

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION *29*

Authority OSD to 1018-78, NSC 12-6-78  
By delby, NARA, Date 4-6-92

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Friday, March 15, 1968 -- 4:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 5:00 p.m. Meeting, March 15, 1968

*Pres file*

1. Ask Sec. Clifford to present his recommendations.
2. Questions, if not answered:
  - What level of draft call-ups go with the proposed package: in 1968; in 1969?
  - What are the budgetary implications of the proposed package: for FY 1968; for FY 1969?
  - What end strength figure for the Armed Forces goes with this package: end FY 1968; end FY 1969?
  - I note this package will bring our strategic reserve up to 7 divisions. How would this compare with the reserves before our commitment of major forces in mid-1965?
  - How thin has this package been pared: is the call-up sufficient to backstop the additional forces?
  - Do I take it that I am receiving from the Secretary of Defense a recommendation in which the JCS concurs?
  - How long can we maintain this posture without changing current personnel policies or calling up more reserves?
  - Has this recommended package been communicated to General Westmoreland?
  - Suppose the enemy commits his forces to a simultaneous offensive against: Saigon; Western Highlands; Khe Sanh; Quang Tri; and Hue. Is Westy in a position to deal with such an all-out offensive by the Nor North Vietnamese regular units? In such an emergency, are there any additional forces that could be quickly generated or deployed?
  - What is your present assessment of enemy intentions over coming weeks?

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3. ARVN

- How is recruiting proceeding?
- Do we have a plan to modernize ARVN equipment rapidly?
- If we give the rebuilding and reequipment of the ARVN top priority, does this package cut across that objective? If so, to what extent?

4. Timing.

(Obviously the timing of this announcement must be related to our situation with respect to the monetary consultations and your confidence that we can cover the extra costs fully by increased taxes and reduced expenditures. In any case, Joe Fowler and Bill Martin should be promptly informed of any decision at which you arrive.)

5. Vietnam General Review.

(You may -- or may not -- wish to discuss how we proceed to examine where we go with Vietnam policy after the winter-spring offensive. My strong recommendation is: have a separate meeting on that subject.)

6. Depending on your feeling and judgment at the end of the session, you may wish to:

- arrange for further Congressional consultation and/or leadership meeting;
- give Secretaries Rusk and Clifford guidance on the themes for your speech.

W. W. Rostow

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