

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ PENNSYLVANIA

Monday, October 9, 1967
8:55 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of the interview in which our message was delivered in Paris, plus an account of a pre-interview set of conversations on an issue raised by M and A.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House: Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *mg*, NARA, Date *10-11-91*

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Kissinger/Read Telecon, October 8, 1967 (9:30 a.m.)

October 8, 1967 M and A called on Bo at 9:00 a.m. Paris time and spent 1½ hours with him. As in the past Bo was cordial to his visitors throughout the meeting.

M and A handed the written portion of the message from Kissinger to Bo, which Bo read closely. M and A then read to Bo Kissinger's four "oral points", and Bo wrote them down carefully in his own notes. (M and A did not leave with Bo the "oral" part of the message.)

Bo told M to tell Kissinger how much Bo appreciated K's personal efforts. Bo then dictated to M and A the following short message of acknowledgement to K:

"M and A have passed the note from K to B.
In case B will have a reply to make, he
will make it through this channel."

M suggested that Bo add a sentence saying that Bo was studying the message but Bo refused.

Bo then said on first reading of the written note from K, it seemed to him that all that appeared after the opening phrase stating US willingness to stop the bombing without conditions did in fact constitute conditions. In particular B characterized as "conditions" the words "prompt", "productive" and "in accordance with the proposal of August 25".

M and A said that the latter phrase really meant that neither side should take advantage of a standown of bombing while US/DRV discussions were in process, as stated in the August 25 proposal and the President's San Antonio speech. In this regard M and A mentioned specifically that serious hostilities in the DMZ would make productive talks impossible. (M and A noted that Bo made no rejoinder to the point about the DMZ in the oral message from K or when they referred to the DMZ at this place in the conversation.)

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Authority State Ex 7-17-78
(Kerry, pp. 761-764)
By 2/2/99, NARA, Date 10-11-91

M asked what Bo's response would be if the words "prompt" and "productive" were taken out. Bo replied that if this happened he would have to refer back to his government before answering.

Bo read the third oral point in K's message as referring back to the portion of the August 25 message which referred to the possibility of partial limitations of actions against the DRV because of the difficulty of keeping discussions secret after bombing stopped altogether. Bo said this was "clearly unacceptable".

Bo also referred to the "usual American double game"---that on September 29 or 30, US planes hit a school in Haiphong, killing 30 children.

M and A underscored to B the new features in the Kissinger message.

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Sunday, October 8, 1967

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation


Henry Kissinger telephoned me at home on Saturday evening, October 7, 1967, at about 6:40 p.m. He said he had tried but failed to get Ben Read, and he did not wish to call Sec. Rusk. Therefore, he called me.

Kissinger reported that M and A had called from Paris. They expressed the judgment that our message was weakened by the insertion of the phrase "in accordance with our proposal of August 25th." M and A said that Hanoi might find the message "unacceptable" because it had already "rejected" our proposal of August 25th.

I explained to Kissinger why that phrase had been inserted and its essentiality. Kissinger then said it might be easier if M and A could explain that the phrase was meant to cover the "assumption" in the August 25th proposal and especially in the San Antonio speech. I said that I would consult Sec. Rusk.

Sec. Rusk said that he saw no harm in their linking the "in accordance" phrase with the San Antonio speech but that M and A should understand that intermediaries should not do the negotiating for the principals.

I conveyed those two points to Kissinger who said he would so inform M and A.

 W. W. Rostow

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By reg/sep, NARA, Date 10-23-91

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