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Thursday, September 28, 1967
9:25 a.m.

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from file

Mr. President:

I have not yet received Acting Sec. Nitze's and Acting Chairman Johnson's responses to Westy's cable of recommendations yesterday -- promised to me for 9:00 a.m. -- but I think you will wish to read Bob Ginsburgh's independent check list; although Bob feels you will wish to defer to the formal recommendations coming from DOD.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rla

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By EG, NARA, Date 10-9-91

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

19a

28 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

1. General Westmoreland's message on the DMZ situation is sober and well balanced. His recommendations are reasonable and should be implemented to the extent feasible.

2. Recommend that the President:

a. Leave the decision to General Westmoreland -- unless he requests guidance -- on whether or not to anchor the main defensive line on Route 9.

b. Take no steps to allocate additional tac air sorties to the DMZ area. General Westmoreland has the necessary authority and he and General Monnier have already allocated more sorties than they have been able to use.

c. Direct the employment of the B-52's immediate surge capability to the maximum sustainable rate within current resources.

d. Delegate to CINCPAC and CINCSAC, acting jointly, authority to conduct B-52 raids up to 17° 10'.

e. Authorize achievement of a 1200/month sortie rate for the B-52's as soon as possible.

f. Direct the deployment of a sound and flash unit to SVN by air as soon as possible (perhaps by mid-October).

g. Query MACV and CINCPAC to see whether any additional naval gunfire units could be made available (beyond those just authorized by CINCPAC) and whether they could be usefully employed.

h. Query SecDef and JCS as to:

(1) Possibility of accelerating the arrival of programmed tactical units (some acceleration is possible).

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-400

By 120, NARA, Date 4-5-95

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(2) Possibility of accelerating issue of M-16s to ARVN.

i. Direct SecDef and JCS to keep you informed on

(1) Studies to use larger bombs on B-52s.

(2) Effectiveness studies on use of MK-36 destructors.

j. Query SecDef, and possibly Sec AF and Dr. Hornig, on feasibility of intensifying research and development for target acquisition.

k. Direct the JCS to have plans prepared for mounting commando (or larger) type raids against artillery sites in NVN. Request their recommendation as to whether plans should be implemented.

l. Direct JCS to assume for planning purposes that they will subsequently receive authorization to conduct a shallow airborne/amphibious invasion as soon as feasible next spring or summer (objective to avoid a similar situation a year from now).

m. Direct SecDef and Sec State to review jointly the possibility of stationing additional B-52s in Thailand and the desirability of authorizing overflights of Laos.

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ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

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