

SECRET--EXDIS

Saturday, September 16, 1967

11:30 a. m.

*went up at about
3:40 PM*

87

free file

Mr. President:

**This cool French assessment of
Hanoi's basic attitude towards negotiating
now will interest you.**

W. W. Rostow

Paris 3341

*Another report - in some
way - is attached.*

-SECRET--EXDIS

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

**E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House C.I.D. File, Feb. 24, 1983
By CG, NARA, Date 10-1-91**

87a

~~SECRET-EX-35~~

September 16, 1967

Paris 3341

SUBJECT: DRV Attitude Toward Negotiations

Embassy Official asked Manac'h, September 13, whether Quai had detected any change in DRV position over last few weeks toward negotiations. Manac'h replied that if anything DRV attitude had "hardened" and DRV may even be less inclined to make "gesture" to obtain negotiations than some months ago (as, for example, Trinh's January 28 statement). He based this assessment on his two conversations this month with DRV representative in Paris Mai Van Bo, cables from French representative Hanoi De Quirielie, and report from Algerian Ambassador, Peking who recently visited Hanoi. Reasons cited by Manac'h for what appeared to him as possible hardening of DRV position can be found in: (a) feeling DRV leaders that already much of their country destroyed and DRV has little to lose by continuing struggle; (b) conviction North Vietnamese leaders that 1968 U. S. presidential elections -- regardless of who elected -- will bring about favorable change in U. S. policy toward Vietnam; (c) impression North Vietnamese leaders that U. S. negro problem (which Manac'h thinks is exaggerated in their minds) will force U. S. to disengage in Vietnam in order to devote energy and resources to domestic problems; (d) increasing opposition to continuation of present U. S. - Vietnam policy by leading Americans. "One merely has to read newspapers to see how split U. S. is on this subject." All of these factors taken together, Manac'h said, makes North Vietnamese conclude that time is on their side, that all they have to do is to hang on and that, therefore, they do not have to change their present intransigent policy.

BOHLEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-363
By 1-13-95, NARA, Date 1-13-95

~~SECRET-EX-35~~

~~SANITIZED~~
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-366
NARA, Date 8-14-95

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

~~SANITIZED~~

ROUTINE

876

By [redacted]

IN

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
EXO 001

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

DIST 15 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM [redacted]
DOI EARLY SEPTEMBER 1967 1.3(a)(4)
SUBJECT NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

ACQ 13 SEPTEMBER 1967 FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

1. [redacted] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMAT [redacted]

MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS IN
EARLY SEPTEMBER 1967 ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

A. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY CONTINUES TO BE THE ADVOCATION OF COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS OBJECTIVE MUST CONTINUE TO STAND BY ITSELF AND SHOULD NOT BE TIED TO ANY QUID PRO QUO ON THE PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

B. IF THE BOMBARDMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM BY THE UNITED STATES CEASES, NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, THE NORTH

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

(class) (location) (system controls)

1.3(a)(4)

COPY EBJ LIBRARY

(classification)

(dissem controls)

VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE NO POSITION ON THE FORM THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PRIOR TO THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSION OF BOMBARDMENTS.

C. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS OPPOSED TO ANY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. THE UNITED STATES MUST NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH NORTH VIETNAM.

D. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS OPPOSED TO ANY NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM. [REDACTED] THIS NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION, WHICH IS SHARED BY THE SOVIET UNION, REFLECTS THE NEED FOR EXCLUDING COMMUNIST CHINA FROM ANY ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE VIETNAM WAR. COMMUNIST CHINA, [REDACTED] IS OPPOSED TO THE PRESENT NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS.)

1.3(a)(4)

2. [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTION RESULTS CAUSED INCREASED DISUNITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT HE EXPECTED THAT ALL SORTS OF PROPOSITIONS ON PEACE NEGOTIATION WOULD SOON BE FORTHCOMING AS A RESULT. NONE OF THESE PROPOSITIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED, HOWEVER, UNLESS THERE WAS FIRST AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSION OF BOMBARDMENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM.

1.3(a)(4)

3. [REDACTED] EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION THAT IN [REDACTED] THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION WAS INCREASINGLY FAVORABLE TO NORTH VIETNAM'S POSITIONS. IN HIS VIEW, THERE APPEARS TO BE ALMOST COMPLETE UNITY OF OPINION THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CEASE ITS BOMBING OF THE NORTH. [REDACTED] ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE FAVORABLE TREND HE BELIEVES IS 5 4 DEVELOPING IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.

5

4

3

2 4. [REDACTED] IS VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT NORTH 1 2

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

IN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

1.3(a)(4)

• [REDACTED] (classification) (dissem controls)

VIETNAMESE PROSPECTS FOR SETTLING THE VIETNAMESE WAR ON ITS OWN TERMS, AND HE APPEARS TO EXPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES, IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC OPINION, WILL SOON STOP ITS BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE [REDACTED] CINCPAC, ARPAC, PACAF,
PACFLT [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

5
4
3
2
1

[REDACTED] (classification) (dissem controls)

5
4
3
2
1

1.3(a)(4)