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Thursday, November 2, 1967
6:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

This conversation between
President Ayub and Amb. Oehlert
covers a number of items which
may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Karachi 807

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WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By ky, NARA, Date 11-20-91

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Wednesday, November 1, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR OEHLERT (Karachi 807)

At 11:00 p.m. Monday, October 30, I received a phone call at my residence from Mansur Ahmad of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that in a telegram from Ankara President Ayub had instructed them to request me to meet with him in Karachi on November 1. I proceeded to Karachi last evening and this morning met with him, Foreign Minister Pirzada and Ahmad for one hour.

Ayub apologized for calling me to Karachi but stated he had gathered information in Romania which he considered could be urgently important to the U. S. Government. He then stated that Chairman Maurer had advised him that approximately one month ago he (Maurer) had visited with Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi and that Minh had stated that:

- A. North Vietnam does not insist on a unified Vietnam;
- B. North Vietnam does not insist on any settlement which would result in loss of face to the U. S. Government;
- C. A bombing pause would lead to negotiations but apparently no time element indicated;
- D. It was recognized that the withdrawal of the U. S. Government and allied forces would have to be accompanied by both Vietnamese withdrawal and also by the creation of an international presence in South Vietnam to supervise a referendum and to keep the peace;
- E. Upon Maurer's request of Minh as to why he did not signal this to the U. S. Government, Minh replied that to do so would be to surrender;
- F. Ayub indicated to me that he believed that Maurer would be more than willing to try to maintain a dialog with Minh if the U. S. Government so desired;
- G. Ayub questioned Maurer about the North Vietnamese ability to continue the conflict and elicited the reply that while industry was leveled on the ground, food supplies were adequate, military supplies generous from the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R., and that underground facilities provided for minimal non-military industrial requirements;

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-476

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~By 1-10-95, NARA, Date 1-10-95

H. In all this context, Ayub added that:

On his recent trip to the U.S.S.R., Kosygin had indicated to him that if Vietnam were settled then the U.S.S.R. could and would come to a harmonious agreement with the U. S. Government on all other outstanding issues but for its position in the Communist world vis a vis the Chinese Communists could not proceed cooperatively with the U. S. Government before Vietnam was resolved;

De Gaulle had just stated to Ayub that in his opinion, the U. S. and U.S.S.R. could and would find total accommodations albeit not friendship, if Vietnam could be gotten out of the way.

Ayub added that throughout their talks, De Gaulle had never spoken of or referred to the U. S. with rancor and while he had pressed Ayub for a joint condemnation of U. S. policy in Vietnam, he had yielded to Ayub's insistence that their joint communique in this area be tailored to Ayub's formula of peaceful self-determination.

Ayub then turned to the subject of CENTO, making the following points:

A. The original military purposes of CENTO have disappeared both because the U.S.S.R. no longer constitutes a military threat and also because the U. S. was no longer affording full military support to CENTO. To my question about the Chinese Communist threat, he responded that they were incapable of seriously threatening anyone.

B. He added that his own military supply picture was so desperate that he could not use up anything by participation in joint maneuvers or exercises.

C. The U.S.S.R. was pressing him about CENTO but he had stated to them that apparently U. S. policy considered the continued existence of CENTO to be important and that he would not do anything to hurt his American friends.

D. He then stated that in his opinion, the future of CENTO lay in the direction of joint economic developments, citing micro-wave as an excellent example of such a project which also had military undertones in that it represented a facility which had both great peaceful uses and also afforded fall-back military usefulness should the need ever arise.

Finally in his context he suggested that serious thought be given to the establishment of a joint study team to develop a general program for further orienting CENTO toward the economic field and later identifying specific projects. He indicated that both Iran and Turkey concurred in this view.

Having spoken of the military aspects of CENTO and his reasons for non-involvement in them, he reverted to the tank issue renewing his "need" for 500 tanks to restore his accepted force levels and his preference for U. S. equipment.

I told him of my recent conversations with the Pakistani Finance Minister and Secretary [REDACTED]

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Emphasizing that I was referring only to the possibility of 100 tanks, even about which the U. S. would need Congressional consultation with no guarantee of the outcome, and that the request for a second 100 tanks could be discussed only when the question of the first 100 had been disposed of. I indicated the possibility that excess M47's might be generated from countries other than [REDACTED]. He interrupted to say "100 are no good". I asked him if that indicated that he had no interest in discussing the possibility of only 100, to which he replied that he certainly did have but that he badly needed more. Before I could identify the other possible countries, he named [REDACTED]. When I indicated that the U. S. had received no formal requests from these countries to Pakistan and that the U. S. would understand it if Pakistan decided to consult discreetly with these possible sources, he did not indicate whether he had or would initiate such consultations. [REDACTED]

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Next I reverted to my previous conversation with the Pakistani Minister and Secretary of Defense in the context that in order to determine whether any tanks were justified in the context of our military supply policy we would need to know how many Chinese Communist tanks Pakistan had received, what others might be committed from that or other sources, whether an obsolete tank would be scrapped for each U. S. -controlled tank acquired, and whether Pakistan would commit itself not to acquire tanks from other sources.

He then said that he was confused as to just what our military supply policy is and I again explained that the U. S. was striving for a military balance on the subcontinent and attempting to lower the level of military expenditure so that more resources could be devoted to economic development. He commented that he understood and concurred in this policy but that the trouble was that India was not complying with it.

After some sparing in which he indicated that the U. S. should tell him what it is prepared to do to help him obtain equipment needed to achieve agreed upon force levels before he told us precisely what he had, he did indicate that he would instruct the Defense Minister to review precise figures with me and that if his minimal requirements could be met in U. S. equipment he would undertake first to scrap one obsolete tank for each new one acquired and second, not to seek or accept additional equipment elsewhere. Since he several times referred both to need for 50 tanks and request for 200 tanks, it is uncertain which figure he regards as minimal requirements. He raised no question of equipment other than tanks, but of course this by no means precludes subsequent reversion to aircraft and artillery.

After thanking him for the improved balance in press treatment, I told him that Governor Harriman would head our Mangla Dam delegation at which he expressed great pleasure. Without my requesting an audience, he said that he would look forward to a private meeting with the Governor and me and that he would also be glad to receive the other delegation members. Both he and Pirzada assured me voluntarily that our delegation need not be limited to five or any other number and that they would be happy for it to be any number we found convenient. Both he and Pirzada agreed there should be no publicity yet about composition of the delegation and that at our appropriate time, there should be a joint Pindi-Washington release.

I reported my wheat conversation with Finance Minister Uquaili and thanked Ayub again for the renewed assurances that any commercially purchased wheat would be purchased from us. I again reviewed with him the significance of a purchase and referred to the possibility of credit, pointing out that such arrangements would not require any actual cash payments until one year after final delivery when the first one-third would be due. He said "It seems such a small thing in your context but so important to us. Is it really all that important?" He made no response to my observation that though the amounts were small the importance lay in the area of Congressional relations. I have the impression that if pressed, there is at least a fifty-fifty chance that he would agree to purchase half of the remaining 234,000 tons over Uquaili's objection. I shall await your instructions.

To my suggestion that I have an early appointment with him to introduce and have a working visit with Bill Kontos, he responded affirmatively and willingly.