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GROUP 4

~~TOP SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

11 November 1966

Authority ADD DIR 5200.10By js, NARS, Date 11-28-84

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Deployments to Southeast Asia (U)

I have reviewed your recommendations in JCRC 11-66, November 4, 1966, and the related military and economic effects of your recommended deployments. The attached table summarizes your plan and the forces which I am approving for planning purposes.

As you know, a reasonably stable economy in South Vietnam is essential to unite the population behind the Government of Vietnam -- indeed to avoid disintegration of the SVN society. Runaway inflation can undo what our military operations accomplish. For this reason, we have already taken actions to reduce military and contractor piaster spending towards the minimum level which can be accomplished without serious impact on military operations. Nevertheless, the price stability achieved last summer may be giving way to a new round of severe inflation. More must be done.

Ambassador Lodge has asked that U.S. military spending be held to P42 billion in CY 1967. The Ambassador's proposed program of tightly constrained U.S. and GVN civilian and military spending will not bring complete stability to SVN; there would still be, at best, a 10 billion piaster inflationary gap. It would, however, probably hold price rise in CY 1967 to 10%-25% as opposed to 75%-90% in FY 1966. The burden of inflation falls most heavily on just those Vietnamese -- the ARVN and GVN civil servants -- upon whose efficient performance our success most heavily depends. Unless we rigidly control inflation, the Vietnamese Army desertion rate will increase further and effectiveness will decline, thus at least partially cancelling the effects of increased U.S. deployments. Further, government employees will leave their jobs and civil strife will occur, seriously hindering both the military and the pacification efforts and possibly even collapsing the GVN.

For these reasons we must fit our deployments to the capacity of the Vietnamese economy to bear them without undue inflation. As your memorandum indicates, the program you recommend would cost over P46 billion in CY 1967 at current prices. I believe implementation of a program of this size would be self-defeating. The plan I am approving at this time for budgetary planning appears to me to be the maximum consistent with any reasonable hope of economic stability. If contingencies arise during the year, we can re-examine the plan accordingly. I plan to provide sufficient combat-ready forces in the U.S. to meet reasonable contingencies.

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A troop list containing each unit in Program #4 is attached. You may wish to suggest changes in the unit mix, if there are units that have been deleted that have a higher priority than those I have approved. I would like to have these recommendations by December 1, 1966. I also would like your proposals as to ways in which approved units can be accelerated so as to provide maximum combat capability as early as possible in CY 1967.

RMCM

Robert S. McNamara

Enclosures (2)

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SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM #4PLAN SUMMARY

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	Jun 1967		Dec 1967		Jun 1968	
	JCS Plan	OSD Plan	JCS Plan	OSD Plan	JCS Plan	OSD Plan
1. PERSONNEL-SVN(000)						
Army	292.6	286.0	334.8	307.9	350.5	313.9
USMC	70.6	70.6	70.6	70.6	70.6	70.6
Air Force	60.6	55.3	63.3	55.4	65.3	55.4
Navy	32.1	27.6	35.3	29.4	35.8	29.4
Total	455.9	439.5	504.0	463.3	522.2	469.3
2. AIRBORNE BATTALIONS-SVN						
Army	62	62	74	67	74	67
USMC	20	20	20	20	20	20
Total	82	82	94	87	94	87
3. ARTILLERY BATTALIONS						
Army	48½	48½	54½	48½	60½	54½
USMC	9½	9½	9½	9½	9½	9½
Total	57½	57½	63½	57½	69½	63½
4. ENGINEER BATTALIONS						
Army	37	37	37	37	37	37
USMC	5	5	5	5	5	5
Air Force	7	6	6	6	6	6
Navy	10	8	10	8	10	8
Total	59	56	60	56	60	56
5. FIGHTER-ATTACK AIRCRAFT (US)	1082	1010	1118	1010	1154	1010
6. ATTACK SQUADS (000)	30	28	32	28	34	28
7. U.S. FIGHTER AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT LOSSES	70	66	61	56	71	62
8. B-52 SQUADS	800	800	800	800	800	800
9. OTHER FIXED WING ACFT (Includes Recce & ECM)	1383	1305	1494	1385	1521	1385
10. HELICOPTER DEPLOYMENTS	2446	2446	3034	2990	3426	3167
11. HELICOPTER LOSSES	40	40	51	50	52	43
12. NAVAL VESSELS OFF-SHORE	91	89	91	89	91	89
13. NAVAL VESSELS IN-SHORE	388	388	547	432	547	432

November 10, 1966

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COMPARISON OF JCS RECOMMENDED
AND PROGRAM #4 FORCES

1. Personnel for SVN - Based on the forces outlined below. A troop list showing the approved forces has been prepared.
2. Maneuver Battalions - Program #4 includes three armored cavalry squadrons and two infantry battalions over the Program #3 forces. Four mechanized, two airborne, and one tank battalion are not approved. In addition, 30 infantry companies are provided; JCS propose 54 additional companies.
3. Artillery Battalions - Program #4 adds ten artillery battalions (4 155mm, 4 175mm and 2 8"); the JCS recommended these ten plus six others (3 105mm and 3 155mm).
4. Engineer Battalions - Program #4 adds one Army combat battalion. The JCS propose one Army combat, two Navy MOB's and one Air Force repair squadron (plus two Army combat and two construction battalions to close October 1968).
5. Fighter-Attack A/C - Program #4 approves no additional tactical Fighter squadrons. One squadron, an F-100 planned for March 1967 to replace the F-5 squadron, is deleted from the approved force. The JCS propose seven additional squadrons. Three Air Force squadrons and a Fourth CVA on-line are not recommended by the JCS because the Services state the forces are not available.
6. Attack Sorties - Reflect different number of planned fighter-attack aircraft. JCS is based on OSD estimate.
7. Fighter-Attack A/C Losses - Based on the differing numbers of aircraft and sorties. JCS is based on OSD estimate.
8. B-52 Sorties - No differences.
9. Other Fixed Wing A/C - Program #4 provides 102 additional aircraft including 18 O-2A psy-war A/C, 64 Army O-1's, and 5 AF FAC O-1's. The JCS propose a further increase of 136 A/C (48 CV-2, 32 C-130, 15 AC-47, 13 O-1, 10 EB-66, 8 C-123 illuminators).
10. Helicopter Deployments - Program #4 adds 609 helicopters compared to 1154 additional proposed by the JCS. The principal increases are 466 Army UH-1's associated with the light airmobile companies and 264 helicopters for 3 additional air cavalry squadrons, 80 OH-47 for 5 medium companies and 16 CH-54's for 2 heavy helicopter companies. Not approved are 176 for 2 air cavalry squadrons and 83 for 2 assault and escort units.
11. Helicopter Losses - Differences are the result of the differing deployment programs.

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12. Naval Vessels Off-Shore - Program #4 adds two frigates - one for air control in the Tonkin Gulf and one to support search and rescue in the Tonkin Gulf. These ships would have to be deployed from LANTFLT. The JCS proposed two more amphibious ships to support a second battalion landing team. The second Marine brigade for Okinawa required to support the second BLT was not proposed by the JCS because the brigade was not available. In addition, both plans would move one extra 8" gun cruiser and one frigate from LANTFLT to PACFLT to support the SLA forces.
13. Naval Vessels In-Shore - Program #4 includes 80 more PBR's for GAME WARDEN (60 in IV CTZ and 20 in I CTZ) as well as a salvage-support force for the two approved River Assault Squadrons (RASs). The JCS propose two additional RASs (50 boats each) and 5 support boats as well as 10 more SWIFT boats for MARKET TIME.

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