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Profile

Wednesday, October 18, 1967
6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have marked a number of interesting passages in Amb. Bunker's weekly report to you. My impressions are:

-- We are really fighting two campaigns, one in I Corps under pressure at the DMZ, which is now about half the total war; the other campaign in II, III and IV Corps, which is going well but slowly with reduced contacts and casualties on both sides. This comes out clearly in the population control discussion on page 5.

-- On the whole Thieu seems to be dealing with his political problems intelligently, although we may have a crisis over the Prime Minister yet.

-- The economic situation is improving markedly with a further drop in prices.

-- On the whole, the Vietnam enterprise is a going concern, if we can buy time for it in U. S. politics.

W. W. Rostow
Saigon 8875

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WWRostow:rln

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
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Wednesday, October 18, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 8875)

Herewith my twenty-fifth weekly telegram:

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-449

By sig, NARA, Date 10-23-94

A. General

The political side, the past week, has been a relatively quiet one. While Thieu and Ky have been wrestling with the problems of forming the new government, the campaign for the Lower House has been picking up momentum. The list of candidates has been gradually whittled down from some 1,650 to about 1,200 or an average of a little under nine candidates for the 137 seats. The distribution, however, is uneven since there are, for example, some 217 candidates for the 15 Saigon seats. Our guess is that the voter turnout will be lower than in the Presidential elections with percentage somewhere in the low seventies. There is a build-up of interest, however, in the provinces outside of Saigon. Thieu told me yesterday that he thought the voter turnout in the provinces might turn out to be as high as 80 percent of the registration, but he believed that Saigon was suffering from a more jaded appetite for elections and anticipated a considerably lower percentage here.

General Thieu has been largely preoccupied with the problems of putting together the new government during the past week. While he confirmed to me on October 13 that his choice for Prime Minister remained Nguyen Van Loc and intimated this again yesterday when I saw him in company with Phil Habib and Bill Jorden, he made it clear that he has run into some opposition by some of the Southern Vietnamese to Loc's appointment. Loc has encountered some disfavor among some of these elements since, although a southerner himself, he supported Ky in the struggle with the southern bloc and is therefore considered something of a renegade. Thieu intimated that Loc might find difficulties in putting together a cabinet and he himself would have to make the appointments. He did not want to have the same old faces in the new government. It must show a new face to the people. Probably because of this situation, other names, including that of Nguyen Van Bong, Rector of the National Institute of Administration, and Truong Thai Ton have cropped up again in the gossip. I believe, however, that Thieu will go ahead with the Loc appointment since he has made this the touchstone of his relationship with Ky. I have told him that I feel strongly that this is the most important factor to keep in mind in the formation of the new government and that if he considers the appointment of Loc essential to this, we would support it. It is encouraging to note that Ky commented to the press on October 14 denying the existence of any disagreements between him and General Thieu. He specifically accused foreign newsmen of fabricating "these stories with the purpose of creating disagreement and dissension within the Army of the Republic of Vietnam." He stressed that "nothing can divide the Army."

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Regarding the cabinet, it appears likely that Thieu will retain Tran Van Do as Foreign Minister, although perhaps with a good Deputy as Administrator; General Nguyen Van Vy as Minister of Defense; General Nguyen Duc Thang as Deputy to the Chief of the Joint General Staff, with authority over Regional and Popular Forces and Revolutionary Development training. I again mentioned to Thieu the high opinion we held for Nguyen Huu Hanh, present Minister of Economy, and my hope that he could be persuaded to continue in this post. Incidentally, Hanh, who has just returned from the United States, expressed to Bob Komer his extreme irritation at reports which had been circulated during his absence that he was a candidate for the post of Prime Minister, that he had American support, and that he had submitted to Thieu a proposed cabinet list. He attributed the circulation of these rumors to Ky and Loan and expressed strong resentment of what he considered an effort to undercut him. Like Thang, however, Hanh is inclined to be somewhat emotional and I hope that this tempest too will blow over. I also expressed our good opinion of Pham Kim Ngoc and suggested that he might be a very good choice as Minister of Agriculture; and that a suitable cabinet post for Dr. Phan Quang Dan would help broaden the base of the government. I also expressed the hope that Tran Van Huong could be persuaded to accept the Inspectorate position and Thieu indicated that it was his hope that Huong would accept the appointment and that it would be possible to have him elected Chairman.

In my talk with Thieu on the 13th, I noted that in his speech to the New Senate, he had referred to the need to emphasize the role of the political parties and to respect the right of the opposition as a political reality of democracy. I asked him how he envisaged the development of a party system here. He replied that he thought this would have to come in stages, given the present party fragmentation and the highly individualistic character of the Vietnamese. He thought the first step would be the formation of what he called "groupings" such as those now being developed by Tran Van Don and his associates and by Huyen Van Cao and Nguyen Gia Hien who have announced the formation of the National-Democracy-Society Bloc (Quoc Dan Xa). Thieu indicated that he rather favored the group being formed by Cao and Hien. He said also that Ha Thuc Ky and Tran Van Huong were considering another "grouping". He thought that after the Lower House elections and the organization of the National Assembly, these "groupings" would gradually take form and begin to attract other elements to them.

In answer to my query as to how he anticipated marshalling support for government policies in the new Assembly, he said he anticipated that when the government program was announced it would draw support of some of the groups being formed within the Assembly. This might be the beginning of the formation of a larger party and the same process might be followed in the formation of an opposition party or parties. He thought, however, the process could not be forced

and that it would take some time. He remarked that the new administration had been elected for a four-year term, which gave time to work toward the development of parties on a sound basis. To force the issue too rapidly could result in the formation of alliances with little stability. It would be preferable to see first how the "groupings" took shape and to work a little more slowly but perhaps more soundly toward the eventual coalescence into larger parties.

Regarding the Buddhist problem, which I have discussed at some length in previous weekly telegrams, Thieu told me he was continuing to work through intermediaries with both sides and felt that some progress was being made. He said yesterday that he hoped to be able to meet personally with the two main Buddhist factions perhaps today or tomorrow. I noted that the issue had been defused for the present. Tri Quang has been very quiet and the funeral in Can Tho on October 8 for the Buddhist nun who burned herself to death was very orderly and resulted in no serious problems. Buddhist protest activity elsewhere in the country, stimulated by the extremist An Quang Pagoda crowd, has been handled with suitable finesse by the local authorities. Thieu said yesterday that Tri Quang had remarked that the religious problem could be easily settled, but it was the political problem with which he was concerned; an observation, Thieu remarked, which indicates Tri Quang still harbors resentment against the government and has designs against it.

In my conversations with Thieu on October 13 and 17, we reviewed the prospects for further reinforcement of the Thai contingent in Vietnam and the announcements by Australia and New Zealand of the increase of their contingents.

Thieu said that naturally he was greatly pleased with the prospects of additional aid, but that the Government of Vietnam also must and would step up its own efforts. He said that additional manpower requirements for military needs in 1968 would come to 206,000 which included covering an additional 65,000 men for the armed forces, casualties, desertions, and other losses. In order to meet these requirements, it would be necessary to draft 18-and 19-year classes, to extend the service of those now in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and to recall some men who had been demobilized. (General Westmoreland has pointed out the serious deficiencies developing in leadership, particularly in the rank of captain.) Thieu said he proposed to take these steps before the inauguration of the new government in order to avoid running into protracted debate in the new National Assembly. He added that active steps would have to be taken to root out corruption in the military and civil administrations and that reorganization of both the armed forces and of the civil administration must be tackled promptly. The new government would have to show through its efforts that it was determined to do its full part to shorten the war. He emphasized again yesterday the impatience of the people to see things move ahead and the fact that they were looking to the new government for action.

In my talk with Thieu yesterday, we referred to his statements about an approach to Hanoi and had a brief discussion on the matter. I shall report on this separately in more detail. Phil Habib explained that Secretary Rusk had wished him to say that our determination had been clearly expressed and would continue to be so expressed, but we also had kept all the doors to peace open and would continue to do so, but as of today there had been no response from Hanoi. Thieu responded that on their part they would like to show that even though this country is invaded, it is anxious for peace and wants to keep the door open. The question is how an approach is to be made. It is clear that his views are still indefinite. He sees two possible approaches:

A. An expression of desire for peaceful settlement and for direct discussions to achieve that end. If this produced a favorable response, Thieu would ask us to halt bombing. We would assume that reciprocal action would be forthcoming from the other side.

B. A halt in bombing to be followed immediately by a message to Ho proposing immediate talks.

The first of the two proposed alternatives seems to me clearly preferable. I told Thieu I would report his views immediately and would come back to him with our reactions. We emphasized the fact that it was important to have the very closest consultation and collaboration on any approach and that it was also important to avoid anything in the nature of an ultimatum. Thieu agreed on both counts and I am satisfied that he will not take action without close consultation and approval on our side.

Regarding the National Liberation Front, he made it clear again that he felt a change of administration offered an occasion to renew the offer of reconciliation. The Government of Vietnam had channels to the National Liberation Front and while a coalition was not acceptable, offers could and should be made to individuals, especially under the National Reconciliation Program. Thieu felt that the front perhaps was in a position to understand better than Hanoi the dismal prospects offered by continuation of the war, that its ability to maintain action for long periods has broken down, that it is unable to mount large scale attacks, had lost momentum and been obligated to disperse into smaller units resorting to harassment and terror as a substitute for the capability which they had previously possessed.

This past week we have particularly benefited from the opportunity to meet and talk at some length with Phil Habib and Bill Jorden. They have put forth very frankly the picture of Vietnamese developments as seen in Washington and have made clear to us, as no written message can, the problems you face at home. For our part, as I think this series of messages has shown, we are urging,

encouraging, pushing, persuading, and suggesting to the Government of Vietnam areas in which its performance should be improved. We continue to anticipate real progress, but, in all honesty, we must say that we don't think the progress can be as dramatic as we would like it to be. As I note below in the political section, we are encountering increased criticism in the Vietnamese press (uncensored since July and increasingly making use of its new freedom) that we are trying to dictate to the Government of Vietnam. We will need to pick the areas where we exert our influence fairly carefully in order not to overload the circuit. We shall be discussing priorities with Phil Habib and Bill Jorden this week. But we will do all that we can to get the absolute maximum of which the Government of Vietnam is capable under present circumstances and do our best to improve its future capabilities.

We also have with us a three-man, top-level delegation from the AFL-CIO, including Joseph Keenan, AFL-CIO Vice President and Secretary of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Richard Walsh, AFL-CIO Vice President and President of the Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees; and Irving Brown, International Representative of the AFL-CIO. They are accompanied by George Delaney, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Labor Affairs. The purpose of the visit is to discuss a union-to-union aid program with officers of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor. However, we feel sure we will get some strong statements of support for our whole Vietnamese policy position, which should be of real benefit.

B. Pacification

The modest but consistent upturn in population and hamlets under Government of Vietnam control, as shown by our new hamlet evaluation system, continued increasing. Secure population increased 92,500, upping the percent of total population secured to 69 percent. Sixty-four hamlets were added to the secure category while Viet Cong-controlled hamlets decreased by 51.

Approximately equal increases in secure population occurred in the Second, Third, and Fourth Corps. First Corps showed a 6,300 decrease, reflecting continued enemy large-unit activity in the northern provinces. In Quang Tri alone there was a decrease of 4,000. Enemy pressure in Quang Ngai resulted in the loss of 6,700 people from the secure categories of hamlets. In the Second Corps, Binh Dinh showed the greatest improvement with an increase of 23,300 people in the highest or "A" category hamlets. Around Saigon in the Third Corps, there was a gain of 25,800 people in secure hamlets in Gia Dinh Province and 7,600 in neighboring Binh Duong. Most notable improvement in the Fourth Corps took place in Vinh Long and Kien Giang Provinces. Nowhere in the Second, Third, and Fourth Corps was there any significant loss of population control.

Refugees -- The Senate Hearings and a concurrent set of adverse news articles seem to have given a negative cast to the growing U. S. /Government of Vietnam refugee effort out here. As in almost every other field, we still have a long way to go in cranking up the Government of Vietnam to adequately care for its refugees. But this should not be allowed to obscure the more important fact that we have come a long way, especially in the last six months. We and the Government of Vietnam have steadily increased the amount of dollars, piasters, commodities, and effort employed in refugee care. Once again, the problem is one of the press accentuating the negative and ignoring the positive. In this case, the chief culprit was UPI.

C. Military

The military situation was somewhat less active during the past week.

The enemy has failed in his objectives at Con Thien and paid a tremendous price in the process. General Westmoreland reported that during the past month the greatest concentration of conventional fire power in the history of warfare was applied to the enemy in this area. He attacked last week with one battalion, probably in order to save face, but was driven off. Shelling has been reduced, but Intelligence indicates that he is still trying to get in supplies and ammunition although further hampered by the flooding of the Ben Hai River.

The military situation was not particularly active in the rest of the country except for a heavy action yesterday half-way between War Zone C and D on the boundary between Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces, in which 61 U. S. and more than 100 of the enemy were killed. This appears to be a major base area, stockpiled with rice and ammunition.

A further dramatic development during the past week has been the capture of a large arms, ammunition, and medical cache by the Ninth Division east of Saigon at the boundary intersection of Bien Hoa and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. The hill included 75 MM. howitzers and recoilless rifles, 57MM. recoilless rifles, 60MM. and 83MM. mortars, 159 machine guns, nearly 1,000 small arms, large quantities of ammunition, and medical supplies.

Yesterday a group of North Vietnamese soldiers on the Bong Son Plain, Binh Dinh Province, Central Coast, flagged down a U. S. helicopter and surrendered. They led the Americans to another group of six North Vietnamese soldiers who surrendered. They were part of a group of 200 North Vietnamese whose base camp was subjected to U. S. air strikes, killing 50 and scattering the rest into the jungle. This is interesting because:

A. The group, on surrendering, displayed a psychological warfare leaflet dropped by American planes.

B. The incident reinforces statements of prisoners of war and in captured documents about hardships of North Vietnamese soldiers and weakened morale.

C. The flagging down of a U. S. helicopter with a white flag is more risky to the surrenders and greater evidence of hardships and weakened morale than the occasional individual North Vietnamese Hoi Chanh or prisoner of war's surrendering on the battlefield. A clipping of Saigon news story is being pouched.

General Westmoreland has moved a brigade of the First Cavalry Division to Quang Tin Province so that Marines could be moved further north to counter the threat to Quang Tri.

D. Political

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(a) (5) I have mentioned Prime Minister Ky's denial of any disagreements between him and General Thieu. According to a [redacted] Ky on October 9 indicated that he envisaged for himself a major role in effecting reforms in provincial administration, while looking to the future Prime Minister to concentrate on economic and educational matters. Ky indicated that he saw a need to remove about 30 of the existing province chiefs and their staffs, replacing them with about 150 of the most highly regarded majors and lieutenant colonels in the Army, who would first be assigned to a four- or five-week training course in early December. This would, I feel, be a major shakeup, since there are 44 provinces in South Vietnam. It is encouraging to see Ky addressing himself to a major problem -- the quality of provincial administration -- which is directly related to the potential effectiveness of the whole pacification program.

I have referred to the fact that the Lower House elections campaign is attracting increased public interest as election day, October 22, approaches, especially in the provinces. By contrast to the Presidential and Upper House elections, when people in the provinces did not know the candidates at all well, in many cases they know the candidates for the Lower House and see in the outcome a direct relationship with their interests. On the whole, I get the impression the elections are going well. Of the more than 1200 candidates for 137 seats, almost 300 are government officials, about 200 are school teachers, 150 are military officers, 150 are businessmen, 125 are professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.), about 100 are members of provincial and village councils, and 40 were members of the constituent assembly. Only about 70 are farmers, but this is typical of an under-developed country, where a "farmer" is a "peasant," having had little opportunity for education in the past.

Although 1200 candidates is a large number for the 137 seats, this represents a substantial reduction from the 1650 who originally filed for the elections. Many withdrew, and a number were challenged by local election councils. One candidate, an Army of the Republic of Vietnam captain, was assassinated by the Viet Cong in Long An Province on October 12. Of those challenged under the law, a total of 152 were reviewed by the Central Elections Council in Saigon, and 54 were found qualified to run. I have the impression that considerable care was exercised in this process. The people will in any case have a substantial range of candidates to choose from.

Following the inauguration of the Senate on October 11, which I mentioned in my twenty-fourth weekly telegram, the first working session was held on October 12. Deputies were appointed by consensus to assist the Acting Chairman, who is the eldest Senator and who has not previously presided over a legislative body, and the Acting Secretary General, who is the youngest Senator and a Montagnard whose knowledge of Vietnamese has some limits. Messages are being drafted to be sent to the nation as a whole, to the U. N., and to the parliaments of friendly nations. In addition, there was inconclusive discussion of a possible resolution calling on the government to amnesty a considerable number of prisoners in celebration of the election of the Senate. Finally, temporary committees on validation of the election of the Upper House and on rules were appointed. At the request of General Tran Van Don, who is one of the main candidates for Chairman of the Senate, we provided a copy of the U. S. Senate rules and procedures for the use of the Vietnamese Upper House. All in all, the Upper House is off to a good start, has a good and effective membership, and gives promise of turning in a good performance.

Stimulated in part by the Martin and Perry articles in Newsweek (discussed in my twenty-fourth weekly telegram) and in part as a result of greater press freedom since the abolition of press censorship in July, there has been a growing number of articles and editorials in the press critical of alleged U. S. infringement on Vietnamese sovereignty. While many of the articles refer specifically to the Martin and Perry articles, assuming them to have been officially inspired by the U. S. Government, other articles take off on other irritants in U. S.-Vietnamese relations. The critical themes focus on the following allegations:

A. The U. S. intends to decide on peace negotiations without consultation with the Vietnamese, despite the fact that it is the Vietnamese who should have the ultimate say in any negotiations.

B. The U. S. is increasingly following in the footsteps of the French in seeking to control all internal affairs of Vietnam.

C. U. S. policies cause the war to be prolonged by giving the enemy encouragement to continue the struggle and by sowing dissension among anti-Communist Vietnamese.

I do not believe anti-Americanism has reached a level of intensity which could be considered critical. We must expect, however, that such allegations are almost certain to be heard with increasing frequency with the development of open political activity, including an elected National Assembly, and with an uncensored press to originate and stimulate discussions on many of them. Statements by prominent Americans on Vietnam get extensive play in the Vietnamese

press, particularly those which are more critical of the Vietnamese. We have seen quite a few such statements from prominent Americans outside the Executive Branch of our government in recent weeks. It does only limited good to make clear, as we have, that these statements do not represent the views of the United States Government. The Vietnamese know very well that they have plenty of defects and shortcomings and have a long way to go before they have a government that functions to their own satisfaction. Understandably, they do not appreciate being criticized as sharply as they have been recently by some prominent Americans, and the articles critical of the U. S. in the local press are a reflection of this resentment. It is part of a natural and healthy process, but it adds a new dimension to our relations.

Considering the problem we have had with the American correspondents here and the critical articles they have written, which have, in turn, stimulated some of the adverse comments on the Vietnamese in the United States, it was ironic to read that R. W. Apple of the New York Times blamed the critical articles in the Vietnamese press on the Embassy. Apple, who has been a firm advocate of using U. S. leverage with the Government of Vietnam, claims that we make a practice of going in and hitting the Vietnamese hard on all manner of issues, stimulating Vietnamese irritation and sensitivity. We have commented publicly to the press, in response to questions, that our relations with the Government of Vietnam cover a wide range of common interests and that they are excellent.

Another reflection of our press problems was the effect created by an unfortunately sharply-edited UPI report of a Thursday night press back-grounder held at the Juspao Director's home on October 12. The UPI report alleged that there is extensive graft and corruption in the Vietnamese administration of the refugee program. The AID official briefing the reporters at the back-grounder acknowledged the validity of some of the correspondents' accusations that there was profiteering on the part of an unspecified number of district officials. The statements attributed to him by UPI and distributed in the U. S. on October 14 were not accurate, however. We released a statement on October 15 noting an intensification of our activities in the refugee field with the anticipated arrival of 20 experts in the field of refugee this week. A CBS television interview of October 13 and a longer and more detailed study of the refugee problem by UPI, now underway, should help to place this important problem in better perspective.

The attacks against prominent Chinese continued with an unsuccessful attempt made on October 11 on the life of Deip Van Hung (Chinese name is Yeh Wen Hsing), a member of the outgoing National Assembly and a candidate for the Lower House. The Chinese Ambassador, Hu Lien, told Ambassador Locke on October 3 that recent rash of attacks on the Chinese community is part of a Viet Cong effort, begun about a month ago, to infiltrate and control the Chinese community.

The Viet Cong radio and the Hanoi-controlled Vietnam News Agency reported the Second Congress of Viet Cong Heroes and Fighters was recently held in South Vietnam. The announcement is of interest as containing a reference to the Viet Cong forces as the "Peoples Liberation Armed Forces", possibly a new name which will become standard usage in the future. There is nothing new about the attacks on the armed forces and people of South Vietnam, whose tragic results are set forth below in the section on Vietnamese Killed.

E. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index dropped five points to 290 compared to 295 the preceding week, with prices of protein foods and vegetables declining due to increased arrivals on the market. The Imported Commodity Index rose from 218 last week to 219 this week, with most prices remaining stable.

The Government of Vietnam tax collection for September totalled more than \$1.5 billion compared to \$0.9 billion in the same period last year, an increase of 72.6 percent. Total tax collections in 1967 will probably exceed by one-half billion piasters the \$17.1 billion predicted for 1967. Income tax collections for the first nine months of this year have slightly doubled over those for the same period of 1966, and these taxes represent a significant 17.5 percent of all taxes collected by the Government of Vietnam.

As part of our anti-inflation program, tight piaster expenditures ceilings for 1967 were imposed on the various elements of the U. S. Mission late last year. The results of this piaster control program have been very gratifying: A Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, ceiling of \$42 billion was set -- we now estimate Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, piaster expenditures for 1967 will be only around 37 billion; a civilian piaster ceiling of \$16 billion was established. We now estimate expenditures of 16.7 billion piasters, only slightly above the ceiling in spite of unanticipated heavy spending for housing the greatly increased number of official U. S. personnel. Counting another 1 billion piasters for emergency handling of cargos during the port crisis, this means total U. S. expenditures for the year of less than 55 billion, compared to the ceiling of 58 billion.

Next year, we intend again to carry out an effective U. S. piaster control program, although total expenditures will have to increase by several billion piasters.

Government of Vietnam spending next year will increase substantially, largely because of increases in military and pacification personnel and because of the further expansion and intensification of the pacification program. This increase in spending will result in further inflationary pressures, though we think

they will be manageable. But it is essential that the Government of Vietnam take effective action to increase its tax revenues at a faster pace. We intend to press the government hard on this matter, and hope to see some results. In particular, I want to try to persuade Thieu and Ky to take action now to increase sharply taxes on gasoline and other petroleum products. This is the quickest and simplest way to provide some increased revenue. Automobile gas sells here for only 31 cents a gallon and is far too cheap for an underdeveloped country, let alone for a country at war.

An interesting item and an indication of progress is the fact that high profits earned by vegetable farmers in the Dalat area have enabled them to purchase modern agricultural equipment despite high credit costs. Two-wheel, Japanese-made tractors have been particularly popular. Eighty of the 100 Kubota tractors imported by the vegetable cooperative in Tuyen Duc Province have been sold. If credit restrictions were eased, the Government of Vietnam and AID area officials estimate tractor sales could reach 500 per year.

F. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period were 288, lower than the 1966 figure of 315 for the same period last year. The lower rate may in part reflect the continuing uncertainty on the Government of Vietnam side pending formation of the new government, which may have hampered activity designed to increase the flow of returnees. There is a question as to whether we will match in 1967 the spectacular rise that took place in the last two months of 1966.

However, the Government of Vietnam administration of the Chieu Hoi Program continues to improve without loss of momentum. Starting this week, the first 10 Army of the Republic of Vietnam reserve officers hired and trained to replace ineffective Chieu Hoi leaders will start work. A total of 25 of these officers will enter on duty this month, and an additional 25 next month. The total number of Chieu Hoi returnees so far this year is 23,906.

G. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending October 14, the enemy killed 103 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 143 and kidnapped 55. Among the dead were three Village Chiefs, 1 Village Council Member, Four Hamlet Chiefs, one policeman, and one newspaper editor. During the week the enemy killed 230 Vietnamese military personnel. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed a total of 2,710 civilians, wounded 5,409, and kidnapped 3,737.