

Friday, September 1, 1967
9:30 a. m.

119
Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

If you wish to have a feel for the process which is making the curves -- which I showed you yesterday -- move favorably, read this CIA field report on the VC in July.

Beneath the surface of the somewhat "desperate" (p. 2) terrorist attacks is (p. 5) a process in which: "the people are leaving the VC, the VC are being forced to leave the people."

The report also notes, however, (p. 7) that "the VC organization is effective and VC forces retain a formidable capability to inflict death and destruction."

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (TDCS-314/13052-67 30 Aug 67)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS-CBS 19
By ics, NARS, Date 6-22-84

Ret'd to: W. JORDEN

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 41966

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PAGE 1 OF 13 PAGES

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EXO

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
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DIST 30 AUGUST 1967

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI JULY 1967
SUBJECT SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN
SOUTH VIETNAM DURING JULY 1967

VIETNAM, SAIGON FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

SOURCE



~~BATOR~~
~~BOWLER~~
~~BUDGET~~
~~DAVIS~~
~~GINSBURGH~~
~~HAMILTON~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~JORDAN~~
~~KEENE~~
~~TAYLOR~~

Handwritten initials and a checkmark.

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SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-366

By [signature], NARA, Date 8-14-95

SUMMARY: THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM THE VIET CONG (VC)
CONTINUE TO FACE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. EVERYWHERE, EXCEPT SOME
PARTS OF IV CORPS, FOOD AND MANPOWER ARE IN SERIOUSLY SHORT
SUPPLY. TAX COLLECTION IS AN INCREASING PROBLEM IN ALL AREAS.
POPULAR SUPPORT CONTINUES TO DECLINE. THIS IS ACCELERATED
BY THE VC'S INCREASED USE OF TERROR AND REPRESSION TO FORCE

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TDCS-314/13052-b/

PAGE 2 OF 13 PAGES

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SUPPORT. LOSS OF POPULATION FROM VC CONTROL CONTINUES TO REDUCE THE MANPOWER AVAILABLE FOR TROOPS, LABOR SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY, AND TILLERS OF THE FIELDS. DESPITE SUCH EROSION, HOWEVER, THE VC STRUCTURE REMAINS STRONG AND DANGEROUS, WITH FAIR TO GOOD MORALE IN THE UPPER LEVELS. THEY LAUNCHED VERY FEW SIZEABLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN JULY, HOWEVER, FOCUSING THEIR RESOURCES ON ATTACKS ON SMALL OUTPOSTS AND ON HARASSMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) AND REFUGEE CENTERS, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THERE APPEARED TO BE AN ELEMENT OF DESPERATION IN THEIR INCREASING RESORT TO INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM. THE CHIEF NEW DEVELOPMENT IN JULY WAS THE GREATLY INCREASED ATTENTION DEVOTED TO THE APPROACHING NATIONAL ELECTIONS. THIS CONSISTED ALMOST ENTIRELY OF PLANNING, PROPAGANDIZING, AND SPREADING THREATS OF DEATH TO THOSE WHO SUPPORT THE ELECTIONS. SOME MINOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES WERE NOTED DURING THE MONTH.

END SUMMARY.

VC PROBLEMS:

1. FOOD SHORTAGES WERE VERY SERIOUS IN JULY IN ALL BUT IV CORPS, AND EVEN THERE THE VIET CONG (VC) WERE HARD PRESSED

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IN 41966

TDCS -314/13052-67

PAGE 3 OF 13 PAGES

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IN SOME AREAS TO COLLECT ENOUGH FOOD. IN I AND II CORPS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MILITARY MANPOWER HAS BEEN DIVERTED TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND COLLECTION OF FOOD FROM THE PEASANTS; FOR EXAMPLE, ONE BATTALION OF THE 95TH NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) REGIMENT IN PHU YEN PROVINCE HAD 15 PERCENT OF ITS MEN DETAILED TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. THE FOOD SHORTAGE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO POOR MORALE AND TO DESERTIONS AND DEFECTIONS. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS AN ABSOLUTE SHORTAGE OF GRAIN CAUSED BY DECREASED PRODUCTION AND INCREASED DEMAND, BUT THIS HAS BEEN COMPOUNDED BY SERIOUS DISLOCATION OF THE VC SUPPLY SYSTEM. ALLIED SWEEPS HAVE BROKEN UP VC SUPPLY ORGANIZATIONS, AND ALLIED UNITS ARE OCCUPYING KEY LOCATIONS ON SOME OF THE ESTABLISHED COMMO-LIAISON ROUTES. IN NINH THUAN A NUMBER OF CADRES WERE REPLACED BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SECURE SUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE MAIN LOGISTIC SUPPORT AREA TO SECRET OPERATIONAL BASES. MEDICAL SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY ANTIBIOTICS, ARE SHORT IN ALL AREAS.

2. THE VC ARE SUFFERING FROM A SHORTAGE OF TAX INCOME ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. RAISING TAX LEVELS HAS SERVED TO MAKE COLLECTION ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT, AND LOCAL UNITS

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ARE INCREASINGLY RESORTING TO TERRORISM TO ENFORCE PAYMENT. IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN "EXECUTED" FOR NON-PAYMENT OF TAXES.

3. POPULATION CONTROL AND LOSS OF POPULAR SUPPORT ARE GROWING PROBLEMS. ALLIED SUCCESS HAS MADE PEOPLE IN MANY AREAS RELUCTANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE VC. TO ENFORCE COOPERATION, THE VC HAVE FREQUENTLY RESORTED TO TERROR AND INTIMIDATION, WHICH HAVE INCREASED THEIR UNPOPULARITY. THE KHANH HOA PROVINCE COMMITTEE FOUND ITSELF IN AN UNHAPPY DILEMMA: IT DECIDED IT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TROOPS TO COUNTER ALLIED OPERATIONS AND MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION, BUT IT COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY ADDITIONAL TROOPS BECAUSE OF THE UNAVAILABILITY OF FOOD. IN IV CORPS, VC HAVE COMPLAINED OF LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT BOTH IN CONTESTED AREAS AND VC AREAS.

4. MORALE IN THE LOWER ECHELONS IS POOR NEARLY EVERYWHERE. HIGHER-LEVEL CADRES AND MAIN-FORCE TROOPS ARE GENERALLY IN BETTER SHAPE AND A FEW INSTANCES OF HIGH MORALE ARE REPORTED. FOOD AND MEDICAL SHORTAGES AND, ESPECIALLY, THE AWESOME POSER OF ALLIED MILITARY FORCES CONTINUE TO DEPRESS

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MORALE.

5. PERHAPS THE MOST IMMEDIATELY CRITICAL PROBLEM IS THE SHORTAGE OF MANPOWER, WHICH IS TO A LARGE EXTENT AN OUTGROWTH OF THE PROBLEMS ALREADY DISCUSSED. ALTHOUGH DECLINING POPULAR SUPPORT MEANS FEWER VOLUNTEERS, THE PHYSICAL EXODUS OF PEOPLE FROM VC-HELD TERRITORY MEANS AN ABSOLUTE DECREASE IN AVAILABLE MANPOWER FOR ALL PURPOSES--TROOPS, AGRICULTURAL, LABOR, AND MILITARY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. IN ONE DRAMATIC EXAMPLE, IN (*PORTION GBLD-BEING SVCD) PHONG DISTRICT OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE, 900(*BEING SVCD) FAMILIES REMOVED THEMSELVES TO A RELATIVELY SAFER RURAL DEVELOPMENT AREA.

6. ~~IT HAS RECENTLY BECOME APPARENT THAT WHILE THE~~
~~PEOPLE ARE LEAVING THE VC, THE VC ARE BEING FORCED TO LEAVE~~

THE PEOPLE. ESPECIALLY IN I AND II CORPS, SUSTAINED ALLIED PRESSURE HAS DRIVEN A LARGE PART OF THE VC FORCES FROM THE POPULOUS COASTAL PLAINS TO THE SAFER BUT SPARSELY INHABITED MOUNTAIN JUNGLES. THIS IN TURN COMPLICATES THEIR RECRUITMENT AND FOOD-SUPPLY PROBLEMS.

7. THE VC ARE TRYING TO MEET THEIR MANPOWER PROBLEMS BY CALLING ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN. YOUTHS DOWN TO 14 YEARS

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IN 41966

TDCS-314/13052-67

PAGE 6 OF 13 PAGES

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OF AGE ARE BEING TAKEN INTO THE ARMED FORCES. EVEN NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) HAS RESORTED TO LOWERED AGE STANDARDS FOR THE REPLACEMENTS IT SENDS SOUTH. SEVERAL RECENTLY INFILTRATED 16-YEAR-OLDS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED. RECENTLY SEIZED DOCUMENTS REVEAL THAT IN ONE AREA THE VC HAVE ORDERED THAT 50 PERCENT OF THE GUERRILLAS MUST BE WOMEN. IN ANOTHER AREA THE MINIMUM WAS SET AT 33 PERCENT. SOME PROVINCES REPORT FURTHER CUTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS TO RELEASE MORE MEN FOR MILITARY SERVICE.

8. THE MANPOWER-REPLACEMENT PROBLEM WAS REPORTED AS BEING SERIOUS EVERYWHERE IN THE THREE NORTHERN CORPS AREAS EXCEPT IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. IN QUANG TRI THEY CAN GET INFILTRATORS FROM THE NORTH WITH RELATIVE EASE, BUT REPORTS SAY THAT EVEN THERE THE QUALITY OF THE REPLACEMENTS IS DECLINING. IN POPULOUS IV CORPS, FIVE PROVINCES HAVE REPORTED SERIOUS MANPOWER PROBLEMS. KIEN HOA REPORTS NO

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1.3(a)(4)

IN 41966

TDCS -314/13052-67

PAGE 7 OF 13 PAGES

1.3(a)(4)

SHORTAGE FOR LOCAL REPLACEMENTS BUT SAYS THE PROVINCE CAN
NO LONGER EXPORT MANPOWER AS IT HAS IN THE PAST.

9. HOWEVER, DESPITE THESE CONTINUING AND, IN SOME
CASES, GROWING PROBLEMS, ~~THE~~ VC ORGANIZATION IS EFFECTIVE AND
~~THE VC FORCES RETAIN A FORMIDABLE CAPABILITY TO INFLICT~~
~~DEATH AND DESTRUCTION.~~

VC ACTIVITIES

10. JULY WAS A RELATIVELY ROUTINE MONTH FOR VC ACTIVITY.
THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, 20 JULY, WAS HERALDED
BY THE VC PROPAGANDIST AS A GREAT OCCASION TO BE MARKED
BY MAJOR MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY, BUT IN THE EVENT
IT WAS NOT DIFFERENT FROM ANY OTHER DAY. IN BINH THUAN PROVINCE,
FOR EXAMPLE, THE VC PROPAGANDIZED THAT THERE WOULD BE POSTERS
AND VC FLAGS EVERYWHERE ON THE 20TH AND THAT THE DAY WOULD
BE CELEBRATED WITH "GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS" AGAINST GOVERNMENT
OF VIETNAM (GVN) INSTALLATIONS. IN FACT, ONE BULLDOZER WAS
DESTROYED AND ONE SMALL, UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK LAUNCHED, BOTH
ON THE 19TH. ON THE 20TH, NOTHING HAPPENED. IN GENERAL,
PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED TRENDS CONTINUED THROUGH THE MONTH,
THE ONLY MAJOR CHANGE BEING THE INCREASING ATTENTION GIVEN

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TO ANTI-ELECTION PLANNING AND PROPAGANDA AS THE 3 SEPTEMBER ELECTION DATE DREW NEARER.

11. EVERY PROVINCE BUT CHAU DOC REPORTED A GREAT DEAL OF ANTI-ELECTION ACTIVITY, MOSTLY IN THE FORM OF PROPAGANDA DISPARAGING THE ELECTIONS AS A "FARCE," STRESSING THE FUTILITY OF VOTING, AND SUGGESTING--SOMETIMES BY EXPLICIT THREATS--THAT SUPPORTING THE ELECTION INVOLVED SERIOUS RISK OF BEING KILLED. BIEN HOA PROVINCE REPORTED THERE WERE SOME INSTANCES OF VC SEIZURE OF FAMILY RECORD BOOKS AND IDENTIFICATION CARDS TO PREVENT VOTING. IN VINH LONG PROVINCE IT WAS NOTED THAT NEARLY ALL VC PLANS AND DIRECTIVES WERE PREFACED BY THE PHASE "FROM NOW UNTIL THE ELECTIONS," INDICATING THE IMPORTANCE ASSIGNED TO THE ELECTIONS BY THE VC LEADERSHIP.

12. MILITARY ACTION BY THE VC/NVA FORCES WAS GENERALLY LIMITED TO SMALL ACTIONS. IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, HOWEVER, THEY MANAGED TO SCORE TWO "SPECTACULARS" OF THE KIND MOST USEFUL IN BOOSTING THEIR OWN MORALE AND PRESENTING THE WORLD WITH A PICTURE OF ALLIED VULNERABILITY. ON 14 JULY THE VC, UNDER COVER OF A MORTAR ATTACK, SEIZED THE HOI AN JAIL AND RELEASED THE PRISONERS. ABOUT 870 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

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CADRE PRISONERS MADE GOOD THEIR ESCAPE, PROVIDING THE VC A MUCH NEEDED SUPPLY OF TRAINED MANPOWER. ON THE SAME NIGHT, AN NVA ARTILLERY UNIT HIT DANANG AIR BASE WITH 48 122MM ROCKETS, KILLING EIGHT, WOUNDING 175, AND CAUSING DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT AND FACILITIES ESTIMATED AS HIGH AS 85 MILLION DOLLARS. IN BINH LONG PROVINCE ON 11 JULY THE ENEMY LAUNCHED AN ILL-CONSIDERED REGIMENTAL-SIZED OFFENSIVE AGAINST A BATTALION OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) 5TH DIVISION AND TOOK HEAVY LOSSES. THROUGHOUT THE REST OF THE COUNTRY, THE VC/NVA GUERRILLAS AVOIDED LARGE-UNIT CONTACTS AND LIMITED THEIR INITIATIVES TO HIT-AND-RUN MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS, ASSAULTS ON SMALL OUTPOSTS, AND SMALL ATTACKS ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

13. TERRORISM INCREASED IN MOST AREAS, POSSIBLY REFLECTING AN INABILITY TO CONDUCT LARGER OPERATIONS. THESE ATTACKS TENDED TO CONTINUE THE INDISCRIMINATE CHARACTER NOTED THE PREVIOUS MONTH: PEOPLE WERE KILLED SEEMINGLY AT RANDOM BY MINES, BOOBY TRAPS, AND MORTAR FIRE. THERE WERE A FEW GROUP "EXECUTIONS" OF PEOPLE WHO WERE ACCUSED OF SOME SORT OF ANTI-VC CONNECTIONS. IN NAM HOA DISTRICT OF THUA THIEN

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IN 41966

TDCS-314/13052-67

PAGE 10 OF 13 PAGES

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PROVINCE, 14 SELECTED PEOPLE, INCLUDING A 4-YEAR-OLD CHILD, WERE ASSASSINATED. IN ONE SUCH CASE IN GIA DINH PROVINCE, SIX PEOPLE WHO WERE KILLED FOR INVOLVEMENT WITH GVN INFORMER ACTIVITIES WERE LATER FOUND NOT TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED.

14. REPORTS FROM SEVERAL WIDELY SCATTERED PLACES INDICATED THE VC ARE STRIVING TO INCREASE THEIR CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVITY IN THE CITIES, BUT THERE WERE FEW SIGNS OF ACHIEVEMENT IN THIS REGARD DURING JULY. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN NEARLY A YEAR, VC-EMPLANTED GRENADES WERE FOUND IN DANANG CITY, BUT BOTH WERE DISARMED BEFORE EXPLODING. KIEN HOA PROVINCE REPORTED THE ORGANIZATION OF A "RESIGNED-TO-DEATH" CLASS FOR GIVING INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING FOR SUICIDE ATTACKS ON GVN TARGETS.

15. THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY THE VC CONTINUED TO GIVE HIGH PRIORITY TO COUNTERING GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAMS. AS PREVIOUSLY, THEY LAUNCHED NUMEROUS PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) TEAMS, OFTEN SELECTING THOSE TEAMS WHOSE PROGRAMS WERE MAKING THE GREATEST PROGRESS. SOME PROVINCES, EXPECIALLY IN IV CORPS, HAVE NOTED INCREASED SOPHISTICATION IN THE ANTI-RED PROPAGANDA. A NUMBER

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OF TECHNIQUES, INCLUDING SONG AND POETRY-WRITING CONTESTS, ARE USED IN AN EFFORT TO TURN THE HAMLET-DWELLERS AGAINST THE TEAMS AND TO DEMORALIZE OR SUBVERT THE TEAM MEMBERS.

16. AGENT REPORTS, DEFECTORS, AND DOCUMENTS TELL OF VC DISTRESS OVER THE GROWING EFFORT OF THE CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) PROGRAM. IN ADDITION TO CONDUCTING EXTENSIVE MADE ATTACKS ON PROPAGANDA, THE VC HAVE/MORTAR / CHIEU HOI AND REFUGEE CAMPS, KILLING AND WOUNDING A NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, AND THEY HAVE ASSASSINATED A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL HOIHXHANH (RALLIERS). ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES.

17. THERE ARE REPORTS FROM ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS OF VC MILITARY UNITS BEING BROKEN UP INTO SMALLER GROUPS AND RECEIVING TRAINING IN SAPPER ACTIVITY AND SMALL-UNIT TACTICS. IN PG CORPS, VC UNITS HAVE BROKEN INTO SMALLER GROUPS IN ORDER TO EVADE FRIENDLY FORCES, AND OBSERVERS SAY THEY SEEM TO BE ASSUMING A SUPPORT ROLE FOR NVA FORCES. THIS WAS DONE

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EARLIER IN I CORPS, WHERE IT REPORTEDLY CAUSED VC RESENTMENT AGAINST THE HVA.

18. AN GIANG PROVINCE REPORTS A "DONG KHOI" (MOVE OUT ALL FORCES) CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO UNITE ALL VC FORCES UNDER A MILITARY COMMAND SECTION AND MAKE ALL CADRES WORK HARDER FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE FALL-WINTER CAMPAIGN. THE DETAILS OF THIS REPORTED POLICY ARE OBSCURE, BUT IT APPEARS TO INVOLVE AN INCREASED RELIANCE ON MILITARY DISCIPLINE IN PLACE OF POLITICAL MOTIVATION. BINH THUAN PROVINCE REPORTS THAT 60 NVN POLITICAL CADRES, WHO CAME DOWN IN MAY, HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO HELP DIRECT ACTIVITIES OF DISTRICT AND VILLAGE COMMITTEES. MANY OF THE BINH THUAN VC ARE LIKELY TO LOOK UPON THEM AS CARPETBAGGERS. THIS PROVINCE HAS ALSO RE-ORGANIZED THREE OF ITS DISTRICTS IN AN EFFORT TO RECOVER FROM THE DISRUPTION CAUSED BY ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS.

19. ON 1 JANUARY 1967, THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) ISSUED A DIRECTIVE THAT CADRES FROM VARIOUS LEVELS WOULD BE SENT DOWN TO LOWER LEVELS TO STRENGTHEN THEM [REDACTED] = TDCS-314/05040-67 SUBSEQUENT REPORTING INDICATED COMPLIANCE WITH THE DIRECTIVE IN A NUMBER OF PROVINCES, IN-

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IN 41966

TDCS -314/13052-67

PAGE 13 OF 13 PAGES

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CLUDING GONTUM, NINH THUAN, PHONG DINH, AN GIANG, KIEN GIANG, AND
KIEN HOA. REPORTING RECEIVED DURING JULY INDICATES
THAT DARLAC IS THE MOST RECENT PROVINCE TO HAVE IMPLEMENTED
THE COSVN DIRECTIVE.

20. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN
ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAK PACAF PACFLT.

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