

9-8-9

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Authority NLI/CBS 8
By is, NARS, Date 12-16-83

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Case # NLI/CBS 8

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~~EYES ONLY~~

*Sent to the Ranch
for Restoration and the Press*

FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
INFO WHITE HOUSE

FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV
TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC
GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
STATE/RCI WASH DC
CAS WASH DC

~~SECRET~~ MAC 00277 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO
SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF CURRENT ENEMY STRATEGY

1. WE HAVE ANALYZED THE MOVEMENTS OF THE MAJOR ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS MOVING FROM NVN TO SVN. WE BELIEVE THEY ARE SIGNIFICANT AS INDICATIONS OF FUTURE ENEMY ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS. THE FACTS REGARDING THESE ENEMY UNITS AND THE DEDUCTIONS FROM THESE FACTS FOLLOW:

A. THE

I TEND TO FAVOR THE
LATTER POSSIBILITY AT THIS TIME.

B.

C. THE MOVEMENT OF THESE REINFORCEMENTS, UNLIKE PREVIOUS MOVES FROM NVN, FOLLOWED TRUCK ROUTES, HOWEVER, THE RATE OF MARCH INDICATES THAT THEY MOVED BY FOOT OR PERHAPS SHUTTLE.

Now Yellow OUTL

DECLAS FR ARMY S

DAAG-ANR-D#

DATE:

83 17
30 NOV 1993

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COULD, BY TIME AND

SPACE CALCULATIONS, BE AS FAR SOUTH AS THE [REDACTED] ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY MAY STILL BE IN NORTH VIETNAM. NEVERTHELESS, AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN UNLOCATED, THEY CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT THREAT.

F. THE DISPOSITION OF THESE REINFORCING DIVISIONS GAINS ADDED SIGNIFICANCE WHEN ANALYZED WITH THE PRESENT TROOP DISPOSITION AND RECENT ACTIVITIES IN THE DMZ AREA AND IN LAOS. THE [REDACTED]

CONSIDERING THE ENTIRE ENEMY PICTURE IN AND AROUND QUANG TRI PROVINCE WE SEE A THINNING OF FORCES ALONG THE DMZ WITH A SHIFT OF MASS INTO LAOS. HANOI'S MILITARY POSTURE WILL BE IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY [REDACTED] THE GAINS ARE THESE: OPERATIONS CAN BE LAUNCHED ON A WEST-EAST AXIS, FROM A RELATIVELY SECURE, WELL DEVELOPED, EASILY SUPPORTED BASE COMPLEX LOCATED ON GOOD LINES OF COMMUNICATION. SECURITY OF LOC'S IS IMPROVED, THE EFFECTS OF OUR BARRIER

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FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
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GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
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CAS WASH DC

~~SECRET~~ MAC 00277 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

SYSTEM HAS BEEN OBVIATED TO SOME DEGREE, AND THE THREAT TO I
CTZ IS INCREASED. THIS CONCEPT MIGHT OBLIGATE HIM TO EXTEND
HIS OPERATIONS FURTHER WEST INTO LAOS IN ORDER TO BETTER
SECURE HIS REAR BASE AREAS.

9-8-11

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NON info

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Case # NLJ/CBS

8

Received Washington CommGen
8:33 A.M. EST Monday 8 Jan 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommGen
9:45 A.M. CST Monday 8 Jan 68

FROM: ART MCCAFFERTY
TO : WALT ROSTOW
CITE: CAP80182

Document #

31

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Authority NLJ/CBS 8

NARS, Date 12-16-83

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF CURRENT ENEMY STRATEGY By us

1. WE HAVE ANALYZED THE MOVEMENTS OF THE MAJOR ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS MOVING FROM NORTH VIETNAM TO SOUTH VIETNAM. WE BELIEVE THEY ARE SIGNIFICANT AS INDICATIONS OF FUTURE ENEMY ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS. THE FACTS REGARDING THESE ENEMY UNITS AND THE DEDUCTIONS FROM THESE FACTS FOLLOW:

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F. THE DISPOSITION OF THESE REINFORCING DIVISIONS GAINS ADDED SIGNIFICANCE WHEN ANALYZED WITH THE PRESENT TROOP DISPOSITION AND RECENT ACTIVITIES IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AREA AND IN LAOS. \

CONSIDERING THE ENTIRE ENEMY PICTURE IN AND AROUND QUANG TRI PROVINCE WE SEE A THINNING OF FORCES ALONG THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE WITH A SHIFT OF MASS INTO LAOS. HANOI'S MILITARY POSTURE WILL BE IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY \ THE GAINS ARE THESE: OPERATIONS CAN BE WAUNCHED ON A WEST-EAST AXIS, FROM A RELATIVELY SECURE, WELL DEVELOPED, EASILY SUPPORTED BASE COMPLEX LOCATED ON GOOD LINES OF COMMUNICATION. SECURITY OF LOC'S IS IMPROVED, THE EFFECTS OF OUR BARRIER SYSTEM HAS BEEN OBIATED TO SOME DEGREE, AND THE THREAT TO I CORP TACTICAL ZONE IS INCREASED. THIS CONCEPT MIGHT OBLIGATE HIM TO EXTEND HIS OPERATIONS FURTHER WEST INTO LAOS IN ORDER TO BETTER SECURE HIS REAR BASE AREAS.

2. WE SEE THREE EXPLANATIONS FOR THESE ENEMY DEPLOYMENTS:

A. THEY MAY BE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE. THE ENEMY HAS SHOWN INCREASED CONCERN OVER THE THREAT TO THE LAOS CORRIDOR POSED BY THE DYE-MARKER SYSTEM. HE IS UNSURE OF THE NATURE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM AND THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE TRACE. HE MAY SUSPECT THAT IT WILL BE SUPPORTED BY GROUND TROOPS IN LAOS. HE PROBABLY VIEWS THE STRONG-POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM AS A MEANS TO AFFORD US FLANK SECURITY FOR A MOVE WESTWARD ON HIGHWAY 9 TOWARD LAOS. THE MANNING OF THIS LINE WITH ARVN TROOPS PROBABLY CONFIRMS THESE SUSPICIONS, SINCE HE BELIEVES THAT WE ARE FREEING U.S. TROOPS FOR EFFORTS IN OTHER AREAS. THUS THE ADDITIONAL FORCES IN LAOS MAY REFLECT THE ENEMY'S FEAR FOR HIS LIFELINE THROUGH THE CORRIDOR.

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B. ON THE OTHER HAND, THESE ENEMY DEPLOYMENTS MAY BE PRIMARILY OFFENSIVE. WE THINK THAT THE ENEMY MADE A MAJOR DECISION IN SEPTEMBER 67 TO LAUNCH AN ALL OUT EFFORT TO ALTER THE COURSE OF THE WAR. DOCUMENTS, CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE, SHOW THAT THE WINTER SPRING CAMPAIGN WHICH BEGAN IN LATE OCTOBER IS OFFENSIVE IN NATURE AND EXHIBITS A DISREGARD FOR CASUALTIES HERTOFORE UNSEEN. IT CALLS FOR CONTINUOUS MILITARY OFFENSIVES BY LARGE AND SMALL UNITS, AND CONCURRENT POLITICAL EFFORTS TO STIR UP POPULAR REVOLT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM ("GENERAL UPRISING"). THESE MAJOR REINFORCEMENTS PROVIDE HIM WITH THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE AS PART OF HIS WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN. THERE IS ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY INTENDS A PREEMPTIVE OFFENSIVE IN THE QUANG TRI-THUA THIEN AREA TO PROTECT THE LAO CORRIDOR.

4. WHILE AN ATTACK COULD BE MADE IN I CORPS PRIOR TO TET, CURRENT TROOP DISPOSITIONS, REINFORCEMENT ACTIVITY, AND PREPARATION TIME INDICATE A POST TET OFFENSIVE OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS. HE NEEDS TIME TO REPOSITION FORCES IN AND SOUTH OF I CORPS, TO PREPARE THE BATTLEFIELDS, AND TO ASSURE COORDINATION OF COUNTRY WIDE ATTACK PLANS. THE TET STAND-DOWN PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE FINAL TROOP MOVES AND BRING UP SUPPLIES.

5. IT IS INTERESTING THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE HINTING THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE POSSIBLE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME HIS OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND POSTURE WERE NEVER MORE MENACING. I BELIEVE THAT HIS OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND POSTURE RELATE DIRECTLY TO THE RECENT OVERTURES BY VICE PREMIER TRINH THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL TALK IF WE STOP THE BOMBING. FIRST, HE MAY USE THIS OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY TO TRY TO GAIN AN EXPLOITABLE VICTORY BEFORE TALKS SO THAT HE MIGHT NEGOTIATE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE MAY ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT SUCH A VICTORY IN ORDER TO GAIN A RESPITE FROM THE BOMBING IN THE NORTH AND TO AUGMENT THE ALREADY SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITIES OF HIS UNITS IN THE SOUTH. THUS, BY POLITICAL MEANS HE COULD BUY THE TIME AND OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE A FORMIDABLE THREAT WHEN HOSTILITIES ARE RESUMED.

6. WHILE THESE COURSES OF ENEMY ACTION WILL PRESENT OBVIOUS DANGERS, EITHER WILL GIVE US GREAT OPPORTUNITIES TO DESTROY MANY OF HIS TROOPS. WITH THIS IN MIND, I AM DEVOTING A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO FIXING THESE MAJOR REINFORCEMENTS AS TARGETS FOR B-52 AND TACTICAL AIR STRIKES.

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Document # 129

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Received Washington CommGen
3:50 PM EST Monday 8 Jan 68

FROM ART MCCAFFERTY
TO WALT ROSTOW
CITE CAP80193

Received LBJ Ranch CommGen
3:20 PM CST Monday 8 Jan 68

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REF: CAP80182

THE CABLE I SENT THIS MORNING (SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF
CURRENT ENEMY STRATEGY) WAS RECEIVED FROM GENERAL
WESTMORELAND. THIS WAS NOT CLEAR FROM MESSAGE AS SENT TO
YOU. MY APOLOGIES.

DTG: 082052Z JAN 68

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Authority NLI-CBS 22

By is, NARS, Date 7-3-84

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