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VOLUME ~~IX~~ VII
GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S
HISTORY NOTES
1 May-18 August 1967

EXHIBIT

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certain corps such as the ANTOS. Krulak said this matter had been carefully analyzed and he would send me a memorandum on this, which he subsequently did. I received the impression that the Marines do not have adequate artillery and that some of their corps are not suited for this terrain. Furthermore, their helicopters are inadequate as to number and size. Krulak's analysis, which he sent me later, did not support these conclusions. However, he pointed out that they are getting new helicopters which will probably be the H-34 which will be faster (175 knots) and carry a 10,000 pound load.

On Monday afternoon I saw General Vien and he told me he had issued orders to the Vietnamese Armed Forces that there would be no single candidate for President supported by the Armed Forces and that individuals who wished to vote would do so as private citizens. He seemed to be very relieved at having solved this dilemma and pleased. I congratulated him on a statesmanlike decision. Thieu had given me the impression that this had been his solution and it probably was. However, it was probably jointly arrived at between Vien and Thieu. Incidentally, both Thieu and Vien told me that Ky had agreed to this policy.

Tuesday, 9 May

On Tuesday, 9 May, General Vien and I started on a round of visits to IV Corps to review AB-142. [Memorandum for record, attached].

Following the meeting and the luncheon with General Manh, I visited Dong Tam where I was briefed by Colonel Fulton on the Riverine Force. Fulton has used initiative and good judgment, and this project

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seems to be off to a good start.

In the late afternoon Colonel Sam Wilson came in to see me and, while talking to him about his experience in Long An, it appeared to me that all the commanders should have the benefit of his observations. I therefore asked him if he would speak at the next Unit Commanders' Meeting which I scheduled for the following Saturday.

Wednesday, 10 May

Wednesday morning General Knowlton briefed me on a hamlet evaluation system which they have been working on for some time with a Washington agency. I was impressed with how this matter has developed and I do believe a system is now evolving which will give us the facts on the hamlet situation, something it never has before. It appears that again facts will reveal that there has been distortion of reports on the optimistic side. It seems to be one of the things that has plagued this war from the beginning.

A briefing on the civilian pay scales again pointed out the lack of a standard schedule for indigenous civilians, both at military and civilian agencies. In the past I have written letters to Ambassador Taylor and Ambassador Lodge on this subject without success. I decided to try it again and write Ambassador Bunker urging that there be a standard pay scale established which would not favor Vietnamese civilians working for civilian agencies. This matter has been clouded by the economist who has attempted to deal in take-home pay rather than hourly wages since civilians for the military work longer hours and their take-home pay is sometimes equivalent to that of a Vietnamese civilian

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working for a civilian agency who gets a greater hourly wage but works fewer hours. This is obviously an unfair system and we must get it corrected. Subsequent to filing the letter, I mentioned the fact to Ambassador Locke who stated he will look into the matter and he appeared to be sympathetic with my views.

The staff briefed me on their views of a brigade for the Capital Military District which could be organized and hopefully replace the 199th Brigade. I am thinking in terms of a four battalion regiment supported by two artillery battalions, and I believe that such a force can be recruited and supported.

Thursday, 11 May

Thursday morning a press conference was held concerning the new organization which gives me responsibility for managing the Mission support of Revolutionary Development with Mr. Komer as my Deputy for this function [Ambassador Bunker's statement, attached].

Following the press conference, a Special Mission Council meeting was held at which time I made the point that I did not consider the new organization to involve a military team and a civilian team but rather an All-American team, and I stated that this is the attitude I would hope all would assume regardless of whether they were in uniform or in civilian clothes.

I visited the 25th Division for a briefing and lunch at which time I had the opportunity of seeing my nephew, Lieutenant Clarkson, and was able to give him a first hand report of my visit to Columbia.

A visit to the several divisions in the II Field Force Vietnam area revealed that they are having great difficulty finding the enemy

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and determining what he is about to do, although they seemed to be aggressively trying.

Friday, 12 May

On Friday morning I presented a Silver Star to General Vien at a formation by the Airborne Division. This decoration had been earned by General Vien as a colonel back in March of 1964. I have been biding my time on presenting it to him and this occasion seemed to be timely and appropriate. Vien was obviously appreciative of this and properly so since he is the only general officer ever to have been decorated by Americans. I could not have awarded the decoration to Vien if he had earned it as a general but since he did so as a colonel, this put it under my authority.

I then travelled to II Field Force Vietnam where I had lunch with General Palmer. Following this, I pinned a DSM on General Weyand for his performance as Commander of the 25th Division and then officiated at a change of command ceremony where Weyand relieved Palmer.

Following this, we all repaired to III Corps Headquarters for a review of AB-142. Following the formal session, General Vien and myself and a few other selected senior officers retired to General Khang's office where I discussed the importance of assigning permanently three ranger battalions to Operation Fairfax to work with the 199th Brigade. I pointed out there had been too much rotation of units and it was their responsibility to stabilize these units as I had ours. This was agreed to and they stated that a third ranger battalion would be assigned and that they would retain them on such a

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mission. This is a good development and should be helpful to the security situation of the environs of Saigon.

Following the private meeting, we met in the conference room with the general officers and division commanders present at which time I discussed my trip to the States and emphasized the importance of continued improvement of the ARVN to enhance its image and the necessity of stability during the election days ahead.

Saturday, 13 May

On Saturday I assembled the unit commanders for a conference at Cam Ranh Bay for the purpose of introducing to them Ambassadors Bunker, Locke, and Komer; to discuss the new organization with them and how it would evolve to include the reorganization steering group and its sub-committee; to allow them the opportunity to receive the benefit of Sam Wilson's experience in Long An Province (this was quite worthwhile); and, finally, to discuss with them certain current operational and administrative problems.

Sunday, 14 May

On Sunday morning I attended a change of command ceremony at USARV where Palmer took over from Engler.

In the afternoon I received a report on our efforts to reduce the military population in Vung Tau, Nha Trang, and Qui Nhon. We have good programs in this regard, but it will be a number of months before they are completed.

I discussed with Mr. Charles Murphy an article which I suggested he write concerning control of the war by Hanoi because I learned during

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my visit to the States that such was not fully understood. I think we haven't given Murphy enough to write a factual article, which I hope he does.

Monday, 15 May

During my call on General Vien on Monday afternoon I discussed with him for the first time my concept for developing a provisional Vietnamese Division to be known as the Rainbow Division (signifying the colored berets of the units involved) which would consist of three task forces of three battalions each of Rangers, Airborne and Marines. At first Vien was somewhat skeptical about this idea but as I discussed it with him further, he seemed to engender some enthusiasm. I told him I had my staff developing a concept which I would present to him in due time for study but stated that in the meantime he might like to think about it.

Air Marshal Hughes called on me and we discussed the relationship of British commitments in Singapore and Malaysia with the provision of troops to Vietnam by Australia and New Zealand. My point was if the British could maintain their forces in Singapore and Malaysia, this would make it easy for Australia and New Zealand to back us in Vietnam. I further pointed out to him that Australia and New Zealand did not have a balanced force in country and was short of infantry. He stated he got the point and hoped that something could be done about this. But he implied that he had very little influence over the political sector in the United Kingdom.

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Tuesday, 16 May

On Tuesday we reviewed the II Corps AB-142 and I had a similar private session with the general officers and division commanders where I used as an excuse, in order to be extremely candid with them, my observations of American public opinion during my recent visit to the United States. It was obvious during the review that Vinh Loc was not in complete support of the Revolutionary Development policy of General Thang and he was openly critical of Thang at the meeting. Bob Komer used bad judgment in asking him a leading question during the meeting which brought forth an emotional response from Vinh Loc. I had intended to ask the same question but planned to use more discretion and ask it during a private meeting as opposed to asking it in front of junior officers. I later pointed this lack of finesse out to Komer and I hope he got the point. He is not a tactful individual, but this is something he must learn to be if he is to succeed in his new assignment.

General Thieu asked to see me and I saw him at the JGS on Tuesday afternoon. He wanted to talk to me about the reorganization of the U.S. Mission for supporting Revolutionary Development and I discussed it with him in great detail. Ambassador Bunker had mentioned it to him but had not answered all of Thieu's questions. Thieu seems to understand the reason for the reorganization and agreed to its soundness. He then asked me if I thought the Vietnamese should reorganize on a parallel basis to which I replied that I thought they should not at this time--that nothing would be gained by a parallel reorganization within their structure. On the other hand, I did say that at a later time it was something that might be considered.

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Wednesday, 17 May

Wednesday I visited the 1st Cavalry Division and Task Force Oregon to include visits to the 101st Airborne Brigade, one of its battalions, and to one of the battalions of the 3d of the 25th. I was pleased with what I saw and received the impression that they have considerably disrupted the enemy in the stronghold which he has dominated for years and one which has never before been invaded on a sustained basis. While visiting one of the battalions of the 101st, I bumped into Lieutenant Colonel Buckley who was Associate Professor of Military Psychology and Leadership at the Academy when I was there. Buckley is on the permanent faculty at the Academy but on a sabbatical leave for duty in Vietnam and is now commanding a battalion. After he had finished briefing me, I took advantage of the presence of a television camera crew to discuss with Buckley why was he was in the field and to make known his unique position. Furthermore, I asked him what he thought of the young American soldier to which he replied with enthusiastic endorsement. I doubt that the television people will use it but it will be good if they do and will further reaffirm the high marks that I have given the American soldier in Vietnam.

From there, I visited Pleiku where I was briefed by General Peers on the situation in that area which seems to be warming up. Peers is now acting as Commanding General of I Field Force Vietnam since General Larsen is on a five day R&R. Brigadier General Walker is commanding the division. I forecast that there are going to be some very active days in the highlands during the next several months because the enemy has five regiments in the area and it is possible that these

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are being reinforced by other units that are now moving down through Laos.

Thursday, 18 May

On Thursday, the 18th, I travelled to DaNang where I reviewed AB-142 with General Lam and General Walt. Again we had lunch followed by a private session with the general officers and I went through my same routine designed to motivate them toward the maintenance of stability and the promotion of greater quality in the ARVN.

I returned to Tan Son Nhut in time to meet Admiral Sharp.

General Hendry came in to see me in connection with a position to be taken at a meeting to be held the next day with Ambassador Locke which resulted from a discussion at the last Mission Council Meeting. The Ambassador had been urged to send a cable asking that all visitors be curtailed to Vietnam. I made the point that although visitors were frequently disruptive, and this probably applied to my agency more than any other, I thought that they were a necessary evil since so much depended on an understanding of the war, of our efforts, and on the support by the public. Therefore, I concluded that rather than curtailing visitors we probably should encourage them on a selective basis and set up a system to cope with them at minimum cost to the efficiency of the U.S. Mission. I suggested that we set a limit on the number that we can handle, set up procedures for efficient processing and briefings, and then ask that individuals responsible for influencing public opinion be encouraged to come to Vietnam to see for themselves. The members of the Mission Council were receptive to this approach, and

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the Ambassador is planning on reviewing this on Friday, the 19th, to put such a proposition into effect.

Friday, 19 May

Friday morning I awarded General Heintges the DSM and then later saw him off at the airport.

Admiral Sharp sat in at the CIIB meeting and I believe this was of benefit to him. I stated that for the time being we would consider the III and IV Corps areas as holding actions while reinforcing the I and II Corps areas in order to meet the enemy buildup in these two areas and to take advantage of the opportunity to inflict maximum losses upon him. I directed that additional contingency plans be developed to deploy another brigade from II Field Force Vietnam in addition to the 173d Brigade.

At noon Mr. Fentress from Time Magazine came in to talk to me about the negro serviceman whom I have spoken well of. He is gathering material for a cover story on this subject. I allowed him to use the following quote: "I have an intuitive feeling that the negro servicemen have a better understanding than the whites of what the war is about."

In the afternoon I received a flag from a Sergeant Päckle that had been carried in a parade in New York City supporting the troops in Vietnam and which had been indorsed by Congressman Reinecke and TV star Chuck Connors.

General Lindberg came in to give me a report on his six months of duty in Vietnam working with the Post Exchange. Remarkable progress

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has been made during that period and I am appreciative of General Lindberg's services.

Saturday, 20 May

Saturday morning Colonel Wilson called to say goodbye. He has definitely made a decision to stay in the Army and not transfer to the State Department despite pressure that has been brought to bear on him to do so.

I called General Momyer and told him about a discussion I had had with Admiral Sharp involving bringing in a carrier to support tactical air strikes in country and in the extended battle area at least once a month in order to exercise the system and orient the fleet on reinforcing our effort. These strikes would be preliminary to contingency reinforcement when targets presented themselves. Momyer said he would proceed to set up the arrangements.

Lou Chioffi interviewed me on film as a part of a show he is making about the Koreans. He specifically asked me about their Tae Kwon Do and my evaluation of their effectiveness in this environment.

Having received Admiral Sharp's approval, I called Ambassador Bunker and received his concurrence on going to Clark to spend the weekend with my family.

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