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directed airstrikes during the May Offensive, stated: ^{9/}

"The VC were located primarily in a large concrete building which was about 100 meters north of the friendlies location. There were smaller and less substantial homes around. This was the main structure in the area. There were quite a number of other structures around that the ground commander told me he didn't want destroyed. The area he gave me to hit was approximately 100 meters long and 50 meters wide. The A-1s overhead had ordnance of 250 pound bombs and 20mm, and I pointed out the targets to the A-11s and put in a rocket to mark the target for them. They come in and hit the target and did a very good job of hitting the target and did not drop any ordnance that hit other structures."

This experience was early during the fighting and the 250 pound bombs were not effective against concrete structures. Although the strikes were right on target, the structure was resistant and these first sorties only succeeded in dropping the roof. The next set of fighters on the scene were F-100s with 500-pound high drag bombs and napalm. The napalm was put in first and the ground commander reported that a number of VC had run out of the building and were subsequently shot by allied troops. The 500-pound high drag bombs were put in next and collapsed the building, again causing the VC to evacuate and get shot or captured. ^{10/}

Commenting on resultant damage to surrounding buildings, the FAC stated: ^{11/}

"As far as the airstrikes go, there is some peripheral damage; this can't be avoided; however, in this particular case the ground commander didn't want the structures across the street damaged, and we managed to wipe out houses on one side of the street without doing direct damage to the houses on the other side. I feel sure that if they had any windows, they were broken, but they didn't burn and they weren't knocked down. As a general rule,

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the high drag bombs are more accurate than the low drag bombs and all the bombs we put in were the high drag type. Napalm is also pretty accurate as far as laying the stuff down, but it is not always effective against every target."

Refugees

A substantial number of refugees resulted from the May attack in the Saigon area. As of 14 May, figures compiled by Saigon city officials estimate the number of new refugees within the city limits at 103,354. The refugees were housed in temporary camps, schools, and pagodas throughout the city as well as in camps previously established for Tet refugees. The overall government handling of refugees was demonstrably better than during the Tet Offensive. More significant perhaps, was the difference in attitude of the general populace in comparison to that during Tet. The population showed great resiliency in sustaining the psychological pressures that the VC had been attempting to inflict upon the city.^{12/} Business went on fairly normally with only the slightest traces of panic and the police had little problem dispersing the curious.^{13/}

During the attack on Saigon the National Police displayed a notable amount of courage and professionalism. The entire CMD police force had been on 100 percent alert since 22 April in readiness for a renewal of the Communist offensive. The reaction to the attack was swift and surprising to the enemy, who appeared to rely heavily on the assumption that the police would become confused and either would not react or would prematurely commit their forces to a few areas. One of the primary reasons for police success can be attributed to the large amount of intelligence that was volunteered by the

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civilian populace, evidencing a popular appreciation for the police and their efforts which, heretofore, had not been apparent. ^{14/}

With the staggering amount of refugees piling up in Saigon, it was again, as in Tet, dramatically clear that the Communists were oblivious to the wanton destruction their attacks caused in the city. To alleviate suffering as rapidly as possible, a massive rebuilding program was launched immediately following the May attack. Both American and Vietnamese resources were poured into the project.

Review

On 13 May, COMUSMACV convened a meeting to review the Saigon situation. COMUSMACV stated that the Chief of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff was in possession of enemy documents that revealed that VC/NVA tactics for urban areas involved getting into heavily populated areas and provoking widespread destruction by U.S. and ARVN forces. This, in turn, would create large numbers of refugees. Follow-on enemy efforts were then designed to create discontent among the refugees through exploiting the theme that the US/ARVN were responsible for their plight--with the end goal of prompting the public uprising that they failed to achieve during their Tet Offensive. ^{15/}

The discussion focused on the need to develop better means for overall control of friendly firepower to negate the enemy's designed tactics of causing wide-scale destruction in the urban areas. COMUSMACV was concerned that allegations from various sources of indiscriminate use of tactical air and gunships in the Saigon area, such as excessive use of air-delivered weapons to

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root out minimum numbers of VC/NVA, were creating damaging effects. ^{16/}

Responding to COMUSMACV's direction, a question and answer session was conducted by MACV IG with the 9th U.S. Division Commander and his representatives. The following questions were posed: ^{17/}

- Q: "If you had a Battalion Commander on the ground and he wanted to get some kind of fire (airstrikes). To get a clearance for that, what was his channel?"
- A: "Now when we got the request for an airstrike, my rear CP, since it was in the CMD, would go to CMD to get the clearance to bring in the airstrike."
- Q: "From the Vietnamese side, how did they get information in terms of getting a clearance for this?"
- A: "Through the 8th MP District. I would assume Colonel Jom went to the 8th MP section and he went one step down to insure this in effect was needed."
- Q: "Were there any occasions where there were requests for fires and the request was turned down?"
- A: "Yes."
- Q: "Is there any occurrence where there was a request for fire support and clearance there was some restrictions put on them?"
- A: "We gave them the exact six digit coordinates where we were going to put it. When they came back they just assumed my people were bright enough to put the airstrike exactly where we asked for it. We had to go back up to the Battalion Commander in most cases. In fact, pinpointed the thing with six digit coordinates, so when they approved an airstrike for us everyone of these airstrikes in this area was approved by CMD."
- Q: "When you ask for a clearance you base this on a precise six digit coordinate. What is your understanding about the latitude of action you have in adjusting the fire?"
- A: "We can adjust the fire, for example, on an airstrike you usually have two to four passes. You have a Battalion Commander up and a man on the ground. All in

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communication with one another. If the initial coordinates are not exactly where they want it, then they will adjust it.

- Q: "How about laterally, as far as your moving it?"
- A: "We can't move it away from that set of coordinates. There can always be slippage between that we think is 896427 (example) and where that guy on the ground is at that moment when that airstrike shows up."
- Q: "Can you define that for us. How much latitude do you have once you get a clearance to hit a particular set of coordinates. Say the target moves 100 meters, can you still hit it?"
- A: "Yes."
- Q: "If it moves 500 meters can you still hit it?"
- A: "No."
- Q: "What is the cut off?"
- A: "I don't think there is any specific cut off point."
- Q: "The general subject we were discussing. Is that covered by any particular 9th Division regulation or SOP?"
- A: "Yes, sir."
- Q: "Are you provided with any regulation from JMD?"
- A: "Not as such, not their Rules of Engagement. They get into the engagement sequence by holding up their permission for us to being in an airstrike until they are satisfied that the strike is necessary."
- Q: "On the description of this area, did you notice any fires produced?"
- A: "Yes, in fact on the 9th (of May), the Battalion Commander was the one who noticed the action when they brought in an airstrike or gunship. They said they hit a building and it exploded and kept on exploding."

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Photo Reconnaissance of Damage in Saigon


Various sources have pointed out the dangers of using airpower against urban guerrillas. As noted earlier, it was difficult, if not impossible, to separate the damage caused by ground supporting fire, aerial delivered ordnance, and deliberate destruction initiated by the VC. A review and compilation of the Combat Mission Report Logs for the period 5-31 May show that USAF air-strikes, though hitting in built-up areas, generally struck on the outskirts of Saigon, with most sorties being put in west of the city and south of the Saigon River. The bulk of VNAF strikes were north of Tan Son Nhut with a few in the heart of the city along Plantation Road and a pagoda west of Phu Tho Racetrack (Fig. 8 and 9.)

Figures 9-21 graphically portray the areas in and around Saigon which were destroyed or damaged and had at least one fixed wing airstrike during the May Offensive. The approximate number of strikes is depicted on the Strike Plot Map (Fig. 8) and general observations precede each photograph. Again, it was not possible to ascribe depicted damage to a specific cause. The numbers on the pictures are keyed to the numbered blocks on the Plot Map. All the photos, oriented north and south, were taken on 19 May and the scale is 1:3000.^{18/}

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STRIKE PLOT MAP SAIGON



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FIGURE 8

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STRIKE PLOT MAP

NHI
BINH

TAM
BINH XA


TRUNG MY TAY

TANSON NHUT

⊗-VNAF
X-USAF

FIGURE 9

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CHAPTER VI

CAPITAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND

The Capital Military District (CMD) was not organized to defend against attacks of the magnitude that occurred between late January and early May. Until reorganization, the CMD had various U.S. Army and ARVN areas of operation with each being an entity unto itself, loosely joined by the CMD headquarters located in downtown Saigon. Prior to reorganization, the senior U.S. representative was an Army colonel in the capacity of Advisor.

Consequently, on 4 June, COMUSMACV established a II Field Force Forward Headquarters in Saigon and designated the Deputy CG, II FFV, as the Commander as well as the Senior Advisor to the Military Governor of Saigon. Emphasizing the permanence of the organization and the vital role it played in the defense of Saigon, COMUSMACV redesignated II FFV Forward the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). Further, in early August, a U.S. Army major general was appointed as the CMAC Commander vice the Deputy CG, II FFV. On the RVNAF side, the Saigon Military Governor was appointed the CG, CMD, and established concurrently under CG, III Corps.^{1/}

The CG CMAC had operational control for security over all U.S. Military Advisors and National Police Advisors in the Saigon/Gia Dinh/Cholon area. He also had operational control over designated brigade and battalion-size maneuver units, artillery, and air cavalry elements. The U.S. and RVN commands were closely coordinated through collocated command headquarters and staffs plus an integrated Tactical Operations Center (TOC).^{2/}

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The relationship between CG CMAC and U.S. Divisions plus other forces in III Corps was that of subordinate commanders under CG II FFV. Additionally, CG CMAC coordinated directly with other II FFV elements regarding their operations proposed to them by CG CMD in areas outside the CMD. The specific mission of CMAC was identified as:^{3/}

- Exercise operational control of designated units in the defense of Saigon and of a specified area within the CMD.
- Provide surveillance and countermeasures to prevent rocket and mortar attacks on Saigon.
- Advise and assist the Saigon Military Governor and Commanding General, CMD, with particular emphasis on providing for the effective defense of Saigon.
- Direct U.S. Advisors to ARVN, Regional and Popular Forces, and National Police Forces in security matters.

CMAC was specifically tasked to "exercise assigned authority for MACV in employment of air and artillery within Saigon built-up areas". The organizational charts of CMAC are shown in Figures 22 and 23.^{4/} Note that the Staff Directory shown in Figure 22 does not depict the command and control relationship of the CMAC Air Liaison Officer (ALO). This facet will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

ALO/FAC Reorganization

In concert with centralized control and effective support of the expanded mission, the USAF reorganized its ALO and FAC support. Previously, the ALO for the CMD divided his time between his organization at Tan Son Nhut and the CMD Headquarters where he acted as advisor to the ARVN and the CMD staff. A

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HEADQUARTERS CAPITAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND

STAFF DIRECTORY

SAIGON RVN

AUGUST 1968




FIGURE 22

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CAPITAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND (PROV)




FIGURE 23

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full-time ALO was assigned to CMAC on 10 June and an Assistant ALO was posted in July. Complementing the ALO capability at CMAC was the increase in FACs and aircraft directly responsive to CMD requirements. As of 9 August, 15 FAC aircraft (O-1s and O-2s), 29 pilots and eight navigators were dedicated to the defense of Saigon.^{5/}

Commenting on the flexibility and enhanced command and control, the CMAC ALO stated:^{6/}

"With ground units having a centralized control and the attached units who support them coming under the same headquarters, we have much more flexibility and our responsiveness has increased tremendously. The backbone of setting up this organization depends on a first class communications system. This system was set up. We now have communications by landline, FM, UHF, and HF radio. Each system has at least one back-up system. This insures us constant communication at all times as long as we have power and this is backed up with emergency generators."

Increased Capability

By August, a greatly increased amount of men and equipment in the CMD was engaged in preventing enemy ground and fire attacks. In the CMD, 450 separate units ranging from squad-size to company-size were conducting patrols and ambushes. Moreover, various technical devices were installed throughout the area:^{7/}

Watch Towers - ringing the city and equipped with plotting boards, linked communications, plus triangulation and azimuth computers.

Sensors - seismographic, infrared, and "people sniffers" were seeded within the CMD by ground troops.

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Ground Surveillance Radars - emplaced to the south and west of Saigon to detect movement at night.

Counter Mortar Batteries - located strategically within the CMD. A total of four on Tan Son Nhut.

Rocket Watch - a combination of armed helicopters and FAC/Spooky aircraft in specified corridors nightly.

Rocket Watch

A mortar round fell in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy on 5 May, starting a series of rocket/mortar attacks that was to last until 21 June. During that 48-day period, rockets or mortars fell on the city on all but 19 days (Appendix 1). A total of 173 rockets, 215 mortar rounds, and nine unknown firings pounded the city during that span, causing widespread terror and destruction.^{8/}

Based on high-level interest in regard to the damaging effects of the rocket/mortar fire in and around Saigon, DIA requested MACV provide a detailed assessment of damage inflicted in the Saigon area during the series of fire attacks which commenced on 5 May. On 30 June, MACV updated their earlier figure to 13,830 houses destroyed in Saigon during the May Offensive and subsequent fire attacks, with 6,592 homes heavily damaged or destroyed in neighboring Gia Dinh. A total of 599 Saigon/Gia Dinh civilians were killed and 5,657 wounded. There were 164,884 persons in Saigon/Gia Dinh refugee camps, of which 10,209 were refugees remaining from the Tet Offensive.^{9/}

COMUSMACV publicly stated that the rocket/mortar terror attacks were going to be stopped. He further stated that the allies had the means and the

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will to prevent the random rocketing of Saigon and its adjacent military installations. The troop increase and the technical devices had been introduced; however, one of the means--Rocket Watch--was an Air Force role and will be traced in greater detail.

After the onset of the rocket attacks on Saigon and Tan Son Nhut in February, a Rocket Watch was initiated using the then limited resources of the FAC elements in the CMD. Initially, the various FAC units divided the workload of flying the night watch according to their manning and capability.

By 11 June, a more formal and controlled night Rocket Watch program went into effect. Four corridors were established around Saigon at the cardinal points to box in the city. The north corridor, after extensive experimentation, was assigned to USAF and established as 7 x 14 kilometers--the long axis running east-west. The other three corridors were the responsibility of U.S. Army helicopter gunships. The north corridor had a bottom of 3,000 feet to allow artillery to fire through the area, but above 3,000 feet and within the corridor boundaries, USAF pilots were guaranteed artillery clearance. Furthermore, during periods of inclement weather, the USAF crews could move their orbit point southward to the southern portion of the city, still with artillery clearance. This flexibility of orbit did not hinder ground batteries as their rules of fire precluded firing artillery rounds across the city.^{10/}

The CG CMAC assigned the helicopter gunship duty officer the responsibility of assuming all the decisions affecting the Rocket Watch areas and coverage.

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The duty officer was also accountable for the necessary coordination between the ground stations and all the Rocket Watch aircraft. This arrangement not only centralized control, but had the added advantage of freeing an Air Force duty officer.^{11/}

The Commander, 7AF, approved the use of O-2 aircraft exclusively for the CMAC Rocket Watch on 21 June. Aircraft and crews moved to Bien Hoa AB, set up operations, received local check-outs, and went into full operation by 27 June.^{12/}

Several changes in operating procedures occurred during June and July out of which evolved the nightly posture. However, the time of coverage remained constant, from 1900 to 0700. In the early stages, the O-1 crews flew from 1900 to 2130 when they were relieved on station by two O-2s. The O-2s would subsequently be replaced on station by other O-2s until 0700. The north corridor was patrolled by one O-2 while the other ranged over the remaining three corridors as required to cover the highest threat area.^{13/}

On 21 July, a meeting of Army and USAF senior staff officers and the CG CMAC was held at CMAC headquarters to discuss Rocket Watch procedures. The USAF proposed having a single O-2 provide nightly coverage in the north corridor, thus freeing the O-1s from Rocket Watch duty and thereby reducing the overall O-1 commitment to an acceptable level. The USAF position was that the single O-2 could provide adequate coverage of the north corridor and the O-2 sorties freed from Rocket Watch duty could be used to VR the infiltration routes in III Corps in conjunction with Tropic Moon aircraft

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(A-1s equipped with low light level TV). The CG CMAC agreed to the proposal on a test basis only, the stipulation being that if the coverage was degraded in any way by the absence of the second FAC, the original plan would be reinstated. Single FAC coverage was promulgated on 22 July and, as of 15 August, the results were satisfactory. It must be noted, however, that Saigon was not struck by mortars/rockets during that period.^{14/}

Completing the USAF team in the north corridor was a Spooky, which appeared on station at the beginning of the Rocket Watch and flew from 1930 to 0630. In constant contact with both the ground controlling agencies and the FAC, Spooky provided immediate firepower as well as increased visual coverage. Spooky and the FAC coordinated very closely in the small 7 x 14 km box with Spooky holding at approximately 3,700 feet and the FAC at 3,000 feet; each generally having the other in sight. Ancillary benefits accrued as a result of an airborne Spooky just north of Tan Son Nhut. The most obvious was the ability to react rapidly on the air base, while still on call to incursions anywhere within the CMD.^{15/}

In late August, the system was again modified. The Air Force assumed the responsibility for the eastern corridor as well as the northern one; therefore, two O-2s were airborne from 1900 to 0700 covering north and east of the city and the night VR was dropped. Further, the size of the north corridor was enlarged and the east corridor was redesigned to follow natural topographic features.^{16/}

Complementing the airborne visual watch for rockets was a procedure

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designed to deliver significant and diverse VR sightings to the G-2 and G-3 in the TOC. Special VR requests to check out hot intelligence reports were passed to FACs, who would investigate and report their findings to the TOC. In turn, unusual movement or activity was called in by the FAC to the TOC, who investigated and reported their findings to the FAC. This VR procedure was implemented both day and night.^{17/}

The FACs assigned to the Rocket Watch were all SCAR-qualified (Strike Control and Reconnaissance) and were normally not intended to be used for purposes other than directing strikes against active rocket sites. Nonetheless, in emergency situations, it was envisioned that they would direct close air support for friendly troops. The rocket attack procedures were outlined by III DASC as follows:^{18/}

- If a rocket launch is observed, immediately advise Saigon Artillery Center on FM, Snap Control (TOC at CMAC) on the VHF.
- Call DEADLY 52 (helicopter gunship) with information.
- Attempt to pinpoint the rocket site and obtain six digit coordinates (100 meters); pass coordinates to, and request clearance to expend, from DEADLY 52. DEADLY 52 will obtain clearance for FACs, SPOCKY, Light Fire Teams, and artillery.
- Do Not expend any ordnance without proper clearance from DEADLY 52.
- Continue to monitor the suspected site. Use extreme caution and look around. Light Fire Teams will be in the area and artillery will engage as soon as possible. VNAF A-1s have been known to expend while USAF is still awaiting clearance.

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- Again, do not expend without clearance, use caution, and keep your eyes open.

On 26 July, CMAC published a Clearance of Fires Regulation, Number 525-1, to inform ground commanders of procedures for clearance of fires in the CMD. The CMD Commander was responsible for providing final approval of specified strike zones (areas approved by GVN/RVNAF where artillery, airstrikes, and naval gunfire required military, but not civil, clearance) in his area. Point target clearance, which was defined as six digit coordinates unless otherwise specified, was clearance to fire in the area of a 1,000 meter radius from the requested target coordinates. The Rules of Engagements specified that within the CMD, the maneuver force commander desiring fires was responsible for securing appropriate clearances.^{19/}

Definitive and detailed rules were established by CMAC Reg 525-1, outlining procedures for placing artillery fire in the CMD; however, the regulation did not include airstrike control, limitations, or procedures. Therefore, the ground forces had no way of knowing the tactical air capability or restrictions. The CMAC ALO was requested to review and coordinate on the proposed regulation in mid-July. He later commented, "Several pages of suggestions were submitted by myself and the Assistant ALO that were designed to integrate the USAF Rules of Engagement. Unfortunately, none of which appeared in the CMAC regulation."^{20/}

To increase the capability of Rocket Watch teams in spotting and marking rocket launch sites, a program was established for artillery to fire "flash tests" on a no notice basis every night. These tests were designed to simulate

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a rocket launch by firing a white phosphorus air burst round on a predetermined set of coordinates. The FACs, Spooky, helicopter gunships, and watch towers were to spot the flash of light, which lasted about a second and a half, convert it to a ground position, and call in the coordinates. Originally, the results were erratic, but the trend soon reflected the value of constant training. By August, the normal error for FACs/Spooky was under 300 meters with a reaction time of 45 seconds from the time the flash appeared. Moreover, the FAC/Spooky plotting problem was much more complex than that confronting watch towers or helicopters for they were moving platforms with constantly shifting reference points.^{21/}

Rocket Watch Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the Rocket Watch program was difficult to evaluate. Certainly there were no attacks by fire on Saigon since 21 June and the Communist boast of "100 rockets for 100 days" did not occur, but this failure to make good their boast may have been due to a number of reasons. The capture of large rocket/mortar caches discovered in and around the CMD greatly degraded the enemy capability and the ground sweeps kept him off balance. However, it was doubtful whether the munitions interceptions and increased patrols resulted in total cessation. Another possible factor may have been enemy discipline. He was either husbanding his rockets for a massive attack or reacting to the adverse publicity garnered by the indiscriminate rocketing of a heavily-populated city. Even when obviously attacking Tan Son Nhut, a few "short rounds" occurred.

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The CMAC ALO was of the opinion that the Rocket Watch was valuable: ^{22/}

"The Rocket Watch, as we are conducting it, is well worth the time and effort expended giving us this air surveillance. There is a by-product of this Rocket Watch. We have constant surveillance of the ground during hours of darkness. The Rocket Watch corridors are set up to be nearly over rocket positions used in the past. These are also the same routes the enemy used moving into the Saigon area. The FACs, SPOOKY, and the helicopters are able to observe movement on the waterways, the roads, the trails; in fact, any movement going on in the area. This side effect, in my opinion, is almost as important as the Rocket Watch itself. The mere fact that these people are there provides a deterrent to the firing of rockets and the movement of the enemy at night."

Reinforcing the ALO's opinion of the effort, a Rocket Watch FAC displayed his completely thorough knowledge of the north corridor by pointing out prominent landmarks, known friendly locations, villages by name, and frequencies of control agencies without referring to a map or checklist. He further stated his navigator could do the same and he was reasonably sure they could pinpoint a rocket launch within 200 meters. The reason for his estimate being lower than the "flash test" scores was that the "flash test", although providing excellent training, had built-in errors. For example, the artillery fired on a predetermined set of coordinates; however, as the shell was an airburst, there was no definitive method of determining exactly where the flash occurred. Therefore, the desired impact point was used, resulting in errors of up to 100 meters. ^{23/}

Conversely, a CMD FAC who participated in the Rocket Watch since its inception didn't think it was particularly effective, though it did have some

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usefulness. He commented: ^{24/}

"I don't think we can ever prevent the VC from firing rockets, at least the first volley into a base; but at the same time, I have never seen them send up a second volley, at least from the same place. I don't feel the night operation is very effective, but on the other hand, I don't think that Charlie is extremely effective at night either. I think that we are more or less obligated to stay up there whenever there is a risk of a rocket attack."

"In some cases we have been able to put in fire and when the friendlies went in the next day, they would find blood traces and equipment lying around."

Problems

The most persistent problem for all supporting fires in the CMD was one of clearances. This barrier prevented efficient and rapid reaction to enemy ground assaults and rocket/mortar fire. During July, approximately one-third of the requests for clearances were approved and executed; the rest were denied by one or more of the clearing agencies. Airstrikes often were cancelled or diverted due to previously granted clearances being rescinded. Specifically, one request was denied on a troops-in-contact mission because friendly troops were in the area. This clearance was finally granted after it was made very clear that the friendly troops had requested the airstrike. Further, an active rocket site was not attacked, even though an Army helicopter was directly over the target--it was deemed too close to a hamlet for clearance purposes. ^{25/}

Echoing the clearance problems, one FAC stated: ^{26/}

"We have had some difficulty getting ground clearance"

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to hit. One thing that is a problem here, there are so many friendlies in the area up to the north including a Hawk site and they are roaming the area constantly. When you try to get a clearance in this area, the people that clear you have a lot of work to do before they tell you that you can go in."

An organization established as rapidly as CMAC was destined to have growing pains. As of August, the Army Staff had not integrated the assistance available to it from the ALOs. An example of the CMAC Clearance of Fires Regulation has already been mentioned. Moreover, in early August, CMAC recommended B-52 ARC LIGHT strikes within the CID. The target nominations went forward to MACV without the CMAC ALO or Assistant ALO having seen or coordinated on the nomination of targets. Coincidentally, the combined experience of the two ALOs totals 17 years in the B-52 program. The ALO commented: "Normally, as the ALO, I find out about things after they have already happened; sometimes asked 'how come you dropped the ball on our plans.'" ^{27/}

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CHAPTER VII
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Since the beginning of the Communist Spring Offensive, the enemy took every advantage in areas normally considered as non-military, such as churches and pagodas, and installed defensive positions in public and private dwellings. To counter the increased use of this tactic, Deputy COMUSMACV, on 17 February, modified the current Rules of Engagement for artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire in parts of I Corps:^{1/}

"Effective immediately, current Rules of Engagement are modified as contained herein where responsible commanders identify positive enemy hostile acts either in execution or preparation, such responsible commanders are authorized to attack with weapons and forces most appropriate to the circumstances to insure prompt destruction of the enemy...responsible commanders will use every means available to react quickly with maximum firepower to destroy the enemy forces and/or material."

This interest in the Rules of Engagement and their applicability to the enemy offensive was paralleled by certain actions taken by 7AF relevant to FAC and Spooky Rules of Engagement.

The increase of rocket attacks in the Saigon/Bien Hoa area in mid-February highlighted the problem associated with the process of obtaining clearances for FACs to mark enemy rocket positions with white phosphorus and for Spooky gunships to initiate fire on rocket positions which were in the process of firing against friendly forces and positions. The Rules of Engagement - 7AF Regulation 55-49 - directed that "all targets selected for an airstrike will be approved by the Province Chief directly or through higher ARVN authority."^{2/}

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The ability to launch attacks swiftly, without warning and normally during the hours of darkness, worked strongly in the favor of the enemy under the existing rules. Consequently, on 24 February, 7AF modified the Rules of Engagement for FAC and Spooky aircraft in an area encompassed by a 25-kilometer radius from Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut air bases. The amendment authorized:^{3/}

- Spooky aircraft to initiate fire on enemy rockets and installations.
- FACs to fire white phosphorus marking rockets on enemy positions which were in the process of firing against friendly forces and installations.

The increased authority charged the FACs and Spooky commanders to keep on board the latest and most up-to-date information on friendly positions to avoid unnecessary risk to allied forces. Seventh Air Force recognized that some risk accrued from the increased authority, but that stopping rocket attacks on friendly troops and installations warranted the slight additional risk incurred. Authority for airstrikes by tactical fighter aircraft without further clearance was not granted and the Rules of Engagement under 7AF Reg 55-49 applied. Further, the Director of III DASC, who controlled the FAC and Spooky aircraft in the Tan Son Nhut/Bien Hoa area, was to report to TACC all firings and results of the local program in determining possible expanded use.^{4/}

On 1 March, 7AF reinterpreted the Rules of Engagement for Spooky to apply to all of South Vietnam:^{5/}

- Spooky aircraft are authorized to initiate fire

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on enemy rocket/mortar positions which are in the process of firing against friendly forces and installations.

- In the event that ground fire is encountered by the Spooky aircraft while striking, paragraph 71 of 7AFR 55-49 ("Rules of Engagement") applies. "Strike aircraft are authorized to defend themselves against groundfire providing; (1) the source of fire can be visually identified, (2) the strike can be positively oriented against the source, (3) the fire is of such intensity that counteraction is necessary."

The expanded authority obliged FACs and Spooky commanders to use the best information of friendly forces available from controlling DASCs to avoid unnecessary risks to friendly forces. This new directive did not alter the basic rules given III DASC regarding Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut in the 24 February message. ^{6/}

In mid-April, the Deputy Director of III DASC suggested an A-37 Air Alert/FAC combination with the objective of expending tactical fighters on a timely basis during a rocket attack. He felt that current ground rules negated the capability of tactical fighters as an adequate retaliatory weapons system. To be effective during such an attack, the fighters had to be cleared for immediate ordnance expenditure against the rocket/mortar site. To provide increased firepower for immediate response to rocket attacks and yet operate within the basic framework of the governing Rules of Engagement, the following plan was submitted to 7AF by III DASC. ^{7/}

- In the event of firm intelligence concerning the date and time of an enemy rocket attack, a flight of two A-37s should be made available for airborne alert. A formation of two aircraft is considered adequate. This formation is easy to handle and two aircraft are capable

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of carrying adequate ordnance to cover the mission.

- A qualified FAC should fly "right seat" in the lead aircraft.
- To obtain required information regarding position of friendly ground troops, artillery fire plans, helicopter fire team status, etc., the FAC, using the FM radio, should establish contact with the appropriate ground commander, Spooky, other FACs, the artillery coordinator, and/or the Army Aviation element, all of whom should be monitoring a pre-briefed tactical FM frequency.
- In the event of a rocket attack, if the FAC is positioned so as to be able to observe the rocket launching, the FAC (lead aircraft) should immediately engage the launch site with heavy ordnance. This ordnance impact will serve as a "mark" for other members of the flight, who can immediately roll in as necessary.
- ...the lead A-37 could be armed with SUU-25 flare dispensers and Mark 24 flares to provide illumination as the FAC deemed necessary... Within the flight, the ordnance load should include CBU-24 and napalm plus rockets. Napalm will also provide a means for working the target.
- For the defense of important military installations such as the Tan Son Nhut complex and the Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex, this proposal, if implemented, will provide both speed and quantity of retaliatory firepower we do not currently possess. Additionally, the A-37s could be employed without Spooky/Moonshine (flaeship) or additional FAC aircraft. Artillery, which could pose a problem in regard to orbit altitudes, can be coordinated with appropriate fire control centers.

The Director, TACC, concurred with the proposal, as FAC and Spooky aircraft in the past retaliated against rocket firing positions; however, their ordnance was limited and offered more harassment than destruction. The effectiveness of bombs delivered immediately after the first rocket firing would not only end the attack, but destroy the rockets and enemy. The fall out psychological impact of this immediate destruction would be an impressive

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deterrent to further attacks.^{8/}

As a result of the above proposal, the Rules of Engagement for the 25-kilometer radius of Bien Hoa/Tan Son Nhut were further amended in late April. A-37s with a qualified FAC in the right seat of the lead aircraft were authorized to deliver ordnance on enemy rocket positions which were in the process of firing on friendly forces or installations with the following provisions:^{9/}

- The FAC in the lead A-37 will make contact with the appropriate ground commander, Spooky, other FACs, artillery coordinator, all of which should be on the same FM frequency. He should obtain initial clearance into the area and the position of friendly forces.
- The lead A-37's primary duty will be to function as a FAC. The lead A-37 should engage the rocket firing site with a marking rocket. The FAC in the lead A-37 will then clear each A-37 and request adjustments to impact points as usual. Flares may be used as desired.

As a test measure, two flights were flown to exercise the concept; however, no ordnance was expended. All other phases of the operation, i.e., coordination with Spooky, the Dong Nai Sensitive Area and the ground commanders in the local area proved without doubt that the concept would work. Even with such promising results, the increased ground troop posture in the area, coupled with increased clearance sensitivity, caused further flights to be held in abeyance.^{10/}

Again, the FACs and Spooky aircraft commanders were directed to keep on board and use the best information on friendly positions from controlling DASCs and TACPs to avoid unnecessary risks to friendly forces. In addition, III

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DASC and TACPs would make an effort to streamline clearance procedures in order to expedite after-the-fact clearances. Authority for placing other tactical airstrikes without further clearance was still withheld.

COMUSMACV, on 2 May, expressed concern that the expend authority without ground approval, granted to FAC and Spooky aircraft commanders, could result in unacceptable casualties to friendly ground forces. In the highly fluid tactical situation that existed in the Saigon area, it appeared extremely difficult to keep FAC and Spooky aircrews thoroughly abreast of exact locations of friendly units and personnel. In that light, COMUSMACV considered that Rules of Engagement changes of such significance should only be implemented after thorough coordination and ultimate approval of MACV. Accordingly, 7AF was requested to withdraw the authority granted FAC and Spooky aircrews in February and to reinstitute such authority only in areas where agreement could be reached with appropriate ground commanders and MACV.^{11/}

The 7AF Commander concluded that COMUSMACV's letter referred only to A-37s; therefore, authority was withdrawn from the A-37s and a letter sent to MACV advising that the A-37 program was suspended:^{12/}

"7AF DO Secret Msg, LFP 260500 (April 1968) (authorizing A-37 strikes) is hereby rescinded. This deletes the authority for the pilot of an A-37 aircraft, with a qualified FAC in the right seat, to deliver ordnance on enemy rocket positions in the process of firing on friendly forces or installations."

The message emphasized that the directive issued in late February--the original expenditure authorization granted FACs and Spooky--was still in effect.^{13/} The

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letter to COMUSMACV stated: ^{14/}

"I have withdrawn the authority for the pilot of an A-37 aircraft with a qualified FAC in the right seat, to deliver ordnance on enemy rocket positions in the process of firing on a friendly air base."

On 26 May, II FForceV noted that the incidences of misdirected aerial ordnance increased during the month of May. There were two cases where gunships fired on friendly troops without having radio contact with the ground or having proper maps aboard the aircraft. The gunships most probably were Army. A review of 7AF "Summary of Short Round Incidents" subsequent to 1 January 1968 and updated to 18 July 1968, disclosed three short round incidents in the Saigon area. None of these incidents involved Spooky, FACs, or A-37 aircraft. Specifically vulnerable, with a heavy concentration of ground forces and the large number of night ambushes both static and moving, was the Bien Hoa/Tan Son Nhut rocket belt. Consequently, the Commander, II FForceV, requested that the FAC and Spooky authority to engage mortar or rocket positions without clearance be withdrawn. ^{15/}

On 28 May, COMUSMACV replied that 7AF had been requested to withdraw the authority earlier in the month and requested that immediate action be taken to withdraw the FAC/Spooky authority granted them in February. MACV had no objection to 7AF and Field Force Commanders arranging mutually agreed procedures for attacks on enemy rocket positions; however, such procedures were not to be determined or promulgated on a unilateral basis. Also, MACV requested notification of such arrangements when consummated. ^{16/}

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The Rules of Engagement expanding the FAC/Spooky authority were rescinded on 30 May.^{17/} However, the 7AF Commander did not concur with the decision and notified COMUSMACV of the rescission and non-concurrence on 31 May:^{18/}

"In compliance with your directive I have temporarily withdrawn the authorization for Spookies and FACs to fire on rocket positions. However, I request reconsideration of your decision. I strongly believe that Spooky on station and authorized to immediately fire upon positively identified rocket sites in the process of launching rockets upon the Bien Hoa and/or Tan Son Nhut Air Bases complements the ground force's action to prevent such type attacks.

"If permission for Spooky to fire must be withheld until the ground force commander can approve, the effect of Spooky fire has been negated since either additional rockets have been launched and/or the VC have withdrawn their equipment. This exposes two of the largest bases in Vietnam with eighteen thousand people and 500 million dollars of equipment to additional rocket fire. I feel this is a far greater risk than the possibility of injury to friendly patrols. I realize that friendly patrols could be within 1500 meters of the launch site; however, the Spooky aircraft have been instructed to carefully concentrate their fire on the rocket site and if in doubt to withhold their fire pending ground clearance. Over the past few months Spooky has expended several times on rocket sites immediately after their launch in the Bien Hoa area without endangering the ground troops in the area. Prior to take off the Spooky crew is briefed on the location of ground forces. After airborne a refined location is received by radio since final troop disposition for the night has not been determined at the time of the pre-flight briefing. It is believed that these procedures coupled with the accuracy of the Spooky aircraft should protect any ground forces outside of a 200 meter radius of the launch site.

"...my staff will attempt to work out an arrangement with CG II FFV for continued utilization of Spooky in the Tan Son Nhut/Bien Hoa area."

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In mid-June, COMUSMACV designated the Commanding General, II FForceV, as the authority to employ U.S. tactical air, helicopter-delivered fire, or artillery in the built-up area of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh. The authority could be further delegated to the Senior U.S. Advisor to the Military Governor of Saigon/Gia Dinh, but no further delegation was authorized. Clearance to employ the above-mentioned fire supporting arms was to include political as well as military clearance.^{19/} On 2 July, CG II FForceV delegated authority to employ U.S. tactical air and helicopter-delivered fire (gunships or armed slicks), artillery, and mortar fire within the built-up area of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh to the Senior U.S. Advisor to the Military Governor.^{20/} The authority was finally vested in the CG CMAC.

In reviewing the Rules of Engagement after the May Offensive, MACV IG noted several discrepancies between the rules as set down by MACV Directive 95-4, II FFV Regulation 525-9, CMD G-3 SOPs, and 9th Division Rules of Engagement. Some areas were contradictory while others were not in consonance. For example, MACV Directive 95-4 required GVN clearance for all airstrikes yet permitted armed helicopters to fire upon villages or hamlets without approval if the situation clearly presented an immediate threat to the crew. Further, the Directive specified that, under certain circumstances, inhabitants of urban areas had to be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeakers prior to air attacks. II FFV Regulation 525-9 and CMD SOPs did not include provisions for warning of inhabitants.^{21/}

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CHAPTER VIII

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Since Tet, enemy ground activity throughout the republic, which ranged from squad-size assaults against an outpost to a multi-regimental attack, continually decreased with the exception of the surge in early May (Fig. 24). Conversely, their attacks by fire in proportion to the ground effort rose steeply. Further, ground attacks during the month of June declined to the lowest level of enemy-initiated action in 1968, characterizing a country-wide trend--a generally increasing number of stand-off attacks. In III Corps, the preponderance of the activity centered around Saigon and during the 5 May attack, there were twice as many attacks by fire over those of 18 February, but only two-thirds the number of rounds.^{1/}

The enemy clearly intended to sustain pressure on Saigon, yet his activity had fallen below the pre-Tet level. There were several probable contributing factors:^{2/}

- He is husbanding his strength for another wave.
- His forces are generally weaker. Estimates place his losses as high as 36,000 KIA, or 76 percent of his strength, with green replacements who have had a minimum of training filling the ranks.
- He has been at least partially pre-empted by the concentrated ARC LIGHT strikes which started on 14 June.

After the repulsion of the early May assault, the weekly review of significant intelligence presented to COMUSMACV was dominated by the phrase, "Enemy activity throughout the Republic remained at a low level". The enemy

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had suffered extensive turnover. The ranks were, for the most part, filled with green recruits who were very young and had received reduced training. For instance, a sample of 62 infiltrator privates revealed only half had the normal 12 weeks of training, the remainder ranged from zero to eight weeks.^{3/}

Captured enemy documents indicated that the next offensive was scheduled for August or early September. The estimate in part stated that the coming attacks would be fierce and the VC would have to sacrifice more soldiers than before. There were still a large number of troops coming from NVN. The 9th VC Division had received sufficient replacements and the Quyet Thang Regiment, which lost two battalions in early June, had also received replacements. Although the VC had penetration agents in Saigon, these agents were weak and would be reorganized and used as support for military attacks.^{4/}

Another agent of proven reliability reported that VC forces were having great difficulty infiltrating the capital. He stated that there was a maximum effort being made to infiltrate weapons, ammunition, and men into the city. However, as of the date of this report, no attack had occurred. Perhaps the document captured on 1 July echoed the problems of other VC/NVA units:^{5/}


"The battalion has only 104 men present for duty, including those on sick call...many were ill. Medicine was not available and local people dared not purchase it for them. The personnel feared airstrikes, artillery fire, and gunships."

The extremely heavy pressure applied to the enemy by B-52 strikes, tac air, and artillery drastically upset the offensive timetable. It may, in fact, have delayed the third offensive indefinitely. According to an enemy document,

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ENEMY ATTACKS COUNTRY-WIDE IN SVN



 ATTACKS BY FIRE
 GROUND ATTACKS

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on 21 July, instructions were passed to VC/NVA forces to cancel their plans for a third ground offensive and to await further orders. The reason for the postponement of attack plans was given as due to the loss of 15 percent of VC/NVA combat-effective troops by allied bombing and artillery raids plus approximately 30 percent of their troops were incapacitated due to illness and wounds.^{6/} A COMUSMACV message attributed these statistics to a "fairly reliable source" and, in the absence of independent confirmation, must be qualified as possible VC deception.

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CHAPTER IX
LESSONS LEARNED

An enemy situation report prepared by an unidentified agency of Sub-Region 6 (Saigon) mirrored the enemy estimate of U.S. and RVNAF attempts at coordinating efforts in the defense of Saigon. The document admitted that there had been some coordination between the U.S. and RVNAF, but they did not think their cooperative effort had been extensive enough to make their operation prohibitive. In addition, the document pointed out that the VC/NVA elements had failed to motivate the local populace to join in armed activities. Thus, there had not been sufficient replacements for the casualties sustained by VC/NVA units during the initial stage of the Second Offensive.^{1/}

When combating the enemy in urban areas, the choice of weapons was of paramount importance if the enemy was to be ejected with minimum resultant damage to civilian property. Alert aircraft with mixed ordnance normally used for rural and jungle area combat were not generally effective in urban combat. Particularly undesirable were napalm and a mixture of CBU and HE bombs. Once the decision was made to employ tactical air, specifics as to munitions delivered must be stated.^{2/} Conversely, in an After Action Report following the May Offensive, the 25th Infantry Division reported that:

"If the position is heavily fortified, it may be wise to back off and call in airstrikes. Rather than back off the distance required for 750 pound bombs, we preferred to use napalm which could be brought in much closer to the troops."

The size and type of bombs needed to obtain the desired results with

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fewest number of airstrikes should be used, residual effects considered. The large 750-pound delayed fuze bomb was more effective than many small bombs. Target marking for tactical air, gunships, or aerial CS drops necessitated special provisions and advance preparation.^{3/}

As noted earlier, the abnormally high winds during early May undoubtedly caused greater damage by fires. Therefore, climatic conditions or the use of CS must be considered.

Airstrikes were effective primarily against hard targets such as fortified areas with underground emplacements which resisted direct and area fire. Airstrikes were used only when the decision had been reached that destruction was unavoidable.^{4/}

Each airstrike requested was processed through the normal request channels. In many cases restrictive clearances and instructions were issued. Normally, a clearance for an airstrike included a designated 500-meter circle for ordnance employment. During the May Offensive, most of the clearances were for a pinpoint location with instructions to hit the pinpoint or not utilize the airstrike. In all cases, the airstrikes were controlled by a FAC who was in constant communication with the ground commanders who requested the strike.^{5/}

The 5-12 May attacks on Saigon were considered in detail by the combined MACV/JGS Study Group and the recommendations listed below were approved for the Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh area:^{6/}

- US/RVNAF plans for defense of urban areas will have as their key objective the interception and defeat of enemy prior to his reaching major urban areas.

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- The decision to use napalm, indirect artillery, helicopter gunships, and tactical air for close fire support in urban areas will be retained at Corps/Field Force level.
- Selected RVNAF units will be equipped ASAP with 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles for close fire support in urban area fighting.
- Direct fire weapons will be used, whenever possible, for destruction of point targets and fortified structures.
- Helicopters will be used whenever possible to maneuver troops and heavy weapons to roofs of key buildings and other locations to expedite cordoning the enemy.
- US/RVNAF units charged with defense of key urban areas will receive refresher training to include practical exercises in urban warfare tactics.
- Selected RVNAF units will receive the necessary equipment to allow the maximum use of CS riot control agents in urban warfare.
- Selected CS agent munitions will be controlled and used only in urban area operations until theater stocks have reached required level....
- MACV/JGS and GVN agencies will initiate an extensive PSYOP program directed at the civilian populace in all urban areas of RVN as to protective measures, refugee guidance, resistance to the enemy and support for the government.
- Large scale (1:1000) detail city maps will be made available to appropriate US/RVNAF units and aerial photographs of the combat area will be provided on an "on call" basis.
- All defense plans will be reviewed to insure that there is an integrated defense to include US/RVNAF, National Police, and other GVN agencies, against infiltration of VC/NVA sappers, arsonists and terrorists into the cities.
- The defense plans will provide for refugee care, special equipment and resupply to National Police Field Forces and security for local GVN fire fighting units.
- JGS/GVN will develop an active self-defense program designed to augment warning nets, control points on routes of access, monitor curfew violations and report VC/NVA covert activities.

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APPENDIX I

ROCKET/MORTAR DAMAGE

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>NR OF ROUNDS</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>PRECINCT/VICINITY</u> |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------|--|
| 5 May | 1 | Mortar | XS-863922 | 1 Vic U.S. Embassy |
| | 10 | 122mm Rocket | XS-873945 | Go Vap area |
| | UNK | Mortar | XS-891939 | Newport Bridge (no damage) |
| 6 May | 2 | Mortar | XS-853899 | 2 Near International Hotel |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-866912 | 1 |
| | 8 | 122mm Rocket | XS-820960 | TSN area 1 bldg dest |
| | 3 | 122mm Rocket | XS-798945 | TSN area 9th ARVN Base Camp |
| | 15 | 60mm Mortar | XS-815938 | TSN area 1 warehouse damaged |
| 7 May | UNK | Mortar | XS-839884 | 5 Central Police Stn |
| | 1 | Unk Mortar | XS-846888 | 5 Cholon Power Stn |
| | 13 | 122mm Rocket | XS-821955 | TSN area minor dam (1) C-47 |
| | 5 | 122mm Rocket | XS-821955 | TSN area 1 bldg dam |
| 8 May | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-865906 | 2 5 homes destroyed |
| | 4 | 107mm Rocket | XS-820960 | TSN area no damage |
| 12 May | 12 | Unk Mortar | XS-891940 | Newport Bridge |
| | | Sabotage | XS-891940 | Newport Bridge 50-60m 2 lanes destroyed |
| | UNK | Mortar | XS-871970 | Binh Loi Bridge no damage |

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| <u>DATE</u> | <u>NR OF ROUNDS</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>PRECINCT/VICINITY</u> |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------|--|
| 19 May | 3-4 | 60mm Mortar | XS-800900 | 6 38th Rangers no dam |
| | 3 | 122mm Rocket | XS-844915 | 3 Police Stn 3d Pct |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-853914 | 2 Near Independence Palace |
| | 3 | Unk | XS-854908 | 2 Near Hoa Lu BQC |
| | 3 | Unk | XS-856905 | 2 Damage to homes |
| | 2 | 122mm Rocket | XS-856905 | 2 4th Psyops Compound minor damage |
| | 1 | Unk | XS-856905 | 2 Fire damage |
| | 4 | 122mm Rocket | XS-859903 | 2 716th MP Motor Pool Truck damaged |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-855894 | 2 Several homes damaged |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-866908 | 2 Residential area |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-868908 | 2 Hit old American Embassy |
| | UNK | | XS-880895 | 4 Dock area |
| 23 May | 6 | 81mm Mortar | XS-898877 | 8 Police Station |
| 27 May | 6 | Unk Mortar | XS-860950 | Gia Dinh area |
| 28 May | 3 | Unk Mortar | XS-785885 | 6 Phu Lam Stratcom |
| | 2 | Unk | XS-782885 | 6 Phu Lam Stratcom |
| | 3 | 122mm Rocket | XS-831921 | 3 7 houses damaged |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-832916 | 3 6 houses damaged |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-840936 | Go Vap area 6 houses damaged |
| | 2 | 122mm Rocket | XS-823911 | 5 |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-848944 | Go Vap area garage damaged |

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| <u>DATE</u> | <u>NR OF ROUNDS</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>PRECINCT/VICINITY</u> |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------|---|
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-838934 | TSN area 1 bldg damaged |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-825941 | TSN area 1 bldg damaged |
| | 2 | 122mm Rocket | XS-848938 | Phu Nhuan area |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-851934 | 1 1 house damaged |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-842912 | 3 2 houses damaged |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-815927 | Phu Tho area |
| 31 May | 1 | Mortar | XS-789884 | 6 536th Maint Bn Motor Pool 4, 1/4-ton damage |
| | 1 | Rocket | XS-856947 | Go Vap area |
| | 1 | Rocket | XS-852944 | Go Vap area - dud |
| 2 Jun | 3 | 122mm Rocket | XS-832901 | 5 |
| | 3 | 122mm Rocket | XS-813926 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-813933 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-835921 | 3 * |
| | 2 | 122mm Rocket | XS-855945 | Go Vap area* |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-843917 | 3 * |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-825931 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-831921 | 3 * |
| 3 June | 1 | Mortar | XS-846887 | 5 |
| | 2 | Mortar | XS846884 | 8 |
| | 6 | Mortar | XS-847888 | 5 One hit on Cholon Electric Power Plant |

* Numerous civilian houses damaged and destroyed.

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| <u>DATE</u> | <u>NR OF ROUNDS</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>PRECINCT/VICINITY</u> |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------|--|
| | 18 | Mortar | XS-798864 | 7 Hit two ships at dock |
| 5 June | 1 | Unk | XS-830888 | 5 |
| | 1 | Unk | XS-845885 | 8 Minor damage Y Bridge |
| 6 June | 4-5 | 107mm Rocket | XS-883894 | 4 Nimor warehouse fire |
| | 200 lbs C-4 | Sabotage | XS-838886 | 5 Chinese newspaper bldg destroyed |
| | 10 | 82mm Mortar | XS-847962 | Go Vap area |
| | 2 | 122mm Rocket | XS-776909 | Tan Hoa Dong area, 30th Ranger Bn, no damage |
| 7 June | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-849909 | 3 |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-851914 | 3 |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-852908 | 2 |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-849933 | Go Vap area |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-843912 | 3 |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-853920 | 3 |
| | 2 | 122mm Rocket | XS-844918 | 3 |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-851906 | 2 |
| | 3 | 122mm Rocket | XS-861959 | Go Vap area |
| 8 June | Explosive Chg | Sabotage | XS-815895 | 5 Generator at power sta damaged, 3 civ houses damaged |
| | 2 | 82mm Mortar | XS-868915 | 1 |
| | 2 | 82mm Mortar | XS-868914 | 1 |
| | 2 | 82mm Mortar | XS-870913 | 1 |
| | 4 | 82mm Mortar | XS-872921 | 1 |
| | 2 | 82mm Mortar | XS-869914 | 1 |
| | 3 | 82mm Mortar | XS-880895 | 4 |

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| <u>DATE</u> | <u>NR OF ROUNDS</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>PRECINCT/VICINITY</u> |
|-------------|---------------------|-------------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| | 1 | 82mm Mortar | XS-881897 | 4 |
| | 6 | 82mm Mortar | XS-869906 | 4 |
| 9 June | 3 | Mortar | XS-896939 | 9 Newport Bridge-no damage |
| | 4 | Mortar | XS-820883 | 8 Vic bridge-no damage |
| 10 June | 1 | Rocket | XS837928 | 3 * |
| | 1 | Rocket | XS-831932 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | Rocket | XS-834930 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | Rocket | XS814930 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | Rocket | XS-835917 | 3 * |
| | 1 | Rocket | XS-826916 | 3 * |
| | 1 | Rocket | XS-822923 | 5 * |
| | 1 | Rocket | XS-834931 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | Rocket | XS-837938 | TSN area* |

* Numerous civilian houses damaged and destroyed.

| | | | | |
|---------|---|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 11 June | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-855909 | 2 + |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-865907 | 2 + |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-861918 | 1 + |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-863920 | 1 + |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-865926 | 1 + |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-866926 | 1 + |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-865913 | 1 + |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-863916 | 1 + |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-835938 | TSN area+ |

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| <u>DATE</u> | <u>NR OF ROUNDS</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>PRECINCT/VICINITY</u> |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-857934 | 1 + |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-867916 | 1 + |
| | 2 | 122mm Rocket | XS-857911 | 2 + |
| | 4 | 122mm Rocket | XS-827939 | TSN area+ |
| | 12 | 122mm Rocket | XS-857911 | 2 + |

+ Three civilian houses damaged and three streets cratered.

| | | | | |
|---------|---|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| 12 June | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-808942 | TSN area# |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-809943 | TSN area# |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-802954 | TSN area# |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-797966 | TSN area# |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-799965 | TSN area# |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-803947 | TSN area# |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-816957 | TSN area# |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-811953 | TSN area# |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-812953 | TSN area# |
| | 2 | 122mm Rocket | XS-820948 | TSN area# |
| | 3 | 122mm Rocket | XS-809945 | TSN area# |

1 U-21 acft dest, 1 helo dest, 6 acft damaged, 1 fuel trk damaged.

| | | | | |
|---------|----|--------------|-----------|-------------|
| 13 June | 20 | 82mm Mortar | XS-845969 | Go Vap area |
| 14 June | 1 | 107mm Rocket | XS-816955 | TSN area+ |
| | 1 | 107mm Rocket | XS-813955 | TSN area+ |
| | 1 | 107mm Rocket | XS-812956 | TSN area+ |
| | 1 | 107mm Rocket | XS-812954 | TSN area+ |

+ 1 U-3 dest, 1 hangar damaged.

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| <u>DATE</u> | <u>NR OF ROUNDS</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>PRECINCT/VICINITY</u> |
|--|---------------------|--------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| 15 June | 10 | 82mm Mortar | XS-829874 | 8 |
| | 20 | 82mm Mortar | XS-830873 | 8 |
| | 18 | 82mm Mortar | XS-824886 | 5 |
| | 1 | 82mm Mortar | XS-829886 | 5 |
| 16 June | 1 | 107mm Rocket | XS-883894 | 4 |
| | 2 | 107mm Rocket | XS-882893 | 4 |
| | 1 | 107mm Rocket | XS-880894 | 4 |
| 17 June | 30 | 82mm Mortar | XS-787871 | 6 |
| 18 June | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-838983 | TSN area |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-858983 | TSN area |
| 20 June | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-835936 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-833936 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-835946 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-838934 | TSN area* |
| | 1 | 122mm Rocket | XS-806946 | TSN area* |
| * Caused damage to one house and one building. | | | | |
| 21 June | 1 | 107mm Rocket | XS-802948 | TSN area |
| | 1 | 107mm Rocket | XS-805947 | TSN area |

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| | |
|-----------|--|
| ALO | Air Liaison Officer |
| ARVN | Army of Republic of Vietnam |
| ASAP | As Soon As Possible |
| AW | Automatic Weapons |
| BDA | Bomb Damage Assessment |
| Bn | Battalion |
| CE | Combat Effectiveness |
| CICV | Counterintelligence Corps, Vietnam |
| CG | Commanding General |
| CMAC | Capital Military Assistance Command |
| CMD | Capital Military District |
| CO | Commanding Officer |
| COMUSMACV | Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam |
| CP | Command Post |
| DASC | Direct Air Support Center |
| DIA | Defense Intelligence Agency |
| FAC | Forward Air Controller |
| FFV | Field Force, Vietnam |
| FM | Frequency Modulation |
| FWF | Free World Force |
| FWMAF | Free World Military Assistance Forces |
| GVN | Government of Vietnam |
| HE | High Explosive |
| HF | High Frequency |
| I FFV | I Field Force, Vietnam |
| IG | Inspector General |
| JDOC | Joint Defense Operations Center |
| JGS | Joint General Staff |
| KBA | Killed by Air |
| KIA | Killed in Action |
| km | Kilometer |
| Lbs | Pounds |
| LZ | Landing Zone |
| MACV | Military Assistance Command, Vietnam |
| mm | millimeter |
| MP | Military Police |

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| | |
|----------------|--|
| NVA | North Vietnamese Army |
| PPIF Psyops | Photo Processing and Interpretation Facility Psychological Operations |
| RITS | Reconnaissance Intelligence Technical Squadron |
| RPG | Rocket-Propelled Grenade |
| RTS | Reconnaissance Technical Squadron |
| RVN | Republic of Vietnam |
| RVNAF | Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces |
| SCAR SOP | Strike Control and Reconnaissance Standing Operating Procedure |
| TACC | Tactical Air Control Center |
| TACP | Tactical Air Control Party |
| TOC | Tactical Operations Center |
| TSN | Tan Son Nhut |
| TV | Television |
| UHF | Ultra High Frequency |
| US/RVNAF | United States/Republic of Vietnam Air Force |
| UTM | Universal Transverse Mercator |
| VC | Viet Cong |
| VNAF | Vietnamese Air Force |
| WIA | Wounded in Action |

