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TCZC00A0987  
OO YEKADS  
DE YSNKQA 45 2442643  
O 132036Z ZYH ZFF-5  
FM GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASH DC  
TO MR ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE, WASH DC  
MR CLIFFORD, WHITE HOUSE, WASH DC  
MR RUSK, STATE DEPT, WASH DC  
MR HELMS, CIA  
GEN JOHNSON, CSA, WASH DC  
GEN MCCONNELL, CSAF, WASH DC  
ADM MOORER, CNO, WASH DC  
ZEM/GEN CHAPMAN, CMC, WASH DC  
O 131411Z ZYH ZFF-1  
FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV  
TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC  
GEN WHEELER CJCS  
SMB BUNKER SAIGON  
GEN ABRAMS (MACV FWD)  
ZEM

~~S E C R E T~~ MAC 22063 EYES ONLY

1. A DOCUMENT DATED 9 FEB, PROBABLY WRITTEN BY RANKING CADRE OF MR 5, WAS TAKEN FROM SENIOR CAPTAIN PHAN DUY DAI, A SENIOR MILITARY MEMBER OF THE QUANG NAM PROVINCE COMMITTEE CAPTURED AT DANANG. THIS DOCUMENT IS ESSENTIALLY A CRITIQUE OF THE ENEMY'S TET OFFENSIVE THROUGH 9 FEBRUARY.
2. THE FIRST PARAGRAPHS REITERATE THE STANDARD CURRENT CLAIMS OF VC PROPAGANDA. THE AUTHOR CLAIMS A BRILLIANT VICTORY, DESTRUCTION OF 1500 AIRCRAFT, HUNDREDS OF ARTILLERY PIECES, LIBERATION OF TOWNS AND CITIES AND SO FORTH. HOWEVER, THE REST OF THE DOCUMENT IS DEVOTED TO A MORE REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION.
3. THE DOCUMENT ADDRESSES THE TWO MAIN TASKS OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN--THE "GENERAL COUNTERATTACK" AND THE "GENERAL UPRISING." THE AUTHOR REFERS TO THESE AS "T NO. 1" AND "T NO. 2" RESPECTIVELY. HE DESCRIBES THE ANALYSIS BY THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF MR 5 OF THE DEFICIENCIES IN CONCEPT AND TIMING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE.
4. THE DOCUMENT ADMITS TO A FAILURE OF THE VC TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT "...A BIG MISTAKE." IT ALSO ADMITS TO A FAILURE TO DEFECT RVNAF TROOPS ("MILITARY PROSELYTING" IN VC TERMS), AND TO A FAILURE IN COORDINATING THE ATTACK RESULTING IN PREMATURE ATTACKS.
5. THE AUTHOR ATTRIBUTES THE FAILURES TO WEAKNESSES IN BOTH PREPARATION AND EXECUTION. HE STATES THAT THE POPULACE WAS PASSIVE BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT BEEN POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND ORGANIZED. HE ATTRIBUTES MILITARY FAILURE TO THE TIMIDITY OF MAIN FORCES WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED FOR "CLOSE ATTACKS," I.E., IN THE CITIES. THEY STAYED "OUTSIDE" AND FAILED TO "SERVE THE IMPORTANT POINT." EXECUTION OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS "STAGGERED" BECAUSE SOME UNITS DID NOT RECEIVE A DELAY ORDER FOR "N DAY." (THIS IS OUR FIRST INFORMATION EXPLAINING THE 24-HOUR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MR 5 ATTACKS AND ATTACKS ELSEWHERE.) THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT "MILITARY PROSELYTING" WAS "WELL DEVELOPED," BUT UNCOORDINATED.
6. MR 5 ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL STRATEGY

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By delby NARA Date 2792



(THIS IS OUR FIRST INFORMATION EXPLAINING THE 24-HOUR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MR 5 ATTACKS AND ATTACKS ELEMENTS.) THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT "MILITARY PROBLETTING" WAS WELL DEVELOPED, BUT UNCOORDINATED.

6. MR 5 ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL STRATEGY CONSIDERED THAT THREE OPTIONS OR "CIRCUMSTANCES" ARE NOW OPEN.

A. CONTINUE WITH ATTEMPT TO GAIN POPULAR UPRISING ("2T").

B. GET GENERAL COUNTERATTACK PROCEEDING "TO SOME DEGREE" AND THEN TRY UPRISING AGAIN.

C. GET GENERAL COUNTERATTACK UNDERWAY WITH GENERAL UPRISING STILL NOT POSSIBLE: RETREAT, CONSOLIDATE AND TRY AGAIN AT A LATER DATE. THE AUTHOR STATES THAT THERE WERE A FEW CASES IN WHICH THE GENERAL UPRISING WAS PROCEEDING, E. G., TAM KY. AT SAIGON AND HUE, THE SECOND "CIRCUMSTANCE" PERTAINED, I. E., GENERAL COUNTERATTACK AND GENERAL UPRISING. IN MOST AREAS, HOWEVER, THE THIRD CIRCUMSTANCE, GENERAL ATTACK AND NO UPRISING OCCURRED.

7. MR 5 CONCLUDES THAT STRATEGY MUST BE BASED ON THE FIRST CIRCUMSTANCE. THE "GENERAL UPRISING" MUST BE ACHIEVED WHILE RELATIVELY STRONG FORCES STILL EXIST, RURAL BASES ARE INTACT AND ADMINISTRATION STILL EFFECTIVE. SPECIFICALLY, MR 5 ADVOCATES KEEPING UP TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE CITIES, RESTORING GUERRILLA WARFARE OUTSIDE THE CITIES, AND LAUNCHING CONTINUOUS WAVES OF BIG ATTACKS. POLITICALLY THE NEW FRONT ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED AND EXPLOITED. THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTING A DROP IN MORALE IS TO BE CONSIDERED "IN A CRITICAL AND CONTINUOUS MANNER" BY POINTING OUT RECENT EVENTS AS VC VICTORIES AND EXPLAINING THE RECENT ATTACKS IN THE CONTEXT OF A SERIES OF EVENTS.

8. OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCUMENT CARRIES THE USUAL HAZARDS OF INTERPRETING THE TURGID COMMUNIST STYLE OF EXPRESSION. FURTHER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE DOCUMENT EXPRESSES THE VIEWS OF BUT ONE IMPORTANT HEADQUARTERS; MR 5'S ANALYSIS MAY NOT PREVAIL IN THE OVERALL REEVALUATION THAT IS CERTAINLY UNDERWAY WITHIN THE ENEMY LEADERSHIP. NEVERTHELESS, WE FIND THESE POINTS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT AND FAIRLY CLEAR:

A. "T NO. 1", THE GENERAL COUNTERATTACK, AND "T NO. 2", THE GENERAL UPRISING, WERE TO BE SIMULTANEOUS, NOT CONSECUTIVE. IT IS NOT SO CLEAR WHETHER THE KHE SANH, DMZ, AND B-3 FRONT ATTACKS WERE TO BE PART OF "T NO. 1." WE BELIEVE FROM OTHER EVIDENCE THAT THEY PROBABLY WERE; THE LACK OF SEPARATE TREATMENT OF THOSE AREAS IN THE DOCUMENT ALSO SUGGESTS THEY WERE TO BE PART OF THE "GENERAL COUNTERATTACK." WE HAVE NO GOOD CLUE AS TO THE REASON FOR THE LAST MINUTE POSTPONEMENT ORDER FOR "N DAY", BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN DUE TO PROBLEMS IN GETTING THE NVA ATTACKS IN REMOTE AREAS UNDERWAY.

B. THE ENEMY REALIZES THAT HIS EFFORTS HAVE LARGELY FAILED. MR 5 SEES NO REAL ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUATION OF ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE A GENERAL UPRISING AND IS WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF RECENT EVENTS ON THE MORALE OF CADRE AND THE RANK AND FILE.

C. ~~THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT A GENERAL UPRISING WAS EXPLOITED AT~~

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C. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT A GENERAL UPRISING WAS EXPECTED AT HIGH LEVELS, AND WAS NOT MERELY A CYNICAL PROPAGANDA PLOY TO INSPIRE THE LOWER ECHELONS.

D. IF MR 5'S VIEWS PREVAIL, THE ENEMY WILL STRIVE TO KEEP UP CHAOS WITHIN THE CITIES, PREVENT THE RETURN OF STABILITY, AND LAUNCH ADDITIONAL LARGE-SIZED ATTACKS--ALL STILL DESIGNED TO PROVOKE A GENERAL UPRISING. HOWEVER, MR 5 MAY BE ADVOCATING A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO COSVN OR HANOI.

9. INTERROGATION OF SENIOR CAPTAIN PHAN DUY DAI IS PROCEEDING AND, IF APPROPRIATE, WILL BE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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