

~~SANITIZED~~

41

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 19, 1967 -- 7:55 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

I believe these two intelligence reports of this morning give us as accurate a picture as we are likely to get of Hanoi's intentions if we stop bombing, and their basic view of the pressures that will force us to move their way.

W. W. Rostow

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(a)(4)

18 Oct 1967

18 October 1967

~~SANITIZED~~

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-454

By sig, NARA, Date 10-4-95

WWRostow:rln

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE
IN 74759 *4/2*

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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
~~DDT EXD~~ USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

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1.3(a)(4)

SANITIZED

DIST 18 OCTOBER 1967

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

NJ 94-455

By 06, NARA, Dec 9-6-95

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI

SUBJECT

COMMENTS [REDACTED] ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
SITUATION

1.3(a)(4)

ACQ

SOURCE

1.3(a)(4)

1.

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] WESTERN JOURNALISTS VISITING HANOI
COULD SEE FOR THEMSELVES THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE ARE BEHIND
THE GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE A FEW INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE
BECOMING WEARY OF THE WAR AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT END AT ALMOST
ANY PRICE.

2.

[REDACTED] NO NEGOTIATIONS WOULD

1.3(a)(4)

• (classification) (dissem controls)

TAKE PLACE AS LONG AS THE BOMBING CONTINUED, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IT WILL BE

1.3(a)(4)

NECESSARY TO DEFINE THE OBJECTIVES IN ADVANCE. THESE SHOULD BE THE RESTORATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM AS A WHOLE, AND THE DEPARTURE IN TOTO OF THE AMERICAN FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. THEN ONLY WILL THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE BE FREE TO DECIDE ITS OWN FUTURE. NEVER WILL THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ACCEPT A DIVISION OF VIETNAM IN WHICH THE SOUTH WILL REMAIN UNDER THE "PROTECTION" OF THE AMERICANS. [REDACTED] HE REALIZED THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT YET PREPARED TO ACCEPT SUCH AN OUTCOME AND STILL HOPED FOR THE AGREEMENT OF HO CHI MINH TO A DIVISION OF VIETNAM WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO MAINTAIN A FREE HAND IN THE SOUTH. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

3. IN CONNECTION WITH VO NGUYEN GIAP'S ARTICLE, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WAS BENT ON

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

CARRYING ON UNTIL FINAL VICTORY. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE NATURALLY NOT POWERFUL ENOUGH MILITARILY TO DRIVE THE AMERICANS OUT, BUT THAT AFTER A TIME..PERHAPS EVEN A LONG TIME, THE VIETNAMESE HOPE TO GAIN A POLITICAL VICTORY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE BELIEVED IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE THE MILITARY PROBLEM FROM THE POLITICAL ONE. IN ORDER TO HAVE A SATISFACTORY POLITICAL

SOLUTION, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE VIETNAMESE TO HAVE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF MILITARY VICTORIES. THESE VICTORIES ARE ATTAINABLE IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG FORCES CONTINUED TO FRUSTRATE THE ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY, AS THEY HAVE BEEN DOING. IN THIS

RESPECT, [REDACTED] DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICAN MILITARY LEADERS WILL RISK AN ASSAULT ON NORTH VIETNAM, EITHER FROM SOUTH VIETNAM OR FROM THE NORTH VIETNAM COAST. IF THEY DO INVADE NORTH VIETNAM THE AMERICAN FORCES WILL ENCOUNTER A GUERRILLA ACTION THAT WILL IMMOBILIZE AS MANY MEN IN THE NORTH AS ARE NOW FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH, SO THAT FOR ALL THEIR EFFORT, THEY CAN NOT BE VICTORIOUS. IF AMERICAN TROOPS ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY A LIMITED SECTION OF NORTH VIETNAM, THEY WILL BE SURROUNDED, ISOLATED AND DESTROYED.

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

4. [REDACTED] IN THE EVENT OF SUCH 1.3(a)(4)
AN INVASION BY THE AMERICANS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT
NEED TO CALL ON THE CHINESE OR THE SOVIETS AS NORTH
VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG FORCES ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO COPE WITH
SUCH A SITUATION.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, CINCPAC, PACAF, ARPAC, PACFLT 1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-455

By CB, NARA, Date 9-6-95

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
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STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	OCR	SDO	ACQ
								U.S.A.	ONE	ONE	ONE	ONE	ONE

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CITE

1.3(a)(4)

DIST 18 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM [REDACTED] 26Z

DOI: 14 OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) REPRESENTATIVE
HEDGES ON ANY COMMITIMENT TO NEGOTIATE EVEN IF
BOMBINGS CEASE.

ACQ: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

1. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

THE DRV EMBASSY IN DJAKARTA [REDACTED] REITERATED

CHARGE OF [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

THE HANOI STANDARD CONDITIONS FOR ANY POSSIBLE TALKS, NAMELY THAT AMERICAN BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM CEASE.

2. WHEN [REDACTED] ASKED IF THE DRV WOULD THEN BE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE TALKS IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RESPONDED TO INTERNATIONAL APPEALS FOR A BOMBING HALT, [REDACTED] HESITATED AND THEN STATED THAT THIS WOULD BE AN INITIAL STEP WHICH WOULD DISPOSE HANOI TO CONSIDER OPEN NEGOTIATIONS BUT WOULD REQUIRE EVIDENCE THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF A WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. [REDACTED] THIS SEEMED

1.3(a)(4)

TO BE A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE POSITION OF WILLINGNESS TO TALK IMMEDIATELY UPON CONDITION OF A BOMBING HALT. [REDACTED] DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY, BUT MERELY COMMENTED THAT PRESSURE WAS BUILDING UP WORLDWIDE AND IN AMERICA AS WELL AGAINST THE FUTILITY OF AMERICA CONTINUING TO "OPPRESS THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM". [REDACTED] THIS

1.3(a)(4)

PRESSURE TO DATE HAD HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF THE WAR. [REDACTED] MERELY OBSERVED THAT THE PRESENT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT FOREVER REMAIN IMPERVIOUS TO SENSIBLE OPINION IN ITS OWN NATION AND THROUGHOUT

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

(WHEN FILLED IN)

COPY NO. *yes*

(classification)

(dissem controls)

THE WORLD.

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THIS SEEMED TO INDICATE DRV RENEWED HOPES THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE DETERRED BY CURRENT INDICATIONS OF THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE WAR IN AMERICA, OR WILLINGNESS TO HOLD ON WITH A HARD LINE UNTIL NEXT YEAR'S AMERICAN ELECTIONS WHICH THEY HOPE MAY REVERSE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT POLICY.

4. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (CHARGE ONLY), (CINCPAC POLAD EXCLUSIVELY, SAIGON (AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY)

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)