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By jm, NARA, Date 91792

April 1, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

In your discussion with General Spike Momoyer this afternoon, you may wish to make the following points:

- The bombing cessation was designed to maximize the chance of a negotiated peace and to unify the country, while minimizing military disadvantages and giving our front line troops essential support.

- Military disadvantages are minimized because (1) key infiltration routes into Laos and SVN are still covered, (2) we anticipate only five to eight good bombing days in the northern route packages, and (3) weight of effort in northern route packages has historically been low (6-15%) in April (see Tab).

You may wish to query him on the following:

- How will the air crews in Vietnam react to last night's announcements?

- How has bombing effectiveness over the past few months compared with previous periods? How did it contribute to Khe Sanh defense?

- Is there anything more that could be done within present ground rules to increase the effectiveness of the air campaign?

- What de-escalatory actions by Hanoi would warrant cessation of bombing throughout NVN? In Laos?

- If Hanoi does not respond favorably to our de-escalatory action, what should we do and when?

Finally, you may wish to ask for his thoughts on a message to our men in Vietnam. (A draft will be available by 6:00 p. m.)

P. S. You might ask him what all the fracas is about in control of Marine air in I Corps?

W. W. Rostow