

43
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-456

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By CB, NARA, Date 4-5-95

Pres file
Monday, November 13, 1967 -- 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Meeting with Amb. Bunker at 11:00 a.m. today.

You need no help from us on this meeting. But you may wish to cover these points.

1. Thank him for the election, which you gave him as his first primary task. Remind him of the other two points: take care of his health and get the people he wants.
2. Acceleration in the South. At your instruction I told Amb. Bunker to be prepared to answer the question: What four or five programs would most accelerate progress in the south in the months ahead? The consensus reached in Nick Katzenbach's Vietnam Committee (attached Tab A) is:

- Anti-corruption effort.
- ARVN performance.
- Anti-infrastructure efforts.
- Building political institutions.
- Economic stability.
- Efforts to get GVN into contact with VC.

You may wish to hear him out and raise these issues with him?

3. BUTTERCUP. You may wish to ask his assessment of this contact. (We should get out a message of guidance on BUTTERCUP today. We have been holding up awaiting Ellsworth's return.

4. Bunker's schedule: Congressional, press, and TV contacts.

You may wish to go over the schedule (Tab B) emphasizing the points it would be most helpful for him to underline; for example --

- the growing desire and will of the South Vietnamese to take a larger hand in their own destiny;
- the improvement of the ARVN;
- evidence of progress in population control, pacification, etc.
- plans and prospects for the new government.

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- 2 -

5. In particular, you may wish to decide what line to take with the press, if you have a joint session with the White House press corps at the end of the meeting -- which George Christian says is now planned.

W. W. Rostow

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-478

By , NARA, Date 4-3-76

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Highest Priority Areas in Viet-Nam

Our group (Paul Nitze, Bus Wheeler, Walt Rostow, Dick Helms, Averell Harriman, Paul Warnke, Phil Habib, Bill Bundy and myself) addressed the question of what areas should receive the maximum attention and effort by the US in the next year in Viet-Nam.

The list we came up with, without dissent, concentrated on six main themes. They are chosen as themes with a potential short-term payoff, either here or in Viet-Nam. While we make an extra push on them, we should continue our normal efforts, although I have a growing suspicion that we could make some cutbacks in some of our programs without damaging our over-all effort; this can only be done, however, with Ellsworth's full backing and participation.

Our list is quite similar to the present Mission priorities, so I think you will find Ellsworth in basic agreement with us.

These are the items:

1. Anti-corruption effort--There was unanimous agreement that a visible and credible anti-corruption effort would help a great deal in improving the Administration's position, and in building a more effective GVN. (Bus Wheeler was particularly strong on this point.) Current efforts are still highly ambiguous; the quick trial and death sentence of one unfortunate
"KILLER" IS NOT THE KIND OF SIGHTSHEW, BUT IT'S

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campaign that is essential.

2. ARVN performance--Everything that can be done must be done to make the Vietnamese Army assume a greater portion of the war burden--visibly. While I do not think that we will be able to reduce the US troop role in the next year, we should be able to get more out of the ARVN, and we should have a better press policy to show that this is happening.

3. Anti-infrastructure efforts--This is probably the quickest payoff item around; while the CIA is going all out now on this effort, I think we can and should demand more from the GVN.

4. Building Political Institutions--We all agree that that is important, but unlike Walt Rostow, I tend to doubt that we can anticipate a really dramatic break-through on this one in the next year. The Vietnamese are feeling their way slowly in a world that is quite new to them, and while they learn--and write--the new rule book, they are not going to build great national parties. Any effort that Thieu made in that direction, as Ellsworth quoted Thieu as saying, would turn out to be a new version of the old secret parties which were so hated in Viet-Nam.

5. Economic Stability--I wish we didn't have to put this item on our list, but after analyzing the economic situation we are anticipating a probable inflation of about 40%. At the very best we could reduce it to about 25%, but if things get out of hand there could be as much as a 75% increase.

The projected inflation of 40%--which is about what we are experiencing in 1967--would not only wipe out the effects of any GVN wage increase that is granted, but it would also get the new government off on the wrong foot,

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-3-

and would make any serious anti-corruption campaign that much tougher. Incidentally, if there is a 50% inflation next year, plus a GVN wage increase, the real income of GVN officials and soldiers will be about half of the 1964 level--which itself was inadequate.

6. Efforts to get the GVN into contact with the VC--On this point, only Ellsworth can really make a dent. We can't push the GVN too hard, or they will think we are asking them to commit suicide. But we can definitely push them harder than they have been pushed in the past. There is no reason why representatives of the GVN, or of the legislature, could not meet with representatives of the Front. I do not think that such meetings would leave the GVN divided and on the verge of collapse, as some people do. Furthermore, if the GVN made its willingness to entertain such contacts clear its position and image would be far stronger than at present. Finally, it would be a major GVN response to the growing desire of the South Vietnamese people for some end to the war.

The Mission's List is quite similar to our six items. It covered:

1. Mobilization measures.
2. Reorganization of RVNAF.
3. Reorganization of Civilian Administration.
4. Vital Pacification Measures in addition to above.
 - a. Attack on VC infrastructure.
 - b. Expanded detention centers and related judicial measures.
5. Attack on Corruption at all levels.
6. Economic stabilization measures.
7. Peace to include willingness to seek peaceful settlement, seek out members of NLF and move towards reintegration through national reconciliation.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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November 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Program of Consultation
for Ambassador Bunker

Ambassador Bunker arrives the morning of November 10, a holiday, and will be here for a week or 10 days on consultation. I enclose a proposed program of consultation and other activities for the Ambassador, beginning November 13. On receiving White House approval, the Department will proceed to arrange specific engagements.

Regarding the substance of Ambassador Bunker's discussions here, we suggest the following major topics:

1. Progress in the war and prospects for 1968;
2. Development of effective Vietnamese political institutions and of effective government;
3. Ways to accommodate Vietnamese sensitivities regarding the United States presence and Vietnamese sovereignty;
4. Peace initiatives;
5. United States public's assessment of the war.

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proposed program

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Proposed Program of Consultation
for Ambassador Bunker
November 13-18

Monday, November 13

Morning

The President
Public appearance with the President at White House

Afternoon

The Secretary of State
The Vice President

Tuesday, November 14

Morning

Today's Show (Washington)
The Secretary of Defense

Afternoon

The Under Secretary, Mr. Katzenbach

Wednesday, November 15

Morning

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Afternoon

Governor Harriman
Ambassador Lodge

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-2-

Thursday, November 16

Morning

House Foreign Affairs Committee

Afternoon

Ambassador Goldberg

Friday, November 17

Morning

Mr. Gaud
Mr. Helms
Mr. Marks

Afternoon

JCS

Saturday, November 18

Morning

The Secretary of State
The President

Evening

Major speech in New York or elsewhere away from
Washington

Sunday, November 19

Joint TV appearance with General Westmoreland on
discussion type program

Evening

Departure

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