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~~TOP SECRET/PENNSYLVANIA/SENSITIVE~~

Pres file

Tuesday, October 3, 1967
10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read carefully this latest Paris item.

This is the first movement we've had. What it means, I cannot say. We'll have to await arrival of the piece of paper.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlh

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 5.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 10-15-91

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA~~ W 10-97

Telecons between Kissinger and Read
9:00 p.m., October 2 - 7:30 a.m.,
October 3, 1967

October 2, 1967
(a.m.)

- Kissinger phoned M to read to him some of the editorial comments in the NYT and other US papers about the forthcoming nature of President Johnson's September 29 speech. By way of contrast K also read to M from the Schoenbrun articles which indicated the extremely tough and unyielding DRV position regarding negotiations. K told M that his colleagues in Washington were getting increasingly impatient because so little had come back from the DRV through this channel. K gave M this information for M's background use during M's scheduled meeting with Bo on October 4, and K did not request M to do anything with this information prior to that meeting.

October 3, 1967
(p.m.)

- On his own initiative M went to see Bo and spent an hour and a half with him on the afternoon of October 2, although Bo reported that he was extremely busy (perhaps with a visiting delegation). M told Bo that he had taken it on himself to ask for the appointment to pass on information received from Kissinger because M considered it of such importance. He then told Bo of K's report of growing impatience in Washington and the feeling on the part of K's Washington colleagues that they had received almost nothing from Hanoi through the M and A channel. At some point in the conversation M wrote down a message to Kissinger from Bo on a piece of paper, which Bo corrected in Bo's own handwriting. M considered the text to be so important that he was unwilling to describe its content clearly to K on the phone but the essence of the message, as K understood it was as follows: Talks between DRV/US officials could start almost immediately after the end of the

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By By/MLP, NARA, Date 10-23-01

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~~bombing, although the DRV could not give further assurances to this effect. M drew a distinction between "talks between officials" and formal negotiations, and K infers that the former encompasses preliminary discussions concerning procedures, agendas, etc., but he cannot be certain. Bo (for the first time) told M to report to Bo immediately by phone Kissinger's reactions to Bo's message.~~

M thought the matter of sufficient importance to fly to Rome immediately after his talk with Bo to discuss the situation with A, and M and A called Kissinger jointly from Rome to describe the foregoing. A concurred in M's unwillingness to describe the message in more detail by phone and they informed K that late on October 2 they had airtailed the message to K in Boston from Rome. K advised M and A that he was unwilling to give his reactions by phone until he had had a chance to study the message in full.

M will keep his scheduled meeting with Bo on October 4. (A has gone to Lebanon on business for 6 days.)