

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, September 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres. file*

SUBJECT: Your meeting with George Brown - 10:00 a.m.,  
Wednesday, September 27

Nick Katzenbach's memo is at Tab A.

Topics Brown May Raise

1. Middle East

Brown will probably:

- say that Britain is hurting from the continued closure of the Canal. (They claim it costs them \$200 million for six months; we think that is too high.)
- urge that we try to reach some partial settlement that will at least open the Canal.
- perhaps go so far as to endorse the Yugoslav proposals as a starting point.

You may wish to answer that:

- we and the British must stick together; there should be no retreat from the principles you laid down on June 19.
- partial solutions such as the Yugo proposal will make it more difficult to end the belligerency.
- both of us should try to keep the Israelis from painting themselves into a corner.

2. Vietnam

before your meeting.  
Rusk hopes you will read Brown's Tuesday UN speech (Tab B). He describes it as "gutsy and courageous".

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3. Our ABM Decision

Brown may:

- express disappointment at our lack of consultation with NATO.
- say he fears effects of our decision on the arms race.
- say he thinks U.S. decision may endanger NPT.

You may wish to answer that:

- we are sorry British feel aggrieved. Bob McNamara, however, gave a full picture of our thinking on ABMs when the NATO Nuclear Planning Group met last April. We took Allied views into account.
- the Soviets know our decision is aimed at the Chinese. It should not escalate the arms race; in fact, it may put some pressure on the Russians to stop stalling. Our lines to Moscow are good.
- we can't see why our ABM should put the NPT in trouble. It should give Asian states greater assurance that we would be able to protect them against Chinese nuclear blackmail. This should give them less cause to go nuclear.

4. Byrnes Amendment

Brown will probably say he and Wilson understand the Congressional picture; while they are grateful for Bob McNamara's willingness to help on this one, they are worried about the future.

\* \* \* \* \*

Brown will be accompanied by Pat Dean and Paul Gore-Booth (Permanent Under Secretary). I will stand by with Ed Fried and Harold Shullaw (State Country Director).

*Walt* Rostow



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

September 26, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Foreign Secretary  
Brown, September 27, 10:00 a.m. —

Foreign Secretary Brown saw the Secretary in New York on Monday, September 25. Brown was preoccupied with the problems of Viet-Nam and the Middle East. He told the Secretary that in his conversations with Gromyko in New York the latter had been completely intransigent on Viet-Nam, merely reiterating calls for unconditional cessation of United States bombing and United States withdrawal. Brown thought, however, that Gromyko was more flexible on the Middle East and interested in a settlement, although the Soviets after two reverses were reluctant to get out in front.

On Viet-Nam Brown reiterated that the United Kingdom will continue to support United States policy. He expressed the hope, however, that the United States would carefully evaluate its bombing policy to see if it is essential to maintain its current pattern, having regard to the unfavorable impact it is having on public opinion. The Secretary expressed skepticism with respect to the impact of bombing on Hanoi or on Western public opinion, saying that our opponents on the Viet-Nam question moved easily from one position to another and without any recognition of the need for reciprocity. Brown fears that the forthcoming Labor Party conference (October 2-6) will be difficult on Viet-Nam.

On the Middle East Brown is anxious to see some movement toward a settlement. The continued closure of

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
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By ig, NARA, Date 3-24-95~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

the Canal is costing Britain heavily in foreign exchange. After talking with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Brown believes the Yugoslavs might be prepared to modify the original Tito proposals to make them more balanced on the question of withdrawal and an end to belligerency.

The British Government, and Brown, have been unhappy at our announcement of an intention to deploy a limited ABM system. The British are particularly disturbed at what they regard as inadequate consultation with them and with our NATO allies prior to the announcement. They are also concerned about the Soviet reaction as well as the effects of the decision on progress toward a Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Byrnes amendment created a furor in Britain, but the British Government, assisted by Secretary McNamara's action on procurement of nine of the mine sweepers in question, has put the matter into a better perspective. Nevertheless this Congressional action has created real concern in the United Kingdom about other and more damaging possibilities, such as the Gross amendment.

  
Acting Secretary

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SECTO 9

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SUBJECT: FONSEC BROWN'S REMARKS ON VIETNAM AT UNGA

FOR POSSIBLE USE IN CONNECTION WITH BRITISH FONSEC BROWN'S  
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON, THERE FOLLOWS PORTION BROWN'S  
SEPT 26 UNGA SPEECH DEALING WITH VIETNAM (UNNECESSARY WORDS  
OMMITTED): QTE I MUST NOW TURN TO ISSUE WHICH IS NOT FORMALLY  
ON AGENDA BUT WHICH IS CERTAINLY ONE OF MAJOR PROBLEMS IN WORLD  
TODAY AND WHICH MEMBERS OF ASSEMBLY CAN AND MUST HELP TO BRING

PAGE 2 RUEHDT 1011 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
SOLUTION--VIETNAM.

PAST YEAR HAS BEEN FILLED WITH KILLING AND DESTRUCTION  
AND MARKED BY RANGE OF ABORTIVE ATTEMPTS BRING ABOUT PEACE.

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IT IS TRAGIC NORTH VIETNAM HAS DECLINED GRASP MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO NEGOTIATE WHICH HAVE BEEN OFFERED, AND STILL REMAIN OPEN TO THEM. THERE HAS BEEN NO REDUCTION IN FIGHTING. THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTION. THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS OF ANOTHER SORT: FOR PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE SHOWN THEIR DETERMINATION FOLLOW CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES IN MIDST OF WAR, AND THEY WANT REGIME OF THEIR OWN CHOICE. BUT NEED FOR SOLUTION IS MORE URGENT THAN BEFORE.

"VIETNAM ITSELF CANNOT AFFORD LET WAR CONTINUE; AND NO MORE CAN ANY OF US, FOR CONFLICT DISTORTS RELATIONS BETWEEN US, AND HINDERS GROWTH OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION. IT IS DUTY OF ALL WHO HAVE INFLUENCE TO USE IT TO FIND WAY OF STOPPING FIGHTING, AND TO DO THIS SOBERLY AND IN FULL RECOGNITION OF THEIR

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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. USE OF VIOLENT AND EXCESSIVE LANGUAGE TOWARDS ANY OF PARTIES IN THIS CONFLICT CONTRIBUTES NOTHING TO SEARCH FOR PEACE.

"IN THIS SITUATION MY GOVT HOPE THAT ALL CONCERNED WITH CONFLICT WILL ACKNOWLEDGE NEED FOR COMPROMISE--NOT OF PRINCIPLES, BUT IN MOVING TO NEGOTIATION. WE WILL SUPPORT ANY INITIATIVE WHICH OFFERS CHANCE OF PROGRESS. WE HAVE WARMLY SUPPORTED PERSISTENT EFFORTS OF SYG, AND PLAN HE PUT FORWARD LAST MARCH. WE ARE READY MEET WITH GOVTS OF SOVIET UNION, INDIA, CANADA, AND POLAND AS PROPOSED BY PRES OF WORLD FEDERATION OF UN ASSOCIATIONS. IN SAME SPIRIT WE WELCOME DESIRE OF PERS-ELECT OF SOUTH VIETNAM TRY ONCE AGAIN TO BRIDGE GAP BETWEEN SAIGON AND HANOI.

"MUCH HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM. I JOIN WITH THOSE WHO WOULD DEARLY LIKE IT STOP. BUT I REGRET LEADERS OF NORTH VIETNAM HAVE NEVER SAID WHAT THEY WILL EITHER DO OR REFRAIN FROM DOING TO HELP PROCESS OF PEACE IF IT IS STOPPED. I AM CONSCIOUS, AS WE ALL MUST BE, THAT THERE ARE MILLIONS PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHO CRAVE FOR SHADOW OF KILLING AND MISERY BE

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LIFTED FROM THEM.

"LAST YEAR, SPEAKING BEFORE THIS ASSEMBLY, I OUTLINED BASIS ON WHICH I BELIEVED SOLUTION TO CONFLICT COULD BE BUILT. THIS YEAR MR. GOLDBERG HAS SET OUT ELEMENTS OF SETTLEMENT ON BASIS APPROACHING MY OWN, AND I WELCOME HIS CLEAR EXPOSITION. IN MY VIEW FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN MY PLAN MUST STILL HOLD FIELD AND ALL PARTIES SHOULD BE ABLE RECOGNISE AND ACCEPT THEM.

"THERE MUST BE CEASE-FIRE. THERE MUST BE NEGOTIATIONS. FINAL SOLUTION MUST BE POLITICAL. AND THERE MUST BE INTERNATIONAL CONFIRMATION OF ARRANGEMENTS AGREED UPON BY COMBATANTS.

"I SEE NO REASON WHY BALANCED SETTLEMENT EMBRACING THESE PRINCIPLES SHOULD NOT BE ACHIEVED ON BASIS OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS. BOTH US AND NORTH VIETNAM HAVE SAID THIS BASIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. I SEE NO REASON WHY POWER OF WORLD OPINION REPRESENTED BY ASSEMBLY SHOULD NOT BE ALIGNED BEHIND THESE PRINCIPLES, AND BEHIND SUCH PLAN AS I OUTLINED LAST YEAR, SO COMBATANTS MAY

~~PAGE 5 RUEHDT 1011 CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
BE ENCOURAGED TOWARDS CONFERENCE TABLE. AND I SEE NO REASON WHY NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY, THOUGH ALL MUST ACCEPT THAT THEIR PROGRESS WOULD BE IMMEASURABLY EASED IF ALL HOSTILITIES HAD CEASED BEFOREHAND. I APPEAL TO ALL GOVTS REPRESENTED HERE WHO AGREE WITH ME TO MAKE THIS KNOWN, IN WHATEVER WAY THEY THINK BEST, TO THOSE ENGAGED IN CONFLICT WHO HAVE SO FAR IGNORED BOTH NEED AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEGOTIATION.  
END QTE.

DECON UPON RECEIPT.

RUSK

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