

SANITIZED

59

Monday, Sept. 25, 1967
11:15 a. m.


MR. PRESIDENT:

This is mainly interesting because of the more
mature North Vietnamese assessment of
U. S. politics.

From file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment



1.3(a)(4)

cc: Mr Goldstein

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-401
By cb, NARA, Date 9-19-95

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-406

By 06, NARA, Date 7-21-95

59a

Saturday, September 23, 1967

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

Text:

In early September 1967, North Vietnam [REDACTED] said, "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam will definitely commence negotiations as soon as the United States stops bombing North Vietnam. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam will under no circumstances enter into any conversation with the United States Government while bombing continues, but the bombing is the only obstacle to negotiations." [REDACTED] as to what would be talked about at such negotiations, [REDACTED] "Everything, but it is premature to discuss this while the bombing continues."

1.3(a)(4)

Discussing the effect of internal United States opposition to the Vietnam war, [REDACTED] although the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was encouraged by the extent of internal United States opposition, the North Vietnamese Government has come to the realization that it ought not to over-estimate the effectiveness of such opposition. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has observed that opposition so far has had no effect on United States Government policy. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] opposition can be counterproductive in that the head of a government does not wish to give the impression he is negotiating under pressure; nevertheless, [REDACTED] "It is up to the United States to make the first move by stopping the bombing."

[REDACTED]