

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, September 7, 1967
5:50 p.m.

b This file

33

Mr. President:

Herewith Andy Goodpaster's report
on his latest briefing of Gen. Eisenhower.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 9-12-91



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

33

6 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is the memorandum for record of my meeting with General Eisenhower this morning. I passed on to him your thinking on major problems as you indicated it to me on Saturday. He was deeply appreciative, particularly with respect to the Russians and the Vietnamese war, and the recent press reports of controversy involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two points that he emphasized were, first, that the approach to the water problems in the Middle East should be a single plan, as regards the Jordan River and nuclear desalination plants, and that our strategy for Vietnam should continue to reject the "enclave" concept.

He seemed to be in excellent physical condition, and was in excellent spirits.


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

Authority per declassification of attachment
By AS/DR, NARA, Date 10-3-91



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

336

6 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Eisenhower, 6 September 1967

I met with General Eisenhower for two hours at his office in Gettysburg this morning.

I first brought to his attention the points about which the President talked to me on Saturday afternoon. The first pertained to the role the Russians might play in working toward a cessation of bombing in North Vietnam and concurrent satisfactory action on the part of the North Vietnamese during talks opened at that time. Such talks would, of course, have to be productive and there could be no cheating in the form of increased infiltration. I added that the President had noted that, while the Russians have given indications of wanting to see the Vietnamese war resolved, he will, of course, in fact watch them very closely to see whether their statements are borne out in what they actually do. General Eisenhower was keenly interested. He commented that this report suggested the Russians were being more responsive than had been indicated immediately following the Glassboro meetings. I commented that the Russians must, of course, recognize their vulnerability to attack by the Chinese communists, using the Vietnam war as an issue, against Russian leadership of the world communist movement. This would tend to make them very cautious in applying any pressure to the North Vietnamese. I also recalled to him the question Secretary Rusk had put to the Russians, "If the United States were to stop the bombing, what would you, the Russians, be prepared to do?" General Eisenhower found this a very interesting approach. I next showed him the copy of extracts of statements indicating the impact of bombing in North Vietnam (dated 8/31/67)(copy attached).

I then reported the President's comments that, despite the recent reports in the press indicating controversy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the bombing, the President in fact considered that relations with them are harmonious and sound -- and that there are in fact only some 40 out of more than 300 targets recommended by the Chiefs on which approval for attack had not yet been given. I added that it is my impression that the President has great respect for the advice he is receiving

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority NLE MR 97-148 #6

By ng/del, NARA, Date 10-3-91

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

from the Chiefs, and feels that their attitude toward his decisions and responsibilities is cooperative and constructive. Certainly the Chiefs are not trying to undercut the President's position, nor take initiatives opposing or attacking his policies. General Eisenhower welcomed this report. He reverted to his view that much of the problem relates to past timing, i. e., the rate at which important targets were authorized for attack.

I next reported that the President had stressed his strong conviction and desire that General Eisenhower should be kept fully informed not only of the facts relating to major national problems with which the President is concerned, but also the thinking of the President and the administration on these problems. General Eisenhower indicated that he appreciated being kept informed, and reiterated his view that the proper course is to pass any reactions or suggestions that he has confidentially to the President.

I next covered with General Eisenhower the memorandum furnished me by Secretary Udall for this purpose on "Water for Peace" in the Middle East (copy attached). He was especially interested in the provision that the problem of providing water should be attacked via a single plan in two phases -- the first the development of the Jordan River in an optimum way without regard to damage to any nation's rights or plans, and the second the generating of new water supplies to meet the needs of the initially sacrificed nations. He put strong emphasis on the need for a single water plan -- if the two phases are not completely and irreversibly connected from the beginning, the result is likely to be squabbling over the Jordan River phase of the plan which would, as in the past, frustrate the whole effort. An inherent part of his thinking is that the project should be of such magnitude, that the proposal would be bound to gain the attention of the Arab people, who would then exert a pressure on their governments. I commented on recent indications that the Arabs may be trending toward a more moderate position. Even Nasser was at least talking more in these terms at the recent Arab summit meeting. General Eisenhower told me that, even since my call to him a few days ago reporting the President's views, he has been advising his friends that the President welcomes further discussion on this matter and it should be kept on a bipartisan basis.

I next showed General Eisenhower a chart (copy attached) given to me by the President indicating the number of convictions of organized crime and gambling figures as a result of FBI investigations. The key point brought out by the chart is that, in terms of actual results

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

achieved, the trend is clearly upward -- by a factor of 3 between 1964 and 1967.

I next covered a number of specific items, most of which relate to previous discussions by phone with General Eisenhower. The first item was on our actions in behalf of our prisoners held by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. I left with him public statements contained in a recent White House press release and in a State Department information sheet furnished to our posts abroad. I also told him of the "Joint Personnel Recovery Center" established by General Westmoreland, of coordinating responsibilities assigned to Mr. Warnke in OSD, and of typical diplomatic efforts through third countries and with the international Red Cross in behalf of our prisoners.

I next referred to recent aircraft losses in North Vietnam, and told him that analysis does not indicate any new factor -- rather it is the type of loss rate to be expected from increased attacks in this highly defended area.

I next reviewed the general trend of military operations in South Vietnam, referring to the report given by General Johnson on his recent return (which I had covered by phone a week or so ago). Also I covered the revolutionary development report for July, contained in a long message recently received. Finally, I described the current status of development of the anti-infiltration system which is to go into operation in the November-December period in the terrain areas close to the 17th parallel extending westward from the coastal plain of South Vietnam into the personnel and vehicle infiltration routes in Laos.

In further discussion relating to the Vietnamese war, General Eisenhower emphasized that he sees no merit in an "enclave" strategy, and has so advised various people who have written to him on this subject. He said he thought the South Vietnamese government should constantly stress to its people that the Americans were there simply to help them achieve independence, and when this has been achieved, the Americans will leave. We discussed briefly the significance of Dzu's unexpectedly large vote in last Sunday's elections. I told him that this is still being analyzed. However, it seems significant to me that Dzu's total amounted to some 17% -- in other words nearly 83% went to other candidates. The total Thieu, Huong and Suu vote was in excess of 50%.

Finally, General Eisenhower and I discussed at length a number

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of aspects relating to racial problems, riots in the cities and severe social and welfare problems, and unemployment and lack of education among the Negro population. He cited data regarding the age and educational level of those who have participated in the riots, which he has been studying. I told him of some of the key points of discussions I have recently had on the subject with academicians and others expert in these fields incident to our coverage of demographic, economic and social factors at the National War College. I told him my own study suggests the effectiveness of studying these problems over a time span of a generation or two, covering the period in which the large-scale movement from southern rural areas into the central cities occurred and looking forward for a generation to determine what can be seen, and what can be done, in terms of improved education, employment and individual status and responsibility. He indicated agreement that it is perhaps better to have these problems out in the open rather than festering and building up explosive suppressed resentment.

3 Att
as


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

~~SECRET~~

33C
(8/31/67)

"All industrial plants had been evacuated from urban areas. The 38 spinning plant outside of Hanoi was running at 20% of its original capacity."

Bombing "has resulted in the large scale evacuation of the factories and population."

"Since I have been unemployed since March (1967), I grow deeper in debt. With no income and no reasonable work, I have volunteered to work in the forest, but while waiting for action on my application, I have been without a cent of income."

Nam Ha, Fruit Company, June 30, 1967. "Moreover, the war is spreading all over the country and no one can feel secure in his life. Who knows whether or not I will die in the next minute."

Hanoi, June 29, 1967. "Due to the difficult war situation, nourishing food is lacking and medicines are rare. Our only solution is to try and bear it."

Ha Bac, June 15, 1967. "As to the war situation, it is very hard. Living conditions are very poor because we have to reserve everything for the front. Our food is now composed of 70% rice and 30% wheat flour, and you know the nutritional value of wheat flour is very low. Living is very difficult."

Huong Phuong, May 30, 1967. "Because we have been evacuated medicine is rather rare, and on the other hand, because of the war, food is not sufficient. Since we are engaged in a war, want is the common situation of everybody."

Viet Bac, May 20, 1967. "An evacuated student: In general our activities and studies are getting more burdensome."