

UNCLASSIFIED

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The 7th Cu Chi Local Force Battalion ranged the area north of National Route 1 from Trang Bang to Tan Phu Trung while elements of the 1st MR-4 Battalion generally worked the areas to the north of the 7th Cu Chi Battalion (lower Roi Loi, Ho Bo, Filhol). To the east of Cu Chi, along the western banks of the Saigon, could be found the 2d Local Force Battalion (Go Mon District). All these elements mentioned above drew their indirect fire support, in part, from the 8th Artillery Battalion MR-4. The northwestern portions of the TAOI were the operational areas of the D-14 Battalion (lower Tay Ninh - Roi Loi) and the D-16 Battalion (Straight Edge Woods-lower Tay Ninh). In southern Hau Nghia and northern Long An (the Pineapple) were located the 269th, 267th and the 506th VC Battalions. ~~There were occasional sorties of Main Forces and NVA units both through and into the area from the north, but there had not been any extensive NVA-MF contacts prior to Operation SARATOGA.~~ Enemy offensive activity for several weeks prior to the initiation of Operation SARATOGA was principally of a harassing nature. (Stand off attacks were initiated on several provincial towns as well as Cu Chi Base Camp.) (Occasional attacks on RF/PF Outposts, primarily along Route 1, made up the bulk of the enemy-initiated action. The probable locations and strength of units within the TAOI upon initiation of SARATOGA are shown below:

Super 3-Arms

- Near main Rd

- 1st

Grand  
the  
which  
had  
troops.

UNIT	STRENGTH	LOCATION
1st MR - 4	460	XT5517
8th <u>VC</u> Arty	230	XT6630
269th Battalion	270	XS5197
2nd Go Mon	240	XT7907
7th Cu Chi	250	XT5922
D-14	400	XT5118

(b) Enemy Contact During Operation:

The first significant enemy contact of the operation occurred on the night of 12 December 1967 when elements of the 101st NVA Regiment conducted a coordinated attack on the night location of the 1-27 INF. In this contact, the first by 2d Brigade units against NVA troops in Hau Nghia, the VC suffered 39 KIA (BC). The VC withdrew north into the Ho Bo and were next located on 21 December when 2 Co's of the 2-27 INF ran headlong into one of the 101st Regiment's base areas. The day-long action cost the VC 43 KIA (BC) and gave a hint of the defensive tenacity that could be expected in future operations against similar units. This action added weight to various agent reports that indicated a build up of NVA units and the addition of NVA soldiers to MF and LF units already situated in the area of operations.

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The final operation of the year was Operation "Camdan." This operation lasted 14 days and took place in the Boi Loi Woods and Hobo Woods. The 1st Battalion 8th Artillery supported the 2nd Brigade against the 101st NVA Regiment. The total VC KIA (bodycount) for the 2nd Brigade was 99, and the 1st Battalion 8th Artillery played an important roll in obtaining this count. The last day of the year, 31 December 1967, marked the close of Operation "Camden"; and the close of this summary.

~~144444~~ - Dec 31 67

The first contact

SANATOW

Significant of the operation was also the first contact

against N. Vietnamese soldiers in Hau Nghia province. 101st NVA regiment launched

a night attack on the 1st of the 27th wolfhounds. In this encounter 39 North

Vietnamese were killed and the remainder of their force withdrew into the hobo woods.

The NVA force was next run aground by the 2nd wolfhounds on (Dec.) 21st when one of

In a

the base camps was discovered. day long action the wolfhounds killed 43 but

found the NVA somewhat tougher customers than their VC counterparts. Tough or not

the 1st and 2nd wolfhounds found more NVA members of the 2nd Gomang battalions

Go Mon District  
Thanh An

in base camps on western bank of the Saigon river near Trun ang and killed 89.

Bright,  
J. P. W.  
we had been the  
1944-45  
A depend.

most of Duc Hoa, Duc Hoa and ~~part~~ portions of Chu Chi + Triang Lang  
were openly under Viet Cong control - controlled 60% of the  
population 1966. The enemy was so firmly entrenched that  
the heaviest allied weaponry could not dislodge them. miles of  
elaborate connecting tunnels, trenches, bunkers + underground  
rooms allowed the enemy to laterally maneuver its forces  
below the ground.

2nd - 27th w/hours.