

## THE WHITE HOUSE

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Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith a capsule version of MACV's pacification reporting for April:

I Corps

- The program's most important feature in April was its stability.
- The provinces can be considered to have recovered from Tet.
- Of foremost importance is the reestablishment of urban security and the opening of LOC's despite night attacks in the cities and only daytime security in the countryside.
- Supplies shortages nonexistent and prices stable.
- Initial anxieties about US intentions being replaced by stronger sense of self-reliance by SVN.

II Corps

- Provincial authorities are on the offensive and recovery programs are essentially completed except for three hardest hit areas.
- Local officials are "showing the flag" and exploiting people's increased anti-VC attitude.
- RF/PF have racked up some impressive kill ratios and police occupy more district positions than before.
- Healthy upswing in commercial traffic from farm to market to towns and cities.
- Yet overall pacification picture is mixed: good progress and prospects in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Bon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh; problems persist in Ninh Thuan and along Route 20 from Dalat to Saigon from increased VC activity, in Dalat from less aggressive RF/PF, and in Darlac because of sizeable refugees.
- GVN mobilization will decidedly effect all programs and ironically may result in sufficient security forces with inadequate civilian infrastructure.
- Tet attacks catalyzed and solidified identity between people and GVN agencies.
- II Corps, now contingency oriented, can meet any situation with confidence that will sustain pacification.

IV Corps

- Trend continued up from Tet; April was most encouraging month in past eight.
- RD teams are entering 1968 hamlets at rate which would have been extremely unlikely 60 days ago.
- Some hamlets with 2 or 3 years of GVN control are more resistant to VC usurpation than was imagined.

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E.O. 12858, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1983

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- Leadership is upgraded at middle and lesser levels; Thang's fame and popularity is spreading into the hamlets.
- VC efforts focus on hamlets where GVN control has been tenuous.
- Aside from military operations, GVN contact with bulk of rural populace is almost non-existent.
- Phoenix/Phung Hoang program is not yet effective.
- General mobilization call causes unrest but overall impact is unclear.

W. W. Rostow

Note: The report for III Corps has not yet been received.

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