

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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..... ZZ RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 3383 2571810 ~~SECRET~~
Action ZNY TTTT
Z 141803Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5459
Info STATE GRNC
BT

CN 3354
Sept 14, 1967
2:54 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~ PARIS 3383
NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA.

FROM KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-361
By ~~48~~, NARA, Date 10-14-94

M SAW BO AT 1200 PARIS TIME. BO ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD BROUGHT THE MESSAGE. AS INSTRUCTED BY ME M. SAID THAT I HAD ASKED FOR GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON ABOUT WHETHER THE MESSAGE COULD BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE A-M CHANNEL. (NOTE: I DID THIS TO GAIN TIME AND TO SEE WHETHER DELAY MIGHT NOT PRODUCE A PERSONAL MESSAGE.) BO ASKED WHETHER M. WAS SURE THERE WAS A MESSAGE. M. SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THAT A MESSAGE EXISTED AND THAT I WOULD RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS SOON.

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M. THEN HANDED BO THE MESSAGE FROM PARIS 3242 IN A SEALED ENVELOPE CONTAINING AN ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXT. BO PLACED THIS ENVELOPE UNOPENED ON THE TABLE AND SAID HE WOULD STUDY IT LATER. M. THEN READ TO BO FROM HIS HANDWRITTEN NOTES CONTAINING BOTH "OFFICIAL" AND "PERSONAL" EXPLANATION AS REPORTED. WHEN HE HAD CONCLUDED BO ASKED WHETHER HE COULD SEE THEM. M. POINTED OUT THAT THEY WERE ROUGH NOTES AND NOT PUT IN VERY ELEGANT FRENCH. BO REPLIED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO STUDY THEM AND WOULD RETURN THEM IN THE MORNING. THIS MEANS THAT BO HAS A TYPED TEXT AND SOME VERY ROUGH NOTES IN M'S HANDWRITING CONTAINING A COMMENTARY. (TO COMPLETE THE RECORD I SHALL SEND THE FRENCH TEXT OF M'S NOTES AS THEY WERE WHEN HE LEFT ME BY SEPTTEL.) M. THEN MENTIONED THAT AT SOME POINT THE ELYSEE WOULD HAVE TO BE INFORMED. BO REPLIED "THE FEWER PEOPLE KNOW ABOUT THIS THE BETTER." WHEN M. LEFT HE SAID THAT HE HOPED BO AND I WOULD BE IN DIRECT CONTACT SOON SO THAT M. COULD RETURN TO HIS LABORATORY AND HIS FAMILY. BO REPLIED, "IF THE PRESENT EXCHANGE LEADS TO PEACE, I HOPE YOU WILL CONSIDER YOUR TIME WELL SPENT". M. WAS STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT BO NEVER SPOKE OF REFERRING MATTERS TO HANOI. FROM THIS HE

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CONCLUDES THAT BO MAY HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED DISCRETIONARY
AUTHORITY TO SEE ME.

I ALSO TALKED TO A. HE CANNOT GET HERE BEFORE TOMORROW EVENING.
I HAVE ASKED HIM TO STAY UNTIL MY DEPARTURE (SEPTEMBER 21 OR 22).

RECOMMENDATION: (1) I SUGGEST WE HOLD UP DELIVERY OF THE MESSAGE
UNTIL SATURDAY MORNING. A. WOULD BE BACK BY THEN. BO'S CURIOSITY
ABOUT THE MESSAGE MAY PRODUCE A PERSONAL MEETING. IN ANY EVENT
WE HAVE PASSED NOTES ON TWO SUCCESSIVE DATES AND A DAY'S INTERVAL
WILL AVOID AN IMPRESSION OF ANXIETY.

I HAVE, IN ANY CASE, SET A MEETING WITH M FOR 10:00 FRIDAY
PARIS TIME. IF YOU APPROVE OF THIS COURSE, I SHALL TELL HIM THAT
I AM STILL WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, BUT THAT I HAVE DEFINITELY
BEEN PROMISED THEM BY THE END OF THE DAY. IF YOU DISAGREE, I
SHALL HAND HIM THE MESSAGE IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH IN A SEALED
ENVELOPE.

GP-1 BOHLEN
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action DE RUFNCR 3329 2571220
ZNY TTTT
Z 141210Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
Info TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5428
STATE GRNC
BT

CN 32430
Recd Sep 14, 1967
9:12 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-361

By isg, NARA, Date 10-14-94

~~TOP SECRET~~ PARIS 3329

NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA

FROM KISSINGER

I SAW M. FOR TWO HOURS TODAY. BECAUSE OF BO'S SUGGESTIONS REPORTED IN PARIS 3288, I PROPOSE TO ADOPT THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:

(1) FOR EACH MEETING WITH BO I SHALL HAND M (AND A. WHEN HE ARRIVES) A SEALED ENVELOPE CONTAINING AN UNSIGNED STATEMENT ON PLAIN PAPER. I DO NOT TELL THE CONTENTS OF THIS ENVELOPE TO A & M. (2) I SHALL THEN MAKE TWO SETS OF COMMENTS: PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL. I SHALL ASK M. TO TRANSCRIBE THESE IN HIS OWN HAND-WRITING, TRANSLATE THEM INTO FRENCH AND READ THEM BACK TO ME. BO CAN USE THE SAME PROCEDURE IN REPLY. THIS IS TIME-CONSUMING, BUT IT HAS THE ADVANTAGE THAT IT REDUCES A&M'S ROLE IN EFFECT TO THAT OF MESSENGERS AND BRINGS ABOUT A "DIALOGUE" BETWEEN BO AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BASED ON WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS.

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I AM RELUCTANT TO PUT EXPLANATIONS IN WRITING LEST IT CREATE CONFUSION DELIBERATE OR UNINTENTIONAL.

AS APPLIED TO TODAY'S DISCUSSION, I HANDED M A SEALED ENVELOPE CONTAINING THE TEXT REPORTED IN PARIS 3257 (IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH). I THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING "OFFICIAL" COMMENT: "THE ENCLOSED PAPER CONTAINS WASHINGTON'S VIEW ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESTRAINT IN THE HANOI AREA AND THE UNCONDITIONAL NATURE OF OUR MESSAGE OF AUGUST 25." I ADDED THE FOLLOWING "PERSONAL" COMMENT: "THE ENCLOSED DECLARATION IN MY JUDGMENT ERASES THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY CHARGE THAT WE ARE PROCEEDING BY ULTIMATUM.

I THEN SAID: " I HAVE REPORTED TO WASHINGTON'S M'S COMMENT ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF CONDUCTING DISCUSSIONS IN THE FACE OF ESCALATION AND BO'S REMARK ABOUT THE PROXIMITY OF THE RAIDS OF SEPTEMBER 11 TO THE CENTER OF HAIPHONG." I GAVE THE FOLLOWING

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"OFFICIAL" REPLY:

"WASHINGTON DOES NOT CONSIDER THE ATTACKS OF 11 SEPTEMBER AS ESCALATION. THE ATTACKS CLOSEST TO THE CENTER OF HAIPHONG WAS IN AN AREA THAT HAD BEEN ATTACKED THREE TIMES PREVIOUSLY, MOST RECENTLY ON JUNE 26. MR. KISSINGER IS PREPARED TO GIVE

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MORE DETAILED CLARIFICATIONS." I ADDED THE FOLLOWING "PERSONAL" COMMENT: (A) "BO SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS AWARE OF THE CURRENT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IS VERY SMALL. THIS MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT TO REVERSE DECISIONS TAKEN PRIOR REPEAT PRIOR TO THE DECISION TO SEND THE MESSAGE OF AUGUST 25 AND MAINTAIN SECRECY. (B) IT SEEMS MORE USEFUL TO SEEK A SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT SITUATION THAN TO DEBATE ABOUT HOW WE GET THERE. HANOI SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THE U.S. MESSAGE OF AUGUST 25 OFFERED TO END THE BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS NOT TO INVOLVE CONDITIONS BUT WHICH RATHER REPEAT STATEMENTS MADE BY HANOI. IF BO WANTS CLARIFICATION, I STAND READY TO GIVE IT."

I THEN GAVE M. THE FOLLOWING CONCLUDING "PERSONAL" COMMENT: "THE PRESENT EXCHANGES CAN BE USEFUL IF THEY ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO GAIN A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES BEFORE THEM. I MUST POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THE CONCERN EXPRESSED TO ME BY HIGH OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON THAT TOO OFTEN THESE COMMUNICATIONS ARE ONE-WAY STREETS."

M. TOOK ALL THIS DOWN, READ IT BACK TO ME AND PROMISED TO READ IT TO BO WITHOUT PERSONAL EXPLANATIONS. HE THEN CALLED BO AND RECEIVED AN IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT FOR 1200 PARIS TIME. I SHALL MEET M. AT HIS LABORATORY AT 1300.

A IS RETURNING LATE TONIGHT OR EARLY TOMORROW.

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SPECULATION ON DRV-U.S. TALKS

46-c

PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH 1639 GMT 14 SEP 67 E

(BY BERNARD-JOSEPH CABANES)

(TEXT) HANOI--TALKS BETWEEN HANOI AND WASHINGTON COULD BEGIN THREE OR FOUR WEEKS AFTER THE AMERICANS STOPPED AIR AND NAVAL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, ACCORDING TO INDICATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS FROM RELIABLE SOURCES HERE TODAY. A SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN DONG ON LAST 30 AUGUST CONTAINED AN ESSENTIAL PHRASE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACE TALKS WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS: IF THE U.S. SIDE REALLY DESIRES CONVERSATIONS, IT SHOULD FIRST UNCONDITIONALLY CEASE THE BOMBINGS AND EVERY OTHER ACT OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV.

ONE THING IS TO BE NOTED: THE WORD PERMANENTLY, WHICH WAS ALWAYS USED IN HANOI'S STATEMENTS ON THE NECESSITY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS AND STOP THE BOMBINGS, DOES NOT FIGURE IN THIS PHRASE. IT DOES APPEAR IN OTHER PARAGRAPHS OF THE SAME SPEECH, BUT NOT IN THIS PHRASE, WHICH DEALS SOLELY WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS BETWEEN HANOI AND WASHINGTON.

ONE COULD ARGUE THAT PHAM VAN DONG'S EXPRESSION EVIDENTLY IMPLIES THERE CAN BE NO CONDITIONS AS TO THE DURATION FOR THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBINGS. HOWEVER, SUCH AS IT IS, THE PHRASE LOSES ITS ASPECT OF AN ULTIMATUM AND BECOMES MORE CONCILIATORY IN THE LIGHT OF EXPLANATIONS FROM RELIABLE SOURCES.

WHAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ASKS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO DO IS, BRIEFLY, TO STOP BOMBING WITHOUT POSING CONDITIONS, IN OTHER WORDS, WITHOUT SAYING IT WILL DO SO ONLY FOR SUCH AND SUCH A LAPSE OF TIME AND WITHOUT PROCLAIMING THAT DURING THE PAUSE IT WILL SEND OBSERVATION PLANES INTO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SKY. NO PUBLIC STATEMENT, NO OFFICIAL UNDERTAKING IS DEMANDED OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR, IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VIEW, CEASING WARLIKE ACTS AGAINST THEIR COUNTRY, PURELY AND SIMPLY WITHOUT SAYING ANYTHING, WITHOUT MAKING CONDITIONS, IS EQUIVALENT TO CEASING THEM UNCONDITIONALLY.

WHEN THIS FIRST STEP HAS BEEN TAKEN, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT IF, THREE OR FOUR WEEKS AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THIS CESSATION OF BOMBING, WASHINGTON QUESTIONS HANOI THROUGH ONE CHANNEL OR ANOTHER ON THE OUTCOME TO THIS CESSATION, A REPLY WOULD BE GIVEN TO THIS QUERY. AND TO REPLY TO A QUESTION IS ALREADY TO BEGIN A CONVERSATION, THE SOURCES SAID.

IN THIS LIGHT, ABSENCE OF THE WORD PERMANENTLY TAKES ON ITS FULL MEANING: WITH A VIEW TO POSSIBLE CONVERSATIONS, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ASKED TO STOP THE BOMBINGS FOREVER BUT TO STOP THEM WITHOUT POSING CONDITIONSS.

NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL CIRCLES STRESS THAT A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING TO PAVE THE WAY FOR TALKS IS, FINALLY, ONLY AN ELEMENTARY PREREQUISITE WHICH HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS INDISPENSABLE BY WORLD FIGURES LIKE GENERAL DE GAULLE, BY INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES LIKE UN SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT, AND BY LARGE SECTIONS OF PEOPLES ALLIED TO THE UNITED STATES, SUCH AS THE BRITISH.

TO START CONVERSATIONS WITH AMERICA, NORTH VIETNAM CANNOT GIVE WAY TO THE BLACKMAIL OF BOMBS, THE SAME SOURCES ADD. IT CANNOT ADMIT THAT IT IS BEATEN BY THESE BOMBS, FOR, FIRST, IT IS NOT TRUE AND, SECOND, IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ADMITTING THAT IT (WORDS INDEISTINCT), IN THE START OF THE WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM, WHEREAS