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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file*

Sunday Oct. 15, 1967  
11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

The marked passages in these three items are mildly interesting especially the emphasis on the Chinese role in Hanoi and the alleged arrival of a high level mission from Peking on Oct. 7 in Hanoi.

It is possible we shall have a message in Paris this coming week via the week-end courier who appeared to operate Hanoi, Prague, Paris.

But we shall see.

W.W.R.



# Department of State **TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

*2a*

PAGE 01 PARIS 05199 132225Z

8

ACTION SS 70

INFO 1070 W

R 131815Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6546  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 831  
USMISSION NATO 009

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4  
N<sup>o</sup> 94-417  
By CB, NARA, Date 1-20-95

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 5199

LIMDIS

SUBJ: VIEWS OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN HANOI

REF: PARIS 5125

1. DURING FOLLOW-UP CONVERSATION OCT 12 ON SOVIET ATTITUDES  
ON VIETNAM, [REDACTED] (1.3(a)(3))  
LET EMBOFF READ TELEGRAM FROM HANOI OF WHICH PORTION CITED REFTEL.

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 5199 ~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM REPORTED RECENT CONVERSATION OF FRENCH DELEGATE GENERAL DE QUIRIELLE WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO DRV. REACTIONS OF DE QUIRIELLE WERE NOT REPORTED. SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID FOLLOWING:  
(A) REFERRING TO INCIDENT OF CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE'S STATEMENT AT CHICOM NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION, SOV AMB COMMENTED "CHINESE DID NOT HELP THEMSELVES BY THIS INCIDENT." (SOURCE COMMENTED THAT CHINESE HAD RECENTLY BEEN PUTTING "GREAT IDEOLOGICAL PRESSURE" ON HANOI AND REMARK WAS MADE IN THIS CONTEXT.)  
(B) REFERRING TO HANOI'S POSITION BETWEEN CHINA AND USSR, SOV AMB SAID USSR "DID NOT WANT PUT HANOI IN POSITION OF HAVING TO MAKE CHOICE."

**SECRET**



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 05199 132225Z

(C) SOV AMB THEN DISCUSSED WAR, PICTURING IT AS GOING WELL FOR COMMUNIST SIDE. HE SAID SAMS WERE PROVING EFFECTIVE, THAT ONE HAD KNOCKED OUT THREE US PLANES, THAT HE THOUGHT US NOW HAD TO COUNT ON 10 PER CENT LOSSES IN SORTIES. HE ADDED THAT WAR GOING WELL ENOUGH THAT NEXT DRY SEASON US WOULD NOT BE ABLE TAKE OFFENSIVE. (SOURCE COMMENTED THAT HE DISCOUNTED GOOD BIT OF THIS.)

(D) AFTER DISCUSSING NEW ELN PROGRAM (REFTEL), SOV AMB SAID HE DID NOT SEE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS STARTING SOON. HE

PAGE 3 RUFNCRI 5199 ~~SECRET~~

CONCLUDED THAT PERSONALLY HE WAS CONVINCED THAT IF US BOMBING CEASED THIS WOULD SOON LEAD TO NEGOTIATIONS.

PROTECT SOURCE. BOHLEN

~~SECRET~~

28

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC ~~ACQ~~ ~~DDA~~ ~~SOO~~ ONE OCR ORR ~~DDA~~ ~~SOO~~ CIA/NMCC

~~EXC~~ ~~DD/1~~

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CITE

1.3(a)(4)

DIST 14 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY SOVIET BLOC/NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA

DOI JULY-OCTOBER 1967

OCT 14 17 59 67

SUBJECT 1. TRANSPORT PROBLEMS IN SOVIET BLOC AID SHIPMENTS TO  
NORTH VIETNAM.  
2. CHINESE INFLUENCE IN HANOI.

~~SANITIZED~~

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NUJ 94-419

By lsp, NARA, Date 5-21-95

ACQ [REDACTED] FIELD NO.

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

1. EIGHTY PERCENT OF ALL AID TO NORTH VIETNAM FROM THE  
SOVIET BLOC IS SHIPPED BY SEA WHILE THE REMAINDER IS SENT BY RAIL  
THROUGH CHINA. [REDACTED] (THIS PERCENTAGE FIGURE IS  
PRESUMABLY BASED ON TONNAGE AND INCLUDES BOTH MILITARY AND  
ECONOMIC AID, [REDACTED])

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] OTHER EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT ON THE BASIS  
OF TONNAGE ABOUT 48 PERCENT OF ALL SOVIET BLOC AID GOES BY SEA.)

2. IN JULY 1967 THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS REFUSED TO GRANT  
TRANSIT PRIVILEGES TO SOVIET AIRCRAFT BEING FLOWN TO HANOI AND TO  
CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AIR CORRIDOR FOR SUCH AIR MOVE-  
MENTS, THUS FORCING THE SOVIETS TO SHIP THE AIRCRAFT BY SEA.

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(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

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IN

1.3(a)(4)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

(classification)

(dissem controls)

THE TYPE OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED, [REDACTED] WERE PRESUMABLY MIG-21S. 1.3(a)(4)

WHILE THERE HAS BEEN SPORADIC DISRUPTION OF INDIVIDUAL SOVIET RAIL SHIPMENTS BY THE CHINESE, THERE IS NO OTHER RECENT EVIDENCE OF DENIAL OF TRANSIT RIGHTS TO THE SOVIETS OR THE CANCELLATION OF FLIGHTS DUE TO CHINESE INTRANSIGENCE.)

3. THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ON HANOI SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. DESPITE MASSIVE SOVIET AID, PARTICULARLY ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, THIS SUPPORT IS NOT DECISIVE WITH HANOI BECAUSE THE CHINESE STILL HAVE A CONTROLLING INFLUENCE ON HANOI'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY CIRCLES.

4. THE SOVIETS ARE EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE US OVER ACCESS TO HAIPHONG BY SOVIET VESSELS AND ARE VERY GLAD THAT THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED. [REDACTED]

AT SOME UNSPECIFIED TIME IN THE PAST THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT [REDACTED] ISSUED AN ORDER TO SOVIET CONVOYS TO SHOOT THEIR WAY THROUGH ANY BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG BUT TO AVOID EXTENDING HOSTILITIES IN ANY OTHER SPHERE. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

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1.3(a)(4)

IN

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

1.3(a)(4)

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(dissem controls)

THE ORIGINAL BLOCKADE-BREAKING ORDER HAD BEEN  
GIVEN TO A SINGLE CONVOY BUT [REDACTED] IT WAS EXTENDED TO SUBSEQUENT  
CONVOYS.) [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] NO  
MERCHANT VESSELS GOING TO HANOI FROM THE BLACK SEA OR THE SOVIET  
FAR EAST ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN CONVOY.)

1.3(a)(4)

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP ONLY), STATE (AMBASSADOR  
BUNKER ONLY), USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY).

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(classification)

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1.3(a)(4)

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• ROUTINE

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES

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CITE

1.3(a)(4)

DIST 14 OCTOBER 1967

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-419

By ACQ, NARA, Date 7-21-95

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM / ROUMANIA / COMMUNIST CHINA / INDONESIA

DOI 28 SEPTEMBER TO 11 OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT ROUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER MAURER SECRET VISIT TO HANOI TO SEEK  
NEW FORMULA FOR ENDING VIETNAM WAR IS FOLLOWED BY VISIT FROM  
HIGH-RANKING CHINESE COMMUNIST OFFICER

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1.3(a)(4)

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GENERAL THOMAS

TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

1.

1.3(a)(4)

ROUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER MAURER MADE A SECRET VISIT TO HANOI

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28 SEPTEMBER TO 1 OCTOBER 1967. AS OF 11 OCTOBER THIS VISIT WAS STILL

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PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(declass controls)

BEING KEPT SECRET IN HANOI.

1.3(a)(4)

THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO PERSUADE THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) TO CHANGE ITS HARD ATTITUDE IN LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM WAR. THE ROUMANIANS PROPOSED THAT THERE BE A JOINT RESOLUTION OF SEVERAL NATIONS OPPOSING THE BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM, ASKING THAT THE BOMBINGS BE STOPPED ON CONDITION THAT THIS BE FOLLOWED BY TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DRV.

1.3(a)(4)

TOP OFFICIALS IN THE HANOI GOVERNMENT WERE NOT UNRESPONSIVE TO THIS PROPOSAL; THAT IS, IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO STOP THE BOMBING, THE DRV WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS CONDITIONS FOR MEETING, INCLUDING PULLING OUT OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS. MAURER ALSO HAD VISITED CHINESE COMMUNIST PREMIER CHOU EN LAI. CHOU HAD NO OBJECTION TO A POSSIBLE MEETING BUT WAS RATHER SKEPTICAL AS TO SUCCESS BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THE UNITED STATES WOULD NEVER STOP THE BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM.

2. ON 7 OCTOBER A CHICOM MILITARY PLANE WITH SEVERAL HIGH RANKING OFFICERS ARRIVED FROM CHINA TO HANOI. THE OFFICERS WERE QUARTERED IN THE PALACE, WHICH IS VERY UNUSUAL; ALL FOREIGN GUESTS ARE ALWAYS RECEIVED IN THE STATE GUEST HOUSE. THIS VISIT WAS ALSO KEPT SECRET. THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE SOME CONNECTION WITH MAURER'S EARLIER VISIT.

1.3(a)(4)

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(dissem controls)

3. THERE WERE AT THIS TIME ALSO SOME RUMORS THAT HO CHI MINH IS VERY ILL.  
MAURER WAS RECEIVED BY PHAM VAN DONG ONLY.

4. [REDACTED] UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY U THANT'S PRESS RELEASE  
THAT HANOI IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE HAS NEVER BEEN EITHER CONFIRMED OR DENIED  
BY THE HANOI GOVERNMENT.

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS REALLY REPRESENTS ANY BASIC CHANGE  
IN THE DRV'S NEGOTIATING POSITION NOR WHETHER POSSIBLY THE DRV FOREIGN  
MINISTER MADE ANY FURTHER SECRET CONCESSIONS OR PROVISOS IN DISCUSSIONS  
WITH THE ROUMANIANS.)

6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR ONLY) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP AND  
POLAD ONLY) (ALSO SENT ASIGON FOR AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY)

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