

89
~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, October 3, 1967, 6:00 pm

has file

AGENDA

1. Middle East, etc.: The View in New York. Sec. Rusk.
A report.
2. NATO Nuclear Committee. Sec. McNamara.
A report.
3. Negotiations. Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
-- the Paris track and the ten-mile circle (see marked passage, Tab A)
-- the Shah's proposal: a response
4. Westmoreland DMZ Recommendations: Report on follow-up.
(Sec. McNamara)
Check list at Tab B.
5. NPT: U.S. Position on Article III. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
6. Delegation for Vietnamese Inaugural, November 1. (Sec. Rusk)
7. Other.

W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *14*, NARA, Date 10-15-91

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89a

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Kissinger/Read Telecon, 9:00 a.m., Sept. 30, 1967

M and A called on Bo at 9:00 a.m. on September 30 and spent two hours with him. The atmosphere was friendly and cordial throughout and Bo gave them tea.

M and A told Bo that they had been in touch with K, and K had had further discussions with his Washington friends. M and A noted that K and the USG had put a proposal and questions to the DRV through the Bo channel to which there had been no substantive responses. The US August 25th offer without conditions remained open. M and A noted that K's Washington friends were interested in learning whether Bo had received an answer to the point Bo had raised on September 25 about the possibility of "preliminary discussions."

Bo replied that he had an answer to the latter point. Bo said that he could not talk directly to a US validated individual even in a preliminary way because "too much had happened since July." M and A got the impression from Bo that he feared that "preliminary discussions" would simply be a ruse on our part to get into substantive talks with the DRV while the bombing continued.

When Bo referred again to the "conditions" contained in the US position, M and A asked him to point out what conditions he was referring to. Bo said in the first paragraph of the US August 25 proposal the words "with the understanding that" really amounted to a condition on our part, as did the words "productive" and "prompt". He indicated there were other "complications" with the proposal.

M and A referred to the forthcoming sentences in President Johnson's September 29 speech which repeated US willingness to stop the bombing "when this will lead promptly to productive discussions" the assumption that the DRV would "not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation" during the discussions. Bo said he had not had

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Sept. 2

a chance to study the President's speech, but he was glad that they had brought this portion of the speech to his attention, because the French press headlines made the US position sound conditional.

They discussed the Viet-Nam statements in the U.N. debate to date, and Bo said the DRV was highly displeased with George Brown's speech but pleased with the French and Canadian statements in New York. Bo added jocularly that he "claimed some credit" for the French position. Since M and A did not know the content of the French or Canadian positions and Bo did not elaborate, there was no discussion about what features of the GOC or GOF positions Bo was referring to.

Bo expressed the thought that the "present political trend" in the US was favorable to the DRV.

At one stage of the discussion M and A found the opportunity to underscore the point that the US had made no commitments regarding its future actions.

A asked whether Bo had received an answer to the September 23 inquiry regarding the accuracy of A's notes of his discussion in Hanoi with Pham Van Dong on the point that there would be "no question of a delay" between the end of bombing and talks both sides knew how to meet each other.

A again vouched for the care and accuracy of the notes of his conversation with Dong. Bo said he had not had an answer to this inquiry which he had made on September 23, but he expected an answer early next week. Bo did say that if there was a halt in the bombing "Kissinger should put on his hat and come to Paris immediately." When A and M asked for clarification of the conflicting reports of the DRV position regarding the delay between a bombing halt and talks as reflected in September 26 AFP column and a September 28 Le Monde article,

-3-

Bo said he hoped that the answer he would get from Hanoi to the question regarding the Dong/Aubrac exchange would clarify this issue.

M and Bo arranged to meet again on Wednesday, October 4. Bo repeated the point he had made before: he was available at any time to M and A to talk to them, meet with them, discuss matters with them, and report to Hanoi on their discussions. He said he would advise them as soon as he had received anything from his government.

Comment: Kissinger believes Bo and M and A fail to understand that the "preliminary discussions" we visualize would be confined to strictly procedural matters relating to the timing of the end of the bombing and place, time and arrangements of the substantive talks to follow.