

QUESTIONS THAT MAY BE RAISED BY THE PRESS

General Westmoreland

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drafted by  
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1. At the present rate, when do you estimate the war in Viet-Nam will end?  
One year? Two years? Five?
2. Isn't it true that the Viet Cong can today do pretty much what they have been able to do for a long time--cut any road, hit any airfield, bombard any U.S. or Vietnamese base? Can't they overrun practically any village in the country if they really want to? If so, how meaningful is the so-called "progress" we hear about?
3. Officials in Saigon have talked often about progress. But the press corps out there which is covering every aspect of the war just doesn't share this opinion. How do you account for this sharp difference?
4. Many reports from Vietnam describe the Vietnamese Army as poorly trained, poorly motivated, poorly led. This has been true for six years at least. Why have the Vietnamese made such slow progress in developing an effective fighting force if they really want to defend their country?
5. Isn't it true that many generals and other high officers in the Vietnamese forces are corrupt and have used their positions to build personal fortunes? How can we expect the ordinary soldier to fight well when he knows this perfectly well?
6. Is anything serious being done to eliminate corruption in the Vietnamese Army and Government?
7. If we thought that stopping the bombing of the North would probably result in negotiations, wouldn't it be worth the risk?
8. Isn't it true that sanctuaries north of the DMZ, in Laos, and in Cambodia have added to VC and North Vietnamese effectiveness? If so, why don't we do something about those sanctuaries? What would be the difference between hitting them and bombing the North?
9. If you could have twice as many men as you now have--and a free hand to do what you wanted--by how much would it shorten the war? Shouldn't we make such an all-out effort?
10. How much is bombing of the North doing to limit the effectiveness of the VC and NVA in the South?
11. If bombing of the North is useful, why don't we step it up? do more than we now are doing?

12. Shouldn't we lift some of the restrictions under which our pilots now operate in bombing the North?
13. Wouldn't it help the military effort if we mined or blockaded all major North Vietnamese ports? Why don't we do it?
14. Would you be in favor of closing the port of Haiphong by whatever means?
15. General Gavin was recently in Vietnam. Did he change his mind about using "enclaves"? Or did he change your mind?
16. What is the effect on our soldiers' morale when they read about anti-war demonstrations in this country? Are they really affected in any way?
17. There are reports of increasing friction between Vietnamese and American forces, that the Vietnamese are also getting tired of so much American advice? Is there any evidence of this? Are you doing anything to counter it?
18. It is reported that you have not this time asked for additional forces--but that you want those already authorized to arrive sooner. Are you going to reach 525,000 sooner than originally planned?
19. Are any major changes going to be made in our actions as a result of your present consultations?
20. You have been quoted as saying we could begin to reduce the size of our forces in Vietnam in two years. Secretary McNamara made a similar forecast in 1963. Why do you think your estimate is better?
21. How long do you think it will take before we can withdraw all U.S. forces in Vietnam?
22. Don't most of our estimates of the Vietnamese Army come from American advisers who don't want to admit failure--who want you and other superiors to think they are doing a good job?
23. Isn't it true that despite heavy losses, despite repeated defeats, despite reports of morale problems and the like, that the size of the VC and North Vietnamese main force is about what it has been for the last year or two--and that they fight just as hard and as skillfully?