

Cover letter
dated 26 Apr 67

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

USE AS REFERENCE
ONLY - TERRAIN
WEATHER

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION CEDAR FALLS

10 MAR 67

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation CEDAR FALLS was a search and destroy and blocking operation along the SAIGON River to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas, denying the use of the SAIGON River in the sector to VC/NVA forces. This operation was conducted in two phases.

Phase I: (D Day) 25th Inf Div under the guise of normal operations deploys the 196th Bde (reinf) by air and ground means to seize the critical ground overlooking the SAIGON River in the HO BO Woods and destroys VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.

Phase II:

a. (D+1 to D+9) 2d Bde deployed by ground means to blocking positions along the SAIGON River in sector. The 2d and 196th Bdes prevented VC/NVA exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas and controlled the SAIGON River in their sectors to deny its use by VC/NVA forces.

b. Brigade blocking forces conducted detailed search of their sectors and destroyed VC/NVA forces and installations.

2. DATE OF OPERATION: 8 January 1967 - 26 January 1967.

3. LOCATION: Along the SAIGON River from south of the BOI LOI Woods to a line 4 kilometers east of PHU HOA DONG.

NOV
2nd
Battalion
Sims
air
TRAVEL 1

4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: II FFORCEV

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Major General Frederick C Weyand, 8 Jan - 26 Jan 67.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

25th Inf Div:

2d Bde, 25th Inf Div;

1st Bn, 27th Inf
2d Bn, 27th Inf
2d Bn, 34th Armor
1st Bn, 8th Arty (DS)
3d Bn, 13th Arty (-) (GS)
B Co, 65th Engr Bn (-)

TRAVEL
EXP.
DOWN GRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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P. May objectives
Attempt to upset the
enemy in the Iron Triangle
and deny him sanctuary

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196th Inf Bde (LT)(SEP)

2d Bn, 1st Inf
1st Bn (M), 5th Inf
2d Bn (M), 22d Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
F Trp, 17th Cav
3d Bn, 82 Arty
A Btry, 2d Bn, 77th Arty
175th Engr Co

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Air Support.

During Phases I and II air support was provided by fighter bombers and heavy bombers. A total of 409 sorties were flown in the area of operations from 8 Jan - 26 Jan 67. B-52 Strikes were flown in the AO during the period in support of the operation. They are as follows:

<u>DATE/TIME STRUCK</u>	<u>AREA COVERED</u>
6 060200 Jan 67	XT626303 - XT634314 XT648282 - XT656296
1 070240 Jan 67	XT582312 - XT586303
1 070200 Jan 67	XT612322 - XT616312
6 061600 Jan 67	XT649290 - XT660293 XT653270 - XT669274 XT654248 - XT665270
W 190400 Jan 67	XT660242 - XT672246 XT570352 - XT601359 XT574340 - XT604347

100000
NOV

b. Artillery Support:

(1) 5 January: A command and control element from HQ Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty and A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty displaced from CU CHI Base Camp to vicinity TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center. A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" - 175mm), moved from CU CHI to TRUNG LAP and was GSR to the 25th Inf Div. A platoon of M42's from B Btry, 5th Bn, 2d Arty (MSP) were attached to 3d Bn, 13th Arty (-) to provide security for the fire support base. The MPQ-4 Radar Section from 7th Bn, 11th Arty was attached to the 3d Bn, 13th Arty at TRUNG LAP.

(2) 6-7 January: No change in status or location of units.

(3) 8 January: Operation CEDAR FALLS commenced with the 1st Bn, 8th Arty, located in CU CHI Base Camp, providing direct support to the 2d Bde. A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 3d Bn, 82d Arty from its fire support base at TRUNG LAP. D Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty

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was in general support of the 25th Division from its location in CU CHI Base Camp.

(4) 9-12 January: No change in status or location of units.

(5) 13 January: C Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty displaced from base camp to vic XT74701464 to better support the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. The 8" platoon of A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty displaced from TRUNG LAP to vic TDM SON NHUT and an 8" platoon of D Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty moved from CU CHI to the TRUNG LAP fire support base and was attached to A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty.

(6) 14 January: No change in status or location of units.

(7) 15 January: 8" platoon from A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty returned to TRUNG LAP and the 8" platoon from D Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty was detached from A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty and returned to CU CHI Base Camp.

(8) 16-20 January: No change in status or location of units.

(9) 21 January: C Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty displaced from ~~XT74701464~~ *W/ 1st Stry, 1st Mtn* to CU CHI Base Camp.

(10) 22-24 January: No change in status or location of units.

(11) 26 January: Operation CEDAR FALLS terminated. HQ Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty (-); A Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty; A Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty and the platoon of M42's from B Btry, 5th Bn, 2d Arty displaced by convoy from TRUNG LAP to CU CHI Base Camp.

(12) Special Equipment and Techniques. During the operation, Armor Infantry units established multiple base camps and forward positions in the FILHOL Plantation and HO BO and BOI LOI Woods. Up to this time there had been little or no target area survey because of the lack of high ground for a target area base and because of the requirement for an inordinate amount of security for isolated survey parties. Taking advantage of the security offered by the forward bases and by using DME's with NUI BA DEN as a control base, the survey parties were able to establish control in areas that are frequently target areas.

*Dec 1967
1st Stry, 1st Mtn
Platoon
background*

(13) Commanders Analysis. With the artillery fire support originating from CU CHI Base Camp and TRUNG LAP, administrative and supply matters were greatly simplified. Supporting from the base camp enabled the firing batteries to improve defenses and living conditions.

(14) Total missions and rounds fired:

- (a) Missions: Support 515, H&I 2,276.
- (b) Ammunition expended: HE 14,644, WP 868, ILL 386
- (c) Results: 12 VC KIA (BC), 40 VC KIA (poss), 6 bunkers, 25 sampans, 23 buildings destroyed and 27 buildings damaged.

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8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. General: The area of operation for the 25th Inf Div during Operation CEDAR FALLS encompassed the area from south of the HOI LOI Woods to a line 4 kilometers east of PHU HOA DONG. The division positions were located along the SAIGON River in former VC safe havens in both the HO BO Woods and FILHOL Plantation. Enemy units operating in and around the AO included the 1st, 2d, 7th, and 8th Bns of the 165th A Regt, elements of the D 14 Local Forces Bn, elements of MR 4, and local guerrillas. The area contained many foxholes, trenches, tunnels, bunkers and underground fortifications. The VC utilized the SAIGON River to a great extent in moving supplies and equipment.

b. Terrain: The terrain in the area of operation varied from broad, flat plains of wet rice land to scrub brush and forested areas with heavy canopy. Cover in the rice paddies, marshes, and swamps was limited to road embankments and dikes. Concealment in the rice land was poor with fair to good concealment in the forests and high marsh grass area. Fields of fire were poor in the forests to generally good in the rice lands and marshes, however, fields of fire were limited by stream banks and vegetation. Obstacles to overland movement were the interconnecting streams, ditches, and dikes in the rice land marshes.

c. Weather: The weather during the operation was generally clear to partly cloudy with good visibility and light winds. The maximum temperature was 93 degrees and the minimum was 63 degrees with an average high of 86 degrees and low of 68 degrees. Total rainfall for the period was .2 inches.

d. Operations: Light enemy contact was made initially as friendly units moved to the occupied blocking positions in the HO BO Woods and FILHOL Plantation. In the extreme eastern portion of the division sector, heavy contact was made with forces of the 2d Bn, 165 A Regt on 8 January 1967. by elements of the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. The enemy encountered by 1st Bn, 27th Inf withdrew under the cover of darkness on the night of 8-9 January. Throughout the remainder of the operation no other heavy contact was made with the enemy forces and most of the body count resulted from contacts with small groups of VC. During hours of darkness, maximum use was made of ambushes along the SAIGON River and several VC were killed by ambush patrols as they sought to escape from the CEDAR FALLS Operational Area. Search and Destroy Operations accounted for most of the daylight activity of friendly forces. Through these S & D operations, several VC base camps along with large amounts of rice, equipment, ammunition and weapons were located. A large tunnel complex was discovered by the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf in the HO BO Woods on 21 Jan at coordinates XT650235. The tunnel is believed to have been the location of a VC headquarters unit. It was destroyed after it had been fully searched.

9. MISSION: To conduct S & D and blocking operations south and west along the SAIGON River to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE areas and to destroy VC base areas.

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10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. 2d Bde: Attached: 2d Bn, 34th Armor, effective D-1.
B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav, effective 1900H D Day.
B Co, 65th Engr Bn, effective 1900 H D Day.
MID element, effective 1900H D Day.
Attach: 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf to 196th Bde, effective 1900 H D-1.

(1) Establish blocking positions in sector along SAIGON River early on D+1 to prevent VC/NVA exfiltration from the IRON TRIANGLE area.

(2) Maintain control of the SAIGON River to prevent its use by VC/NVA forces.

(3) Destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.

(4) Conduct BUDDY Operations in conjunction with 2d Bn, 7th ARVN Regt to destroy VC/NVA infrastructure in PHU HOA DONG and expand government control over that village.

(5) Continue reorganization of 4th Bn, 23d Inf in base camp.

(6) Be prepared to release 4th Bn, 23d Inf to 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in the event 25th Inf Div or II FFORCEN reserve is committed.

b. 196th Inf Bde: Attached: 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, effective 1900 H D-1.
2d Bn (M), 22d Inf, effective 0600H D-1.
B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav, effective 1900H D-1.

(1) Conduct airmobile operations on D Day to destroy VC/NVA forces in sector with priority of effort in objective A.

(2) On D+1 secure high ground overlooking SAIGON River in sector and establish blocking positions to prevent exfiltration from the THANH DIEN Forestry Reserve and IRON TRIANGLE.

(3) Maintain control of SAIGON River in sector to deny its use to VC/NVA forces.

(4) Conduct detailed search of sector to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations.

(5) Upon shift of left limiting point from vic XT571349 to a point east of BEN SUC be prepared to release control of B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav to parent unit.

(6) Maintain security of base camp and retain responsibility of securing Route 26 in JP BLUE.

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(7) Be prepared to release one battalion to the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in the event 25th Inf Div or II FFORCEV reserve is committed. If this battalion is released, 196th Bde is relieved from responsibility for securing of Route 26.

11. **EXECUTION:**

a. General: On D-2 (6 Jan 67) the Div, under the guise of normal operations, deployed the 196th Inf Bde reinforced. The 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf moved from DAU TIENG along the southern edge of the BOI LOI Woods to an overnight position. At the same time the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf with Trp B, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav attached moved into the area north of the ~~TRUNG LIP Ranger Training Center~~ to initially open a route and secure artillery fire support bases. The 3d Bn, 21st Inf, and supporting artillery consisting of the 3d Bn, 82d Arty and A Btry, 2d Bn, 77th Arty was lifted into these bases. The 196th Inf Bde CP and elements of the 3d Bn, 13th Arty and 2d Bn, 32d Arty moved by convoy to TRUNG LIP. On D-1 the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf secured an LZ for the 2d Bn, 1st Inf. All elements less the fire support base security forces moved to blocking positions along the SAIGON River at the same time the 2d Brigade moved to blocking position along the SAIGON River north of the FILHOL Plantation and MIL VIEC. They deployed with TF 2d Bn, 34th Armor in the north, TF 2d Bn, 27th Inf in the center, along with 2d Bn, 7th ARVN Regt and 1st Bn, 27th Inf in the south. During the nights a maximum amount of ambushes were emplaced along the river. During daylight hours minimum forces secured the river allowing extensive S & D operations in the VC base areas. Control of traffic on the SAIGON River was the responsibility of the 25th Inf Div while the 1st Inf Div was responsible for the control at the junction of the SAIGON-THI TINH Rivers. The 1st Inf Div with the 173d Abn Bde and 11th Armd Cav Regt blocked enemy escape routes east of the THI THAN River, executed an air-mobile assault north of the Iron Triangle and then executed S&D operations south through the area. Highlights of the operation were:

(1) B-52 strikes exploited by ground followup and occupation; (2) the effective denial of VC escape routes and use of the SAIGON River as evidenced by the high casualty toll suffered by the VC through out the operation; (3) the discovery of a major VC HQ's tunnel complex by the 1/5 (M) Inf in the HOBO/BOI LOI Woods complex from which exploitation resulted in the recovery of important and timely intelligence; (4) the US and ARVN cooperation in the evacuation and relocation of personnel and live stock from the village of BEN SUC to a new Life Hamlet; (5) the use of a 3d Riverline RAG Task Force enabling the 196th Inf Bde and 2d Bde to search thoroughly along and beneath both sides of the SAIGON River resulting in the exploitation of several VC safe havens; (6) the destruction of numerous VC fortifications and structures along with the discovery of many VC cache sites and (7) the effective fire support provided by the supporting artillery from the forward fire support bases and CU CHI plus the integration by tactical air support greatly aided the success of the operation; (8) the utilization of bulldozers and engineer equipment on the out-skirts of PHU HOA DONG to isolate that village from the VC in the FILHOL Plantation.

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for mailing

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b. Significant Actions:

(1) On 8 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22d Inf, located 10 tons of rice, 1500 gals of fish sauce, 2 boats (one with motor), 12 CHU's and 3 Bicycles via XT566323. All were destroyed except the rice and motor which were evacuated.

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(2) On 8 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf Ambush Patrol engaged an unknown number of VC with SA and AW fire vic XT733197. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification). One US Carbine and one Russian rifle were captured and evacuated.

(3) On 9 January, C Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22d Inf, destroyed 2 underground fortifications vic XT597324. In the same area 35.65 tons of rice were destroyed.

(4) On 9 January, B Co, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor engaged 15 VC on a raft with 90mm fire vic XT688222. Results: 15 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification).

(5) On 10 January, B Co, 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf, destroyed 5 VC structures vic XT 563313. In the same area 100 tons of rice and 100 gals of tar were located and evacuated.

(6) On 10 January, C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, destroyed 30 underground fortifications vic XT744155 and 30 underground fortifications vic XT734184.

(7) On 11 January, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, destroyed 1 Sampan, 1100 lbs of rice, 9 underground fortifications and 20 VC structures. B Co destroyed 61 underground fortifications and 1 Sampan vic XT7319.

(8) On 12 January, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, conducted an airmobile operation from the SAIGON River to vic XT747142 and conducted S&D Operations resulting in the capture of 4 tons of rice, 2,000 rds of SA, 2 Sampans, 1 underground fortification, 1 VC structure and 5500 lbs of rice destroyed.

(9) On 12 January, between 2000 and 2130, A Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 13 VC in Sampans vic XT715214 to XT716210. Results: 13 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification) and 2 Sampans destroyed.

(10) On 13 January, C Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf engaged 4 VC in a Sampan vic XT673255. Results: 4 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification) and 1 Sampan destroyed.

(11) On 13 January, B Co, 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT569306 with SA and AW fire. Results: 6 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification).

(12) On 15 January, B Trp, 2d Sqdn, 4th Cav destroyed 1 underground fortification, 4 tunnels, 60 60mm rds, and 5 grenades vic XT592288.

(13) On 16 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf engaged 13 VC in a Sampan attempting to cross river vic XT673287. Results: 10 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC KIA (POSS) and 1 Sampan destroyed. Miscellaneous documents were captured and evacuated from the same area.

(14) On 16 January, B Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav destroyed 2 underground fortifications and 1 tunnel vic XT615305. One shotgun, 1 cal .45 SMG, 2 CHI COM rifles, 1 pellet gun, 1 cal .25 rifle were captured and evacuated.

(15) On 17 January, B Co, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, located 14 tons of polished rice vic XT590306, ~~which was evacuated~~. In the same location 12.5 tons of rice were destroyed.

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(16) On 19 January, B Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf located 9 VC KIA (BC) vic XT664274 that were a result of operations conducted by the unit in the area. Five tons of rice were located and evacuated.

(17) On 20 January, Co C, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, engaged 6 VC in a Sampan vic XT718213. Results: 5 VC KIA (BC) (no unit identification), 1 VC PW and 1 cal .45 pistol captured and evacuated.

(18) On 20 January, B Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, with the assistance of a HOI CHANH located the following: 2 Springfield Rifles, 2 US SMG, 1 French Rifle, 1 Mauser Rifle, 6 CHICOM Carbines, one Shotgun, and 700 rds SA ammo vic XT661281.

(19) On 21 January, A Co, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, located a tunnel complex consisting of a main tunnel 600 meters long and 10 branch tunnels vic XT650235. Sixty pounds of documents were evacuated.

(20) On 22 January, C Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf, apprehended 3 VC PW's vic XT704210. VC PW's led the unit to XT704216 where the following items were destroyed: 3 hand grenades, 10 AT Mines, 4 homemade bangalore torpedoes, and two 155mm rds. Located and evacuated were: 2 commercial radios, miscellaneous web equipment, 1300 rds SA ammo, 4 CHICOM carbines, 1 Russian rifle and 1 Mauser rifle.

c. Revolutionary Development Activities: MEDCAP Teams were used and helped Hand items distributed in PHU HOA DONG. Mass evacuation and relocation of the villagers and livestock of BEN SUC to a New Life Hamlet was completed.

d. ARVN participation: The 2d Bn, 7th ARVN Regt, conducted successful seal and search operations in PHU HOA DONG in coordination and conjunction with the 2d Bde. The 30th RIC of the 3d Riverine Zone provided boats to allow the banks of the SILICON River to be checked for VC caches and sampans.

12. RESULTS:

a. US Losses:

- (1) Personnel: 40 KIA, 156 WIA
- (2) Equipment: 3 APC destroyed, 3 APC damaged (moderate), 2 APC's damaged (heavy), 1 tank dozer damaged (heavy), 1 tank destroyed, one $\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck damaged (heavy)

b. Enemy Losses:

(1) Total Personnel Losses:

VC KIA (BC)	331
VC KIA (poss)	155
VC PW's	39
HOI CHANHS	147
Detainees	147

(2) Total Material Captured:

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(a) Small Arms Weapons:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Rifle, Cal 30, M-1 US	7
Rifle, 7.92mm, Mauser	7
Rifle, AK-47, Soviet Assault	6
Rifle, U/I	5
Rifle, U/I, Soviet	2
Rifle, MAS-36, French	3
Rifle, Type 56, CHICOM	7
Rifle, Cal .25	1
Rifle, Enfield	1
Rifle, Springfield, (US)	2
Rifle, 7.62mm, M-14 (US)	1
Carbine, Cal .30 (US)	12
Carbine, Type 53 CHICOM	35
Carbine, 7.62mm, Soviet	3
SMG, Cal .45, (US)	4
SMG, 7.92mm	2
SMG, CHICOM	1
Pistol, Cal. 45, (US)	6
Pistol, Homemade	8
Pistol, 9mm, P-38	4
Shotgun, U/I	2
Gun, Pellet	1

(b) Crew Served Weapons:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Launcher, RPG-2 Rocket	3
BAR, Cal .30, (US)	2
Rockets, U/I	3

(c) HE Rounds:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
82mm Mortar	2 rds
(d) SA ammo	7717 rds
(e) Rice	253.85 tons
(f) Miscellaneous:	NONE

(3) Total Material Destroyed:

(a) HE Rounds

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
155mm	10 rds
105mm	18 rds
90mm	1 rd
82mm	23 rds
60mm	117 rds

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Bombs	15
4.2 Inch	2 rds
82mm	1 rd
57mm	26 rds
RFG-2	2 rds
8 Inch	3 rds
75mm	3 rds
2.75	6 rockets
175mm	1 rd

(b) Mines and Grenades:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
-------------	-----------------

Bangalore Torpedos	4
CBU	135
Grenades	451
Shape Charge	1
AT Mines	101
AP Mines	59

(c) SA Ammo:

2013 rds

(d) Miscellaneous:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
TNT	4 lbs
Salt	200 lbs
Outboard Motors	6
Bicycles	10
Sampan	11
Printers Ink	5 gals
Tar	5 gals
Cement	600 lbs
Documents	285 lbs
Books	Four 5 gal cans
CHICOM flashlight batteries	260
Roll of tin	1 roll (1000' X 3")
Gasoline	10 gals
Typewriters	2
Grenades	10
Medical Supplies	15 lbs
Mask, gas (VC)	121
Mask, protective, (US)	4
Sewing Machine	1
Batteries	24
Misc clothing and web equip	0
Civilian Radios	6
Camera	1
Tape Recorders	2

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Sound Tapes	74
Forging Kit	1
Rolls of Wire	2
Fish Sauce	1500 gals
Outboard Motors	3
Boats	4
Trenches	14
Bicycles	9
Salt	1200 lbs
Sampans	145
Claymore Mines	7
Foxholes	129
TNT	292 lbs
Printing Press	1
Bridges	6
Kerosene	5 gals
Punji Pits	26
Tunnels	521
VC Structures	340
Rice	100.4 tons

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Logistics. For a listing of logistic problems encountered see the After Action Report of the 25th Inf Div SUPCOM (App 1).

b. Signal. The circuits established to support this operation are described in the 125th Signal Bn After Action Report (App 1).

c. Aviation. For Aviation Operations see 25th Aviation Bn After Action Report (App 1).

14. CIVIC ACTION:

a. 196th Bde:

- (1) Conducted a total of 3 MEDCAPS at TRUNG LAP treating 301 patients.
- (2) Provided 2,500 lbs of captured rice to ARVN dependents at TRUNG LAP Ranger Training Center.
- (3) Constructed 5,000 meters of road vicinity TRUNG LAP.

b. 2d Bde:

- (1) Conducted a total of 10 MEDCAPS vicinity of PHU HOA DONG treating 2,123 patients.
- (2) Distributed clothing to approximately 1,000 people at PHU HOA DONG.

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- (3) Constructed a swing for school at PHU HOA DONG.
- (4) Constructed playground at PHU HOA DONG.
- (5) Delivered 4,000 lbs of captured rice (sour) to PF Compound at TAN PHU TRUNG to be used as hog feed.

c. Division:

(1) Provided clothing and commodities to 83 people evacuated from operational area.

(2) Provided 4,000 lbs of captured rice to HAU NGHIA Province Chief.

d. Civic Action by Divisional units was confined generally in the vicinity of TRUNG LAP (XT5921) and PHU HOA DONG (XT7119) villages. The proximity of US forces has enabled units to increase civic action projects in those villages. The security provided by 2d Bde has enabled the district chief of PHU HOA DONG to reestablish the district office at PHU HOA DONG from PARIS TAN QUI. Evacuation of non-combatants was primarily handled by 1st Div units. 25th Div was involved in the evacuation of 83 non-combatants who were subsequently returned to GVN control at TRUNG LAP New Life Hamlet.

e. Psychological Operations:

(1) The task organization of the division had a HB, light Mobile (Loudspeaker Team) attached to 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div and an ARVN PSYOPS team attached to the 196th Lt Inf Bde. The 246th PSYOP Company was in general support of the 25th Inf Div PSYOP program.

(2) The general attitude of the population toward the US forces was one of mistrust and concern. In the area in and around the village of PHU HOA DONG (XT7121), the population was extremely hostile as this had been a Viet Cong stronghold for many years.

(3) Psychological Operations were directed against enemy targets, emphasizing Allied Might and Introductory Themes. As the operation continued, emphasis was placed on themes to convince the VC that their situation had deteriorated in order to induce them to rally. For this purpose, CHIEU HOI and inevitable victory themes were used. Target areas were systematically covered to reach all intended target audiences. On D+1 the 246th PSYOP Company and brigades commenced leaflet and loudspeaker operations in the AO. Preplanned operations to D+5 were executed and then conducted as the tactical situation presented itself. Ground mounted loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted on a nightly basis at (XT7121) across the SAIGON River. There were 3 HOI CHI NHHS exploited with personalized leaflets and 4 with loudspeaker tapes. Altogether there were 976,265 leaflets dropped and 29 loudspeaker sorties flown in support of the operation. Total aerial broadcast time was 10 hours and 40 minutes. Total ground broadcast time was 17 hours and 20 minutes. Approximately 70% of all loudspeaker operations were conducted at night.

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(4) The operation resulted in 37 HOI CHANHS who returned, 11 of them to US units. Those who were interviewed acknowledged seeing leaflets and hearing loudspeaker broadcasts, and admitted that they were to some extent influenced by the propaganda.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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1. Appendix 1
2. Appendix 2

w/d

James D. Dethlefsen
JAMES D. DETHLEFSEN
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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