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Pres file
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday Oct. 15, 1967
11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

The marked passages in these three items are mildly interesting especially the emphasis on the Chinese role in Hanoi and the alleged arrival of a high level mission from Peking on Oct. 7 in Hanoi.

It is possible we shall have a message in Paris this coming week via the week-end courier who appeared to operate Hanoi, Prague, Paris.

But we shall see.

W.W.R.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

2a

PAGE 01 PARIS 05199 132225Z

8
ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

R 131815Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6546
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 831
USMISSION NATO 009

RECEIVED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 2.4
REL 94-417
By cb, NARA, Date 1-20-95

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 5199

LINDIS

SUBJ: VIEWS OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN HANOI

REF : PARIS 5125

1. DURING FOLLOW-UP CONVERSATION OCT 12 ON SOVIET ATTITUDES
ON VIETNAM, [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(3)
LET EMBOFF READ TELEGRAM FROM HANOI OF WHICH PORTION CITED REPTEL.

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 5199 ~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM REPORTED RECENT CONVERSATION OF FRENCH DELEGATE GENERAL
DE QUIRIELLE WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO DRV. REACTIONS OF DE
QUIRIELLE WERE NOT REPORTED. SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID FOLLOWING:
(A) REFERRING TO INCIDENT OF CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE'S STATEMENT
AT CHICOM NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION, SOV AMB COMMENTED "CHINESE
DID NOT HELP THEMSELVES BY THIS INCIDENT." (SOURCE COMMENTED
THAT CHINESE HAD RECENTLY BEEN PUTTING "GREAT IDEOLOGICAL PRESSURE"
ON HANOI AND REMARK WAS MADE IN THIS CONTEXT.)
(B) REFERRING TO HANOI'S POSITION BETWEEN CHINA AND USSR, SOV
AMB SAID USSR "DID NOT WANT PUT HANOI IN POSITION OF HAVING TO
MAKE CHOICE."

SECRET

OVER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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(C) SOV AMB THEN DISCUSSED WAR, PICTURING IT AS GOING WELL FOR COMMUNIST SIDE. HE SAID SAMs WERE PROVING EFFECTIVE, THAT ONE SAM HAD KNOCKED OUT THREE US PLANES, THAT HE THOUGHT US NOW HAD TO COUNT ON 10 PER CENT LOSSES IN SORTIES. HE ADDED THAT WAR GOING WELL ENOUGH THAT NEXT DRY SEASON US WOULD NOT BE ABLE TAKE OFFENSIVE. (SOURCE COMMENTED THAT HE DISCOUNTED GOOD BIT OF THIS.)

(D) AFTER DISCUSSING NEW FLN PROGRAM (REFTEL), SOV AMB SAID HE DID NOT SEE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS STARTING SOON. HE

PAGE 3 RUENCR 5199 ~~SECRET~~
CONCLUDED THAT PERSONALLY HE WAS CONVINCED THAT IF US BOMBING CEASED THIS WOULD SOON LEAD TO NEGOTIATIONS.

PROTECT SOURCE. BOHLEN

~~SECRET~~

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Intelligence Information Cable

IN

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC ~~DDI~~ ~~DDP~~ SDO ONE OCR ORR ~~DDO~~ ~~DDP~~ CIA/NMCC

EXC DD/1

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CITE

1.3(a)(4)

DIST 14 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY SOVIET BLOC/NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA

DOI JULY-OCTOBER 1967

OCT 14 17 59Z

SUBJECT 1. TRANSPORT PROBLEMS IN SOVIET BLOC AID SHIPMENTS TO
NORTH VIETNAM.
2. CHINESE INFLUENCE IN HANOI.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-419

By lap, NARA, Date 5-21-75

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1.3(a)(4)

1. EIGHTY PERCENT OF ALL AID TO NORTH VIETNAM FROM THE SOVIET BLOC IS SHIPPED BY SEA WHILE THE REMAINDER IS SENT BY RAIL THROUGH CHINA. (THIS PERCENTAGE FIGURE IS PRESUMABLY BASED ON TONNAGE AND INCLUDES BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID,

1.3(a)(4)

OTHER EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT ON THE BASIS OF TONNAGE ABOUT 48 PERCENT OF ALL SOVIET BLOC AID GOES BY SEA.)

2. IN JULY 1967 THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS REFUSED TO GRANT TRANSIT PRIVILEGES TO SOVIET AIRCRAFT BEING FLOWN TO HANOI AND TO CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AIR CORRIDOR FOR SUCH AIR MOVEMENTS, THUS FORCING THE SOVIETS TO SHIP THE AIRCRAFT BY SEA.

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1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

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IN

1.3(a)(4)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

(classification)

(dissem controls)

THE TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

INVOLVED, [REDACTED] WERE PRESUMABLY MIG-21S. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] WHILE THERE HAS BEEN SPORADIC
DISRUPTION OF INDIVIDUAL SOVIET RAIL SHIPMENTS BY THE CHINESE, THERE
IS NO OTHER RECENT EVIDENCE OF DENIAL OF TRANSIT RIGHTS TO THE SOVIETS
OR THE CANCELLATION OF FLIGHTS DUE TO CHINESE INTRANSIGENCE.)

3. ~~THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ON HANOI SHOULD NOT~~
~~BE UNDERESTIMATED.~~ DESPITE MASSIVE SOVIET AID, PARTICULARLY ANTI-
AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, THIS SUPPORT IS NOT DECISIVE WITH HANOI BECAUSE THE
CHINESE STILL HAVE A CONTROLLING INFLUENCE ON HANOI'S POLITICAL AND
MILITARY CIRCLES.

4. ~~THE SOVIETS ARE EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE CONFRONTA-~~
~~TIONS WITH THE US OVER ACCESS TO HAIPHONG BY SOVIET VESSELS AND ARE~~
~~VERY GLAD THAT THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED.~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AT SOME UNSPECIFIED TIME IN THE
PAST THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT [REDACTED] ISSUED AN ORDER TO SOVIET CONVOYS TO
SHOOT THEIR WAY THROUGH ANY BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG BUT TO AVOID EXTENDING
HOSTILITIES IN ANY OTHER SPHERE. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

THE ORIGINAL BLOCKADE-BREAKING ORDER HAD BEEN
GIVEN TO A SINGLE CONVOY BUT IT WAS EXTENDED TO SUBSEQUENT
CONVOYS.) COMMENT:

1.3(a)(4)

NO
MERCHANT VESSELS GOING TO HANOI FROM THE BLACK SEA OR THE SOVIET
FAR EAST ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN CONVOY.)

1.3(a)(4)

5. DISSEM: CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP ONLY), STATE (AMBASSADOR
BUNKER ONLY), USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY).

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1.3(a)(4)

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● ROUTINE

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ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE NMCC **XXX** **XXX** **SDO** **XXX** **CRS**
XXX **XXX** **XXX** **XXX** **XXX**

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CITE

1.3(a)(4)

DIST 14 OCTOBER 1967

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLI 94-419

By *sig*, NARA, Date 7-21-95

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM / ROUMANIA / COMMUNIST CHINA / INDONESIA

DOI 28 SPETEMBER TO 11 OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT ROUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER MAURER SECRET VISIT TO HANOI TO SEEK
NEW FORMULA FOR ENDING VIETNAM WAR IS FOLLOWED BY VISIT FROM
HIGH-RANKING CHINESE COMMUNIST OFFICER

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1.3(a)(4)

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES

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NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL FLUCKEY; AIR FORCE AFCIN,
GENERAL THOMAS

TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

1. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

ROUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER MAURER MADE A SECRET VISIT TO HANOI

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28 SEPTEMBER TO 1 OCTOBER 1967. AS OF 11 OCTOBER THIS VISIT WAS STILL

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1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

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1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

BEING KEPT SECRET IN HANOI.

1.3(a)(4)

THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO PERSUADE THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) TO CHANGE ITS HARD ATTITUDE IN LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM WAR. ~~THE ROMANIANS PROPOSED THAT THERE BE A JOINT RESOLUTION OF SEVERAL NATIONS OPPOSING THE BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM, ASKING THAT THE BOMBINGS BE STOPPED ON CONDITION THAT THIS BE FOLLOWED BY TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DRV.~~

1.3(a)(4)

TOP OFFICIALS IN THE HANOI GOVERNMENT WERE NOT UNRESPONSIVE TO THIS PROPOSAL; THAT IS, IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO STOP THE BOMBING, THE DRV WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS CONDITIONS FOR MEETING, INCLUDING PULLING OUT OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS. MAURER ALSO HAD VISITED CHINESE COMMUNIST PREMIER CHOU EN LAI. CHOU HAD NO OBJECTION TO A POSSIBLE MEETING BUT WAS RATHER SKEPTICAL AS TO SUCCESS BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THE UNITED STATES WOULD NEVER STOP THE BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM.

2. ON 7 OCTOBER A CHICOMI MILITARY PLANE WITH SEVERAL HIGH RANKING OFFICERS ARRIVED FROM CHINA TO HANOI. THE OFFICERS WERE QUARTERED IN THE PALACE, WHICH IS VERY UNUSUAL; ALL FOREIGN GUESTS ARE ALWAYS RECEIVED IN THE STATE GUEST HOUSE. THIS VISIT WAS ALSO KEPT SECRET. THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE SOME CONNECTION WITH MAURER'S EARLIER VISIT.

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

3. THERE WERE AT THIS TIME ALSO SOME RUMORS THAT HO CHI MINH IS VERY ILL. MAURER WAS RECEIVED BY PHAM VAN DONG ONLY.

1.3(a)(4)

4. [REDACTED] UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY U THANT'S PRESS RELEASE THAT HANOI IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE HAS NEVER BEEN EITHER CONFIRMED OR DENIED BY THE HANOI GOVERNMENT.

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS REALLY REPRESENTS ANY BASIC CHANGE IN THE DRV'S NEGOTIATING POSITION NOR WHETHER POSSIBLY THE DRV FOREIGN MINISTER MADE ANY FURTHER SECRET CONCESSIONS OR PROVISOS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ROUMANIANS.)

6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR ONLY) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP AND POLAD ONLY) (ALSO SENT ASIGON FOR AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY)

1.3(a)(4)

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