

*yes*

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, December 15, 1967  
9:15 a.m.

*Reag*  
12

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy responds to the question you instructed me to ask him about the use of our manpower for combat versus support purposes.

He has some reason for pride (p. 2) in the 40% versus 43% Korea and World War II figure.

*Walt* Rostow

48 ret'd  
12/19

*43*  
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, December 14, 1967  
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

*Re: 12/14/67*

Herewith Westy responds to the question you instructed me to ask him about the use of our manpower for combat versus support purposes.

He has some reason for pride (p. 2) in the 40% versus 43% Korea and World War II figure.

*Wade* Rostow

49a

UNITED STATES MILITARY AIR FORCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Commander  
APO San Francisco 96222

MACJ312

9 DEC 1967

Mr. W. W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Walt:

In reply to your letter of 27 November 1967 and the President's message therein, I assure you that the proper and efficient use of manpower is of continuing concern to me and my staff. Last summer I reorganized my staff to provide for tighter manpower measures in the development of our force structure and the manning of our headquarters. Further in this area I exert a personal and continuing influence on the development of manpower spaces and control.

As you know, we moved rapidly into South Vietnam in 1965-1966 and created a logistical base in an underdeveloped country. This base is now complete and we have turned our diligent efforts to reducing our support elements to the minimum essential. In this regard, a program entitled MAC ECONOMY has been implemented to imbue my entire command with the need for economy. Management actions producing manpower, money, and material savings are continually reported.

It is not always apparent to the short time visitor that approximately 1-2 million persons receive some degree of service support from US military forces. Only 500,000 of this number are US military, the rest are RVNAF, RVMAF and US civilians. The type and amount of support provided varies with the nature and location of the supported personnel and in many cases is not easily identifiable in terms of US manpower. Approximately 16,000 military personnel spaces are dedicated to support for other than US military

MACJ312

Mr. W. W. Rostow

Emphasis on combat power in the development of the Program 5 additive forces resulted in 81 percent being combat and combat support. As a result of this, the current percentage of US forces in combat service support is now 10.3 percent, 17 percent less than in 1966. When considering the overall US military, Free World and Republic of Vietnam military forces only 30.5 percent were engaged in combat service support roles. This compares favorably with 43 percent in World War II and Korea.

Please be assured that I will continue to give my personal attention to the most effective and efficient employment of the manpower resources of this command toward the accomplishment of assigned missions.

Sincerely,

  
W. C. WESTMORELAND  
General, United States Army  
Commanding

Copy furnished:

The Honorable Ellsworth Bunker, American  
Ambassador, Saigon, Vietnam

48-000

UNITED STATES MILITARY AIR FORCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Commander  
APO San Francisco 96222

MACJ312

9 DEC 1967

Mr. W. W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Walt:

In reply to your letter of 27 November 1967 and the President's message therein, I assure you that the proper and efficient use of manpower is of continuing concern to me and my staff. Last summer I reorganized my staff to provide for tighter manpower measures in the development of our force structure and the manning of our headquarters. Further in this area I exert a personal and continuing influence on the development of manpower spaces and control.

As you know, we moved rapidly into South Vietnam in 1965-1966 and created a logistical base in an underdeveloped country. This base is now complete and we have turned our diligent efforts to reducing our support elements to the minimum essential. In this regard, a program entitled MACONOMY has been implemented to imbue my entire command with the need for economy. Management actions producing manpower, money, and material savings are continually reported.

It is not always apparent to the short time visitor that approximately 1-2 million persons receive some degree of service support from US military forces. Only 500,000 of this number are US military; the rest are RVNAF, FVNMAF and US civilians. The type and amount of support provided varies with the nature and location of the supported personnel and in many cases is not easily identifiable in terms of US manpower. Approximately 800 military personnel spaces are allotted to support for other than US military

MACJ312

Mr. W. W. Rostow

Emphasis on combat power in the development of the Program 5 additive forces resulted in 81 percent being combat and combat support. As a result of this, the current percentage of US forces in combat service support is now 10 percent, 17 percent less than in 1966. When considering the overall US military, Free World and Republic of Vietnam military forces only 30.5 percent are engaged in combat service support roles. This compares favorably with 48 percent in World War II and Korea.

Please be assured that I will continue to give my personal attention to the most effective and efficient employment of the manpower resources of this command toward the accomplishment of assigned missions.

Sincerely,

  
W. C. WESTMORELAND  
General, United States Army  
Commanding

Copy furnished:

The Honorable Ellsworth Bunker, American  
Ambassador, Saigon, Vietnam