

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: General Wheeler's Visit to Vietnam

Reflecting on the possible objectives of General Wheeler's visit, I would hope that he would obtain answers to some of the fundamental questions which are troubling us, derived from detailed private discussions with General Westmoreland and his staff. The questions which need exploring appear to me to include the following:

- a What are Westy's operational plans, force requirements, and force availabilities for the following contingencies?
  - (1) A renewal of the attack of the cities accompanied by simultaneous or successive enemy offensives against Khe Sanh, the eastern DMZ and the Darlac-Kontum border.
  - (2) A spring-summer offensive by friendly forces to regain the initiative and to exploit the weakened condition of the enemy when his offensive has run out of steam.
  - (3) An evacuation of Khe Sanh under attack.
- b How will the defense of Khe Sanh contribute to a major defeat of the enemy? What will be the scheme of maneuver of the reinforcements brought into the Khe Sanh area?
- c Taking the foregoing contingencies into account, what reinforcements will General Westmoreland need during this calendar year?
- d What enemy units have been identified in the attacks on the cities? What uncommitted units are available for a second cycle?
- e What grounds are there for the allegation of an "intelligence failure" at the time of the first wave of attacks on the cities? How does General Westmoreland feel about the functioning of his own and the Vietnamese intelligence services in connection with this situation?

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By copy, NARA.

f What has been the nature of our psychological warfare activities directed at North Vietnam and the VC since January 30?

These are all hard questions for which there are probably no final answers at this time but whatever Bus can bring back will be most helpful.

*MDT*  
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