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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-453
By cb, NARA, Date 4-11-95

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Pres file

Tuesday, October 31, 1967
7:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

The gut of this long cable is that Sec. Rusk and Under Sec. Katzenbach believe it would be a good idea for Harriman to visit Bucharest on his return journey from Pakistan.

If Maurer accepts, Averell might stop in certain other East European countries.

I see no harm in this and some possible good.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

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WWRostow:rla

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Amembassy BUCHAREST (PRIORITY)

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E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-451

By CL, NARA, Date 3-30-95

REF: Bucharest 604

1. Your excellent account of interview with Maurer has been studied with great interest.
2. Please make appointment with Maurer as soon as possible and during that discussion, express, on behalf of the President, appreciation of Maurer's account and gratitude for his own valuable observations. You should express the President's personal satisfaction at Maurer's having accurately conveyed to the North Vietnamese leaders the interest of the USG in working for a settlement of the Viet Nam problem on the basis of full freedom for the South Vietnamese to determine their own destiny. The President also welcomed Maurer's telling the North Vietnamese that he found the

S/AM: DIDavidson/Isham; tvb 7541

S/AM - Governor Harriman

WH -

INR/REA-Smyser

The Under Secretary

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EA - W.P. Bundy

S/S -

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Ambassy BUCHAREST

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

US goal as expressed to him by the President and Secretary of State of a solution within the basic framework of the 1954 Geneva Accords, provided a real basis for discussions. The President believes, that to the extent Maurer succeeded in impressing these basic truths upon the North Vietnamese leaders he performed a very significant service and one in the interests of all nations.

3. Please inform Maurer that Governor Harriman, who is charged with directing the US effort to bring about a peaceful solution in Viet Nam, will be in Pakistan in late November to head the US delegation at the dedication of the Mangla Dam. If Maurer agrees that it would be useful to have further frank and private talks on the Vietnamese situation as a follow-up to his talks with the President and the Secretary of State, Harriman would arrange to visit Bucharest on his return journey. Impression that Harriman visit connected with Maurer's trip might be minimized since Harriman also considering visiting one or two other East European nations such as Yugoslavia. FYI: If Maurer welcomes Harriman visit it is important for us to know whether he regards Harriman visit to other East European capital or capitals as necessary or desirable. END FYI.

4). You should emphasize the importance USG attaches to

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Maurer's conversations with the North Vietnamese and the Chinese and therefore press him for the most detailed and precise accounts of those matters which he has already discussed with you. Unless you think it counter-productive you should enquire about possibility of obtaining further amplification from other Rumanian officials who accompanied him. You should point out our need to be able to differentiate between the North Vietnamese and Rumanian positions as they were revealed in their talks. For example, as reported reftel, Maurer explained Rumanian position as requesting North Viet Nam to declare categorically that in case bombardment ceased unconditionally and forever North Viet Nam would be willing to start negotiations for a solution within the framework of the 1954 Geneva Accords. According to Maurer the NVN replied in a sense which essentially agreed with Rumania, i.e., if bombardment ceased they would be prepared to enter negotiations. The precise wording of the reply is obviously of great significance to the USG. Did Hanoi ask for cessation of bombardment? Did Hanoi use the words permanently or unconditionally? Did Hanoi differentiate (as it has in the past) among contacts, talks and negotiations and which word did they use to describe the discussions that would take place after the stopping of the

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bombing? Was it clear that the stopping of bombing would be followed by talks within a short time? What indications were there of the matters that would be taken up at the talks? What was Hanoi's reaction to Maurer's request that it "categorically" declare its readiness to begin talks after the stopping of the bombing? FYI Usual DRV formulation is that talk "could" follow bombing halt. End FYI

5. Other specific points on which we hope Maurer will be willing to furnish further information include:

- a) Whether the expectation that fighting will continue in South Viet Nam concurrently with negotiations is Rumanian or North Vietnamese and, if NVN, the reasoning behind their expectation.
- b) Whether NVN agreed with Rumania that basic provisions of '54 Geneva Accords provided real basis for discussions. If so, can Maurer provide any specific indication of how North Vietnamese view basic provisions?
- c) What did Hanoi indicate as its conception of conditions under which South Vietnamese people could decide their own destiny?
- d) What "special ties" between South Viet Nam and the

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US did North Viet Nam see as possibly emerging as result of talks ending conflict?

a) What is the basis for Maurer's distinction between the NVN leaders who use their own brains and those who make judgments under Chinese influence? What underlies his judgment that Chinese influence on North Viet Nam "from war viewpoint" is diminishing? What "elasticity" in position of USG does Maurer suggest would strengthen independent elements in North Viet Nam?

f) What further information can Maurer provide as to North Viet Nam's views on reunification of Viet Nam?

g) To what extent did North Viet Nam leaders authorize Maurer to give report to USG?

6. You should enquire whether, since Maurer's conversations in Hanoi, Rumanians have received any indication of Hanoi's reaction to the President's September 29 San Antonio formulation. In connection with this enquiry you should state that the President has instructed you to inform Maurer of two important points:

a) There can be no doubt as to the magnitude of NVN infiltration into South Viet Nam. Through the capture of hundreds of prisoners, thousands of documents, the

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of its forces in the South, to attack our forces from north of IMZ or to mount large-scale visible resupply efforts now impossible it would not be acting in good faith.

7. You should close by again noting USG gratification at the highest levels for Rumanian contribution and enquire what further role Maurer anticipates for Rumania.

END