

ACTION

SECRET

Thursday, February 8, 1968
1:55 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Here are the 8 questions that Gen. Taylor has set out as the basis for the discussion you want organized today.

You may wish to set a time _____;
indicate those you wish to attend the discussion:

W. W. Rostow

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
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *kg*, NARA, Date *13192*



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February 8, 1968

Questions Related to the Military Situation in Viet-Nam

1. What are the problems confronting General Westmoreland if the enemy continues the attacks on the cities and, at the same time, opens up one or more border fronts (e.g., Khe Sanh, DMZ, Darlac-Kontum)?

a. What mobile reserve forces does Westmoreland have to meet these frontier attacks? Can he sustain them concurrently in action? In particular, will he have enough airlift to support and supply all of the actions?

b. With respect to Khe Sanh, what will be the supply problem if the airstrip is kept under artillery and rocket fire?

2. How have the Marines organized Khe Sanh for defense? How many days of supply, particularly ammunition, are in the perimeter? Are these supplies protected from enemy fire?

3. How is weather likely to affect the action along the border? When does it favor us, when the enemy?

4. What is the enemy air capability if he elects to use his IL-28's, MIG's and AN-2's in South Viet-Nam or against U.S. naval targets? Are there any other surprise weapons with which we should be concerned?

5. If we decided to send additional forces to Viet-Nam, what ones are available? How soon could they be deployed and become operational in South Viet-Nam? What would be the effect on our strategic readiness world-wide?

6. In case of an affirmative decision to reinforce, what actions should be taken with regard to extension of tours and terms of service, call-up of reservists, and requests of Congress? Should we reconsider the question of a declaration of war?

7. What would be the domestic and international impact of the foregoing actions?

8. In the light of the foregoing considerations and our estimate of the probable course of events during the next few months, are we satisfied with the military resources presently available in Southeast Asia or should we make a drastic effort to rush additional forces to the area?

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Authority OSD ltr 10-25-78 NSCH 8-1480By ip/rj NARA, D