

10-3-84

92THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~Walt:~~

The CINCPAC year end review is a good summary but it contains very little if anything new.

Suggest you glance at the marked portions.

91

New

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*This is CINCPAC 2
assessment of 1967
in South Vietnam.*

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By is, NARS, Date 8-28-84

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YEAR-END REVIEW OF VIETNAM (U)

1. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS ON THE PROGRESS OF THE VIETNAM WAR DURING 1967 AND EXAMINES THE PROSPECTS FOR 1968.
2. OUR STRATEGY FOR VIETNAM FORMS THE BASIS FOR EVALUATING PROGRESS DURING 1967. THIS STRATEGY 3. 74-:3 5#433 3, 534\$323, \$3, 5 7, \$3:5-(8, & 2#3:# 5933THER CONSTITUTE AN INTEGRATED CONCEPT FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. THE UNDERTAKINGS ARE TO:
A. SEEK OUT AND DESTROY COMMUNIST FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM BY OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS.
B. TAKE THE WAR TO THE ENEMY IN NORTH VIETNAM BY UNREMITTING BUT SELECTIVE APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES AIR AND NAVAL POWER.
C. EXTEND THE SECURE AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM BY COORDINATED CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN BUILDING AN INDEPENDENT VIABLE, NON-COMMUNIST SOCIETY.
3. THE COMBINATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS DURING 1967 PRODUCED A DEFINITE

ADDED DIST: J1-2(42-43) J4-3(44-46) J6-3(47-49)
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SHIFT IN THE MILITARY SITUATION FAVORABLE TO US, AS A RESULT THE ENEMY IS NO LONGER CAPABLE OF A MILITARY VICTORY. ✓ IN THE SOUTH, THIS WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE STRENGTHS AND CAPABILITIES OF ALLIED FORCES. THE INCREASE IN FORCES FACILITATED EXPANSION OF COMBAT OPERATIONS TO AN EXTENT WHICH DENIES THE ENEMY THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS IN THE POPULATED AREAS. OUR OPERATIONS, SUPPORTED BY CLOSE AIR AND ARC LIGHT STRIKES, INCREASINGLY NEUTRALIZED ENEMY BASE AREAS, LOCATED AND DESTROYED THE SUPPLIES ON WHICH THE ENEMY DEPENDS, AND DROVE HIM INTO SPARSELY POPULATED REGIONS WHERE FOOD IS SCARCE. STEADY PROGRESS WAS MADE IN SEEKING OUT AND DESTROYING COMMUNIST FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE. THE OVERALL TREND IN THE ENEMY'S LOSSES FROM KILLED, WOUNDED, DISEASE, AND CAPTURE WAS FAVORABLE TO US, AS WAS THE OVERALL TREND IN HIS DEFECTIONS. THE PROPORTION OF POPULATION AND AREA WHICH HE CONTROLS SLOWLY BUT STEADILY DECLINED. HIS IN-COUNTRY RECRUITMENT ALSO DECLINED SIGNIFICANTLY. CONSEQUENTLY, THE REPLACEMENT BURDEN HAS FALLEN INCREASINGLY ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT NORTH VIETNAM IS RESORTING TO WIDER USE OF WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE AND TO USE OF 1#-YEAR OLD BOYS AND MEN OVER 38 YEARS OF AGE TO PROVIDE SOME OF THE BADLY NEEDED MILITARY REACEMENTS. SHORTAGES OF FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE TAKING THEIR TOLL WITH DETERIORATION OF THE MORALE AND QUALITY OF THE COMMUNIST FORCES NOTED IN SOME UNITS - ESPECIALLY THOSE IN ISOLATED AREAS.

A. THE ENEMY DID NOT WIN A MAJOR BATTLE IN VIETNAM IN 1967. MOST OF HIS MAIN FORCES HAVE BEEN DRIVEN TO POSITIONS NEAR THE BORDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM WHERE THEY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SANCTUARIES FOR PROTECTION AND RESUPPLY. WHEN OUR TROOPS BEGIN TO PUNISH THEM SEVERELY, THEY RETREAT ACROSS THE BORDERS, AND AVOID CONTACT UNTIL THEY HAVE REFITTED AND PREPARED FOR ANOTHER OPERATION. EVEN THEN WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETECT IMPENDING MAJOR OFFENSIVES AND TO MOUNT SPOILING ATTACKS TO KNOCK THEM OFF BALANCE.

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
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AND FORCE THEM TO FIGHT DEFENSIVELY. THE DAK TO BATTPE IS A RECENT EXAMPLE.

B. THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY CONTINUES TO REFLECT AN EFFORT TO DRAW ALLIED FORCES INTO REMOTE AREAS OF HIS CHOOSING, ESPECIALLY THOSE AREAS ADJACENT TO BORDER SANCTUARIES, THEREBY ENABLING HIS LOCAL AND GUERRILLA FORCES TO HARASS, ATTACK AND GENERALLY IMPEDE THE GVN NATION BUILDING EFFORT. HE HAS SHOWN A RECENT WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE OUR FORCES IN SUSTAINED COMBAT. RECENT LARGE UNIT DEPLOYMENTS FROM NORTH VIETNAM INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE SEEKING A SPECTACULAR WIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE NEAR FUTURE.



4. OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM ITSELF HAVE THREE BASIC OBJECTIVES: TO DISRUPT THE FLOW OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE INTO NORTH VIETNAM; TO CURTAIL THE FLOW OF MEN AND SUPPLIES FROM NORTH VIETNAM INTO LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM; AND TO DESTROY IN DEPTH THOSE RESOURCES IN NORTH VIETNAM THAT CONTRIBUTE TO SUPPORT OF THE AGGRESSION.

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A. REDUCING EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE:

(1) THE AMOUNT OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

TO NORTH VIETNAM HAS CONTINUED TO INCREASE EACH YEAR SINCE THE WAR BEGAN AND WITH IT THE TONNAGE OF GOODS IMPORTED INTO THE COUNTRY. IN 1967, FOR EXAMPLE, SEA IMPORT TONNAGES WERE ALMOST 40 PERCENT GREATER THAN THE 932,222 METRIC TONS DELIVERED IN 1966. MINING AND AIR STRIKES AGAINST PORT FACILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED WHERE THIRD COUNTRY SHIPPING COULD BE ENDANGERED. HOWEVER, SYSTEMATIC STRIKES ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION HAVE GREATLY IMPEDED THE FLOW OF IMPORTED GOODS ONCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY. FROM 1 JANUARY TO 15 DECEMBER 1967, A TOTAL OF 22,143 ATTACK SORTIES WAS FLOWN IN ROLLING THUNDER ROUTE PACKAGES VIA AND VIA. THESE SORTIES INCLUDED ATTACKS AGAINST WAR-SUPPORTING FIXED TARGETS AS WELL AS KEY LOG TARGETS TO REDUCE THE FLOW OF IMPORTED MATERIAL.

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(2) THE ADVENT OF GOOD WEATHER IN LATE MAY
PERMITTED A CONCENTRATED STRIKE EFFORT AGAINST ALL
OF THE NORTHERN RAIL-LINES AND WITHIN THE HANOI
AND HAIPHONG COMPLEXES DIRECTED TOWARD REDUCING THE FLOW
OF MATERIAL. STRIKES DURING THE THREE MONTHS FROM JUNE -
AUGUST ACCOUNTED FOR OVER 56 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL TRUCKS
AND RAIL ROLLING STOCK REPORTED AS DAMAGED AND DESTROYED
FOR THE ENTIRE YEAR. A MID-YEAR ESTIMATE INDICA-
TED THAT APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT OF IMPORTED MATERIAL
WAS BEING DESTROYED BY IR STRIKES WHILE IN TRANSIT.

PAGE 2 RUEKA 0013 TOP SECRET
STRIKES AGAINST LARGE MILITARY STORAGE DEPOTS IN THE HANOI
AND THE THAI NGUYEN AREA DESTROYED A
NITIONAL SUPPLIES
WHICH HAD ARRIVED IN NVN BY RAIL AND SEA.

(3) BEGINNING IN AUGUST, A MAJOR CAMPAIGN WAS
LAUNCHED TO ISOLATE HANOI AND HAIPHONG FROM EACH OTHER AND
FROM THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN LOGISTIC ROUTES. MAJOR
RAIL AND HIGHWAY BRIDGES WERE RENDERED UNSERVICEABLE AS
THESE TARGETS WERE AUTHORIZED FOR STRIKE. VITAL WATER-
WAYS WERE SEEDED WITH DESTRUCTOR MK-3SS TO DETER RECON-
STRUCTION AND IMPEDE MOVEMENT OF WATERCRAFT. OF 77 TARGETS
IN THE ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST ASSOCIATED WITH THE
ISOLATION OF HAIPHONG, 51 HAD BEEN STRUCK BY MID-DECEMBER.

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OF THE UNSTRUCK TARGETS, 23 ARE NOT AUTHORIZED FOR STRIKE, 540 ARE OF LOW TARGET VALUE AND ONE IS LOCATED IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO FOREIGN SHIPPING IN HAIPHONG.

(4) THE OVERALL EFFECT OF OUR EFFORT TO REDUCE EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE HAS RESULTED NOT ONLY IN DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE TO THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AND GOODS BEING TRANSPORTED THEREON BUT HAS CREATED ADDITIONAL MANAGEMENT, DISTRIBUTION, AND MANPOWER PROBLEMS. IN ADDITION, THE ATTACKS HAVE CREATED A BOTTLENECK AT HAIPHONG WHERE INABILITY EFFECTIVELY TO MOVE GOODS INLAND FROM THE PORT HAS RESULTED IN CONGESTION ON THE DOCKS AND A SLOWDOWN IN OFFLOADING SHIPS AS THEY ARRIVE. BY OCTOBER, ROAD AND RAIL INTERDICTIONS HAD REDUCED THE TRANSPORTATION CLEARANCE CAPACITY AT HAIPHONG TO ABOUT 2700 SHORT TONS PER DAY, AN AVERAGE OF 4400 SHORT TONS PER DAY OF IMPORTS HAD ARRIVED IN HAIPHONG DURING THE YEAR.

B. IMPEDING MOVEMENT OF MN AND MATERIAL SOUTHWARD

"" ALTHOUGH MEN AND MATERIAL NEEDED FOR THE LEVEL OF COMBAT NOW PREVAILING IN SOUTH VIETNAM CONTINUE TO FLOW DESPITE OUR ATTACKS ON LOGS, WE HAVE MADE IT VERY COSTLY TO THE ENEMY IN TERMS OF MATERIAL, MANPOWER, MANAGEMENT, AND DISTRIBUTION. FROM 1 JANUARY THROUGH 15 DECEMBER 1967, 122,950 ATTACK SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN ROLLING THUNDER ROUTE PACKAGES I THROUGH V AND IN LAOS. SEA DRAGON OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS INVOLVED 1,384 SHIP-DAYS ON STATION AND CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY IN REDUCING ENEMY SEABORNE INFILTRATION IN SOUTHERN NVN AND IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ.

(2) ATTACKS AGAINST THE NVN TRANSPORT SYSTEM

DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS RESULTED IN DESTRUCTION OF CARRIERS CARGO CARRIED, AND PERSONNEL CASUALTIES. AIR ATTACKS THROUGHOUT NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS DESTROYED OR DAMAGED 5,261 MOTOR VEHICLES, 2,475 RAILROAD ROLLING STOCK, AND 11,425 WATERCRAFT FROM 1 JANUARY THROUGH 20 DECEMBER 1967. SEA DRAGON ACCOUNTED FOR ANOTHER 1,473 WLC DESTROYED OR DAMAGED FROM 1 JANUARY-30

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NOVEMBER. THERE WERE ADDITIONAL ENEMY MATERIAL LOSSES FROM DESTROYED RAIL-LINES, BRIDGES, FERRIES, RAILROAD YARDS AND SHOPS, STORAGE AREAS, AND TRUCK PARKS.

SOME 3,535 LAND TARGETS WERE STRUCK BY SEA DRAGON FORCES, INCLUDING THE DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE OF 323 COASTAL DEFENSE AND RADAR SITES. THROUGH EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE, THE ENEMY HAS BEEN ABLE TO REPLACE OR REHABILITATE MANY OF THE ITEMS DAMAGED OR DESTROYED, AND TRANSPORT INVENTORIES ARE ROUGHLY AT THE SAME LEVEL THEY WERE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DECEMBER. NEVERTHELESS, CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS HAVE CAUSED INTERRUPTIONS IN THE FLOW OF MEN AND SUPPLIES, CAUSED A GREAT LOSS OF WORK-HOURS, AND RESTRICTED MOVEMENT PARTICULARLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.

(3) SEABORNE INFILTRATION OF ENEMY PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES IS CONSIDERED NOW TO BE A RELATIVELY SMALL CONTRIBUTION TOWARD MEETING OUT OF COUNTRY REQUIREMENTS. MARKET TIME AND SEA DRAGON OPERATIONS HAVE REDUCED THIS ENEMY CAPABILITY. STILL, AS IN THE GROUND WAR, THE ENEMY APPEARS WILLING TO ACCEPT LOSSES AND CONTINUES ATTEMPTS TO RESUPPLY IN CERTAIN HARD PRESSED COASTAL AREAS.

(4) A PRIMARY EFFECT OF OUR EFFORTS TO IMPEDE MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMY HAS BEEN TO FORCE HANOI TO ENGAGE FROM 500,000 TO 600,000 CIVILIANS IN FULL-TIME AND PART-TIME WAR-RELATED ACTIVITIES, IN PARTICULAR FOR AIR DEFENSE AND REPAIR OF THE LOGS. THIS DIVERSION OF MANPOWER FROM OTHER PURSUITS, PARTICULARLY FROM THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, HAS CAUSED A DRAWDOWN ON MANPOWER. THE ESTIMATED LOWER FOOD PRODUCTION

PAG 5 RUMKA 0013 TOP SECRET
YIELDS, COUPLED WITH AN INCREASE IN FOOD IMPORTS IN 1967 (SOME SIX TIMES THAT OF 1965), INDICATE THAT AGRICULTURE IS HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ADJUSTING TO THIS CHANGED COMPOSITION OF THE WORK FORCE. THE COST AND DIFFICULTIES OF THE WAR TO HANOI HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED, AND ONLY THROUGH THE WILLINGNESS OF OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM REPLACEMENT

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OF GOODS AND MATERIAL HAS NOW MANAGED TO SUSTAIN
ITS WAR EFFORT.

(5) MUSTLE SIGNALS/DYE MARKER OPERATIONS
ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING IMPLEMENTED. ONLY ONE
SUBSYSTEM BECAME OPERATIONAL DURING 1967 - THE AIR
SUPPORTED ANTI-VEHICULAR SYSTEM (MUD RIVER) IN CENTRAL
LAOS. THE REMAINING THREE SUB-SYSTEMS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED
DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1968. IT IS TOO EARLY
TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS PROGRAM.

C. DESTROYING VITAL RESOURCES:

(1) AIR ATTACKS WERE AUTHORIZED AND EXECUTED BY TARGET
SYSTEMS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 1967,
ALTHOUGH THE ATTACKS WERE LIMITED TO SPECIFIC TARGETS WITHIN
EACH SYSTEM.

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A TOTAL OF 9,740 SORTIES WAS FLOWN
AGAINST TARGETS ON THE ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST
FROM 1 JANUARY - 15 DECEMBER 1967. THE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE POWER SYSTEM RESULTED IN REDUCTION OF
POWER GENERATING CAPABILITY TO APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT OF
ORIGINAL CAPACITY. SUCCESSFUL STRIKES AGAINST THE
THAI NGUYEN IRON AND STEEL PLANT AND THE HAIPHONG
CEMENT PLANT RESULTED IN PRACTICALLY TOTAL DESTRUCTION
OF THESE WORKS. ALL INDIGENOUS NVN ADJUSTMENTS
LSSS HAVE HAD TO BE MADE BY RELYING ON ADDITIONAL IMPORTS
FROM CHINA, THE USSR OR THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.
THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL IMPORTS REDUCES AVAILABLE
SHIPPING SPACE FOR WAR SUPPORTING SUPPLIES AND ADDS TO THE
CONGESTION AT THE PORTS. INTERRUPTIONS IN RAW MATERIAL
SUPPLIES AND THE REQUIREMENT TO TURN TO LESS EFFICIENT
MANS OF POWER AND DISTRIBUTION HAS DEGRADED OVERALL
PRODUCTION.

(2) ECONOMIC LOSSES TO NORTH VIETNAM AMOUNTED
TO OVER \$130 MILLION DOLLARS IN 1967, REPRESENTING
OVER ONE-HALF OF THE TOTAL ECONOMIC LOSSES SINCE
THE WAR BEGAN.

D. NVN AIR DEFENSES:

(1) STRIKES OVER NORTH VIETNAM, PARTICULARLY
IN THE VITAL NORTHEAST SECTOR, HAVE ENCOUNTERED INCREASED

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OPPOSITION FROM NVN. THE NET RESULT FOR THE YEAR, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN A REDUCTION IN NVN'S FIGHTER AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY AND FREQUENT DISRUPTION OF OPERATIONAL AIRFIELDS. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, SOME 72 MIG FIGHTERS WERE IN-COUNTRY. THEY USED THE FOLLOWING AIRFIELDS: PHUC YEN, KEP, GIA LAM, CAT BY, AND KIEN AN, AND LATER, HOA LAC. BY LATE-OCTOBER, STRIKES HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED AND CONDUCTED AGAINST ALL OF THESE AIRFIELDS EXCEPT GIA LAM. BY THE END OF OCTOBER AND THROUGH DECEMBER, ONLY SOME 20 FIGHTERS WERE OPERATING FROM AIRFIELDS WITHIN NVN, WITH THE BALANCE OPERATING FROM CHINESE BASES. FROM 1 JANUARY - 18 DECEMBER 1967, THE RATIO OF US AIRCRAFT TO MIG AIRCRAFT DOWNED IN AIR ENCOUNTERS WAS ABOUT 1:3 (25 TO 75) COMPARED TO THE 1966 RATIO OF 1:2 1/2 (9 TO 22).

(2) PROBABLY THE MOST POSITIVE REACTION TO US BOMBING STRIKES HAS BEEN THE ENEMY BUILDUP OF THE GROUND COMPONENTS OF THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM: SAMs, AAA, AND THE AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING FACILITIES. ALTHOUGH THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF SAM BATTALIONS REMAINED AT ABOUT 25, THE NUMBER OF SAM SITES DISCOVERED BY THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR WAS 151. BY MID-DECEMBER, THE TOTAL SAM SITES DISCOVERED HAD RISEN TO 270, A NET GAIN OF 119 SITES; HOWEVER, 41 OF THESE ARE NOT CURRENTLY IN USE. ALTHOUGH SOME 3,400 SAM VISUAL FIRINGS WERE NOTED FROM 1 JANUARY THROUGH MID-DECEMBER (COMPARED TO ONLY 990 FIRINGS FROM 1966), SAM RESULTS ACTUALLY DECLINED AS EVIDENCED BY THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF SAMs EXPENDED TO DOWN ONE U.S. AIRCRAFT (56:1) IN 1967 COMPARED TO THE RATIO FOR 1966 (33:1). THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AAA WEAPONS INCREASED FROM 7,126 TO 7,559 FOR 1967, AN ADDITION OF SOME 830 GUNS, MOSTLY IN THE LIGHT CALIBER RANGE (37MM AND 57MM). IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ, 85MM AAA GUNS WERE USED FOR THE FIRST TIME AS A THREAT TO HIGHER ALTITUDE OPERATIONS. NVN ELECTRONIC ORDER OF BATTLE DECLINED

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FROM SOY 433 TO 333 RADARS DURING 1967, HOWEVER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RADAR SYSTEM CONTINUED TO IMPROVE. MOST OF THE RADAR DECLINE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO REFINEMENT OF OUR ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS, DEACTIVATION OF OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT, AND A SLIGHT REDUCTION IN THE ENEMY'S USE OF FIRE CONTROL RADARS. E. THE AIR AND NAVAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST NVN IS VITAL TO THE WAR IN SVN. HANOI DRAMATIZED ITS IMPACT BY MOVING MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF SUPPLIES AND MEN DURING THE FEBRUARY 1967 ET AND DURING CHRISTMAS 1967 WHILE ATTACKS AGAINST NVN WERE SUSPENDED.

5. NATION BUILDING EFFORTS DURING 1967 WERE CONCENTRATED

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ON LAYING A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR ON-GOING PROGRAMS. GAINS WERE MADE IN A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT AREAS, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING.

A. POLITICAL STRUCTURE. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE IN THE BROAD AREA OF NATION BUILDING DURING 1967 WAS REGISTERED IN THE POLITICAL ARENA. THE CITIZENS OF RVN - L OF D AND THEREBY LEGITIMIZED THEIR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. SIMILARLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE EARLY DAYS OF THE DIEM REGIME, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT WAS INITIATED AT THE VILLAGE AND HAMLET LEVELS. THERE ARE ALREADY FRAGMENTARY BUT NEVERTHELESS ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS BECOMING CONSTITUTED ORIENTED.

B. U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION SUPPORT. DURING 1967 THERE WAS A REORGANIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION IN US SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION. AS A RESULT, THE PROGRAM IS BUTTRESSED WITH ADDED RESOURCES, INCREASED MILITARY SUPPORT, AND UNIFIED CIVIL-MILITARY STAFFING. THUS, WE NOW HAVE IN MAC CORDS, A SINGLE, FORCEFULLY DIRECTED US PACIFICATION SUPPORT ORGANIZATION.

C. ECONOMIC STABILITY. DESPITE GREAT STRESSES PLACED ON A FRAGILE ECONOMY, THE THREAT OF RUNAWAY

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INFLATION WAS CHECKED THROUGHOUT 1967. WHILE
THE AIGON PRICE INDEX ROSE PERCEPTIBLY DURING 1967,
IT WAS KEPT BELOW THE DANGER MARK.

MORE ATTENTION WAS FOCUSED ON OPENING MARKET AREAS
AND SECURING LOC'S, SUCH AS THE MANG THIT NICOLAI
WATERWAY, VITAL TO THE ECONOMY OF THE COUNTRY. AS
OF 30 NOVEMBER, OF ROADS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO
FRIENDLY OPERATIONS, 91 PERCENT WERE OPEN AND 54
PERCENT SECURED; 53 PERCENT OF THE RAILROADS WERE
OPEN AND 43 PERCENT SECURED; AND OF THE WATERWAYS
IN THE NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS OF III AND IV CTZ'S,
92 PERCENT WERE OPEN AND

47 PERCENT SECURED.

D. POPULATION SECURITY. BY GVN MEASUREMENT,
54.9 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WAS CONSIDERED SECURE
DAY AFTER DAY AS OF 30 NOV, A GAIN OF 5.5 PERCENT
SINCE 1 JANUARY. SIMILARLY, 4,658 HAMLETS ARE LISTED
BY THE GVN AS SECURED, COMPARED TO 4,401 AS OF 1

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THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES) POPULATION
AND HAMLET FIGURES ARE EVEN MORE FAVORABLE. WHILE
THE INCREASE IN SECURED POPULATION CONSISTS TO A
LARGE DEGREE OF REFUGEES AND URBANIZED POPULATION,
THE CHANGE MUST BE VIEWED AS AN OVERALL GAIN. CONVERSELY,
ACCORDING TO GVN FIGURES, THE PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION
OVER WHICH THE VC MAINTAINED SUSTAINED CONTROL DROPPED
DURING THE YEAR FROM 18 PERCENT TO 12.9 PERCENT AS
OF 30 NOV.

E. CHIEU HOI. ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF RETURNING
HOI CHANH HAS DROPPED SHARPLY IN RECENT MONTHS THE
OVERALL TOTAL OF 26,868 AS OF 15 DECEMBER IS 44 PERCENT
HIGHER THAN FOR THE SAME TIME LAST YEAR AND MUST
BE VIEWED AS A MEASURE OF PROGRESS.

6. PROGRESS OF RVNAF. DURING THE LAST YEAR, THERE
WERE A NUMBER OF PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE OVERALL
IMPROVEMENT OF THE RVNAF:

A. EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE THE RVNAF WERE PURSUED.
THE M16 RIFLE WAS ISSUED TO RVNAF AIRBORNE BATTALIONS
AND SELECTED INFANTRY AND RANGER UNITS. DAY PATROLS
AND NIGHT AMBUSHES ARE BEING STRESSED FOR RVNAF UNITS
IN SUPPORT OF RD. THE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING CAPABILITY

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B THE RVNAF IS BEING INCREASED. TWELVE REGIMENTAL RECONNAISSANCE COMPANIES ARE INCLUDED IN THE FY68 FORCE STRUCTURE. THE ARVN IS ORGANIZING AND TRAINING FIVE MAN PATROL TEAMS TO CONDUCT LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE. THE PURPOSE OF BOTH OF THESE EFFORTS IS TO LOCATE THE ENEMY SO LARGER UNITS CAN BE INSERTED TO EXPLOIT TARGETS DEVELOPED. THE JCS IS ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF UNITS IN RESERVE AND TO RE DEPLOY UNDER-EMPLOYED UNITS SUCH AS CERTAIN ARMOR AND ARTILLERY UNITS IN III CORPS. GREATER

UTILIZATION IS BEING MADE OF THE GENERAL RESERVE UNITS (EIGHT ABN AND SIX MARINE BNS). THIS YEAR THESE UNITS SPENT TWO MONTHS IN AN OPERATIONAL AREA PRIOR TO RETURNING TO HOME STATION; FORMERLY THEY SPENT TWO WEEKS. THE MAJORITY OF MAJOR U. S. OPERATIONS THIS YEAR HAVE HAD AT LEAST ONE ARVN BATTALION TEAMED WITH U. S. UNITS. THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARVN BATTALIONS HAS BEEN INCREASED BY THIS CLOSE ASSOCIATION. THE U. S. UNITS PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND DEMONSTRATE THE PROPER USE OF THESE RESOURCES. BY SUCH ON-THE-JOB TRAINING, THE ARVN UNIT BECOMES MORE CAPABLE.

B. INADEQUATE LEADERSHIP, BOTH IN QUALITY AND QUANTITY, REMAINS A PROBLEM. FROM 1964 THROUGH 1966, RVNAF STRENGTH INCREASED OVER 50 PERCENT. LIMITED LEADERSHIP ASSETS WERE STRETCHED TO THE UTMOST. HOWEVER, A GOOD START NOW HAS BEEN MADE IN THE SLOW PROCESS OF BUILDING QUALITY INTO THE RVNAF LEADERSHIP. A FEW SAMPLES OF THE PROGRAMS AIMED AT IMPROVING LEADERSHIP AND PERSONNEL EFFECTIVENESS ARE AN IMPROVED PROMOTION SYSTEM BASED ON MERIT AND BETTER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS COVERING SUCH FIELDS AS ASSIGNMENTS, SCHOOL SELECTION AND BATTLEFIELD PROMOTION OF ENLISTED MEN. IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF RVNAF LEADERSHIP OVER THE LONG HAUL, HEAVY EMPHASIS CONTINUES TO BE PLACED ON UPGRADING THE RVNAF SCHOOL SYSTEM. THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY ACADEMY COURSE WAS INCREASED FROM TWO TO FOUR YEARS, THE CURRICULUM REVISED AND

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THE FACULTY AND ADVISORY EFFORT STRENGTHENED. THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE WAS SIMILARLY IMPROVED. THE COLLEGE NOW OFFERS A BATTALION COMMANDER'S COURSE OF 12 WEEKS AND A DIVISION AND HIGHER LEVEL STAFF COURSE OF 20 WEEKS. A DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE TO OPEN A NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE IN FEBRUARY 1968.

C. ARVN/RF RECRUIT TRAINING HAS BEEN SHARPENED, ESPECIALLY FOR THE RF, WHO NOW ARE REQUIRED TO ATTEND THE SAME COURSE IN A NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER THAT THE ARVN RECRUIT ATTENDS. LEADERSHIP COURSES HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED FOR CORPS AND DIVISION UNITS, BY USE OF MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS, AND STRONG EFFORTS CONTINUE TO IMPROVE THE ARVN OFFICER CANDIDATE PROGRAM.

7. OTHER FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES.

A. ROYAL THAI ARMY VOLUNTEER REGIMENT (RTAVR).
THE MAIN BODY OF THE RTAVR, COMPRISING APPROXIMATELY 2,000 TROOPS, CLOSED INTO ITS BASE CAMP IN SOUTH VIETNAM ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1967. THE UNIT WAS PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE U. S. 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION WHICH PROVIDES A SMALL ADVISORY GROUP AND FURNISHES LOCAL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. THE RTAVR COMPLETED A SHAKEDOWN PERIOD AND AT YEAR'S END IS PARTICIPATING IN ITS THIRD TACTICAL OPERATION. DURING THIS OPERATION ELEMENTS OF THE RTAVR ENGAGED AN UNKNOWN SIZE VC FORCE AND KILLED 52 ENEMY WHILE SUSTAINING ONLY FIVE KIA AND EIGHT WIA. THEIR INITIAL PERFORMANCES HAVE BEEN PROFESSIONAL. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE AS JUNGLE FIGHTERS. THAI FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE INCREASED TO A DIVISION SIZE FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 12,000 MEN IN MID-1968.

B. REPUBLIC OF KOREA FORCES. DURING 1967 THE ROK FORCES OF TWO ARMY DIVISIONS AND A MARINE BRIGADE CONTINUED TO PERFORM IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER. THEY HAVE SUSTAINED FEWER CASUALTIES PER ENEMY KILLED THAN ANY NATIONAL FORCE IN SVN. DURING THE YEAR THE ROK TAORS WERE EXPANDED FROM THE VICINITY OF QUANG TRUNG SOUTH ALONG THE COAST TO PHAN RANG AND NORTH

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TO PHU CAT. INAT. INCLUDED IN THIS AREA ARE MORE THAN 350 KILOMETERS OF HIGHWAYS 1 AND 19 (WHICH THEY HAVE OPENED FROM PHAN RANG TO PHU CAT), THE MAJOR PORTS OF QUI NHON AND CAM RANH, AND THE I FIELD FORCE HEADQUARTERS AT NHA TRANG.

C. AUSTRALIAN/NEW ZEALAND TASK FORCE. THE AUSTRALIAN/NZ TASK FORCE CONDUCTED OPERATIONS IN THE BA RIA AREA OF PHUOC TUY PROVINCE. ARRIVAL OF THE THIRD BATTALION, ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT, IN DECEMBER BROUGHT THE TASK FORCE TO FULL THREE BATTALION STRENGTH. THIS ADDITIONAL STRENGTH TOGETHER WITH THE RECENTLY DEPLOYED SECOND NZ RIFLE COMPANY WILL FURTHER ENHANCE THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE FORCE.

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8. SPECIAL OPERATIONS. DURING THE YEAR, PRAIRIE FIRE ACTIVITIES WERE INTENSIFIED.

THE PRAIRIE FIRE ZONE OF OPERATIONS WAS ENLARGED, AUTHORITY WAS OBTAINED TO UTILIZE HELICOPTERS THROUGHOUT THE ZONE, AND AUTHORITY WAS OBTAINED TO USE LARGER EXPLOITATION FORCES. THERE WAS AN INCREASE OF APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT IN THE NUMBER OF PRAIRIE FIRE MISSIONS. THESE MISSIONS WERE SUPPORTED BY OVER 2600 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES, WHICH WAS AN INCREASE OF OVER 170 PERCENT FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR. THE AUTHORIZED NUMBER OF PRAIRIE FIRE RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS WAS INCREASED OVER THREEFOLD DURING 1967. THE DANIEL BOONE PROGRAM WAS INITIATED DURING THE YEAR AND AUTHORITY WAS GRANTED TO ENLARGE THE OPERATIONAL AREA SHORTLY AFTER THE PROGRAM BEGAN. THE AREA NOW RUNS FROM THE LAOTIAN BORDER IN THE NORTH TO THE GULF OF SIAM IN THE SOUTH. IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE AREA, AUTHORITY WAS ALSO OBTAINED TO USE HELICOPTER INFILTRATION ON FIVE MISSIONS PER MONTH AND A TOTAL OF 30 MISSIONS PER MONTH WAS AUTHORIZED. IN ADDITION, THE USE OF FAC AIRCRAFT WAS AUTHORIZED FOR TWO RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS PER DANIEL BOONE MISSION.

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IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE AREA, ENTRY REQUIRES WASHINGTON LEVEL APPROVAL OF A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

9. LOGISTICS. A NUMBER OF LOGISTICS PROGRAMS INSTITUTED PRIOR TO 1967 WERE COMPLETED DURING THE YEAR. NEW PROGRAMS AND PROGRAM REFINEMENTS WERE DEVELOPED TO CONTINUE AND IMPROVE AN EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE LOGISTICS SUPPORT STRUCTURE.

A. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION EFFORT WAS DIRECTED TOWARD THE UPGRADING AND EXPANSION OF COMBAT BASES, AUGMENTATION OF THE LOGISTIC INFRASTRUCTURE, UPGRADING THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AND THE INITIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE DYE MARKER ANTI-INFILTRATION OBSTACLE SYSTEM IN NORTHERN I CTZ. THE REDUCED MILCON FUND LEVELS FROM ABOUT \$50 MILLION IN FY 1966 TO \$40 MILLION IN FY 1967 AND ABOUT \$8 MILLION IN FY 1968 REQUIRED A CORRESPONDING DECREASE IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR CAPABILITIES IN RVN.

B. SUFFICIENT QORT THROUGHPUT CAPABILITY WAS ACHIEVED IN 1967 TO ASSURE TIMELY DISCHARGE TO MAINTAIN ESTABLISHED LEVELS OF SUPPLY. CONTAINERSHIP SERVICE TO RVN WAS INITIATED, CARRYING 10 PERCENT OF CONUS ORIENTED CARGOS BY YEAR'S END. NEWPORT BECAME OPERATIONAL AS A SEPARATE MILITARY PORT WITH FOUR DEEP DRAFT BERTHS, AND IS THE PRIMARY RECEPTION POINT FOR SAIGON AREA MILITARY CARGOS. IN THAILAND, PRACTICALLY ALL MILITARY CARGO OPERATIONS SUPPORTING THE AIR WAR IN NVN WERE SHIFTEED FROM BANGKOK TO THE NEW MILITARY DEEP DRAFT PORT IN SATTAHIP.

C. ADDITIONAL TACTICAL AIRFIELDS AND BASE AREAS WERE COMPLETED IN THE I CTZ SUCH AS THE LST PORT AT CUA VIET, AN INTERIM LST RAMP AT TAN MY AND THE C-130 AIRSTRIP AND LOGISTICS BASE AT QUANG TRI CITY. IN THE DELTA AREA, THE BASE AREA AT DONG TAM WAS COMPLETED AND NOW PROVIDES SUPPORT TO THE US AND ARVN FORCES DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THAT AREA. THE QUI NHON DEPOT WAS EXPANDED AND DISPERSED TO A NEW SITE LOCATED 15 MILES WEST OF QUI NHON, THUS REDUCING THE CONGESTION IN THE URBAN AREA ADJACENT TO THE PORT.

D. TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF THE US PRESENCE ON THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMY, A CONCERTED EFFORT WAS BEGUN TO MOVE

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US ACTIVITIES OUT OF THE CITY OF SAIGON. NEW HEADQUARTERS COMPLEXES WERE CONSTRUCTED FOR COMUSMACV AT TAN SON NHUT, AND FOR USARV AND THE 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND AT LONG BINH. AN ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE FROM THIS EFFORT WAS THE BENEFIT GAINED FROM CONSOLIDATING THESE STAFFS, SINCE THEY HAD FORMERLY OPERATED FROM NUMEROUS SMALL INSTALLATIONS IN THE CITY.

E. LOGISTICS OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT RVN CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE COMBAT FORCES ENGAGING THE ENEMY IN EVER MORE REMOTE AREAS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE AMERICAL DIVISION WAS ORGANIZED TO OPERATE IN THE NORTHERN IICZ AND SOUTHERN IICZ AREAS. LOGISTICS SUPPORT WAS FURNISHED THROUGH COMBINED ARMY/NAVY/AIR FORCE ACTIONS OVER THE HAZARDOUS AND INSECURE LAND LOC FROM CHU LAI AND QUINHON, AUGMENTED BY OVER-THE-BEACH SUPPORT AT DUC PHO. THIS SUPPORT WAS FURTHER AIDED BY EMERGENCY RESUPPLY BY AIR WHEN REQUIRED. THROUGH SUCH EFFORTS, NO COMBAT OPERATION HAS YET BEEN CURTAILED BECAUSE OF LACK OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

F. IN AUGUST 1967, USCOMVAP approved an aid plan to provide military hospital facilities for VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTIES AND DIRECTED EARLY IMPLEMENTATION. A PLAN TO CONSTRUCT THE NECESSARY FACILITIES WAS DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED. TEMPORARY PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE TREATMENT FOR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION.

G. THE OVERALL AIR MUNITIONS PICTURE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY DURING 1967 WITH MODERN AIR MUNITIONS FROM PRODUCTION SATISFYING APPROXIMATELY 95 PERCENT OF STATED REQUIREMENTS. INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF AIR MUNITIONS PERMITTED INCREASES IN AUTHORIZED STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES TO A 45 DAY LEVEL FOR ALL ITEMS EXCEPT FOR 5 ITEMS REMAINING ON THE PUSH RESUPPLY SYSTEM. MONTHLY EXPENDITURES INCREASED GRADUALLY DURING 1967 FROM 63,000 TONS IN JANUARY TO THE HIGH OF 83,000 TONS EXPENDED IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER. THE INVENTORY OF OLDER MUNITIONS (LOW DRAG CONFIGURATION) WAS REDUCED FROM 45,000 TONS ON HAND IN JANUARY TO 20,000 TONS IN DECEMBER. THE FIRST PHASE FOR REBUILDING THE PACOM AIR MUNITIONS WAR RESERVES WAS IMPLEMENTED WITH AUTHORITY RE-

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CEIVED FROM JCS TO INCREASE WRM LEELS TO 30,000 TONS. M ALLOCATIONS WERE APPROVED FOR 25,513 TONS THROUGH DECEMBER 1967 WITH THE RVXX REMAINING 4,487 TO BE ALLOCATED FOR REBUILD THROUGH MARCH 1968. TWO SIGNIFICANT WEAPONS BECAME AVAILABLE IN THE PACOM AIR MUNITIONS INVENTORY WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE WALLEYE (AGM-62) IN MARCH AND THE MK36 DESTRUCTOR WHICH WAS FIRST USED IN JUNE.

H. SEA PQL CONSUMPTION IN 1967 TOTALED APPROXIMATELY 70 MILLION BARRELS, REPRESENTING 48 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PACOM CONSUMPTION. AN ABRUPT CHANGE IN PQL SUPPLY PATTERNS OCCURRED IN JUNE WHEN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS CAUSED PERSIAN GULF OIL TO BE DENIED TO THE US. HOWEVER, THIS CHANGE DID NOT HAMPER SEA MILITARY OPERATIONS.

I. LOGISTICS ACTIONS WERE COORDINATED AND MONITORED AS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ROYAL THAILAND VOLUNTEER REGIMENT (RTAVR).

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SIMILAR COORDINATION TO SUPPORT
THE DEPLOYMENT OF A THAI DIVISION-SIZE FORCE IN 1968 IS NOW
BEING PROVIDED.

J. IN NOVEMBER, A SPECIAL AGENCY WAS ESTABLISHED,
THE PACOM UTILIZATION AND REDISTRIBUTION AGENCY (PURA), TO
COORDINATE MATERIEL UTILIZATION ACTIVITIES. CINCUSARPAC WAS
TASKED TO ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MANAGE THE PURA AND TO
DEVELOP OPERATING PROCEDURES.

K. OPERATION EAGLE THRUST WAS SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED,
MOVING THE ENTIRE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION FROM FORT CAMPBELL
KENTUCKY TO BIEN HOA AIR BASE IN RVN. THIS REPRESENTED THE
LARGEST SINGLE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS, REQUIRING 370 SORTIES
BY MAC C-141 AIRCRAFT AND FOUR SHIPS FOR SURFACE LIFT. THE
WHOLE DEPLOYMENT WAS CONCLUDED IN 45 DAYS.

10. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. DURING THE YEAR
SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE 1965 PROGRAM FOR FIXED TRUNK
COMMUNICATIONS IN SEASIA BECAME OPERATIONAL, PERMITTING
IMPLEMENTATION OF HIGH SPEED DATA AND SECURE VOICE
SERVICE. WHILE MOST MAJOR BASE AREAS NOW HAVE GOOD
INTRA-BASE COMMUNICATIONS, THE 1966 INTER-BASE SWITCHING
PROGRAM WAS DELAYED AND WILL NOT BE OPERATIONAL UNTIL

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LATE 1968. EXPANDED AND IMPROVED SATELLITE SERVICE TO SEASIA WAS PROVIDED, INCLUDING THE COMPAS LINK PHOTO TRANSMISSION SYSTEM. THE MANUAL INTERFACE BETWEEN THE USAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AND THE USN/USMC TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM IMPROVED THE CAPABILITY TO CONTROL US AIRCRAFT OVER NVN AND TO PROVIDE EXPEDITED MIG AND SAM WARNING ALERTS. FULL AUTOMATIC INTERFACE IS PLANNED TO BE ACHIEVED BY LATE 1968. ARMY TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS WERE VASTLY IMPROVED BY MODERNIZING GROUND RADIO SETS AND REFITTING ARMY AIRCRAFT WITH NEW COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. WHILE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS MADE, MAJOR TASKS STILL OUTSTANDING INCLUDE: (1) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1966 AND 1967 LONG LINES PROGRAM TO MEET INCREASING DEMANDS FOR RELIABLE AND HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED MODES OF COMMUNICATION, (2) IMPROVED INTER-BASE SWITCHING, (3) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUTODIN AND AUTO-SEVOCOM PROGRAMS, AND (4) IMPROVEMENTS IN THE C-E POSTURE OF THE RVNAF.

11. COMBAT OPERATIONS IN SVN WILL BE INTENSIFIED IN THE FORTHCOMING YEAR. INCREASED COMBAT STRENGTH UNDER PROGRAM 5, AS WELL AS PROGRAMMED ADDITIONS TO RVNAF AND FWMA FORCES DURING 1968 WILL PROVIDE INCREASED ALLIED CAPABILITY TO INTENSIFY IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ENVISIONS THE INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY POWER, CIVILIAN SKILLS AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES INTO SELECTED PRIORITY AREAS. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, FORCES ARE TO BE DEPLOYED IN THREE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING ROLES. FRONTIER DEFENSE FORCES WILL OPERATE ALONG THE DMZ AND OPPOSITE THE ENEMY'S CAMBODIAN AND LAOTIAN SANCTUARIES TO PREVENT MAJOR INCURSIONS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. MOBILE STRIKE FORCES WILL SEEK OUT AND DESTROY VC/NVA FORCES AND NEUTRALIZE HIS MAIN BASE AREAS. TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES, COMMITTED BEHIND THE PROTECTIVE SHIELD OF THE FRONTIER DEFENSE AND MOBILE STRIKE FORCES, WILL SUPPORT THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THE RVNAF WILL HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORTING PACIFICATION WITH PRIORITY OF EFFORT TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SPECIFIED AREAS, TO INCLUDE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SELECTED

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LOC'S. US/FWMAF OPERATIONS WILL CONCENTRATE ON THE
DESTRUCTION OF VC/NVA MAIN FORCES, BASE AREAS AND
RESOURCES; DENIAL OF INFILTRATION AND SUPPLY ROUTES; AND
IN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE AND REINFORCING THE RVNAF
AS NECESSARY IN OPENING AND SECURING VITAL LOC'S,
PROVIDING SECURITY FOR PRIORITY AREAS, AND DESTRUCTION
OF THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE.

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B. THE GVN ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN SHOULD DO MUCH TO STRENGTHEN THE BOND BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE AND MAKE THE GVN MORE ACCEPTABLE IN THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE.

C. RELIEF MEASURES AND, WHEN REQUIRED, VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR REFUGEES AND HOI CHANH WILL BE EXPANDED SO THAT THEY CAN FIND THEIR PLACES IN THE MAIN STREAM OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. 1968 PLANNING IS BASED ON 60,000 HOI CHANH RALLYING TO THE SIDE OF THE GVN AND THE GENERATION OF AN ADDITIONAL 800,000 NEW REFUGEES.

D. A POLICE FORCE TOTALING 94,000 (INCLUDING 22,500 POLICE FIELD FORCE PERSONNEL) IS ENVISAGED BY THE END OF CY68.

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