

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-362  
By CLB, NARA, Date 4-18-95

85

~~1/20/95~~  
1. Pre-file

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

Saturday, September 16, 1967  
6:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Although it doesn't get anywhere in particular, you will wish to read this report of how the message we gave Kissinger was finally delivered and what was said.

Whatever comes of it, I am sure you will enjoy my friend Bo's comment on Dsa (marked passage, page 5).

W. W. Rostow

Paris 3501

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Action ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUFNCR 3501 2591720  
ZNY TTTT  
Z 161605Z SEP 67  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5542  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 3931Q

Rec'd: September 16, 1967  
3:27 p.m.

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~ PARIS 3501

NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA

FROM KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-363

By ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~, NARA, Date 1-13-95

I LUNCHEON WITH A. AND M. WITHIN MINUTES OF THEIR INTERVIEW WITH BO WHICH LASTED FOR OVER AN HOUR. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS THEIR ACCOUNT BASED ON EXTENSIVE NOTES TAKEN BY A. I READ MY OWN NOTES BACK TO THEM TO CHECK THEIR ACCURACY. A. DID MOST OF THE TALKING AT LUNCH AND ALSO AT THE INTERVIEW WITH BO. QUOTATIONS REFLECT THE BEST RECOLLECTION OF A. AND M. BASED ON NOTES MADE DURING RPT DURING THE INTERVIEW.

BO GREETED A. AND M. VERY AFFABLY AND OFFERED THEM WHISKEY.

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A, WHO IS SUFFERING FROM A SCIATIC CONDITION WHICH DELAYED HIS ARRIVAL FROM ROME, DECLINED ON DOCTOR'S ORDERS. BO SAID THAT HE DID NOT LIKE WHISKEY BUT, LOOKING AT M., THAT WHISKEY DID HELP TO REDUCE ANXIETIES. HE THEN OFFERED TEA AND PASTRY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY CHARGED BY PRESIDENT HO TO INQUIRE INTO THE HEALTH OF A'S FAMILY, ESPECIALLY HIS DAUGHTER.

A. THEN HANDED HIM THE U.S. MESSAGE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE. BO ASKED WHETHER HE KNEW ITS CONTENT. A. REPLIED THAT ALL HE KNEW WAS THAT I HAD DESCRIBED IT AS "CONCILIATORY". HE USED THE ENGLISH WORD AND BO MADE HIM WRITE IT DOWN. BO DID NOT OPEN THE ENVELOPE IN A & M'S PRESENCE.

A. NEXT SHOWED BO THE STORIES IN LE MONDE OF YESTERDAY AND OF LE FIGARO THIS MORNING AND INQUIRED ABOUT THEIR SIGNIFICANCE. BO, WHO HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN EXPECTING THE QUESTION REPLIED THAT THE THREE TO FOUR WEEK INTERVAL BETWEEN THE END OF BOMBING AND THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS WAS AN INVENTION OF JOURNALISTS. PHAM VAN DONG'S

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STATEMENT HAD GIVEN NO GROUND FOR THE TIME PERIOD MENTIONED IN THE  
NEWSPAPERS..

A. THEN TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF  
THE A-M CHANNEL. HE SAID HE DID NOT MIND ACTING AS A MAILMAN  
BUT THERE WAS NO SENSE IN CONTINUING IF IT LED NOWHERE OR EMBARRASSED  
EITHER PARTY. "WE ARE, IN MY JUDGMENT, AT THE END OF OUR TETHER (AU  
BOUT DE NOTRE ROULEAU). WE HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTACT AND WE SHOULD  
"WITHDRAW" BO REPLIED: "MY DEAR FRIENDS, YOUR ARE NOT IN MY JUDGMENT  
AT THE END OF YOUR TETHER. YOU HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AS FRIENDS. WE  
TRUST YOU AND YOU TRUST KISSINGER. WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN DOING IS USEFUL.  
IF WE THINK WHAT YOU ARE DOING IS NOT USEFUL, WE SHALL TELL YOU. WHEN  
YOU ASKED FOR A VISA CONCURRENT WITH THE BOMBARDMENT OF HANOI, WE  
REFUSED. TO LET YOU COME WOULD HAVE DISCREDITED US AND ULTIMATELY  
YOU. BUT YOU SEE YOU HAVE PRODUCED RESULTS. THERE WAS A MESSAGE  
TO US FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WHICH WE ACCEPTED. WE REPLIED,  
TO BE SURE, NEGATIVELY. THIS WEEK WE HAVE HAD TWO BRIEF COMMUNICATIONS  
AND TODAY A FORMAL MESSAGE. SO YOU ARE BEING USEFUL."

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M. THEN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE TIME HAD COME FOR BO TO SEE ME.  
BO ASKED MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT MY PLANS FOR NEXT WEEK. (NOTE: FOR  
WASHINGTON'S INFORMATION, I HAVE CANCELLED MY VISIT TO BONN BUT AM  
COMMITTED TO A SPEECH IN HANOVER ON SATURDAY. I WILL STAY HERE  
UNTIL ABOUT NOON (SEPT 22.) M. SAID THAT ONE WAY OF ARRANGING  
A MEETING WOULD BE TO HAVE COFFEE TOGETHER IN SOMEBODY'S HOUSE.  
BO REPLIED: "LET ME THINK ABOUT HOW BEST TO ARRANGE A MEETING AND I  
WILL LET YOU KNOW. I WILL CALL YOU AS I CALLED YOU LAST WEEK."

M. THEN RETURNED TO HIS THEME OF REPORTING TO THE ELYSEE IF THE  
PRESENT EFFORT FAILED BUT OFFERING TO CHECK WITH BO FIRST. TURNING TO  
A. BO SAID: "OUR FRIEND M. IS VERY IMPATIENT. FIRST HE WANTED TO  
REPORT TO PUGWASH, NOW TO THE ELYSEE. I CAN TELL YOU NOW THAT I SHALL  
NEVER TELL YOU NOT TO REPORT TO THE ELYSEE BUT ALSO I SHALL  
NEVER TELL YOU TO REPORT THERE. YOUR CHANNEL IS NOT AT THE END OF ITS  
USEFULNESS. I SEE NO NEED TO BRING ANYONE ELSE IN. COMPLICATED  
MATTERS TAKE SOME TIME TO MATURE AND BECOME MORE COMPLICATED IF TOO  
MANY PEOPLE INTERVENE." (NOTE: A. COMMENTED THAT HANOI AND WASHINGTON  
OBVIOUSLY SAW PROCEDURAL MATTERS IN THE SAME LIGHT.)

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N. RETURNED TO THE INTERVIEW OF A. AND M. WITH PHAM VAN DONG. HE ASKED WHETHER DZU (THE RUNNER-UP IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN SVN) WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NLF IN THE MORE BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT. PHAM VAN DONG HAD MENTIONED IN JULY. BO SAID THAT HE HAD GONE TO UNIVERSITY IN PARIS WITH DZU AND KNEW HIM. DZU WAS A HEEL (SALAUD), WHO ALL HIS LIFE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN CURRENCY MANIPULATIONS. HE COULD NOT BE COUNTED ON. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, MANY REASONABLE PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH, INCLUDING HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS. WHEN A. ASKED ABOUT THIEU BO REPLIED: "I DO NOT UNDERSTAND A MAN WHO GETS HIMSELF ELECTED ON THE BASIS OF INVITING FOREIGNERS TO BOMB HIS COMPATRIORS." A WAS STRUCK BY THE RELATIVE MILDNESS OF HIS COMMENT.

IN CONCLUSION BO ASKED A. AND M. WHETHER I HAD SAID ANYTHING ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE U.S. BECAUSE OF PARIS 3341 I HAD THOUGHT THAT THIS ISSUE MIGHT COME UP. FOLLOWING MY RECOMMENDATIONS, A. AND M. SAID THAT THE MAIN LINES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE NO MATTER WHO WON IN 1968 - UNLESS IF WAS REAGAN IN WHICH CASE THERE WOULD BE A GREATER POSSIBILITY OF ESCALATION THAN OF PEACE OVERTURES.

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BO SEEMED SURPRISED AT THIS NEWS.

A. DID NOT RAISE THE NUANCE HE MENTIONED ABOUT THE TEXT OF THE HANOI MESSAGE OF SEPT 11 (SEE PARIS 3492) BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID IT MIGHT INVOLVE AN IMPLICATION THAT THE VIETNAMESE LACKED ADEQUATE FRENCH.

AT THE END OF THE MEETING BO RETURNED M'S HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF THURSDAY (SEE PARIS 3383). M. APOLOGIZED FOR THE INADEQUATE FRENCH AND POOR HANDWRITING. BO SAID THAT THE NOTES HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL. M. OFFERED TO TYPE THEM UP. BO, FOLLOWING THE RULES OF THE "GAME" SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY. HE HAD STUDIED THEM SUFFICIENTLY.

CONCLUSIONS: (1) A. WHO ON THE WAY FROM THE AIRPORT HAD BEEN VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CONTINUED USEFULNESS OF THE A-M CHANNEL HAS CHANGED HIS VIEW. WHERE THIS MORNING HE THOUGHT THAT THE BASIC PROBLEM WAS THAT HANOI EITHER COULD NOT OR WOULD NOT TALK HE NOW BELIEVES THAT IT IS TORTUOUSLY GROPING ITS WAY TO A DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S.

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(2) A BELIEVES THAT BO ALREADY HAS AUTHORITY TO SEE ME BUT WANTS TO WAIT UNTIL CLOSER TO MY DEPARTURE. HE WANTS, IN A'S JUDGMENT, TO AVOID AN IMPRESSION OF OVEREAGERNESS. HE DID NOT ONCE MENTION THE NEED OF REFERRING THE REQUEST TO HANOI.

(3) A. & M. CONSIDER IT SIGNIFICANT THAT THE BOMBING OF HANOI OR HAIPHONG WAS NOT MENTIONED BY BO (EXCEPT PERIPHERIALLY TO EXPLAIN THE REFUSAL OF A VISA). EVEN THOUGH THE LAST U.S. COMMUNICATION REFERRED TO THEM (SEE PARIS 3383 & 3415).

(4) A. WAS EAGER TO RETURN TO ROME. I ASKED HIM TO STAY OVER THE WEEK END. HOWEVER, HE PLANS TO LEAVE MONDAY MORNING AND RETURN WEDNESDAY.

(5) MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE SIT TIGHT. IF WE HAVE NOT HEARD FROM BO BY WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, A. CAN CALL AND REQUEST AN APPOINTMENT FOR HIMSELF AND M FOR THURSDAY. THIS MEETING COULD

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DISCUSS HOW TO USE THE A-M CHANNEL AFTER I LEAVE PARIS. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON THIS POINT AS ON ANY ADDITIONAL POINTS TO DISCUSS WITH BO IF THE MEETING TAKES PLACE. GP-1 BOHLEN  
BT

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