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75

Wednesday, October 4, 1967
5:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

This report is interesting and probably true; although with the Soviet bill building up over \$700 million a year, there may have been just a bit more pressure than suggested.

W. W. R.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-403
By 48, NARA, Date 10-24-95

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Attached: Intell. Note 785, dated Oct. 3, 1967

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DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

OCT 4 1967

843 AM '67 Note - 785

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To : The Acting Secretary

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Through: S/S

91
NEJ 94-405

From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

By 40, NARA, Date 3-25-55

Subject: Moscow and Hanoi on the Conduct of the Vietnam War:

Agreement to Disagree

A secret Romanian report provides insight into differing Soviet and DRV views on the Vietnam war. The information in this report is at least second hand and may reflect Moscow's interest in demonstrating to Bucharest that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of other socialist states. Nevertheless, the account contained in this report appears plausible.

Soviets Advise Pham Van Dong. According to this report, based on materials prepared by the Romanian Embassy in Hanoi, Pham Van Dong's visit to the USSR in early April was devoted to a discussion of North Vietnam's aid needs and to a discussion of the political aspects of the Vietnam war. To meet the DRV's needs, supplementary military and economic aid was extended by the USSR. During their discussion with Pham Van Dong, Brezhnev and Kosygin stated that a military solution in Vietnam is impossible and advised the DRV to seek a means for ending the war. In offering this advice, the Soviet leaders assured Dong that the USSR would continue to supply aid, despite its differences with Hanoi on the wisdom of continuing the fighting. The report suggests that the Soviets have on several occasions expressed their reservations on this question, but that

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Hanoi has resisted Soviet advice and that Moscow has gone ahead providing aid despite its reservations.

Advice, Not Pressure. It is highly plausible that the Soviets would feel that the DRV should show a greater degree of flexibility. Moscow's attitude is probably conditioned by a higher regard for what can be achieved by diplomacy as well as a concern that a continuation of the war enhances the risks of Soviet involvement. The Soviet leaders probably calculate that their major aid contributions to the DRV war effort entitle them to advise North Vietnam on how to conduct its diplomacy. Nevertheless, as this report indicates, the Soviets have not used their aid as a means of pressuring Hanoi to accept their views. As the Soviets themselves almost certainly recognize, such pressure would be self-defeating, costing Moscow much of what it has gained politically as a result of its reinvolvement in Indochinese affairs after the ouster of Khrushchev in late 1964.

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