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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-479
By CL, NARA, Date 4-5-95

82
Pres file

Friday, November 17, 1967 -- 5:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's recommendation -- about which I talked with him on the phone -- that the Alsop material be included in a Bill Bundy speech on negotiations.

He fears that surfacing the material alone would indicate we are drawing back from negotiations.

The Bill Bundy idea is quite good; but Joe will be sore as a boil if we do it that way. Joe does recognize, however, that you can't say anything about these documents until there is negotiating talk -- say, at Christmas.

Therefore, I recommend that Bundy do a speech; and at some appropriate time you say:

-- We want a negotiated peace;

-- But we should not be naive and be aware of Communist attitudes towards negotiations -- referring to documents;

-- And, above all, we should not confuse negotiations themselves with peace.

W. W. Rostow

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S/S 19322

November 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW ←
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Secretary Rusk's Views on Joe Alsop's
Proposal for a Presidential Statement
Based on Captured Documents Outlining
Hanoi's Tough Negotiating Position

Your note of November 9 informed Secretary Rusk that the President wished his views on Joe Alsop's proposal for a Presidential statement based on captured documents outlining Hanoi's tough negotiating position.

The Secretary concurs with Mr. Alsop's objective of bringing home to the American people what a really tough and dedicated bunch the leaders in Hanoi are, and particularly their comments on "fighting while negotiating."

But the Secretary does not believe that a statement on the proposed lines should be made by the President, since this kind of statement would be interpreted as a harsh and negative position on our part and newspaper comment would be apt to emphasize that we have rejected a bombing pause under any circumstances. Instead, the Secretary believes that an Administration official, possibly Bill Bundy, should give a considerably longer speech in the near future on the whole negotiating history. We now have the documents and other materials to say a lot more than we have yet said about Hanoi's attitude at different stages. We need basic material of this sort for wide use, including the activities of the Douglas/Bradley Committee. While the record is largely there for anyone who digs for it, the fact is that it is not pulled together in any one place and that the captured documents in particular have not registered.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJL 94-480
By CG, NARA, Date 1-17-95

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A fair review of the record going back to the beginning of our negotiating efforts would go far to clear the air and put the DRV views as reflected in the captured documents into wider focus while avoiding some of the negative interpretation that might be drawn from the shorter kind of statement Alsop has drafted.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

For the President to emphasize the captured documents would be interpreted by many a pretext for pulling away from our own position on negotiations.

BR

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