

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Meeting with the President
Friday, February 9, 1968, 10:30 A. M.

Agenda

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Authority State 313-19, NSC 30780
By 10/1/84, NARA, Date 2-3-92

1. Viet Nam situation (The President)

Questions at Tab A

You might begin by saying: You thought it a good time for us to take stock of the situation in Viet Nam. In particular, you have had prepared eight questions designed to clarify where we stand. The object is to put ourselves in a position to answer the question: Does Gen. Westmoreland have the forces he needs to deal with the next phase of the battle? You could then go into the questions.

2. Korea (perhaps without all the Joint Chiefs)A. The Vance Mission

- when will he be briefed?
- by whom?
- when can the President see his instructions?

B. Next Steps at Panmunjom (Sect. Rusk)C. What Soviet naval forces are in the area? What is their significance?
(Sect. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)D. Should we send another message to Kosygin today? (Sects. Rusk & McNamara)
Draft at Tab BE. What do we do if the North Koreans stall further?

- arbitration offer?
- what are results of soundings with Alex Johnson and David Bruce on free world maritime cooperation against North Korea?
- other measures?

F. Conclusion: Aside from deciding on the Vance instructions and the Kosygin letter, you may wish to close by asking Sects. Rusk and McNamara to focus planning sharply on what we do if Panmunjom stalls. What is the full range of diplomatic and military options? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each? We ought to have this by Monday at the latest.

W. W. Rostow

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February 8, 1968

Questions Related to the Military Situation in Viet-Nam.

1. What are the problems confronting General Westmoreland if the enemy continues the attacks on the cities and, at the same time, opens up one or more border fronts (e.g., Khe Sanh, DMZ, Darlac-Kontum)?
 - a. What mobile reserve forces does Westmoreland have to meet these frontier attacks? Can he sustain them concurrently in action? In particular, will he have enough airlift to support and supply all of the actions?
 - b. With respect to Khe Sanh, what will be the supply problem if the airstrip is kept under artillery and rocket fire?
2. How have the Marines organized Khe Sanh for defense? How many days of supply, particularly ammunition, are in the perimeter? Are these supplies protected from enemy fire?
3. How is weather likely to affect the action along the border? When does it favor us, when the enemy?
4. What is the enemy air capability if he elects to use his IL-28's, MIG's and AN-2's in South Viet-Nam or against U.S. naval targets? Are there any other surprise weapons with which we should be concerned?
5. If we decided to send additional forces to Viet-Nam, what ones are available? How soon could they be deployed and become operational in South Viet-Nam? What would be the effect on our strategic readiness world-wide?
6. In case of an affirmative decision to reinforce, what actions should be taken with regard to extension of tours and terms of service, call-up of reservists, and requests of Congress? Should we reconsider the question of a declaration of war?
7. What would be the domestic and international impact of the foregoing actions?
8. In the light of the foregoing considerations and our estimate of the probable course of events during the next few months, are we satisfied with the military resources presently available in Southeast Asia or should we make a drastic effort to rush additional forces to the area?

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By g/h, NARA, Date 2-2-80

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