. Five enemy battalions in lower Quang Tri/Thua Thien suffered severe losses in July; and are having recruitment problems and are believed to be considerably under strength.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan 5, 1998

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The majority of the prisoners of war have identified themselves as infiltrators from North Vietnam rather than local recruits. Interrogation of prisoners of war and returnees taken South of route 9 reveal a definite shortage of food and medical supplies. To add to their problems, we captured, evacuated, or destroyed 135 tons of rice last month.

From 2 to 14 July, seven marine battalions in Operation Buffalo were employed to counter the enemy threat from the demilitarized zone. Significant in this engagement was the enemy's use of large quantities of mortar/artillery/rocket fire. (1,393 mortar rounds, 1,455 artillery rounds, and unidentified rocket rounds). Cumulative results for this operation included 159 U.S. killed and 885 U.S. wounded. The enemy suffered 1,281 killed.

Army of the Republic of Vietnam units conducted 13 large operations and 5,494 small operations. Of the large operations, six were combined and four were heliborne. These operations, in all five provinces, resulted in 759 Viet Cong/North Vietnam Army killed, 270 enemy weapons captured. Army of the Republic of Vietnam losses were 64 killed and 254 wounded. The overall morale and fighting spirit of First Corps units is good. The conflict is being carried to the enemy, especially in the 1st division tactical area. Army of the Republic of Vietnam units have been able to maintain a favorable kill and weapons captured versus weapons lost ratio; however, Army of the Republic of Vietnam contacts with the enemy are not decisive since total destruction of the enemy units is not achieved. Accordingly, over a period of time the enemy is able to reconstitute and rebuild.

On 10 July the remaining closed section of national route number 1 from Mo Duc to Second Corps Tactical Zone boundary was opened thus permitting commercial and military vehicles to traverse the entire 387 kilometers from the demilitarized zone to Second Corps Tactical Zone boundary. This is the first time this highway has been opened for this distance since 1965. Moderate progress continues on the upgrading of both route number 1 and number 9. During July,

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540 feet of new bridging were completed while 1,350 feet were repaired and upgraded. During July, 132 kilometers of highway were repaired which facilitates the movement of military and civil traffic. In addition to road improvements, emphasis is continuing on expanding and improving air transport. At present there are 21 airfields open to C-7A aircraft, 17 to C-123's and 10 to C-130's.

Revolutionary Development and civic action made progress but remained behind schedule. There are 89 new life hamlets and 40 consolidated hamlets undergoing construction in the I Corps Tactical Zone during July fourteen South Vietnamese Army battalions, one Regional Force battalion, twenty-seven Regional Force companies and 182 Popular Force platoons are presently in direct support of the Corps Tactical Zone Revolutionary Development Program. Viet Cong incidents and attacks on Revolutionary Development remained at the June level but friendly casualties were half the average of the last quarter. In areas where military operations have been conducted, higher morale and increased effectiveness are apparent.

The elements of three enemy divisions along the Demilitarized Zone continued to make incursions south of the Demilitarized Zone. The enemy maintains an estimated 45 maneuver battalions of the North Vietnamese Army, Main Force and Local Force Viet Cong in I Corps Tactical Zone.

During July, the enemy increased his use of mortar, artillery and rockets against friendly forces, firing a total of 6,965 rounds as compared to 4,009 rounds fired during June. Two thirds of the enemy artillery was fired in northeastern Quang Tri Province. In spite of detailed planning and aggressive patrolling in the previously established rocket belt around the Da Nang airfield complex, the enemy successfully infiltrated and fired the longer range 122 mm rocket against the airfield, causing a significant loss of personnel, aircraft, and damage to facilities. Enemy efforts, except in the Demilitarized Zone, have been devoted primarily to unconventional warfare avoiding significant action whenever possible.

Along the Demilitarized Zone/Ben Hai River Front, confrontation is characterized by exchanges of artillery fire and sporadic ground fighting which is intense and usually of short duration. The enemy has

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concentrated his effort in populated areas with emphasis on those actions which, if successful, have a potentially high propaganda value. One such attack involved the partial destruction of a large South Vietnamese Army convoy; another, the seizure and opening of the Joi An provincial jail; and a third was the rocket attack on Da Nang. The enemy buildup north of the Demilitarized Zone during the latter part of June and early July caused me to concentrate large forces in this area to counter the threat. Throughout July the North Vietnamese Army continued to maintain pressure all along the northern I Corps Tactical Zone border.

The objective in II Corps Tactical Zone was to prevent enemy infiltration into the Corps Tactical Zone, destroy the base areas of enemy regular forces, open lines of communication, and expand security of the population. Seventeen of the twenty-three Military Advisory Command of Vietnam designated enemy base areas were penetrated, resulting in 54 enemy killed, 16 prisoners and 1,500 tons of rice captured or destroyed. Penetration of these areas forced the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army to keep on the move, to commit a significant portion of their military forces to food production, and for the movement of supplies.

In the II Corps Tactical Zone steady though not dramatic progress is discernable in virtually every segment of our endeavor. The South Vietnamese Army in up to four battalion strength worked in close harmony with the U. S. units involved in Operation Greeley in the Kontum-Dak To area. Employing a force of four brigades, Operations Francis Marion and Greeley frustrated enemy intentions through constant search and destroy actions.

For the month of July the cost of continued conflict remained unfavorable to the enemy; 1,536 killed compared with 272 friendly losses. This assumes even greater significance when one considers that the enemy is encountering increasing difficulty in recruiting within II Corps Tactical Zone. His will to fight appears to be waning gradually as witnessed by the loss of 363 prisoners of war and 107 crew served weapons for the period.

In the coastal provinces, resupply by the enemy to his beleaguered formations is tenuous over extended and insecure lines of communications. His condition there is worsened by systematic

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destruction of his bases which has resulted in reduced food and supply stockages. Prisoners of war from the 3d and 5th North Vietnamese divisions were unanimous in stating that food is scarce, sickness a problem, and morale is low.

An increase in confidence and aggressiveness of Army of the Republic of Vietnam units, plus improvement in their effectiveness is noted. During July, Army of the Republic of Vietnam units conducted 30 airmobile operations which lifted 10,163 troops. This is an increase of 3,605 over the then all time high of 6,558 troops involved in airmobile operations during the preceding month.

For July, Government of Vietnam forces devoted 575 battalion days to search and destroy operations and 275 to security operations. Whereas the latter decreased approximately 50 percent compared to June, search and destroy operations increased approximately 70 percent.

The 9th Republic of Korea and Capital Republic of Korea infantry divisions in Phu Yen Province enjoyed notable success in terms of large personnel and equipment losses inflicted primarily on the North Vietnamese 95th regiment, and on thwarting accomplishment of enemy objectives in Phu Yen Province. During August, Republic of Korea forces will expand their coastland security operations by seeking out elements of the North Vietnamese 18th regiment in Khanh Hoa Province. The latter unit has manifested no inclination to change its thirteen month old objective of avoiding combat. It has received no reinforcements since arrival in South Vietnam and has a high rate of malaria.

During July continued improvement in opening of roads has permitted increased use of land lines of communication to support military operations and the civilian economy. At present, 1,615 kilometers (89.8 percent) of the major roads are in a green or amber condition. Route 1 is open from Phan Rang North into Quang Ngai Province. Route 19 is open from Qui Nhon west to the Cambodian Border, with 10 miles west from Qui Nhon having been paved in July. Route 14 is open from Dak to South to the Third Corps Tactical Zone boundary. Route 21 is open from Ban Me Thuot east to Ninh Hoa.

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Route 20 is open from the Third Corps Tactical Zone boundary to Dalat, and Route 11 from Dalat to Phan Rang.

In July, a C-130 airfield with steel surface at Phu Hiep was opened. Providing 41 C-130 airfields in the Corps; a new C-123 airfield was opened in Binh Tanh. A total of 79 fields are now open to C-7A's, 60 to C-123's and 41 to C-130's in the Second Corps.

Revolutionary development is progressing with security improved to some degree. However, Viet Cong attacks on revolutionary development teams is a continuing threat as evidenced by 26 Viet Cong armed attacks during July. Army of the Republic of Vietnam's operational competence is being engendered by increased emphasis on training. During July 2 South Vietnamese battalions completed revolutionary development support training. Thus far, 24 of 30 battalions have received revolutionary development support training with the six remaining battalions scheduled to complete their revolutionary development support training by ^{mid} September. In support of revolutionary development as of this date are 8 Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalions, 123 regular force companies, and 728 popular force platoons.

The enemy has been without a major victory in the Corps during the past two years. He seeks to tie down a large force and inflict maximum casualties on Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and Free World Military Assistance Forces in the central highlands. His objectives include the destruction of the revolutionary development program, disruption of the September elections, and maintenance of a presence and influence in heavily populated areas. It appears the enemy hopes to draw major friendly forces away from the coastal areas of the Second Corps and redress the losses he has sustained in those areas. This strategy has been unsuccessful to date.

In the coastal provinces of Khanh Hoa and Phu Yen, the enemy, although continuing a defense posture, sabotaged roads, railways, pipelines in a modest scale and conducted small unit attacks against regular force/popular force posts and revolutionary development cadre. His aim appears to be maintenance of the tactical integrity of his forces, while awaiting favor and opportunities to expand control over the population and resources in the rich lowland districts. In the western highlands the morale and overall condition of enemy units are good. This assessment stems from the fact that his sanctuary base

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areas in Cambodia and Laos lie close to established supply routes. Food, medical supplies and ammunition are available in adequate quantities. North Vietnamese killed in action and prisoners of war in Kon Tum and Pleiku Provinces have been described by their captors as well equipped, well fed, and in good physical condition.

Third Corps

Our Monsoon objectives were to disrupt and defeat enemy offensive actions; harass and, if possible, destroy main force elements; maintain continuous pressure on Viet Cong regional and local force units; increase the tempo of the revolutionary development program; neutralize enemy base areas; increase Army of the Republic of Vietnam effectiveness and improve security within the national priority area. During July, those objectives were fulfilled.

A review of events in the Third Corps supports the observation that it was a month of heartening progress both in terms of our success in attaining planned objectives, and the enemy's failure to attain his planned objectives. A notable example of the latter was seen in a Central Office of South Vietnam order which assigned a number of missions for the 5th battalion, Military Region IV, to accomplish during July. None of the missions were accomplished. The Viet Cong spring-summer campaign began 29 May and July was expected to be a period of maximum effort with the objectives of disrupting and discrediting the revolutionary development program, overrunning and destroying Government of Vietnam and allies posts, interdicting allied lines of communication and defeating allied offensive attacks. Their efforts to achieve significant results, including the two rocket attacks which caused relatively light damage, were unsuccessful. Positive progress is indicated in most areas of Third Corps. The cooperations and response accorded U.S. Advisors by Senior Corps Tactical Zone Commanders is favorable; this together with the increased Government of Vietnam attention to inadequate leadership has improved unit effectiveness. Returnees under the Chieu Hoi program were triple those of July 1966, indicating increasing morale and control problems within Viet Cong Ranks.

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Enemy losses for the month (KIA, PW, Hoi Chan) totalled 2,941. An increasing number of Viet Cong village and hamlet units are under-strength. In July combined 199th Brigade and 5 Ranger group operations in Gia Dinh Province greatly restricted Viet Cong activity in areas immediately adjacent to Saigon. No Viet Cong units larger than squad size moved in the area. The Commanding Officer, Viet Cong, Military Region IV requested permission from his superiors to move from Nha Be district because allied activity made it hazardous for Viet Cong units there.

South Vietnamese army units are continuing to improve in all areas.

Improvement in overall combat effectiveness was highlighted by several commendable Vietnamese actions: The South Vietnamese army's 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry at Tan hung by the South Vietnamese 2d and 3d Battalion, 46th infantry and the 3d Marine Battalion in operation Coronado; by the 613th Regional Force Company at Buong Sa on Route 2; by the 2d and 3d Marine Battalions in Operation Paddington; and by the 3d and 4th Marine Battalions in Operation Coronado II.

Vietcong base areas 303, Southern 1/3 of 355, Southern 2/3 of 356, Southeastern 2/3 of 357, 358, 365 and 369 and 370 were neutralized to the extent that they are no longer enemy sanctuaries and can be entered by allied units in company size strength.

Last month, South Vietnamese Army's troop behavior and relationships with the civilian community improved significantly. There were 4 programs initiated to improve Regional Forces, Popular Forces, South Vietnamese Army and Revolutionary Development team effectiveness: five intelligence centers were established at district level to attack Viet Cong infrastructure; A program for each US Brigade to train one South Vietnamese army Battalion every eight weeks was begun with approval of Commanding General, III Corps Tactical Zone; ten US mobile advisory teams were formed to advise Regional Force and Popular Force and two experimental Revolutionary Development augmentation teams were placed on site.

The principal land route 1 and 22 (Gia Ray to Tay Ninh, 1A, 4, 5, 13 (Saigon to Loc Ninh, 15 and 20 remained open with minor interruptions. Routes 1 and 4 were used frequently at night by military convoys, jungle clearings of the Ong Dong jungle and route 20 was 50 percent completed and Viet Cong tax collection on route 20 in 111 Tactical Zone was neutralized. Three additional Regional Force/Popular Force posts were constructed on this route in the area of air trans are 43 airfields opened to C-7A aircraft, 34 to C-123's and

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Revolutionary Development activities in III Corps Tactical Zone for the month of July included the completion of six new life hamlets bringing the total of completed hamlets to 17 with 49 more under construction. Throughout III Corps Tactical Zone there are at present 17 South Vietnamese Army battalions, 75 Regional Forces companies and 245 Popular Forces platoons supporting Revolutionary Development activities either directly or indirectly.

The enemy, particularly the Viet Cong, increased their activity in the populated area west of the Ho Bo woods, carried out 21 assassinations and 51 attacks against police or Regional Force/Popular Force posts and launched two attacks by fire using 122 mm rockets against U.S. base camps at Phuoc Vinh and Phu Loi. They continued interdiction of the route between Song Be and Bu Dop.

Major unit operations within the IV Corps Tactical Zone continued to be orientated to the destruction of the Viet Cong main and provincial units and principal bases. The main battle seems to be concentrating in the key provinces of Dinh Toung, Dinh Long, Vinh Binh and Phong Dinh. This has been brought about by South Vietnamese Army concentration on Highway 4, the Mang Thit-Nicolai area, and the Revolutionary Development effort in Phong Dinh along the base. The South Vietnamese Army campaign plan and major Revolutionary Development efforts and Viet Cong interests appear to be on a collision course which should lead to more decisive events in both Military and Revolutionary Development in the future.

The general situation in the IV Corps Tactical Zone remained favorable during July. For the most part, the Viet Cong were dispersed and attempted to avoid contact; there were 130 major units operations of battalion size or larger size during July. There were eight operations conducted in enemy base areas. Operations such as Coo Long 63 in the Binh Dai base in Kien Hoa province have reduced the coastal areas of Kien Hoa and Vinh Binh to transient storage points. Defoliation of coastal bases continued to expose previously undetected enemy installations and allows increased interdiction by air and naval gunfire.

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There were a total of 54,292 small unit operations in July which resulted in 166 contacts. Although the number of small unit operations have continued to increase, their effectiveness remains difficult to judge because many are not observed by US Advisory elements. Although the kill ratio was a favorable 4.9 to 1, the total number of Viet Cong killed, 641, is the low monthly total for 1967.

The total number of Viet Cong initiated incidents continued to drop with 541 incidents recorded for the month of July compared to 619 in June. Although there has been steady progress and Revolutionary Development goals are about to be achieved, it can be expected that the Viet Cong will make a major effort to preclude such actions in the future. Another example of progress occurred in Chau Doc on 10 July. Three hundred seventy two irregular troops, who had previously been sympathetic to the cause, turned themselves in to Government Vietnam officials under the provision that they be organized into Regional Force forces. This incident points out the increased esteem being gained by South Vietnamese Army forces within the IV Corps Tactical Zone.

The performance of South Vietnamese Army continues to improve. The 7th South Vietnamese Army division is just completing an eight day operation in Dinh Tuong. One of the longest sustained South Vietnamese Army operations in the past two years. This division demonstrated a higher degree of flexibility than in the past in reacting to intelligence. The 9th South Vietnamese Army division over the past three months has shown a much greater desire to operate than in the past: As a result of the 9th South Vietnamese Army division activity the Revolutionary Development effort has been able to make progress. The 21st South Vietnamese Army division has shaken the lethargy resulting from its initial participation in the Revolutionary Development program, has reorganized, and is now in a position to produce results. South Vietnamese Army Senior Commanders seem to be more confident and optimistic than in the past. This is evident in their official estimates and in their desire to operate more often.

The status of major highways in the IV Corps Tactical Zone remained contested.

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The security status of the Mang Thit River was upgraded from Red to Amber due to the Government of Vietnam efforts to secure the area and open the Mang Thit River - Nicolai Canal complex to commercial traffic. Other major waterways of the Mekong Delta remained unchanged during July. Air transport is supported by 31 airfields open to C-7A aircraft, 20 to C-123's and 13 to C-130's

Revolutionary Development activities in IV Corps Tactical Zone are supported directly or indirectly by 15 South Vietnamese Army battalions, 52 Regional Force companies and 87 Popular Force platoons. The Viet Cong have placed emphasis on disrupting the Government of Vietnam Revolutionary Development and Pacification Program thinking it denies them freedom of movement and population control; although there has been no significant change in the progress of Revolutionary Development during July the reaction of the Viet Cong in IV Corps Tactical Zone against the program is evidence of its effect on Viet Cong control in the area.

In Kien Hoa Province, the Viet Cong remained strong and this province is a source of manpower and supplies. The 516th Provincial Mobile Battalion remains strong and virtually unharmed. Until operations such as Coronado V are conducted in Kien Hoa, this province will continue to serve as a Viet Cong source of strength. My estimate is that the position of the Viet Cong in the IV Corps Tactical Zone continues to deteriorate; all signs indicate that the combat strength of the Viet Cong combat elements continues to decrease, recruiting has been increasingly difficult, and that the major Viet Cong elements have had to disperse and avoid contact.

SUMMARY

The enemy appears to be continuing his strategy of (1) posing threats with main forces in an effort to draw friendly military strength from the critical populated areas, (2) seeking to cause increased attrition rates on friendly military forces while avoiding major contact, (3) enticing friendly forces into a posture where he can achieve a major tactical victory to enhance his political stature, attacking the South Vietnamese Pacification Program with particular emphasis on the Revolutionary Development cadre teams in order to destroy the Government of South Vietnam influence in the countryside. The credibility of the threat in the Demilitarized Zone and central highlands

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continues to require sizeable containment forces. Through the use of economy of force measures and superior mobility, we have been able to provide security in the critical population centers at an acceptable level. The maintenance of constant pressure on the enemy in these populated areas, especially the coastal lowlands, has caused growing weakness in the enemy military structure and as his coercive power declines, popular resistance to his increasing demands for support is rising; however, in the contested areas the population as a whole continues to adopt a wait and see attitude, providing willing support to neither side. The enemy reaction to friendly success in thwarting his strategy has been an increased use of attacks by fire. The enemy employment of 140 mm and 122 mm rockets continues to provide the greatest threat to critical installations; however, increased emphasis on offensively oriented security operations and on locating rocket units and their supply routes is expected to reduce the risk.

The Government of South Vietnam Pacification Program for 1967 is now gaining momentum, its implementation having been quite slow until after TET. In July, despite increased Viet Cong emphasis on disrupting the work of the Revolutionary Development cadre teams, several important gains were made. Several of the Revolutionary Development teams had completed their work in first semester hamlets and had begun movement to their second semester areas. Four additional South Vietnamese Army battalions had been assigned to direct support of Revolutionary Development and all of them had a rating of satisfactory in Revolutionary Development training. The Military Advisory Command of Vietnam Action Program would give increased thrust to pacification support was completed and disseminated to the field. An organization was formed to integrate and manage a combined U. S. and Government of Vietnam attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure.

In summary, our past month's operations reflect continuous and steady progress toward accomplishment of our overall objectives in South Vietnam.

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Wed Aug 9/67
Amb. Bunker weekly

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C. Military

I referred earlier to what seemed to me misrepresentations and unjustified criticisms of the state of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Some of these go to the extent of intimating that they are not only ineffective, but are unwilling to engage the enemy. The facts seem to me to be just the opposite. The record will show an increasing number of important engagements in which the Vietnamese forces have performed effectively. General Westmoreland's comments on this are to the point. In a memorandum to me yesterday, he said:

"In my view the recent improvement of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces combat effectiveness can be measured in terms of their willingness to carry the fight to the enemy, and to close with and destroy him in sharp, violent contact. They have demonstrated the well-disciplined attributes of professional soldiers, and a vastly improved ability to use their supporting arms and combat support. They have maneuvered with notable success and closed with the enemy. They have participated successfully with U. S. forces in multi-battalion operations."

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By ra/uo, NARA, Date 9-4-91

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The following are some instances of recent engagements which show the improved performance of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces:

A) An example of ARVN willingness to close with and destroy the enemy took place in Quang Tri province 12 kilometers east of Dong Ha near the Demilitarized Zone the second week of July when the ARVN 2/1 Infantry Battalion attacked an estimated enemy battalion, killing 146 enemy. The 2/1 Infantry Battalion suffered 10 killed and 80 wounded.

B) Another example took place in the Fourth Corps Tactical Zone, four kilometers northwest of My Tho where the 7th ARVN Division conducted a search and destroy operation from July 26 to August 4, 1967. The 7th ARVN Division suffered 16 killed and 93 wounded in this action while the enemy lost 234 killed, 217 detained, 30 weapons and 35,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

C) Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) are standing and fighting major engagements. The latest was in Binh Long province, 14 kilometers southwest of An Loc where, on August 7 at 12:35 a.m., the Tong Le Chon Special Forces CIDG Camp was attacked by approximately two battalions of the 165th North Vietnamese Army Regiment. The Infantry attack was preceded by an estimated two hundred rounds of mortar fire and supported by automatic weapons. A C-47 aircraft and tactical air supported the friendly elements. The enemy succeeded in penetrating the outer perimeter but was forced to withdraw. They lost 115 killed and a considerable quantity of weapons and equipment. Friendly forces suffered 21 CIDG killed and 70 wounded, four of which were US Special Forces personnel.

D) The determination and skill of the ARVN also is exemplified by a recent action of the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry in Binh Long province, ten kilometers east of An Loc. At 2:15 a.m., July 11, the 2nd Battalion, 141 North Vietnamese Army mounted a coordinated attack against the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, using small arms, automatic weapons, mortars and grenade launchers. Concurrently, five bridges were blown and

secondary attacks were launched by enemy forces against the U.S. 1/26th Infantry and a Regional Force compound south of An Loc. The enemy attempted to isolate and destroy the ARVN 2/9 Infantry. Violent attacks by the North Vietnamese Army battalion were repulsed by the ARVN defenders using small arms, artillery, flare and gunship support, and tactical air support. By 3:30 a.m. the battered enemy had to break contact to regroup. The enemy's final attack came at 5:00 a.m. Bitter hand-to-hand combat took place. At first light, 112 North Vietnamese Army dead were counted within the camp and in the wire barrier around the compound. The North Vietnamese Army Battalion Executive Officer was among the five prisoners taken. The ARVN 2/9 Infantry suffered 14 killed and 48 wounded.

E) On July 25, an ARVN battalion and company supported by artillery and tactical air strikes killed 34 enemy soldiers 24 kilometers northwest of Hue. Three ARVN soldiers were wounded. Elements of another ARVN battalion supported by another company, also supported by tactical air and artillery, engaged an unknown size enemy force on the same day 26 kilometers northwest of Hue. Three ARVN soldiers were wounded and 204 enemy soldiers were killed.

F) At midnight August 3, Operation CORONADO II terminated in Dinh Tuong province in the Fourth Corps after a week of joint deployment by US Infantry, ARVN, and US Navy units. Results were: friendly, 50 killed (8 US), 165 wounded (33 US); enemy, 235 killed, 647 detainees, and 17 weapons captured.

G) The 9-day-old ARVN search and destroy operation in Dinh Tuong province, Operation CUU LONG, terminated on August 4. Results were: friendly, 15 killed, 93 wounded; enemy, 47 killed, 128 detainees, and 8 B-40 rockets captured.

This is only a partial list and there are setbacks of course. But as General Westmoreland has said, the results of many battles in recent months demonstrate a marked and unmistakable improvement in Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces combat effectiveness and a growing pride in their ability to cope with the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong.

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Following is a message sent by the President to Secretary McNamara when he was in Saigon the first week in July:

"I would like you to see Ky and Thieu, either separately or together--as you and Ambassador Bunker may judge wise--and tell them in my name:

(1) I am glad that they have honored their commitment volunteered to me at Guam for the military to stay together in the election process and I count on them continuing; and

(2) It is absolutely essential to my ability to continue to back the struggle for South Vietnamese independence and self determination that the election be conducted with complete honesty and fairness, and that this honesty and fairness be apparent to all.

Since I have always dealt with them together, I think it would be good if this message were delivered to them together."