

CORDS

NEWSLETTER

NUMBER 72

28 FEBRUARY 1973



**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
CIVIL OPERATIONS & RURAL
DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT**

SAIGON

CORDS

NORMAN L. SWEET.....Director
Brig. Gen. OLIVER W. DILLARD.....Deputy Director
FRANCIS M. ROTHWELL.....Special Assistant, Chieu Hoi
LEE BRADDOCK....Special Assistant, Pacification Studies

ASSOCIATE DIRECTORS

ROBERT V. CRAIG.....Community Development
JACK P. NAPIER.....Management Support
GEORGE T. BLISS.....Plans, Policies & Programs
MICHAEL G. McCANN.....Public Safety
COL WILLIAM D. DAVIS.....Research & Analysis
COL ROBERT I. CHANNON.....Territorial Security
NORMAN P. FIRNSTAHL.....War Victims

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CORDS: A Farewell and a Salute by George D. Jacobson, Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS.....	4 - 6
History Will Put Us In Perspective by Norman L. Sweet, Director for CORDS).....	7
To Those Who Still Serve in CORDS by Robert W. Komer, former and first Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS).....	8 - 9
Field Operations Takes Over.....	9 - 10
CORDS In Retrospect.....	11 - 36
Life With CORDS (An Autobiography)...	37 - 40

CORDS:

A Farewell And A Salute

BY: G.D. JACOBSON
Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS

It is always sad to see the demise of a working organization. And CORDS was precisely that -- viable, effective, producing. But the reasons for its termination are ones which all of us may be justifiably proud. In large measure, we have accomplished what we and our predecessors set out to do when CORDS was established.

There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that a primary motivation of the other side in launching their 1972 offensive was their assessment of the success of GVN efforts in Pacification. They could see, perhaps even more clearly and more objectively than we, that

the GVN with the assistance of their CORDS advisors was winning the hearts and minds of the people, was providing local security, was establishing and emphasizing effective local government, and was providing the ways and means for the people to live a better life. The other side realized their position with the people had become untenable to the extent that they could no longer successfully conduct a "people's war"

I have always believed that TET of 1968 served up a devastating blow to the other side, one from which they never recovered. The hard-core, deeply motivated enemy infrastructure surfaced and was defeated in the 1968 TET attacks, and consequently, a whole generation of VC leadership was lost. Subsequent to TET Mau Than, the programs established by the GVN with CORDS advice and assistance have progressively given the Vietnamese people, particularly in rural areas, a better life. The Viet Cong were faced with a situation wherein the vast majority of the population were disenchanted with ruthless terror tactics and were forced to look for another way to achieve their needs and desires. And slowly but surely, through representative government, village self-development, modernly equipped territorial forces, advice and assistance from Rural Development and other government cadre, improved police service, ownership of land rather than tenancy, better schools and medical facilities, economic improvement and many other government provided and sponsored services, the GVN has shown the majority of people a better life.

Much of the credit for the status of Pacification can be attributed to the blood, sweat and dedication of the CORDS teams in the field. However, all of us can be proud of the achievement record of our unique organization. All members of CORDS have established a precedence of outstanding devotion and dedication to helping the people of Vietnam.

I am not naive enough to believe all the work that needs to be done has been done. However, CORDS has

assisted the GVN in building the framework for a responsive government and way of life that can meet the aspirations and needs of the people who hopefully can look to a future where their children will not have to endure what they themselves experienced.

In this last publication of the CORDS Newsletter, I wish to commend and thank all of you for your hard work, dedication and professionalism. It is through your efforts and assistance that "Pacification" became a meaningful word. CORDS has done it well. I salute you all.

History will put us in perspective

By NORMAN L. SWEET
Director for CORDS

When CORDS as an element of MACV goes out of existence, its demise will be worth more than a mere historical footnote. Thus, I am certain that the final chapter has not yet been written on the organization which we all have given a full measure of devotion and dedication. CORDS has been unique not only in its structure, which has integrated the efforts of several US agencies into a single chain of command, but also in its relationship with the Government of Vietnam. Under no other circumstances has the US had an advisory relationship that has extended, as has CORDS', from the highest to the lowest levels of government, touching all echelons. Nowhere else, with the possible exception of post-war Japan, has the US advisory effort, as represented by CORDS, had such a profound and beneficial effect on the evolution of the relationship between a government and its people. CORDS has been extraordinarily successful in inducing the GVN to mount those local military, economic and social programs required to gain popular support for the concept of an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam. CORDS's advisors have played an indispensable role in assisting GVN officials to meet the aspirations of the people of South Vietnam, thus blunting the VC/NVA attempts to separate the people from the government.

Presently, we are in a transition period that hopefully will lead to an era of peace and prosperity for the people of South Vietnam. During this period, and perhaps beyond, a new organization, the Office of Field Operations, will carry on in the CORDS tradition. To those of you who will be joining the new organization, I would like to say "welcome aboard." To those who will be leaving to enter upon a new career, I would like to express my appreciation for a job well done and for the support you have given me during my tenure as Director for CORDS. I wish you well.

To those who still serve in CORDS

By ROBERT W. KOMER

As the first DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS, I have followed its evolution with great interest and no little pride. After all, it was a unique experiment -- an integrated civilian-military advisory organization of a type and on a scale never attempted before by the U.S. But our purpose was not to Americanize the "other war." On the contrary, it was to galvanize a far larger GVN pacification effort -- without which, in our view, the GVN/U.S. effort could not succeed in its aims. Thus the "new model" pacification program which CORDS has done so much to stimulate was conceived of from the outset as a wholly "Vietnamized" program, with the U.S. in an advisory and supporting role. CORDS was designed as a temporary field expedient, and as it comes to an end after six hectic years, it is rightly dwarfed by the GVN pacification establishment.

Pacification as we conceived it was basically a rural program, aimed at competing with the VC for the support and allegiance of the rural population. We sought to build faster than the VC/NVA could destroy. The initial backbone was the attempt to provide the villager with sustained local security (something the ARVN and U.S. forces were not designed to provide) via the expansion and refurbishing of the long neglected territorial security forces and police. But restoring rural security was only the precondition to providing the Vietnamese farmer with a functioning local government, agricultural revival, land reform, vastly improved services and the like -- of a sort he had never known before. As a result, we are not only the architects of the first viable counterstrategy to "people's war" in South Vietnam; we have also spurred the start of a genuine socio-economic revolution in the countryside -- one hopefully more than abortive.

How well did CORDS do? It must remain a historical "if." For one thing, the impact of pacification is so inextricably mixed with that of many other factors as

to make them impossible to sort out. For example, twice we have seen many hard-won pacification gains wiped out by VC/NVA offensives. We also made plenty of mistakes. But even so, if only the program we finally got started in 1967 had been the primary focus of GVN/U.S. strategy in the Fifties or early Sixties before Vietnam escalated, the outcome might have been much different and the tragic costs far less.

Nonetheless, taking into account the small fraction of U.S. and GVN resources which went into pacification even at its peak, we surely accomplished more at less costs and with fewer tragic side effects than almost any other facet of the combined GVN/U.S. effort in Vietnam. When emotions have cooled, and America's role in Vietnam can be seen in more perspective, the effort sparked by CORDS in 1967-1972 will stand out. So a vigorous well done to those still hard at work from one who also served.

FIELD OPERATIONS TAKES OVER

When CORDS is abolished, a new chapter of U.S. support to Vietnam rural development will begin. This new chapter will begin on the U.S. side with the creation of a new field oriented organization.

In Saigon the field organization will be headed by Mr. George D. Jacobson whose title will be Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations. He will be assisted by a Program and Evaluation element and a Management Support element.

In the field, four Consulates-General (including the upgrading of the Danang Consulate) are being established at Danang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho. The areas of responsibilities of the Consulates General

correspond to the territory of the MRs.

Each is headed by a Consul General assisted by consular and administrative personnel, a Resettlement and Reconstruction Directorate, and a Technical Assistance Division.

Organizationally below the Consulate General level, and reporting to the Director of Resettlement and Reconstruction in each area, are Province or Inter Province Resettlement and Reconstruction Offices, the distinction being that an office serving two or more provinces is called an Inter Province Office, and one serving a single province is called a province office.

CIVIL OPERATIONS & RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT

SINCE May 1967, U.S. civil and military field activities in support of the pacification and development effort have been directed by the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Under MACV, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) was the primary U.S. organization providing to GVN financial and advisory assistance needed to stimulate self-defense, self-government and self development at local levels of government.

Following the TET offensive of 1968, CORDS encouraged the establishment of a GVN Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) and regional and provincial pacification and development councils to coordinate pacification and development programs among the Vietnamese civilian and military agencies, CORDS also


assisted the GVN in the establishment of a master plan for pacification and development through a series of Civil Defense and Local Development (CDLD) plans which culminated in the four-year (1972-75) CDLD Plans.

Village Self Development

The Village Self-Development (VSD) program, instituted in 1969, seeks to involve the rural population and its elected officials in the direct management of political, social, and economic development. To this end, village information and discussion activities carried out by rural development cadre and village officials culminate in the convening of village assemblies to determine priorities and to approve self-development projects, to pledge cash contributions and volunteer labor, and to allocate village budget funds. VSD subsidies are likewise subjected to village review (e.g. dividing funds between public-use projects and VSD rural credit program, initiated in late 1970 in cooperation with the Agriculture Development Bank).

Village credit committees (composed of locally elected and appointed officials) receive and review applications from farmers and fishermen for non-collateral small production loans. Approved loan applications are forwarded to the Agriculture Development Bank (ADB) for final review and action. Participating villages earmark a portion of their VSD subsidy to the credit program, and the ADB matches the village contributions on a sliding scale formula. The individual maximum loan level is established at VN\$50,000. During the period 1 March 1971 to 31 October 1972, 11,715 farmers and fishermen obtained loans totalling VN\$2,229,509,700. By 31 October 1972, approximately 76 percent of the outstanding loans had been repaid in full.

Piaster budget support from the CY 1972 American Aid Chapter (AAC) for the VSD program totaled VN\$2 billion. As of 30 November 1972, the CY 72 AAC funds were used to complete 1,876 public-use projects and to initiate work on another 2,680. Plans have been completed for an additional 2,787 projects. CY 1972 AAC funds have been effectively used to repair damage inflicted by the NVA offensive. By 30 November 1972, VN219 million had been allocated to VSD recovery activities in



Upper photo shows a dam under construction with people's active participation.

At right is a ricemill in Long An province built under the Rural Credit Program.





A bridge above and a road below
are among many VSD projects where
people are putting more money, ef-
fort, materials...



more than 300 villages.

The Rural Development Cadre (RDC) role was expanded in 1972 as the GVN accelerated the permanent assignment of Cadre personnel in rural areas. At this time, the RDC was given broader responsibilities as coordinators for the Community Defense and Local Development (CDLD) Plan (which is under the operational control of the village chiefs). Providing a direct link between the people and the government, the RDC is specifically responsible for obtaining village information, implementing the VSD and rural credit programs and for operating village post offices. Notable proof of the close and useful relationships between the people and the RDC was offered in 1972 when the NVA offensive generated hundreds of thousands of refugees. The RDC assisted the people in reaching secure areas and took a leading part in organizing assistance in refugee camps. During one critical period more than 3,000 rural development cadre were engaged in refugee assistance.

The Son Thon Rural Development Cadre (STRDC) has been permanently established with financial support from GVN resources to work with the Montagnard population.

The DOD financial assistance to the RDC program, which has been reduced at the rate of 25 percent per year, is expected to end on 30 June 1974. In view of the reduced US support, the GVN in CY 1973 will assume an increasing share of the costs required to maintain a permanent RDC strength of 22,000 men (to be assigned in groups of 3 to 23 men based on village population).

Province Development

The National Fund for Local Development (NFLD) and the Province Development Fund (PDF) complement the VSD as province-managed development activities programmed within the Rural Development Project.

Since its inception, the NFLD has been used chiefly to upgrade and extend networks of secondary roads and bridges in newly pacified areas and to support construction of small irrigation projects. In addition, the NFLD has been used to finance construction of secondary schools, maternity-dispensaries and other simi-

lar community development projects.

Priorities in CY 1972 under the NFLD program were as follows: (1) to construct or repair key roads and bridges in order to improve area security, facilitate the extension of GVN provincial and local administration, and to expand commerce between rural and urban areas, and (2) to promote increased agricultural production by supporting the construction of irrigation works.

In CY 1972, VN\$2 billion was provided for NFLD development projects. Approved CPDC development projects are the product of joint GVN-US planning efforts, and project implementation is jointly monitored by GVN and US agencies. In 1972 NFLD projects constructed 17 irrigation structures, 19 bridges averaging approximately 20 meters in length, and more than 420 kilometers of new or completely rehabilitated secondary roads.

The Province Development Fund (PDF) is designed to enhance the prestige and authority of province and municipal councils. Programs seek the involvement of the people at the province level by permitting representative councils to direct the sponsorship of needed development projects. In 1972, VN\$500 million was allocated for PDF activities. In the wake of the NVA invasion, recovery became a high-priority effort with three clearly-defined objectives: restoration of territorial security; provision of food, shelter and basic necessities of living to war victim evacuees; and the reestablishment of government and public services in newly reoccupied area.

Advisory initiatives taken on recovery matters in late July 1972 led to the establishment of a management structure appropriate to rapid decision-making requirements. Consequently, recovery has gradually accelerated on the basis of excellent interministerial cooperation. As of 24 February 1973, Phase II of the review for recovery plans was well underway. Eight of 13 provinces have submitted their recovery plans for CPDC/Interministerial Committee consideration. The funds reallocated by GVN ministries from their 1971 and 1972 budgets for the initial recovery projects in these provinces amounted to VN\$485 million. In Phuoc Tuy, the first province to receive recovery assistance, VN\$41,130,000 was allocated for initial recovery. Phuoc Tuy projects

included VN\$30 million for schools, VN\$4.5 million for government facilities and VN\$3.8 million for a bridge and two local markets. All projects are expected to be completed by the end of the year.

Ethnic Minorities

The CY 1972 program for ethnic minorities focused primarily on land reform, agriculture, education and related fields. The NVA offensive delayed some training achievements by as much as one-third. All training activities were back in operation by mid-July 1972.

The NVA offensive also created 140,000 war victims among the ethnic minorities. Many of these continue to remain in refugee camps, and the problem exists for re-locating them to secure areas where they can pursue a normal livelihood.

A practical program begun in CY 1972 involves the training of ethnic minorities in agriculture extension. Training is provided through long-term, work-study type projects jointly sponsored by the Directorate General of Agriculture and the Ministry for the Development of Ethnic Minorities (MDEM). Results have been promising, and consequently, the FY 1973 third-country training program for 30 participants to study intermediate level agriculture is no longer required.

The National Montagnard Training Center (NMTC) in Pleiku added several vocational programs to its curriculum. In CY 1972, the NMTC stressed training of literacy teachers who, after graduation, were assigned to villages to conduct adult literacy courses. Other special courses conducted in CY 1972 dealt with land reform, village self development, and rural credit. During the year the NMTC enrolled more than 3,600 trainees although it was closed for more than two months following the NVA invasion.

During CY 1972, officials of MDEM helped to coordinate ethnic minorities programs with other GVN ministries. Consequently, most of the GVN has become more conscious of and sensitive to the needs of the ethnic minorities.



Montagnard children go to
school in Phuoc Long province



18 A feeding program sustains attendance of
this class of Montagnard children even as
it gives them well-balanced nourishment...



Two spring development projects
built by Montagnards under the
VSD Program in Pleiku province.

Public Safety

In CY 1972, CORDS/Public Safety continued advisory and financial support to the National Police Command (NPC), the Combined Telecommunications Directorate and the Directorate of Corrections.

Despite a sustained high level of terrorist activity, the NPC in CY 1972 assumed increasing responsibilities in the field of law enforcement and local security in both urban and rural areas in accordance with the GVN 1972-1975 Community Defense and Local Development (CDLD) Plan. Terrorism, particularly abductions, increased with the NVA invasion. Police presence in CY 1972 improved at the local police station level. By 1 October 1972, 503 new rural police stations were constructed or were under construction through the use of excess U.S. military buildings. During the same period, 802 commissioned police chiefs were assigned to the villages.

The NPC reacted professionally to the NVA invasion and maintained a high state of readiness. Police officers were consistently targeted throughout the year, resulting in 328 police officers killed and 1,030 wounded by the end of September 1972.

Major advisory attention in CY 1972 was focused on the development and use of the NPC management information system to provide improved essential data to police managers at all levels. Selective training also was provided to improve all aspects of internal police management, e.g. supervisors of Police Operations Center (POC) and commanders of district and province police. By October, 307 POCs were in operation from the national to the district level.

The NPC Identification Service accumulated more than 15 million sets of classified fingerprints and allied biographic and records data.

A manpower level of 122,000 remains the NPC staffing goal. In CY 1972 the NPC was authorized to recruit officer candidates with less than 11 years of formal education. One thousand candidates entered a nine-month officers training course, and police manpower reached

119,000 in October 1972.

Several innovations were made in police telecommunications. Initial police FM communications systems were installed in 1,217 villages. (All villages in relatively secure areas are scheduled for this installation). The Village Hamlet Radio System is being used temporarily by the police in 543 villages.

A separate identification teletype system was installed between Saigon and each military region utilizing the NPC Identification Service and its extensive biographic and fingerprint files.

War Victims Assistance

From CY 1964 through CY 1972, the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW), with the support of USAID/CORDS, provided assistance to more than two million displaced civilians. Since the establishment of the Ministry's Return-to-Village (RTV) program in November 1968, approximately 900,000 refugees have been assisted in re-establishing themselves in their home villages. During 1970-1971, the Ministry also assisted in the reception and resettlement of more than 200,000 repatriates from Cambodia.

Immediately prior to the NVA invasion, more than 600,000 refugees had been able to return home and to receive assistance granted under the RTV programs. Only 80,000 new refugees required resettlement assistance away from their original communities, while an additional 89,000 required relief assistance at temporary sites throughout the country. As the requirements for refugee relief were diminished, resources were increasingly being channeled into development programs in RTV hamlets and resettlement sites as well as normal social welfare activities.

The NVA offensive, however, interrupted and reversed this positive trend. By mid-November 1972, an estimated 1.22 million people had been driven from their homes, and of these only 300,000 have been able to return to their home villages. Thus, the GVN and the USAID/CORDS were again faced with the necessity of providing emergency relief to hundreds of thousands of



View of a hamlet area destroyed during the NVA Spring Offensive.

Village officials distribute tin roofing to returning residents as they prepare to reconstruct their homes. Bernard E. Niewoehner, war victims advisor, is in background, upper photo.

Refugee resettlement and reconstruction of homes, lower photo.



people throughout the country for an indeterminate period.

The Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW), with the active encouragement of USAID/CORDS, enlisted the assistance of Vietnamese and foreign voluntary organizations to meet the challenge of the NVA invasion. The initial response helped the MSW to implement a supplemental feeding program for refugee children, utilizing US Public Law 480 food. At its peak, the program provided food to 75,000 children in five provinces. A special nutritional feeding program for seriously undernourished Montagnard children was also established in a number of refugee camps, and this program produced a sharp reduction in the child mortality rate. During CY 1972 the American Aid Chapter budgets (CY 1971 carry-over and CY 1972) in support of child welfare programs were revised upward to VN\$342,630,000. The AAC funds will be used to renovate day-care centers and orphanages, to foster nutritional programs at children's institutions, to sponsor training courses for child welfare personnel and to supplement the expanding commitments of voluntary agencies engaged in child welfare activities.

A pilot social service referral center was put into operation in Da Nang in CY 1972, and approximately 550 war victims were provided vocational testing, training, therapy and other specialized services.

The National Rehabilitation Institute with branches at Saigon, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Can Tho, assisted in providing 10,000 prosthetic and orthotic devices.

The National School of Social Work initiated its first three-year course for social workers, an addition to its one-year course for social welfare auxiliaries. Special seminars were held to deal with problems of community development, juvenile delinquency and family planning. During the academic year, five participant trainees were enrolled in social work studies at the University of the Philippines. Although US support for the community centers program has been terminated 20 community centers continue to be financed by the Ministry of Social Welfare, and nine community centers

are being supported by the city of Saigon.

US Advisory support for the Ministry of War Veterans continued during CY 1972 and was instrumental in helping the Ministry register the increasing number of veterans' and dependents' claims resulting from the recent invasion.

PL 480 -- Title II

The PL 480 Title II program provides for the importation of agricultural commodities to provide food to war victims and needy people through organized social welfare programs. Foods donated for nutritional use in pre-school, school, self-help and other projects include wheat flour, vegetable oil, corn-soya-milk, bulgur and nonfat dry milk.

There were 48,000 metric tons of Title II food valued at over US\$9.5 million programmed in 1972 for distribution to the people of Vietnam. Ocean transportation of the commodities was provided by the U.S. while the GVN provided all in-country transportation. Besides the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW), cooperating sponsors in Vietnam include Catholic Relief Service, CARE, World Relief Commission and World Vision Relief Organization. Food assistance is provided school children, maternal-child health projects, social welfare institutions, refugees, food-for-work projects and nutrition projects for Montagnards. The administration and control of the Title II program have been tightened considerably in the past year to prevent misuse and waste. The efforts of the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Voluntary Agencies in strengthening the management of the various projects have enhanced the effectiveness of the Title II program in providing food supplements for the approximately 1.6 million eligible recipients.

A special effort is being made by the MSW in the wake of the NVA offensive to provide Title II commodities to refugees. The GVN has directed the establishment of central kitchens to provide cooked bulgur and corn-soya-milk (CSM) to the refugees. Funds have been made available for this purpose and for baking bread



Roofing and lumber ready for use at Dong Tam II.

At left is the tent city of Dong Tam II. At the site of Dong Tam I, below, houses are built and gardens are planted.



LAND DEVELOPMENT IN LONG KHANH

for the refugees. Implementation of the program has been slow, but since late September progress has been steady. Approximately 300,000 refugees residing in camps in eight provinces have received prepared bulgur and/or prepared CSM and bread.

Chieu Hoi

Since the inception of the Chieu Hoi program in CY 1963, more than 200,000 enemy personnel have rallied to the GVN.

The number of returnees totaled approximately 10,000 in CY 1972. This returnee rate, however, is lower than the three previous years (47,000 in 1969, 33,000 in 1970 and 20,000 in 1971). While the decline resulted partially from the NVA invasion, the ARVN counter-offensive operations into areas temporarily occupied by the enemy stimulated the returnee rates late in the year. The previous ratio of one former political cadre for each two former military personnel has improved to the current one-to-one ratio.

An encouraging indicator today is that the Hoi Chanh (returnees) are more willing to discuss enemy activities and to provide military information than they were in the past. The Hoi Chanh have proved to be valuable assets to the GVN, and they have actively engaged in promoting GVN efforts through special lecture programs. Working as armed propaganda teams, the Hoi Chanh have also been used effectively against the VC infrastructure.

The Chieu Hoi rate as of 7 February (11,026) includes 10,973 Southern-born Viet Cong Prisoners-of-War who were authorized by President Thieu on 27 January 1973, immediately prior to cease-fire in Vietnam, to be converted to Hoi Chanh status. The remaining 57 regular Hoi Chanh represent the smallest returnee total since TET 1972 when only 47 returnees rallied. When the POW Hoi Chanh are not considered, all Military Regions experienced a sharp decline in Hoi Chanh.

Research and Analysis

When the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support was formed on 28 May 1967, the Reports and Analysis Division was established. In 1968, the name was changed to Operations and Analysis Division. At that time, the division included a Systems Analysis Branch, a Systems Development Branch, and an Operational Reporting Branch.

In August 1971, MACV staff elements were redesignated directorates, and what had started as the Reports and Analysis Division became the Office of the Associate Director, CORDS, for Research and Analysis (CORDS-RA). The functions performed by CORDS-RA fall into two distinct, though not always separable categories. First, CORDS-RA develops, maintains, and operates CORDS ADP software management information systems. Second, CORDS-RA analyzes data; prepares studies, fact sheets, and reports; presents briefings; and provides information to other staff and field elements. The functions are as follows:

1. Operates the CORDS Management Information system.
2. Develops and operates automatic data processing (ADP) systems in support of CORDS and GVN community defense and local development objectives.
3. Controls CORDS field reporting.
4. Analyzes reports to provide quantitative and qualitative measurement of community defense and local development progress.
5. Analyzes the dynamics of the community defense and local development process to define problems and recommend solutions.
6. Advises and assists the GVN Central Pacification and Development Council on matters pertaining to measurement of pacification progress.



Young people from Binh Dinh Province are shown participating in a folk dancing class which was a part of the province's leadership training course for refugee youth conducted 21-26 November 1972 at the Phu Tai Refugee Center.

CADRE ORGANIZE CAMP FOR KIEN PHONG YOUTH

The RD Cadre group in Kien Phong Province organized a youth camp recently. Right photo shows the Hong Ngu district group. On next page (upper photo) little girls dress as North, Central, and South Vietnamese during cultural night. Extreme right, every Cadreman pitches in to prepare the camp.





7. Advises and assists the Office of the Prime Minister in the establishment of the GVN Computer Center.

8. Provides staff support services to CORDS agencies relating to ADP, reports, graphics, and briefings.

Research and Analysis is organized into the Office of the Associate Director, the Plans and Requirements Staff, the Technical Services Staff, the Admin Support Staff, the ADP Operations Division, and the Analysis Division.

Territorial Security

On 7 October 1967 CORDS assumed the responsibility of exercising overall staff monitorship for the Regional Force and Popular Force Advisory Group (sometimes referred to as the RF/PF Directorate) of the MACV Field Advisory Elements on all matters related to the pacification effort. The RF/PF Advisory Group later came under direct staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS and on 16 April 1968 MACV requested a change to the Joint Table of Distribution to officially transfer the responsibility. The RF/PF Advisory Group was made an integral part of the CORDS staff and renamed the RF/PF Division. The division performed essentially the same functions as the RF/PF Advisory Group. Colonel C. R. Truman, the Chief of the Advisory Group at the time of transfer of personnel and responsibilities, became the first Chief of the RF/PF Division under the AC of S, CORDS.

The RF/PF Division was authorized 23 officers and 10 enlisted men and organized with three subordinate branches; the Administrative Branch, the RF/PF Inspection Branch and the Self Coordination Branch. The Division's responsibilities included staff supervision for RF/PF employment and utilization; providing recommended geographic distribution of the RF and PF for support of the pacification effort; monitoring the effectiveness of RF and PF units in accomplishing pacification tasks by means of inspections and staff visits to the field; providing US representation on combined

MACV-Vietnamese RF/PF inspection teams; and providing advisory assistance to the RVNAF Joint General Staff in matters pertaining to the employment and utilization of RF and PF. The primary counterpart agencies of the RF/PF Division were the RF/PF Studies Department and the RF/PF Inspection Department in the office of the Vice Chief JCS (concurrently RF/PF Commander).

During a March-April 1969 realignment of manpower authorizations within CORDS the RF/PF Division was increased in authorizations and renamed the Territorial Security Directorate (TSD). The Directorate received an additional responsibility to advise and assist the GVN implementation of the People's Self Defense Force. Internal organization of TSD was in three primary divisions: the RF/PF Division, the People's Self Defense Force Division and the Inspection Advisory Division. In addition to those responsibilities listed for the original RF/PF Division, the TSD advised and assisted the GVN Ministry of Interior (MOI) relative to the People's Self Defense Forces.

During the last quarter of 1970 MACV transferred responsibility for inspections from MACCORDS to MACIG. This eliminated the Inspection Advisory Division. However, DEPCOMUSMACV acknowledged that MACCORDS would require additional space authorizations to perform those functions not related to inspection, such as staff visits for program evaluation, advice, assistance and reporting. TSD formed an interim division, called the Field Operations Division (FOD), and continued to maintain field liaison responsibilities. During April 1971 a realignment of responsibilities occurred within CORDS and the Territorial Security Directorate assumed responsibility for youth affairs from the War Victims Directorate. The Field Operations Division and transfer of youth affairs to TSD were officially sanctioned by June 1971 CORDS Joint Table of Distribution. The functions of the Directorate after this realignment included advising and assisting the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Joint General Staff relative to the Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF); the GVN Ministry of Interior relative to People's Self

Defense Forces; and the GVN Prime Minister's Office relative to youth affairs. The Directorate also developed and recommended policies and programs on the employment of the RF, PF and PSDF and evaluated the effectiveness of RF, PF and PSDF units/elements and programs as well as youth activities.

Under the auspices of the Combined Improvement Committee (formed in September 1969) TSD was responsible for advice to points of contact in all J4, J5, IG, Central Training Command and Central Logistics Command. In mid 1970 the Vietnamese separate command line for Regional and Popular Forces was eliminated and RF and PF staff functions were merged with the ARVN/JGS staff elements. The Pacification and Development Division of J3/JGS became the primary staff section concerned with RF/PF organization, employment and operations. The Chief of the Pacification and Development Division also became the Co-Chairman of the Central RF/PF Improvement Executive Committee. The Director of TSD was already the US Co-Chairman of the Executive Committee. Without the separate command line for territorial forces, the Central RF/PF Improvement Committee became the focal point at the National level for all territorial force matters. The Pacification and Development Division became TSD's primary counterpart agency at the JGS.

In May 1972 the Territorial Security Directorate became an Associate Directorate in a major revision of all staff offices within MACV Headquarters. Responsibilities of the Associate Directorate for Territorial Security remained the same as before the name change.

During 1972 as US troop withdrawals continued Territorial Security manpower authorizations were decreased and on 1 December Field Operations Division was inactivated and its functions were merged into the two branches (Management and Development Branch and Operational Reports and Analysis Branch) of the RF/PF Division. From December 1972 until the Associate Directorate was disestablished during the final ceasefire phase-out in February 1973, the Associate Directorate continued its advisory efforts relative to RF, PF, PSDF and youth affairs.

Management Support

The Management Support Division, as it was then called, was formed in December 1966 simultaneously with the creation of the Office of Civil Operations --one of CORDS' immediate predecessor organizations.

From the beginning Management Support was organized to provide a broad range of administrative support services to a nation-wide field organization--personnel administration, manpower control, airlift support, field desk liaison, telecommunications and general services.

When CORDS was established in May 1967, combining OCO and the MACV Revolutionary Support Directorate, Management Support passed intact into CORDS. Under CORDS an additional responsibility, that of an advisory role to the GVN Central Logistics Agency, was added.

In the fall of 1969 the logistics advisory and personnel administration functions were transferred to USAID and to other MACV staff elements. Management Support, however, continued to provide administrative services, manpower management, contract airlift, field support liaison and other services.

With the end of CORDS, Management Support will acquire a new parent Headquarters -- the Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations. Though the MS American Staff will be greatly reduced in the new Headquarters, essential administrative services to the field and to Saigon, including airlift support, field desk liaison and field support, will still be carried out through the Vietnamese Staff and the remaining Americans.

Plans, Policies, & Programs

Over the years since the CORDS organization in its present form was initiated, Plans, Policies and Programs has played key roles --

-- In coordinating the many and diverse programs and functions of the CORDS enterprise -- in this

role, acting as the executive arm of the office of the Director;

-- In advising and assisting the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC/CC) and other GVN agencies, and concepts. In this area, the major achievements were the development of the first comprehensive one-year plans for 1970 and 1971, and the first four-year Community Defense and Local Development Plan, 1972 - 1975. The latter constitutes a milestone both in the advisory effort and in the Vietnamization of the major areas represented -- self-defense, self-government, and self-development.

-- In devising, coordinating, and implementing innumerable MACV, CORDS, and other plans culminating in the final plans to effect a smooth transition from the CORDS organization to the new civilian structure to be directed from Embassy level by Mr. George Jacobson as the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations.

-- In the area of programming, determining MACCORDS dollar and piaster requirements, conducting negotiations with USAID and the GVN on resource levels and managing a variety of funds provided from State, AID, DOD and the GVN.

The financing of MACCORDS has been a unique and complex experience in the foreign aid field. As might be expected the diversity of funding sources and budget disciplines/cycles and US and GVN organizations involved have made the task of orchestrating the provision of financial resources a major endeavor.

Over the six years of MACCORDS' existence, these funds have amounted to \$2.9 billion and VN\$534 billion and have financed pacification programs in both the civil and military sectors. In addition to performing MACCORDS' programming functions, PPP has advised the Director of CORDS in his capacity as the Program Director of the AID/DOD Realignment Program. DOD funds under this program amounted to \$29 million in FY 73.

LIFE WITH CORDS

I am a Newsletter, exactly five years old this month. I first appeared as a Ditto publication in February 1968 and metamorphosed into a Gestefax mimeograph paper on stencils ordered from Manila.


Retired USAF Col. Claude E. Tabor, then Self Help Branch Chief of New Life Development, gave the go-signal to print both editions without previous clearance. My future as a budding journal was bleak.

Ambassador Robert W. Komer, DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS, upon getting a copy of the LINK (as I was then known) wrote on 4 April 1968: "I like the idea of your LINK Newsletter..."

On 6 June 1968, RWK sent down another flagnote: "This is good stuff..."

On 12 June 1968, my readership and I were titillated by still another RWK message:

"I have been following with great interest the development of LINK as an extension beyond bags of cement and sheets of roofing. It extends to the larger problems of creating an environment for social, political, and economic growth in the hamlets and villages of Vietnam. This is what community development is all about. The results we are getting are directly attributable to the understanding that our approach must be both catholic and integral. We must blend technical expertise with an awareness of human nature. CORDS CDOs have shown this sensitivity, and it is such sensitivity that makes for an effective advisor. Let me congratulate



The reactions
that confirmed
my being...

late all of the Self Help advisors on the esprit de corps that is evident in the LINK."

My existence was confirmed. To make it official we carried a rejoinder in the next issue: "Authorized unofficial publication...opinions of the writers and editors do not necessarily reflect a U.S. government position..."

I was definitely in. However, when traveling to the field, I was occasionally mistaken for the Protestant LINK publication, and field advisors, not wanting to be irreverent, treated my editor with ecclesiastical consideration.

I was then introduced to JUSPAO for a more sophisticated makeup and format. I only ran 1,000 copies as a monthly newsmagazine. Though competing with hundreds of other mass publications, I managed to get JUSPAO's attention, JUSPAO perhaps being amused by an overzealous and temerarious upstart. And being only the reincarnation of CDOs' LINK in the Philippines which became the "missing link" when I was transplanted on Vietnam's Heidelberg presses, I never had it so good.

In April 1970, Community Development Directorate fancied me and transformed me into the Directorate Newsmagazine now with international mailing list: the Americas, Canada, the Philippines, Australia, Malaysia, and the Middle East.

In August 1971, we found a taskmaster: a purposeful, hard-driving director and ex-newsman Bob Craig who converted me into a weekly newsletter printed in less than two days. The idea was to bring detailed tidings such as GVN activities, down to district level less than a week after they happened. I started carrying more pictures. I had the ZOOM IN pictorial centerfold and acquired photographer Craig as a bonus who kept me supplied with exclusives.

To continuously serve the field advisors efficiently my workhorses went out of their way to person-

A composite shot
of my issues...



ally handcarry press-ready as well as the already printed copies to and from the TPB shop near Tan Son Nhut (not that they did not trust the courier), packed issues off direct to the mailbags soon to be rushed to waiting planes (not that they distrusted the sense of urgency of Miss Bailey's girls) and other such time-saving efforts. TPB's Win Robbins also did many things to put me to bed and out of it on schedule.

On 16 August 1972, CORDS Director Norman Sweet converted me into the CORDS NEWSLETTER.

Only two months ago, ex-newsman and one-time NEWSWEEK correspondent Bob Pierson found an outlet for his passion and nostalgia for newspapering (like Bob Craig) and took an active role in my policy management.

Bob Pierson learned while on leave last December that copies of the CORDS NEWSLETTER sent to AID Washington go to the White House staff.

CORDS bows out. It served its purpose well. And I suppose, I too have done my bit...

Quo vadis, link?

The CORDS NEWSLETTER is an authorized unofficial publication published every Wednesday for the Director, CORDS, by the Office of the Associate Director, CORDS, for COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, in the interests of CORDS advisors. Opinions expressed by the publisher and writers are their own and are not to be considered an official expression by the Department of Defense unless otherwise qualified. Editorial offices at Room 314, CORDS, 32 Ngo Thai Nhien Street, Saigon.

EDITORIAL STAFF

Associate Editors

CAROL H. STEELE, War Victims; FRANCIS M. ROTHWELL, Chieu Hoi, CPT STEPHEN COAKLEY, Management Support; MAJ THOMAS RUSSELL and GEORGE GILMORE, Plans, Policies and Programs; SAMUEL PESACRETA, Public Safety; MAJ DONALD W. NORTON, Research and Analysis; M/SGT CLARENCE BALDWIN, Territorial Security. ROBERT C. PIERSON, Editorial Consultant.

IVAR T. GICA....., Editor

PRINTED BY



1973