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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

28 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Enemy Order of Battle

My personal estimate of changes in enemy order of battle in SVN is as follows: (in thousands)

	<u>Oct 1967</u>	<u>End 1967</u>	<u>Pre Tet 1/</u>	<u>Current 2/</u>
VC	60.8	58.9	58.9	40.2 A
NVA	55.1	51.8	71.8	66.2 B
Guerrillas	81.3	72.6	72.6	68.9
Admin Svcs	37.6	37.6	37.6	35.7
Totals	234.8	220.9	240.9	211.0

On the basis of the above, I would make the following observations:

- Enemy strength is at its lowest point since the summer of 1965.
- The proportion of North Vietnamese in enemy main and local forces ^(40%, 30% all) is at an all-time high -- probably more than 70% (since VC units probably have at least 10% NVA fillers).
- The VC will probably attempt an all-out recruitment effort in an effort to restore as much as possible of their pre-Tet strength in main and local forces.
- Guerrilla forces will probably decline still further as they are drawn upon to fill up main and local forces which cannot be brought back to strength by recruitment alone.
- The North Vietnamese may well decide to send between one and three divisions south in an effort to restore previous force levels.

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By ms/rg, NARA, Date 3-4-92

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1/ The 20,000 difference between the end-1967 and pre-Tet figures consists of the two NVA divisions infiltrated since 1 December. Some of these units may have been in place before the end of the year but are not included in the year-end figures.

2/ The current figures were derived on the basis of the following assumptions:

a. Enemy casualties have been 40,000 KIA, 3,000 captured, and 5,000 disabled or died of wounds.

b. These losses were allocated among the order of battle components in proportion to the commitment of these categories to the Tet offensive.

c. The enemy committed about 84,000 to the Tet offensive, consisting of: 45,000 in VC main and local forces; 22,000 in NVA units; and 17,000 from the guerrillas, administrative services, and political military cadre.

d. Gains since the beginning of the offensive have consisted of 7,000 NVA infiltrates assigned to NVA units and 7,000 VC recruits assigned to VC main and local forces.

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ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

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