

Thursday, Oct. 19, 1967
11:45 a. m.

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MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the JCS takes a dim view of Senator
Symington's proposal.

W. W. R.

Pres. file

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (CM-25x 2697-67 19 Oct 67 - mem to Pres
"Implications of Proposal for Cessation of Hostilities")



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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CM-2697-67
19 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Implications of Proposal for Cessation of Hostilities

1. Senator Symington's proposal would result in relinquishing our present clear-cut military advantages, provide the enemy an uninterrupted opportunity to reconstitute his support base and combat forces and halt current progress toward US objectives.
2. In North Vietnam, the importation and distribution system would be rehabilitated; men and essential war materials could move at will into and within North Vietnam, and into Laos and South Vietnam; port congestion would be relieved; key rail lines and highways would be returned to full capacity; transshipment facilities would be repaired, further dispersed and hidden; air defense units and heavy artillery could be moved south without interference; and units along the DMZ would be brought to full combat status.
3. In South Vietnam, military pressure on VC/NVA units would be relieved; units would be reconstituted and redeployed; base areas would be rehabilitated; unit positions would be strengthened and consolidated; supplies would be replenished; VC terrorism, psychological warfare, taxation and road interdiction would continue; revolutionary development progress would be limited to areas currently held; morale of South Vietnamese forces would suffer and desertion would probably increase.
4. If hostilities were resumed, Free World casualties would be higher and chances of a VC/NVA "spectacular" would be greater. In fact, it is improbable that any feasible post-pause increase in the scope and intensity of our combat operations could offset rapidly the advantages which the enemy would acquire during the proposed cessation of hostilities.
5. In summary, the enemy would receive a military and psychological reprieve and an uninterrupted opportunity to prepare himself for further pursuit of his objectives at a time and place of his choosing.

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By SP1/ADP, NARA, Date 11-14-91

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Earle G. Wheeler

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Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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